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Art. I.—THE OLD AND THE NEW WHIGS.

1. *Further Memoirs of the Whig Party, 1807-1821.* By Henry Richard Vassall, third Lord Holland. Edited by Lord Stavordale. London: Murray, 1905.
2. *The Life of Earl Granville, 1815-1891.* By Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice. Two vols. London: Longmans, 1905.
3. *Letters to Ivy from the first Earl of Dudley.* Edited by S. H. Romilly. London: Longmans, 1905.
4. *Private Correspondence of Lord Grey with Lord Holland, 1806-1827.* MS. in possession of his Excellency the present Governor-General of Canada.
5. *The History of Twenty-five Years.* By Sir Spencer Walpole, K.C.B. Vols I, II (1856-1870). London: Longmans, 1904.
6. *A History of Modern England.* By Herbert Paul. Vols I-IV. London: Macmillan, 1904-5.

THE conduct of political affairs by human agents and means has never yet achieved complete success; nor have we any reason to suppose that the future will exhibit any greater perfection. Motives will be mixed, means will be various, and results will be disappointing, to the end of the chapter. The world will never be without examples of the 'little wisdom' with which it is governed. The claim, therefore, of any special set of men, inspired, or at least influenced, by a special body of opinion, to have contributed exclusively to the advancement of the liberty and the happiness of mankind, must always be liable to dispute. In the court of history the other side will demand to be heard.

Such an exclusive claim has, however, been maintained
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for more than a century by men not wanting in genius, in skill, or in patriotism. Charles Fox embodied that claim in eloquent speeches and an aggressive public career. Macaulay set it forth in essays and a history from which two generations have drawn their inspiration. Lord Holland maintained it in Memoirs which have been accepted with something like reverence. The 'Lives' of many Liberal leaders, Melbourne, Mackintosh, Russell, and Gladstone, for example, have carried on the tradition. Quite recently the biography of Lord Granville has arrived to supplement and to revive the earlier beliefs; and several historians, whose works we have taken as a topic, have gathered up in one loud song of praise the voices of the Liberal school. The popularity and influence of such a literature, written at times with brilliancy and always with enthusiasm, is not difficult to understand. Nevertheless it exhibits as a whole, when critically examined, no little rashness of statement and looseness as to particulars; while its general conclusions regarding the supposed monopoly of the Liberal party as champions of political progress will not bear a moment's serious and impartial enquiry.

The books which we have placed at the head of this article throw an interesting light on the devious track of political development during the greater part of the last century. They display the doubts, the hesitations, the timorous advances, the reckless 'leaps in the dark,' which have marked the path of Liberal politicians. They show some, at least, of the influences which have led to momentous change, and of the motives, sometimes no doubt generous and patriotic, but sometimes selfish or merely factious, that have forced Liberal statesmen to take steps which in their hearts they condemned. They prove, rather by their omissions than their statements, how much of the legislation that has been beneficial was not the work of the Liberal party at all. They enable us to trace the processes by which the Old Whigs—to apply Burke's phrase to other conditions—were metamorphosed into the New, and by which these again have gradually been merged into the Liberals, or rather Radicals, of the present day. They warn us, lastly, of the transitoriness of political power, the oscillations of the popular mind; they tell how parties rise and fall; and, even in the present

depressed condition of the Conservative party, they shed a ray of hope, for they indicate what has happened before to overpowering majorities, and may soon happen again.

To take this last point first. Between the accession of George I and that of George III there was a period during which all hopes based on anything that could be called Tory principles seemed for ever extinguished. Two rebellions had made Toryism, apart from other causes, akin to treason. The prison and the scaffold were convincing arguments of its wickedness or of its unwisdom. The avenues to power, honour, preferment, or even employment, were closed to all but Whigs. The King was king of a party; and, however much he might at times resent the too obvious confinement in which his 'loyal' ministers kept him, it was essential to the maintenance of the dynasty that the gilded chains should be patiently worn. A Whig monarch, ruled by Whig ministers, reigned over a seemingly Whig nation. Yet in 1760 Toryism began to recover; and from 1770 to 1830 it was, with short intervals, the dominant force in national politics.

Again, in 1830, after the resignation of Wellington, there seemed to be an end to that period of Tory rule which had lasted, with but a short break in 1806, since the general election of 1784. The parliamentary struggles of 1831 might well appear to be the last efforts of a doomed party and of expiring principles. The changes of 1832 committed the control of affairs, not merely to new men, but to a new set of political principles. The elections of 1833 resulted in an overwhelming victory for that new Liberalism, which was composed of advanced Whigs and advancing Radicals, in alliance, though not always in accord. The Conservative party in the House of Commons numbered ten less than it can count to-day. In the new Parliament 509 Liberals faced 149 Tories; and, as a force in the State, the latter seemed extinct. Yet in two years the triumphant party was in a state of dissolution; a provisional Ministry under Melbourne only prolonged the process of disintegration; and the country, which so recently had screamed itself hoarse for Reform, was in rebellion against the Reformers. The Tory party had revived. Lord Melbourne's second Administration (1835-41) exhibited a descending scale of popularity. Public opinion out of doors, as is usually the case, moved

faster than in Parliament; and in 1841, eight years after the disaster of 1833, the Tories had a majority of seventy-two in the Lords and ninety-one in the Commons. 'There are no "nevers" in politics,' as Disraeli said. The party which was supposed to be dead, and to have had before its death nothing worth living for, took on a new lease of life; nay, more, it displayed its inherent vitality, not indeed by adopting new principles, but by adapting the old to new political and social conditions.

The causes and occasions of these remarkable shiftings of scenes on the political stage are by no means mysterious. In the earlier period (1770-1830) we may attribute the long duration of Tory power and Whig exclusion mainly to foreign politics. The power of 'thinking Imperially,' though a leading statesman of our day imagined it to be dead, has in reality always been a characteristic of the British nation. The conduct of the Whigs in regard to the American Rebellion had left them in bad odour with the people. Their attitude towards the French Revolution and the struggle with Napoleon confirmed the impression—which has not been removed by events later in date—that they were generally to be found supporting the enemies of their country abroad and those of its integrity at home. That, in such conditions, Pitt, Addington, Portland, Perceval, and Liverpool, should have succeeded each other in a long line of administrations from 1784 to 1827 is not surprising.

In the period after 1830 the failure of the Liberal party to maintain its predominance was due to a variety of causes. Foreign politics played a part here also. The contrast with the Tories was familiar to the public. They had in 1815 ended a prolonged war by a treaty which, whatever objections may be raised to it, secured to us for ever some of our greatest conquests. They had manfully fought out the battle in the Colonies for the integrity of the Empire. They had stemmed the Revolution, driven the French out of Spain, and finally overthrown the greatest warrior and despot of modern times. They had, by wise and successful diplomacy, checked the dangerous westward advance of Russia and established a balance of power in Europe. They had enlarged the boundaries of our Indian Empire and had organised in that country a system of beneficent administration. Though such

achievements, as we have recently seen, are apt to be forgotten for a time, the recollection of them recurs.

The policy of the Whigs had been, during this period, a policy of renunciation and despair, of alternate shouting and shuffling. America must be given up; the Revolution must be allowed to run its course; Napoleon must be allowed his own way; peace must be obtained at any price; the army must be withdrawn from the Peninsula. There must be no annexations in India, even for the purposes of peace and good government. The captive Emperor must be allowed to roam at large in St Helena at the risk of his escape and all that it might imply.

Whig foreign policy maintained a similar character during the generation which followed the Reform Bill of 1832. When in power—and it was in power for the greater part of thirty-five years—it was, to quote Lord Salisbury's words in this Review, 'a portentous mixture of bounce and baseness; dashing, exacting, dauntless to the weak, and timid and cringing to the strong.' He shows how Brazil was bullied on account of the escapades of a couple of midshipmen; how Japan was punished by the burning of Kagoshima for an offence for which there was no remedy; how Denmark was encouraged and betrayed, and France disgusted alike at the encouragement and the betrayal. It is not necessary for us to go over ground that the recently published volumes of Lord Salisbury's essays have made familiar. Nor is it necessary at this point to do more than refer to the singular exhibitions of Liberal policy which serenely contemplated the abandonment of the Colonies; which subsequently proposed disruption of the United Kingdom as the only cure for disaffection; and which accepted as final and conclusive a series of reverses in South Africa, the Sudan, and Afghanistan. This accumulation of treacheries to the national cause, in addition to the dangerous character of much of their domestic legislation, accounts for the general mistrust which in 1886 drove the Liberals from power and revived the popularity of their opponents for a period of twenty years.

If, in the realm of foreign policy, the Whig and Liberal record was unsatisfactory, history could recall many departures in domestic affairs from the principles of liberalism; and their claim to a monopoly, or even to a

consistent advocacy, of reform principles is seen to have but a feeble foundation. For twenty years after the Act of 1832 the Liberals showed no great enthusiasm for further parliamentary reform; they 'back recoiled, they knew not why, even from the sound themselves had made.' Household suffrage, triennial parliaments, the ballot, the charter, were now dangerous and unholy things. In 1852, after nearly shattering the Cabinet in its production, a Bill was introduced; but, after the dismissal of Palmerston and the failure of Lord John Russell to gather in from the highways and byways of politics supporters for his measure, the Government fell under the revengeful axe of Palmerston. In 1854 another almost disastrous effort was made and withdrawn. 'Lord Aberdeen,' said Lord John in a letter to the Queen, 'was the only person who behaved with a due regard to the honour of the Administration.' Disraeli's Bill of 1859 was opposed alike by old Whigs and new Radicals. The Liberal Bill of 1866 was a reluctant measure. In opposing Disraeli's Bill of 1867 the Liberals were so divided that Gladstone threatened to resign his leadership; and the dissidents were scolded into submission by Bright. Molesworth, a Liberal historian, is frank enough with his friends to say (iii, 429) :—

'When we consider the manner in which this question had been dealt with over and over again, we are forced to the conclusion that many of those who had obtained their seats in the House of Commons by professing zeal for reform were in reality its worst enemies, and were secretly using all their influence to prevent the enactment of a really efficient measure.'

A measure sufficiently efficient for its purpose was carried however, by the Conservatives, and so satisfied the wishes of the country that it remained the law of the land till 1884—a satisfactory proof that Tory or Conservative practical wisdom was preferable in the mind of the public to insincere theories on the part of the Liberals.

There were other reasons, more within the knowledge and experience of the general public, for the depression of Whig and Liberal securities and the rise of Tory and Conservative stock. Side by side with the Whig party as it made progress into liberalism there walked the

threatening spectre of radicalism. The alliance of Whigs and Radicals began early—so early, we may say, as the reign of Charles I. It emerged again in 1679 in the struggle over the Exclusion Bill. It reappeared in the long conflict between Pitt and Fox. The agitation for the Reform Bill of 1832 brought the Radicals once more to the front. It was their activity during many years that ripened the cause. But the Whigs, who had evolved them, now gave them the cold shoulder. Fox in his day had countenanced them, but his friends and their successors were less benevolent. Grey and Tierney treated them with lofty contempt, though Romilly, Brougham, and Russell were occasionally willing to serve as cautious connecting links. Lord Holland extended to them a grudging toleration. Referring to Cobbett, he says:—

‘His objects were the co-operation of the Whigs in public meetings for a change of Ministry, and their protection and countenance if he wrote in their favour. In such objects, I told him, the Whigs could not but concur, but I avoided all appearance of any closer connection.’

The virtuous conclusion is hardly consistent with the immoral concurrence, but it illustrates vividly the relations that existed between the parties. The Radicals were to shout when the Whigs cheered, and the latter were to ‘protect and countenance’ their chorus; but, when the Whigs wanted to do nothing, there was to be no inconvenient enthusiasm, and no visits were to be paid except after dark. This humorous situation was renewed during the last half-century, when Gladstone was not unfrequently driven to his wits’ end to explain away his Brights, his Morleys, and his Chamberlains.

The passing of the Reform Bill by no means cemented the alliance. The Radicals were still regarded as mere guerrillas by the regular troops; and the Radicals, on occasion, denounced their patrons with brutal frankness. ‘The professing, the noisy, the clamorous, the disgusting Whigs,’ Cobbett calls them. Place, Hunt, Hume, Bentham, and Cobden, all denounced them at various times. ‘That the Whigs as a party’ (says Roebuck in his ‘History of the Whig Ministry’) ‘sought more than their own party advantage, I see no reason to believe.’ The quarrels of the two sections were amusingly reproduced in their own

domestic dissensions. Hume and Roebuck, Place and Grote, Byng and Wakley, Mill and Buller, exhausted the riches of the language in abusing each other. 'I am heartily sick of my friends,' said Roebuck. John Stuart Mill was as frank as the situation demanded.

'I have little hope' (he said) 'of any of the present race of parliamentary Radicals. Some of them are full of crotchets; others fastidious and overloaded with petty scrupulosity; none have energy except Roebuck and Buller; Roebuck has no judgment, Buller no patient persevering industry.'

Nevertheless the day when the Radicals would prevail was rapidly approaching. Peelites and Canningites became Liberals in vain; the dwindling of the original elements was continuous. Even the Chartist rising—the exasperated expression of Radical discontent, replied to by Lord John Russell with troops and guns—was but an episode, and its failure did not prevent the onward pressure of radicalism. Lord Durham was the first of the Radicals to break through the hedge of Whig exclusiveness. He was made Lord Privy Seal in 1830, and Radical hopes became centred upon him. But he was sent to Canada in 1838 to get rid of him; he was abandoned in Parliament by his friends for his ungentle treatment of the 'friends of liberty' in the colony; he resigned in disgust and died in retirement. Molesworth broke through in 1848 and in 1855, and might have had a career; but an early death cut short his hopes.

Meantime the Manchester school was rising into prominence, more educated, more sane, more systematic than the Radicals of an earlier period. The old school had chiefly occupied itself in denouncing the balance of power, foreign intervention, large votes for defence, the 'bloated armaments' of the navy, the holding of Gibraltar, the maintenance of colonies, the existence of the Lords, and the privileges of landowners. The new school was mainly animated by a passion for political economy, but the methods of agitation were much the same as of old. The repeal of the Corn Laws opened wide the doors of promotion for the long-excluded Radicals. Cobden was offered office by Palmerston in 1859, but refused. The correspondence is amusing. 'Mr Milner Gibson,' said Lord Palmerston, 'has most handsomely consented to waive

all former difficulties' (i.e. to abandon his hostility to Lord Palmerston's policy); 'I am most exceedingly anxious that you should consent to adopt the same line' (i.e. to exhibit an equal pliancy). But Cobden did not see his way. Lord John Russell was tactful enough to tell him he would have preferred Bright, but that Cobden would do in the meantime. Even this was not convincing. Cobden was forced to tell Lord Palmerston that he had been opposed to his foreign policy for twenty years, and was opposed to it still; and, as that policy was not likely to be changed, he could not consent to join the Administration. It was not till 1868 that Bright was induced to join the Government. In 1880 the barriers were finally broken down; the Radical flood poured in; and an absorption of Whiggism in Radicalism took place, the results of which have recently been made only too clear.

Over the new alliance, however, there hung the shadow of discord. The history of the Franchise and Redistribution Bills of 1884-5 brought to light some of these differences. Other discords, revealing other weaknesses in the Liberal Administration, followed fast. With Ireland the Liberals had played fast and loose for generations; but now the Irish members pressed forward for action. The disendowment of the Irish Church in 1869, however necessary it may have been, was but an encouragement to agitation in other directions. If the Church could be so readily disposed of, the landlords were unlikely to be able to resist attack. The Land Bill of 1870 did not satisfy the demands of the Irish members; and the Land League, with its various developments, leaped into being. It was met by coercion maladministered, followed by vain efforts at conciliation. Unchecked terrorism had produced the requisite conviction in the ministerial mind; the Home Rule Bills were successively introduced. One was accepted by reluctant Liberals because it promised to get rid of the Irish members at Westminster. The other was accepted in the hope that the House of Lords would reject it. Meantime a section of the Liberals, ably led and endowed with a high degree of firmness, had imitated their predecessors of an earlier age who rallied to the side of Pitt, and had joined with the Conservatives to save the United Kingdom from disruption. This Unionist alliance was one of the most creditable and memorable events in the

parliamentary history of Great Britain. That it should have been temporarily disturbed by the fiscal controversy is much to be regretted. Its powers for good are not however exhausted; wisdom and patriotism alike forbid its dissolution.

The period and the events which we have sketched are covered by the volumes which we have placed at the head of this article, and to which more particular reference may now be made. The name and fame of Lord Holland form part of our modern history, and are an endowment which any nation might prize. Lord Stavordale, who has already enriched our biographical literature by publishing the 'Life and Letters of Lady Sarah Lennox,' has an additional claim on our thanks for editing the 'Further Memoirs of the Whig Party,' by Lord Holland. The new volume supplements the volumes published in 1852 and 1854 by Lord Holland, as well as the 'Opinions of Lord Holland,' published in 1841, and the 'Foreign Reminiscences,' published in 1850. There is now a high degree of completeness in the record we possess of the constitutional principles which animated Lord Holland and his friends, of their opinions on foreign and domestic policy, and of the influences, political, literary, and social, which spread from Holland House in the eighteenth and the early nineteenth century, influences described with eloquent gratitude by Macaulay, and by no means yet exhausted. Lord Stavordale has accomplished his task with knowledge and discretion.

Several points of interest are revealed in the 'Further Memoirs.' We see, in the first place, the weakness and dissensions of the Whigs from 1807 to 1821, and the failure of the party in its efforts to secure the succession to power, through the expected favour of the Regent, on the lapse of the restrictions placed upon him by the Regency Act. Concerning the weakness and jealousies of the party we need say little. Creevey has made them familiar, and the memoirs published during the past five and twenty years are full of revelations of the personal squabbles to which we have referred. Lord Holland describes (p. 29) the condition of the party in 1809.

'The different sides they espoused proved that no leader had any authority over them; and perhaps the violence of

some and the irresolution of others proved as clearly that not one of them had the qualities requisite to assume it. Mr Ponsonby sunk in the estimation of the party; and the party sunk yet more in the estimation of the public.'

It was under these conditions that the long sustained and all but successful intrigue for office in 1810-12 was maintained by the party. The relation of many of the leading Whigs to the Prince had long been a subject of scandal. Partly from personal liking, partly from a similarity of discreditable tastes, and partly from political forethought, the younger Whigs had made the Prince their leader. They encouraged his extravagance, his vices, and his hostility to his father, in the hope that he would one day reward them with power; and when, in the end, the little share of wisdom that he possessed led him to disappoint them, they joined in a chorus of vituperative condemnation the echoes of which still linger in the literature of the party.

Lord Holland is, on the whole, sufficiently frank about this affair. His remarks on the subject of the intrigue which lasted so long and twice placed office at the disposal of men who had the audacity to consider, but not the wit to accept it, are apt and admirable. Referring to the Regent, he says:—

'His situation as it respected our party was indeed most anomalous. When he avowed any hostility to his ministers, we were bound by the fundamental principles of our party to condemn his conduct as unconstitutional; when he betrayed any approbation of them, we were not backward in stigmatising his conduct as unsteady, insincere, and deceitful to us. Such a state of things could not last; and his cordiality with the Whigs, whether real or affected at the outset, visibly declined during the summer.'

That men of honour and integrity, who entertained such just and correct views of constitutional practice, should at the same time have entered into and continued so long an unscrupulous intrigue for the possession of power, is one of those mysteries of the double action of the human mind about which we feel so much and know so little. History has but one duty, to record and to condemn it. We could wish that Lord Stavordale had done something to bring forward in a more favourable light the career

of Lady Holland in the public affairs of the time. The position she occupies is equivocal; and the bitterness of the language used by Lord Dudley in his 'Letters to Ivy' will contribute to what may be an inimical tradition. The private letters of Lord Grey to Lord Holland, which we have been privileged to read, and which will no doubt some day be published, give us quite another view. That somewhat austere statesman, as well as Lady Grey, remained always on terms of affectionate friendship with Lady Holland; and she was constantly kept informed of Lord Grey's views on the most important questions of the time. This is high testimony to Lady Holland's capacity.

The type of Whiggism represented by Lord Holland from 1798, when he made his first speech in the Lords, to 1840, when he died, is fairly reproduced in Lord Granville during the long period from 1837 to 1891. There were, of course, differences between them. Times had changed; new questions had arisen; and new political methods prevailed. Lord Holland was born in 1773, and was of an age to have caught from his political and social surroundings the early enthusiasm for change. 'Bliss was it in that dawn to be alive!' sang one of the most notable exponents and victims. It was indeed pleasant enough to attend the circus while the lions were shut in their cages; but, when the cages were opened and the lions let loose, 'freedom' changed to ferocity and scared its admirers away. Lord Holland is quite unable to forgive Wordsworth, Southey, and Coleridge for changing their opinions concerning the Revolution. He calls it a 'sudden apostasy.' But the events which precipitated their conversion were still more sudden and unexpected. These events worked on the mind of Burke and many of the Whigs, as they worked on the minds of Wordsworth and his friends; and no one questions the sincerity of their change. To the last, however, Lord Holland felt it fitting that he should, as the nephew of Fox and a 'Friend of Freedom,' maintain, even though with a smile, the first fine careless rapture of the revolutionary age. It was the fashion of his youth; and he cared not to change it, any more than Chesterfield cared to change the fashion of his hat. 'There it goes again!' cries my Lord March in 'The Virginians,' 'he has never changed the shape of that hat for twenty years!' There

it goes again, we are disposed to laugh, as on page after page we note the gentle, amiable, well-bred depreciation of crowns and monarchs and aristocracies in the *Memoirs* of Lord Holland. It was a harmless foible on his part, but it was at times a fierce and earnest sentiment among many of the party to which he belonged. It kept them long out of office and left them naked to their enemies.

Lord Granville's Whiggism was that of a later age, when the lessons of revolution in practice had been learned by men who had something to lose, and were more bent on staving off revolution by reform than on winning reform by revolution. Lord Grey, with some impulses of vehement impatience, was not a dangerous Radical; and Granville was a pupil of Grey. He was a reformer at school, and a reformer he continued to be, but a reformer who preferred good society. He did not, like Melbourne, seek his political inspirations through the Tom Youngs or the Francis Places. For the Humes, Roebucks, Molesworths of his early days he seems to have had little admiration. He had no disposition to give, as Fox wished to do, 'one good blow at prerogative.' Indeed, for prerogative he had so high a respect that he ventured to accept, in 1851, the Foreign Secretaryship on the removal of Palmerston, who had braved prerogative and been beaten. He was willing to take things as they came; to 'let it alone,' like Melbourne, when there was no occasion to be fussy; and to excite himself gently to the required pitch of devotional fervour when Gladstone's inspirations required a sacrifice. Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice's admirably planned and finely sustained narrative reveals to us from time to time that these sacrifices were many. He was condemned by circumstances to be the feather-bed betwixt the castle wall of Russell and the cannon-ball of Palmerston, and was solemnly told, when he interfered for the sake of agreement, that he was 'incapable of realising the depth of the cunning of his friend George Villiers.' Blessed are the peacemakers!

Through the pages of Lord Granville's 'Life' there runs a curious stream of involuntary evidence of the somewhat clammy relations which really existed between Russell and Granville. In 1856 Lord Granville writes in his diary: 'I walked home with Lord John. He was

half-querulous and half-friendly.' This mental mood is characteristic of Lord John from beginning to end. In 1846 he could only find it in his heart to offer Granville the Buckhounds. It is probable that Lord John was only 'half-querulous and half-friendly' with Granville for having induced him to accept office under Lord Aberdeen in 1852, when Lord John was privately of opinion that the firm ought to have been Russell and Aberdeen, not Aberdeen and Russell. Granville was only allowed the Presidency of Council. In 1854 Lord John, in his zeal for administrative reform, obligingly requested Granville to take the Chancellorship of the Duchy in order to enable the Premier to become President of Council. In 1855, when he was attempting to form an Administration, Lord John was tactful enough to intimate to Lord Granville that he could not yet see his way to make him President again.

In 1859, when Lord Granville was called on by the Queen to form an Administration, he found Lord John's molluscous hostility an insuperable difficulty. Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice's account of this negotiation (the correspondence of which had already appeared in Mr Walpole's 'Life of Lord John Russell') is marked by a reserve which shows generosity towards Lord John, but not, perhaps, the full extent of his information. Lord Clarendon pointed out to Lord Granville ('Life,' i, 335) that both Palmerston and Russell were, in their hearts, 'deeply mortified at not having been sent for by the Queen,' and that, sooner or later, they would make common cause against him. Lord John, in his letter of June 12, 1859 (i, 337), clearly equivocates:—

'With Palmerston I could only have to consider who is to have the first and who the second office in the State. With you I could only occupy the third, and should not feel that I had sufficient security either on foreign affairs or on Reform.'

Yet, in 1852, when Lord Granville had been at the Foreign Office only a few months, Russell had spoken of him as 'one of the best Foreign Secretaries the country ever had'; and, as to reform, Lord John had not been so very anxious about it previously. The querulousness is more obvious than the friendliness; and the veracity is not obtrusive.

There are signs of distrust in Lord John's straight-

forwardness on other occasions. Thus, in regard to Italy in 1859, the Prince Consort writes to Lord Granville :—

'Has the Queen's letter to Lord John, in answer to his proposal to lend "the moral support of England to the Emperor Napoleon at Verona," been read to the Cabinet? Lord John promised it should be, but we do not know whether it was' (i, 349).

Lord Granville was aware that this was not a letter which he should have received. He was not the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and he pointed out this fact to the Prince in reply. But, at the same time, he consented, in view of the gravity of the crisis, to communicate with the Court behind the backs of his colleagues. It was a rather dangerous experiment, though nothing disastrous came of it. His advice to the Queen on the occasion reveals a curious state of things.

'It is very desirable, as regards Lords Palmerston and John Russell, that the Queen should show as much kindness as possible to the latter, and *appear* to communicate frankly with the former' (i, 352).

It is clear that Cabinet government could not long continue in such circumstances.

Lord Granville makes up for his public defence of his contentious colleagues by private comments to his friends. Thus, to Lord Canning, on August 23, 1859 (i, 355), Lord Granville writes concerning Lord John: 'His misfortune is that he is always dying to connect his name with something'; and to the Duke of Argyll, a day or two later, he writes that Lord John in council 'equivocated immensely.' The relations of the Queen with the Cabinet, and of the members of the Cabinet with each other, were strained to the utmost. The Queen had no confidence either in Palmerston or in Russell; the latter talked about the Queen's making them 'live under a despotism.' Palmerston wanted the Cabinet to give him larger powers during the recess, 'which was met by a general assurance of readiness to come up by night trains.' The troubles of the two leaders probably gave Lord Granville some moments of not unnatural amusement. They had offered him up as a sacrifice to their own rivalry; and the sacrifice had been in vain.

Lord Granville's capacity for self-effacement had many opportunities of exercise during the Gladstone Administrations of 1868-74 and 1880-5. Circumstances made him the patron of unpopular policies. In the Lords he had to introduce the Irish Church Bill in 1869, and the Irish Land Act of 1870. He was forced to submit to the action of Russia in tearing up the Black Sea treaty, and to a convention on the subject in which Russia's practical triumph was 'a foregone conclusion.' He was largely responsible for the conduct of the 'Alabama' negotiations. He had to acquiesce in Russia's advances in Central Asia in spite of his formal protests. He took his part in the vacillations and procrastinations which permitted Germany to get a firm foothold in West Africa. He had to bear his share of responsibility for the surrender after Majuba, and to face the storm aroused by the death of Gordon. That he fought the battles of his party with a high degree of courage, and bore the brunt of severe criticism with cheery philosophy, is proof of an unusually amiable disposition. Had he been more self-assertive, he might have stood higher in the roll of statesmen; and the Liberals in the Lords would on more than one occasion have lacked a leader.

A considerable part of Lord Granville's career is covered by the two historical works mentioned in our list—Sir Spencer Walpole's 'History of Twenty-five Years,' and the four first volumes of Mr Paul's 'History of Modern England,' beginning in 1846. Sir Spencer Walpole is well known to the world of letters. The six volumes of his 'History of England from 1815-1857' are valuable additions to our historical literature. Written frankly from the Liberal point of view, they are not unduly partisan. They take account, in an unusually full and careful manner, of all the economic conditions of the period, and are, on that account, an invaluable repertory of facts not easily accessible in any other quarter. His recent volumes are marked by equal care in compilation and the same devotion to economic science. We may single out, in particular, the two chapters which relate the story of the American Civil War and the Franco-Prussian conflict as models of condensed and accurate narrative.

Mr Paul appeals to much the same political constituency, but in a somewhat more popular style. His narra-

tive is sparkling, often epigrammatic, sometimes, we must allow, characterised by a journalistic jauntiness hardly in keeping with the dignity of history. It may make for popularity, but not for authority; people may be amused, but are rarely convinced, by epigrams. This is, however, no fatal fault in a work intended for popular reading. If we find exaggeration or misconception in some of the judgments passed, notably in that on Napoleon III, and in some other cases, the work is tolerably free from serious mistakes; there is no bad faith to complain of; and the wells of history are left clear.

Lord Granville's first connexion with Gladstone, who was to influence him so much, was in 1852, when the latter requested him, as Foreign Secretary, to forward, through the channels of the Foreign Office, copies of his pamphlet on 'Neapolitan Persecutions.' Lord Granville cheerfully consented, though he had not read the pamphlet. Lord Aberdeen was opposed to its publication; but Gladstone was not to be restrained. The pamphlet was published, and was circulated through official channels. The object was to procure the liberation of certain Italian State prisoners, especially of Poerio. Mr Paul tells us (i, 232) that 'Mr Gladstone's pamphlet, and Lord Palmerston's adoption of it, had no practical and immediate result. But between them they had given a powerful impetus to the ultimate liberation of Italy.' We may point out, on the contrary, that the pamphlet had a very decided practical effect. It put a sudden end to the negotiations which were amicably going on between Lord Aberdeen and Prince Schwarzenberg for the amelioration of Neapolitan conditions under Austrian influence. Austria was now powerless; the king of Naples was indignant; and the case of the prisoners was worse than before. They would have been liberated. Now they were kept more closely in prison, victims to the injudicious enthusiasm of their friend.

Of this period there is an incident which has often been casually discussed, but calls for more decisive treatment. Lord Malmesbury's 'Memoirs of an ex-Minister' contain a letter from Disraeli to Lord Malmesbury in which, among other things, he says, 'These wretched Colonies will all be independent too in a few years, and

are a millstone round our necks.' These petulant expressions have often been quoted as proof that Disraeli, in subsequent imperialistic speeches, was insincere. To hang so large an accusation on so small a peg shows an obvious desire to have any sort of peg on which to hang it. Mr Sichel, in his enthusiastic and ingenious volume, was the first to challenge the propriety of the accusation. It is necessary to go much farther than even he has gone, even though Mr Paul, who quotes the letter, does not seriously dwell upon it.

In 1852, and for some time before, the affairs of the Colonies had been much disturbed, and public men in England can hardly be blamed for having felt that the Colonies had given just cause for anxiety. There had been war in South Africa; violent anti-British and anti-monarchical agitations in Australia; riots, the burning of the parliament buildings, the mobbing of the Governor-general, and annexation manifestos in Canada. When to these were added fresh complications with the United States and much objectionable correspondence on the part of colonial politicians (to which Lord Glenelg, in a despatch of earlier date, had called special attention), it was not unnatural that statesmen, who could not see into the future, but were distracted by present anxieties and dangers, should in private entertain at times some bitterness of feeling. The Colonies have not always been right, nor have Imperial statesmen been always blunderers. Seventeen years later, with greater knowledge, wider experience, and a more settled policy alike in England and in the Colonies, Lord Granville wrote to Lord John Russell ('Life,' ii, 22) :—

'Theoretically you assume that I wish to get rid of Canada, Australia, and India. Our relations with North America are of a very delicate character. The best solution of them would probably be that, in the course of time and in the most friendly spirit, the Dominion should find itself strong enough to proclaim her independence.'

Opinion has travelled far since that date; but there are still members of the Liberal party whose philosophical temper in discussing the future of the Colonies shows that the passion for retaining them is not strong; and there are still public men in the Colonies whose tone, temper,

and policy indicate a future of anxiety for Imperial statesmen.

There is a curious want of completeness in the accounts given in all these volumes of certain events of historical importance. We have pointed out above that Mr Paul exhibits an undue hostility towards Napoleon III. He adopts the tone of personal hatred of the Emperor which marks Kinglake's *History of the Crimean War*, the narrative of Victor Hugo, and the poetry of Mr Swinburne. He tells us that there is 'happily no English name' for the 'Coup d'État'; though English history is not without precedents for violent revolutions. He calls it 'an infamous crime'—a sweeping moral judgment on a political event which savours of petulant exaggeration. Sir Spencer Walpole is not so uncompromising, either in the sixth volume of his work, in which the event is discussed, or in his later volumes, in which the Emperor's career is narrated. Time has added much to our knowledge. The 'Coup d'État' had become inevitable. The revolution of 1848 had placed France under the rule of men with whom the nation was discontented. They were violent, incapable, and venal; some of them had, for example, charged their personal expenditures to the unaudited accounts of the king. The 'Recollections' of Alexis de Tocqueville—himself a republican—afford us an enlightening view of their sinister characters and their selfish ambitions.

It was over such men as these that Louis Napoleon was called to preside. They watched him with an implacable jealousy: he regarded them with equal suspicion. Beyond all question the nation was with him. He had been twice elected—once by four, and once by six departments—by the combined votes of all classes, social and political. For the presidency, the nation had to choose officially between Louis Napoleon, Cavaignac, Ledru-Rollin, Raspail, and Changarnier. The vote was overwhelmingly for Louis Napoleon over all the others combined. There was never a day from his election till 1851 when the people of France did not expect and desire him to become emperor. The press constantly hinted at it. The troops gave open evidence of their wish for it. Statesmen of all parties, including De Tocqueville, took count of it. Nor was the President wanting in frankness as his struggle with the Assembly proceeded. The dis-

missal of his Ministry in 1849 was the real 'Coup d'État'; the rest was detail. In 1850 he made speeches at Lyons, Rheims, and Caen, openly intimating his determination to appeal for the revision of the Constitution and for his re-election as the sole pledge of peace for France. In 1851 Thiers, in the Assembly, declared 'the Empire is a fact.'

The struggle over the Constitution was mere pretence on the part of the Assembly. The revolutionaries of 1848 had small respect for constitutions. The provisional government was dispersed by the mob. Twice the revolutionaries had proclaimed a dictatorship, under Cavaignac and under Bugeaud. In the autumn of 1851 they were preparing to assert the Constitution by arresting the too popular President. 'It is a toss-up,' said Changarnier, 'who will take the initiative.' The President took it. It was not magnificent, but it was war; and the President won. Mr Paul is frank enough to admit: 'Black as it was, the people of France condoned it. Making all allowance for bribery and intimidation, a majority of seven millions and a half against half a million cannot be explained away.' That being the case, it seems to us useless for people who constantly proclaim the sacredness of majorities—even when, as in this country we see clearly, such majorities are obtained by means which neither honour nor morality can sanction—to heap imprecations on the 'Coup d'État.' What was criminal about it was not the 'Coup d'État' itself, but the massacre on the boulevards. For that deed of blood there was little excuse and no justification. But Mr Paul should discriminate. The Emperor was not our enemy. He lived among us in his youth. We recognised his government; we gave him a royal welcome; we fought as his ally; we gave him an asylum and a grave; his son died in our service; and we owe him at least a benevolent forgetfulness of his failings and a sympathy on his overwhelming misfortune. To consign him without consideration to historical infamy is alike mistaken and unjust.

Mr Paul shows some partiality in discussing an occurrence so important as the Fenian invasion of Canada in 1866, and falls into one serious error. 'The loyalty of Canada,' he says (iii, 22), 'was conclusively demonstrated; and not less conspicuous was the friendly feeling of the United States. The attitude of President

Johnson and his Government was more than diplomatically correct. It was cordial and sympathetic.' How he arrives at this conclusion we are unable to understand. For months previous to the invasion, it was well known to the President and his Cabinet that the Fenians intended mischief on the Canadian border. The newspapers were full of it. The frontier towns swarmed with swaggering volunteers, who met without surveillance and drilled without interruption. Prominent politicians encouraged them. They had even publicly fixed on March 17 as the date of the attack. In vain Canada and the British minister protested; the United States authorities would not move. It was not till after the invaders had crossed the frontier, till blood had been shed and property devastated, that the Washington Government acted. If this was correct and sympathetic conduct, we have to read the words in some non-natural sense. Lord Granville's biography throws no light on the subject, nor does Sir Spencer Walpole discuss it.

Similar incompleteness is noticeable in regard to the accounts of the episode of Maximilian's empire in Mexico and its tragic close. Mr Paul tells us (iii, 116) that 'the sentence [on the Emperor] was legal; and it was too much to expect of President Juarez that he should pardon a foreign usurper who had treated as rebels Mexicans fighting for their independence.' Sir Spencer Walpole hesitates (ii, 98) to call it murder, and thinks that history may 'look upon it as a blunder rather than a crime.' The facts seem quite different in other eyes. The 'Republic' of which Juarez was 'President' was a mere fiction. There was no more a 'government' than there is among the Filipinos, who are still in opposition, in remote regions, to the United States. All the wealth, the education, the character, and sobriety of the country were on the side of Maximilian, who had been adopted as emperor by a gathering quite as legal as the body which recently acclaimed King Hakon of Norway.

A vivid light is thrown on the situation in the letters of the brothers Sherman, published in 1894. General Sherman had been sent into Mexico as escort to a mission to Juarez, when the United States was free to take part in Mexican affairs. General Sherman began his comments before he sailed, 'I feel' (he says in 1866) 'that, if we

cannot be calm and temperate in our country, we have no right to go to Mexico to offer ourselves as their example and special friends.' His brother, Senator Sherman, replies a month later: 'She (Mexico) is terribly in need of a strong government; and, if her mixed population would elect you or some other firm military ruler as emperor or king, it would be lucky for her, but a bad business for the elected one.' General Sherman writes from Santiago, November 7, 1866:—

'We have nearly completed the circle without finding Juarez, who is about as far as ever away, up in Chihuahua, for no other purpose than to be where the devil himself cannot get at him.'

He also says, 'I doubt if Juarez can be made to trust his life and safety to his own countrymen.' His senatorial brother is equally frank.

'On the whole I am not sorry that your mission failed, since the French are leaving; my sympathies are rather with Maximilian. The usual factions of Ortega and Juarez will divide the native population, while Maximilian can have the support of the clergy and property.'

It is obvious that, though the United States felt bound to aid the insurgents and to 'recognise' Juarez, his 'presidency' was looked on as a farce, though, through dilatoriness on the part of the United States, it ended in a melancholy tragedy.

Turning to British affairs, we find in all the volumes mentioned a lack of accurate comment on an event of much moment in Imperial history—the proclamation of the Queen as Empress of India in 1876, and the debates which preceded the measure. No one seems to have noted the remarkable letter which Disraeli wrote to the Queen when the India Bill of 1858 was under discussion.

'It is only the ante-chamber of an Imperial palace; and your Majesty would do well to deign to consider the steps which are now necessary to influence the opinions and affect the imaginations of the Indian populations. The name of your Majesty ought to be impressed on their native life.' ('Life of the Prince Consort,' iv, 233.)

It was not till 1876 that he was in a position to carry that

policy into effect. Mr Paul echoes faintly the opinions of those who denounced the measure of 1876 in a passion of academic pedantry and Radical alarm.

The terms of the settlement of the 'Alabama claims' at the Geneva Convention of 1872 must always remain a question for dispute, because the full information on either side will never be published. Foreign politics must always remain an imperfect subject for history, since Foreign Secretaries, in all countries, 'still keep something to themselves.' Mr Paul thinks that the final settlement and the example it gave were (iii, 294) 'achievements not estimable in gold or silver.' Others will still be of opinion that the attempt of the Americans to estimate their grievances in amounts of gold and silver that the lamp of Aladdin could not have procured, and the final award of a sum for the full amount of which, to this day, no honest claimants have been found, were not conclusive proofs of the merits of international arbitration. While congratulating ourselves and the world at large on the peaceful settlement of the question, we feel bound, in the interests of historical truth, to point out two grounds for not bestowing indiscriminate praise on that particular effort of Liberal policy.

In the first place, Lord Granville and the High Commissioners entered into a treaty the terms of which, as regards the Indirect Claims, were vague enough to encourage the Americans to raise them after it was 'understood' that they were abandoned. This vagueness was inexcusable, inasmuch as these claims had been stated in the Senate by Sumner in 1869, and had been put forward in official correspondence. That the vagueness was purposely allowed to remain in order to avoid raising 'the jealousy of the Senate' ('Granville,' ii, 92), and in the merely private belief that the American Commissioners did not wish to press the claims, proves that the interests and honour of this country were left at the mercy of two inimical forces against which it was the duty of the Government and the Commissioners to guard. That duty was strangely neglected.

Secondly, the Three Rules of International Law, invented *pro re nata*, on which the Geneva Convention was instructed to proceed, made the result a 'foregone conclusion' as much as the result of the London Conference on

the Black Sea treaty. Gladstone's attempt to show that they were morally binding on us, though we were not to press them on foreign nations, with the glosses put upon them by the declarations of the Geneva arbitrators, was a characteristic bit of special pleading. His position was fully exposed by Disraeli, who alone seems to have rightly appreciated the situation. Gladstone's speech has been put to a curious misuse by an official interpreter of American international law. In Wharton's 'Digest of American International Law' (iii, 643) Gladstone is quoted as having said, on May 26, 1873, in the House of Commons:—

'We *deemed* that they [the Three Rules] formed part of the International Law at the time the claims arose, but we never denied that they constituted part of our own obligation.'

The debate of May 26, as reported in Hansard, does indeed contain the word 'deemed'; but any one who reads the paragraph carefully will see that it is a misprint for 'denied'—the only word consistent with the rest of the sentence and with the terms of the treaty of 1871. As the Three Rules are still in abeyance, not having been accepted by any foreign nation, and are now of doubtful acceptance even in the United States, it is well that this correction should be made public. It may remove a stone of stumbling from the path of some future negotiators.

We are told by Mr Paul (iii, 329) that when Gladstone and his colleagues laid down the seals in 1874 'they had the satisfaction of leaving public affairs in the most prosperous and tranquil state both at home and abroad.' At home certainly he had left behind him the confusion of a political wreck. Having violated all the traditions of parliamentary life by delivering his Budget speech to the public instead of to the House of Commons, thereby setting an example which no public man of his rank will ever again be found to follow, he was badly beaten at the polls. His last year in office was a struggle with internal chaos. Even Mr Paul admits that two of his ministers were not on speaking terms, and that three ought to have been dismissed. The clergy were irritated; the older army officers were dismayed; the Radicals were alienated. The Ministry had been once beaten and driven to temporary resignation. Bright was

in open rebellion on the Education Bill and the Gold Coast policy. There had been strikes in the iron trades; there was war in Ashanti; there was famine in India; and the Russians were pressing forward to Khiva. The Conservative Cabinet which succeeded found affairs in a far from 'prosperous and tranquil state.'

One step for which Lord Granville was largely responsible was the sending of General Gordon to Egypt in January 1884. The circumstances surrounding that event are still but confusedly understood and almost as confusedly stated. The proposal to employ Gordon was mooted so early as 1882; and the Egyptian Government refused concurrence. In 1883 the same proposal met with a second veto. In 1884, even after the defeat of Hicks Pasha, there was still the same reluctance on the part of Nubar Pasha. Five days after this third refusal, the subject was again pressed by Lord Granville, Gordon's own previous unwillingness having been overcome; but again the Egyptian authorities were cold. Nevertheless Gordon was summoned from Brussels, and on January 18, 1884, left for Egypt. Four Cabinet ministers only had consulted with him. Gladstone was absent, but telegraphed his concurrence; and Gordon departed on his fatal mission. Lord Granville's responsibility was greater than that of any other minister; but his state of mind as revealed in the 'Life' (ii, 383) shows a certain absence of responsible feeling. Gordon was allowed to 'revise,' i.e. in fact to prepare, his own instructions; and these were again revised and reconstructed in Egypt. He also accepted a commission as Governor-general of the Sudan. Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice tells us frankly that

'both these steps were taken with the approval of the Government at home; but a calm judgment will not deny that the terms of the original commission and of the commission as Governor-general were difficult to reconcile altogether with each other; that the latter were of dangerous latitude, and that to these ambiguities most of the subsequent trouble is to be traced.'

We have here another specimen of that carelessness as to details in grave matters which marked the Washington treaty and the Geneva arbitration.

That Gordon's conduct after his arrival in Egypt,

and his violation or neglect of his instructions, raised immediate alarm in the Cabinet is now fully displayed. Lord Granville proposed to recall suddenly the man he had so suddenly sent out, having indeed 'put a little pressure on Baring' to get him accepted; but the Cabinet refused the recall. They were divided in opinion; one part wanting to send an expedition to relieve Gordon, the other desiring to leave him to his own devices. When the expedition was at length, after much hesitation, despatched, it was too late. There had been, as Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice politely puts it, 'an insufficient realisation of the value of time.' There was an insufficient realisation of facts as well. Twenty-four hours after the four Cabinet ministers had sent Gordon out, Lord Granville said to Lord Hartington, 'We were proud of ourselves yesterday. Are you sure that we did not commit a gigantic folly?'

Gladstone made a still more astonishing declaration. He confessed to 'insufficient knowledge of our man, whom we rather took on trust from the public impressions and from newspaper accounts which were probably not untrue, but so far from the whole truth that we were misled.' That is not the way in which a nation expects its rulers to choose its commanders, even of forlorn hopes. He also confesses ('Granville,' ii, 402) that 'we committed the error of sending Gordon and, I think, another in landing at Suakim. For neither of these are we blamed as we ought to be.' History has repaired the lack of blame; but even yet history has not sufficiently condemned the hasty and careless manner in which the choice was made, the lethargy which hindered the subsequent expedition, the jealousies, differences, and ignorance which divided and paralysed the Administration throughout this melancholy episode.

The same difficulties and jealousies had marked the Cabinet of 1880 during the whole of its career. It was the fault of the ancient democracies, said Burke, that they ruled by occasional decrees. It was the fault of the Administration of 1880 that it ruled by the unexpected inspirations of its leader. In 1885, after a period of mystery, Gladstone had, as Lord Derby reported to Lord Granville, an inspiration that 'Mr Pitt had assigned no sufficient justification for destroying the national life of

Ireland'; and that, in effect, Home Rule of some sort was inevitable. The manner in which his colleagues received the divine message was eminently wanting in religious fervour. Lord Hartington was stunned. 'Of course in the long run,' he said to Granville, 'the active men will have their own way and the future Liberal party will be Radical. I see nothing for the Whigs but to disappear or turn Tories. I think I should prefer the former.' Lord Granville was pretty frank. 'The great bribe to me,' he wrote, 'and I expect to England and Scotland, would be to get rid of the Irish M.P.'s here who are introducing the dry-rot into our institutions.' And he makes the curious statement that 'Gladstone was rather yielding on this in my last conversation; but Wolverton, who saw him later, does not think so.' Gladstone's conversations were apt to be confusing; and Lord Hartington confessed that he could never understand them. 'In the utter perplexity in which I find myself,' wrote Lord Granville, 'it is some consolation, as regards personal vanity, that nobody seems to have a clear view of what is to be done.'

This is not the mood in which a nation has a right to expect a great party to be on a subject involving the integrity of the kingdom. No one understood Gladstone; and no one was willing to call on him to explain. Gladstone was willing to pass the poisoned chalice to Lord Salisbury and even to help him to drink it. The generous offer was coldly refused. Then Gladstone made up his mind at last, still retaining the hope that his former colleagues would follow him when the Conservative Government fell, as it did on January 27, 1886. His hope was disappointed. Lord Granville remained, but was compelled to make another sacrifice and to abandon the Foreign Office, this time for ever. His loyalty to his leader was in a measure noble. How far he would have followed him in his later measure must be left to conjecture. That 'the sporting instinct,' to which Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice refers, would have carried him over the field in 1893 may be suggested; but, in view of his wish to get rid of the Irish members, he would have ridden with some reluctance and in fear of a fall. He was saved from the adventure and the possible disaster by the end, which came in 1891; and he leaves behind him a memory which, apart from political con-

siderations, must ever be one of the most gracious and prized traditions of public life.

It is not necessary for us to pursue any farther the criticism of political parties since the death of Lord Granville. Our views have been incidentally indicated in the course of these pages. One thought must have been constantly in the minds of those of our readers who have followed with attention the opinions expressed. There has never been any time in the history of politics during the past century when the policy and practice of the Liberals and their Radical allies have not been the cause of serious anxiety to all who have held dear the prestige of Great Britain abroad and its peace and unity at home. By the fortunate composition of our political parties and the generally high independence of our public men there has never been wanting a number of statesmen sufficiently firm and independent to be a check upon the extremists of their party. For years past, under the rule of Lord Salisbury and Mr Balfour, the country has had the benefit of such an alliance between Conservatives and moderate men of ancient Whig or more modern Liberal tendencies. That such an alliance is always possible and even probable is one of the strongest checks upon desperate domestic legislation and dangerous foreign policy, and one of the surest safeguards of the honour and interests of the country.

Art. II.—SHAKESPEARE'S 'ANTONY AND CLEOPATRA.'

COLERIDGE'S one page of general criticism on 'Antony and Cleopatra' contains some notable remarks.

'Of all Shakespeare's historical plays' (he writes), "'Antony and Cleopatra'" is by far the most wonderful. There is not one in which he has followed history so minutely, and yet there are few in which he impresses the notion of angelic strength so much—perhaps none in which he impresses it more strongly. This is greatly owing to the manner in which the fiery force is sustained throughout.'

In a later sentence he refers to the play as 'this astonishing drama.' In another he describes the style: '*feliciter audax* is the motto for its style comparatively with that of Shakespeare's other works.' And he translates this motto in the phrase 'happy valiancy of style.'

Coleridge's assertion that in 'Antony and Cleopatra' Shakespeare followed history more minutely than in any other play might well be disputed; and his statement about the style of this drama requires some qualification in view of the results of later criticism as to the order of Shakespeare's works. The style is less individual than he imagined. On the whole it is the style of all the dramas subsequent to 'Macbeth,' though in 'Antony and Cleopatra,' which probably followed that tragedy, the development of this style is not yet quite complete. And we must add that this style has certain marked defects, unmentioned by Coleridge, as well as the quality which he points out in it. But it is true that here that quality is almost continuously present; and in the phrase by which he describes it, as in his other phrases, he has signalised once for all some of the most salient features of the drama.

It is curious to notice, for example, alike in books and in conversation, how often the first epithets used in reference to 'Antony and Cleopatra' are 'wonderful' and 'astonishing.' And the main source of the feeling thus expressed seems to be the 'angelic strength' or 'fiery force' of which Coleridge wrote. The first of these two phrases is, I think, the more entirely happy. Except perhaps towards the close, one is not so conscious of fiery

force as in certain other tragedies; but one is astonished at the apparent ease with which extraordinary effects are produced, the ease, if I may paraphrase Coleridge, of an angel moving with a wave of the hand that heavy matter which men find so intractable. We feel this sovereign ease in contemplating Shakespeare's picture of the world—a vast canvas crowded with figures, glowing with colour and a superb animation, reminding one spectator of Paul Veronese and another of Rubens. We feel it again when we observe (as we can even without referring to Plutarch) the nature of the material; how bulky it was, and, in some respects, how undramatic; and how the artist, though he could not treat history like legend or fiction, seems to push whole masses aside, and to shift and refashion the remainder, almost with the air of an architect playing with a child's bricks.

Something similar is felt even in the portrait of Cleopatra. Wonderful as it is, the drawing of it suggests not so much passionate concentration or fiery force, as a sense of effortless and exultant mastery—what we feel, for example, in the portraits of Mercutio and Falstaff. And surely it is a total mistake to find in this portrait any trace of the distempered mood which disturbs our pleasure in 'Troilus and Cressida.' If the sonnets about the dark lady were, as I do not doubt, in some degree autobiographical, Shakespeare may well have used his personal experience both when he drew Cressida and when he drew Cleopatra. And, if he did, the story in the later play was the nearer to his own; for Antony might well have said what Troilus could never say,

'When my love swears that she is made of truth,
I do believe her, though I know she lies.'

But in the later play, not only is the poet's vision unclouded, but his whole nature, emotional as well as intellectual, is free. The subject no more embitters or seduces him than the ambition of Macbeth. So that here too we feel the angelic strength of which Coleridge speaks. If we quarrel with the phrase at all, it must be because we seem to trace in Shakespeare's attitude something of the irony of superiority; and this may not altogether suit our conception of an angel.

I have still another sentence to quote from Coleridge.

'The highest praise, or rather form of praise, of this play which I can offer in my own mind' (he writes), 'is the doubt which the perusal always occasions in me, whether the *'Antony and Cleopatra'* is not, in all exhibitions of a giant power in its strength and vigour of maturity, a formidable rival of *'Macbeth,' 'Lear,' 'Hamlet,'* and *'Othello.'*

Unless the clause here about the 'giant power' may be taken to restrict the rivalry to the quality of angelic strength, Coleridge's doubt seems to show a lapse in critical judgment. To regard this tragedy as a rival of the famous four, whether on the stage or in the study, is surely an error. The world certainly has not so regarded it; and, though the world's reasons for its verdicts on works of art may be worth little, its mere verdict is worth much. Here, it seems to me, it must be accepted. One may notice that, in calling *'Antony and Cleopatra'* wonderful or astonishing, we appear to be thinking first of the artist and his activity, while in the case of the four famous tragedies it is the product of this activity, the thing presented, that first engrosses us. I know that I am stating this difference too sharply, but I believe that it is often felt; and, if this is so, the fact is significant. It implies that, although *'Antony and Cleopatra'* may be for us as wonderful an achievement as the greatest of Shakespeare's plays, it has not an equal value. Besides, in the attempt to rank it with them there is involved something more, and more important, than an error in valuation. There is a failure to discriminate the peculiar marks of *'Antony and Cleopatra'* itself, marks which, whether or no it be the equal of *'Hamlet'* or *'Lear,'* make it decidedly different. If I proceed to speak of some of these differences it is because they thus go to make the individuality of the play, and because in criticism they seem often not to be distinctly apprehended.

Why, let us begin by asking, is *'Antony and Cleopatra,'* though so wonderful a work and so full of angelic strength, a play rarely acted? For a tragedy, it is not painful. Though unfit for children, it cannot be called indecent: some slight omissions, and such a flattening of the heroine's part as may confidently be expected, would leave it perfectly presentable. It is, no doubt, in the third and fourth Acts, very defective in construction.

Even on the Elizabethan stage, where scene followed scene without a pause, this must have been felt; and in our theatres it would be felt much more. There, in fact, these two and forty scenes could not possibly be acted as they stand. But defective construction would not distress the bulk of an audience, if the matter presented were that of 'Hamlet' or 'Othello,' of 'Lear' or 'Macbeth.' The matter must lack something which is present in those tragedies; and here is the point of difference which explains the fact that 'Antony and Cleopatra' has never attained their popularity either on the stage or off it.

Most of Shakespeare's tragedies are dramatic in a special sense of the word, as well as in its general sense, from beginning to end. The story is not merely exciting and impressive from the movement of conflicting forces towards a terrible issue; but from time to time there come situations and events which, even apart from their bearing on the future, appeal most powerfully to the dramatic feelings—scenes of action or passion which agitate the audience with alarm, horror, painful expectation, or absorbing sympathies and antipathies. Think of the street fights in 'Romeo and Juliet,' the killing of Mercutio and Tybalt, the rapture of the lovers, and their despair when Romeo is banished. Think of the ghost-scenes in the first Act of 'Hamlet,' the passion of the early soliloquies, the scene between Hamlet and Ophelia, the play-scene, the sparing of the King at prayer, the killing of Polonius. Is not 'Hamlet,' if you choose so to regard it, the best melodrama in the world? Think at your leisure of 'Othello,' 'Lear,' and 'Macbeth' from the same point of view; but consider here and now even the two tragedies which, as dealing with Roman history, are companions of 'Antony and Cleopatra.' Consider in 'Julius Cæsar' the first suggestion of the murder, the preparation for it in a 'tempest dropping fire,' the murder itself, the speech of Antony over the corpse, and the tumult of the furious crowd; in 'Coriolanus' the bloody battles on the stage, the scene in which the hero attains the consulship, the scene of rage in which he is banished. And remember that all this, in each of those seven cases, comes before the third Act is finished.

In the first three Acts of our play what is there resembling this? Almost nothing. People converse,

discuss, accuse one another, excuse themselves, mock, describe, drink together, arrange a marriage, meet and part; but they do not kill, do not even tremble or weep. We see hardly one violent movement; until the battle of Actium is over we witness scarcely any vehement passion; and that battle, as it is a naval action, we do not see. Even later, Enobarbus, when he dies, simply dies; he does not kill himself.* We hear wonderful talk; but it is not talk, like that of Macbeth and Lady Macbeth, or Othello and Iago, at which we hold our breath. The scenes that we remember first are those that portray Cleopatra; Cleopatra coquetting, tormenting, beguiling her lover to stay; Cleopatra left with her women and longing for him; Cleopatra receiving the news of his marriage; Cleopatra questioning the messenger about Octavia's personal appearance. But this is to say that the scenes we remember first are the least indispensable to the plot. One at least is not essential to it at all. And this, the astonishing scene where she storms at the messenger, strikes him, and draws her dagger on him, is the one passage in the first half of the drama that contains either an explosion of passion or an exciting bodily action. Nor is this all. The first half of the play, though it forebodes tragedy, is not definitely tragic in tone. Certainly the Cleopatra scenes, even the one just referred to, are not so. We read them, and we should witness them, in delighted wonder and even with amusement. The only scene that can vie with them, that of the revel on Pompey's ship, is in great part humorous. Enobarbus, in this part of the play, is always humorous. Even later, when the tragic tone is deepening, the whipping of Thyreus, in spite of Antony's rage, moves mirth. A play of which all this can truly be said may well be as

* We are to understand, surely, that Enobarbus dies of 'thought' (melancholy or grief), and has no need to seek a 'swifter mean.' Cf. iv, vi, 34 *seq.*, with the death-scene and his address there to the moon as the 'sovereign mistress of true melancholy' (iv, ix). Cf. also iii, xiii, where, to Cleopatra's question after Actium, 'What shall we do, Enobarbus?' he answers, 'Think, and die.'

The character of Enobarbus is practically an invention of Shakespeare's. The death-scene, I may add, is one of the many passages which prove that he often wrote what pleased his imagination but would lose half its effect in the theatre. The darkness and moonlight could not be represented on a public stage in his time.

masterly as 'Othello' or 'Macbeth,' and more delightful; but, in the greater part of its course, it cannot possibly excite the same emotions. It does not attempt to do so; and to regard it as though it made this attempt is to miss its specific character and the intention of its author.

That character depends only in part on Shakespeare's fidelity to his historical authority. This fidelity (I may remark) is often greatly exaggerated; for Shakespeare did not merely present the story of ten years as though it occupied perhaps one fifth of that time, nor did he merely invent freely, but in critical places he made startling changes in the order and combination of events. Still it may be said that, dealing with a history so famous, he could not well make the first half of his play very exciting, moving, or tragic. And this is true so far as mere situations and events are concerned. But, if he had chosen, he might easily have heightened the tone and tension in another way. He might have made the story of Antony's attempt to break his bondage, and the story of his relapse, extremely exciting, by portraying with all his force the severity of the struggle and the magnitude of the fatal step. And the structure of the play might seem at first to suggest this intention. At the opening, Antony is shown almost in the beginning of his infatuation; for Cleopatra is not sure of her power over him, exerts all her fascination to detain him, and plays the part of the innocent victim who has yielded to passion and must now expect to be deserted by her seducer. Alarmed and ashamed at the news of the results of his inaction, he rouses himself, tears himself away, and speeds to Italy. His very coming is enough to frighten Pompey into peace. He reconciles himself with Octavius, and, by his marriage with the good and beautiful Octavia, seems to have knit a bond of lasting amity with her brother, and to have guarded himself against the passion that threatened him with ruin. At this point his power, the world's peace, and his own peace, appear to be secured; his fortune has mounted to its apex. But soon (very much sooner than in Plutarch's story) comes the downward turn or counter-stroke. New causes of offence arise between the brothers-in-law. To remove them Octavia leaves her husband in Athens and hurries to Rome. Immediately Antony returns to Cleopatra and,

falling at once into a far more abject slavery than before, is quickly driven to his doom.

Now Shakespeare, I say, with his matchless power of depicting an inward struggle, might have made this story, even where it could not furnish him with thrilling incidents, the source of powerful tragic emotions; and, in doing so, he would have departed from his authority merely in his conception of the hero's character. But he does no such thing till the catastrophe is near. Antony breaks away from Cleopatra without any strenuous conflict. In a variety of ways we are prevented from feeling any real doubt of his return—through the impression made on us by Octavius, through occasional glimpses into Antony's mind, through the absence of any doubt in Enobarbus, through scenes in Alexandria which display Cleopatra and display her irresistible. And finally, the downward turn itself, the fatal step of Antony's return, is shown without the slightest emphasis. Nay, it is not shown, it is only reported; and not a line portrays any inward struggle preceding it. On this side also, then, the drama makes no attempt to rival the other tragedies; and it was essential to its own peculiar character and its most transcendent effects that this attempt should not be made, but that Antony's passion should be represented as a force which he could hardly even desire to resist. By the very scheme of the work, therefore, tragic impressions of any great volume or depth were reserved for the last stage of the conflict; while the main interest, down to the battle of Actium, was directed to matters exceedingly interesting and even, in the wider sense, dramatic, but neither terrible nor piteous—on the one hand, the political aspect of the story; on the other, the personal causes which helped to make the issue inevitable.

The political situation and its development are simple. The story is taken up almost where it was left, years before, in 'Julius Cæsar.' There Brutus and Cassius, to prevent the rule of one man, assassinate Cæsar. Their purpose is condemned to failure, not merely because they make mistakes, but because that political necessity which Napoleon identified with destiny requires the rule of one man. They spill Cæsar's blood, but his spirit walks abroad and turns their swords against their own breasts;

and the world is left divided among three men, his friends and his heir. Here 'Antony and Cleopatra' takes up the tale; and its business, from this point of view, is to show the reduction of these three to one. That Lepidus will not be this one was clear already in 'Julius Cæsar'; it must be Octavius or Antony. Both ambitious, they are also men of such opposite tempers that they would scarcely long agree even if they wished to, and even if destiny were not stronger than they. As it is, one of them has fixed his eyes on the end, sacrifices everything for it, uses everything as a means to it. The other, though far the greater soldier and worshipped by his followers, has no such singleness of aim; nor yet is power, however desirable to him, the most desirable thing in the world. At the beginning he is risking it for love; at the end he has lost his half of the world, and lost his life, and Octavius rules alone. Whether Shakespeare had this clearly in his mind is a question neither answerable nor important; this is what came out of his mind.

Shakespeare, I think, took little interest in the character of Octavius, and he has not made it wholly clear. It is not distinct in Plutarch's 'Life of Antony'; and I have not found traces that the poet studied closely the 'Life of Octavius,' included in North's volume. To Shakespeare he is one of those men, like Bolingbroke and Ulysses, who have plenty of 'judgment' and not much 'blood.' Victory in the world, according to the poet, almost always goes to such men; and he makes us respect, fear, and dislike them. His Octavius is very formidable. His cold determination half paralyses Antony; it is so even in 'Julius Cæsar.' In 'Antony and Cleopatra' Octavius is more than once in the wrong, but he never admits it; he silently pushes his rival a step backward; and, when he ceases to fear, he shows contempt. He neither enjoys war nor is great in it; at first, therefore, he is anxious about the power of Pompey, and stands in need of Antony. As soon as Antony's presence has served his turn, and he has patched up a union with him and seen him safely off to Athens, he destroys first Pompey and next Lepidus. Then, dexterously using Antony's faithlessness to Octavia and excesses in the East in order to put himself in the right, he makes for his victim with admirable celerity while he is still drunk with the joy of reunion with

Cleopatra. For his ends Octavius is perfectly efficient, but he is so partly from his limitations. One phrase of his is exceedingly characteristic. When Antony in rage and desperation challenges him to single combat, Octavius calls him 'the old ruffian.' There is a horrid aptness in the phrase, but it disgusts us. It is shameful in this boy, as hard and smooth as polished steel, to feel at such a time nothing of the greatness of his victim and the tragedy of his victim's fall. Though the challenge of Antony is absurd, we would give much to see them sword to sword. And, when Cleopatra by her death cheats the conqueror of his prize, we feel unmixed delight.

The doubtful point in the character is this. Plutarch says that Octavius was reported to love his sister Octavia dearly; and in the drama he several times expresses such love. When, then, he proposed her marriage with Antony (for of course it was he who spoke through Agrippa), was he honest, or was he laying a trap and, in doing so, sacrificing his sister? Did he hope the marriage would really unite him with his brother-in-law; or did he merely mean it to be a source of future differences; or did he calculate that, whether it secured peace or dissension, it would in either case bring him great advantage? Shakespeare, who was quite as intelligent as his readers, must have asked himself some such question; but he may have chosen not to answer it even to himself; and, in any case, he has left the actor (at least the actor in days later than his own) to choose an answer. If I were forced to choose, I should take the view that Octavius was, at any rate, not wholly honest; partly because I think this view best suits Shakespeare's usual way of conceiving a character of this kind; partly because Plutarch construed in this manner Octavius's behaviour in regard to his sister at a later time, and this hint might naturally influence the poet's way of imagining his earlier action.*

Though the character of Octavius is neither attractive

* 'Now whilst Antonius was busie in this preparation, Octaula his wife, whom he had left at Rome, would needs take sea to come vnto him. Her brother Octavius Cæsar was willing vnto it, not for his respect at all (as most authors do report) as for that he might haue an honest colour to make warre with Antonius if he did misuse her, and not esteeme of her as she ought to be.'—'Life of Antony' (North's Translation), sect. 20.

nor wholly clear, his figure is invested with a certain tragic dignity, because he is felt to be the Man of Destiny, the agent of forces against which the intentions of an individual would avail nothing. He is represented as having himself some feeling of this kind. His lament over Antony, his grief that their stars were irreconcilable, may be genuine, though we should be surer if it were uttered in soliloquy. His austere words to Octavia again may speak his true mind:—

'Be you not troubled with the time, which drives
O'er your content these strong necessities;
But let determined things to destiny
Hold unbewailed their way.'

In any case the feeling of destiny comes through to us. It is aided by slight touches of supernatural effect; first in the Soothsayer's warning to Antony that his genius or angel is overpowered whenever he is near Octavius; then in the strangely effective scene where Antony's soldiers, in the night before his last battle, hear music in the air or under the earth:

'Tis the god Hercules, whom Antony loved,
Now leaves him.'

And to the influence of this feeling in giving impressiveness to the story is added that of the immense scale and world-wide issue of the conflict. Even the distances traversed by fleets and armies enhance this effect.

And yet there seems to be something half-hearted in Shakespeare's appeal here, something even ironical in his presentation of this conflict. Its external magnitude, like Antony's magnificence in lavishing realms and gathering the kings of the East in his support, fails to uplift or dilate the imagination. The struggle in Lear's little island seems to us to have an infinitely wider scope. It is here that we are sometimes reminded of 'Troilus and Cressida,' and the cold and disenchanting light that is there cast on the Trojan War. The spectacle which he portrays leaves Shakespeare quite undazzled; he even makes it appear inwardly small. The lordship of the world, we ask ourselves, what is it worth, and in what spirit do these 'world-sharers' contend for it? They are no champions of their country like Henry V. The

conqueror knows not even the glory of battle. Their aims, for all we see, are as personal as if they were captains of banditti; and they are followed merely from self-interest or private attachment. The scene on Pompey's galley is full of this irony. One 'third part of the world' is carried drunk to bed. In the midst of this mock boon-companionship the pirate whispers to his leader to cut first the cable of his ship and then the throats of the other two Emperors; and we should not greatly care if Pompey took the advice. Later, a short scene, totally useless to the plot, and purely satiric in its purport, is slipped in to show Ventidius afraid to pursue his Parthian conquests because it is not safe for Antony's lieutenant to outdo his master. A painful sense of hollowness oppresses us. We know too well what must happen in a world so splendid, so false, and so petty. We turn for relief from the political game to those who are sure to lose it; to those who love some human being better than a prize, to Eros and Charmian and Iras; to Enobarbus, whom the world corrupts, but who has a heart that can break with shame; to the lovers, who seem to us to find in death something better than their victor's life.

This presentation of the outward conflict has two results. First, it blunts our feeling of the greatness of Antony's fall from prosperity. Indeed this feeling, which we might expect to be unusually acute, is not so; it is less acute, for example, than the like feeling in the case of Richard II, who loses so much smaller a realm. Our deeper sympathies are focussed rather on Antony's heart, on the inward fall to which the enchantment of passion leads him, and the inward greatness which succeeds it. And the second result is this. The greatness of Antony and Cleopatra in their fall is so much heightened by contrast with the world they lose and the conqueror who wins it, that the positive element in the final tragic impression, the element of reconciliation, is strongly emphasised. The peculiar effect of the drama depends partly, as we have seen, on the absence of definitely tragic scenes and events in its first half, but it depends quite as much on this emphasis. In any Shakespearean tragedy we watch some elect spirit colliding, through its error and defect, with a superhuman power which bears

it down; and yet we feel that this spirit, even in the error and defect, rises by its greatness into ideal union with the power that overwhelms it. In some tragedies this latter feeling is relatively weak. In 'Antony and Cleopatra' it is unusually strong; stronger, with some readers at least, than the fear and grief and pity with which they contemplate the tragic error and the advance of doom.

The two aspects of the tragedy are presented together in the opening scene. Here is the first. In Cleopatra's palace one friend of Antony is describing to another, just arrived from Rome, the dotage of their great general; and, as the lovers enter, he exclaims:—

'Look, where they come :
Take but good note, and you shall see in him
The triple pillar of the world transformed
Into a strumpet's fool : behold and see.'

With the next words the other aspect appears:—

Cleo. If it be love indeed, tell me how much.
Ant. There's beggary in the love that can be reckoned.
Cleo. I'll set a bourne how far to be beloved.
Ant. Then must thou needs find out new heaven, new earth.'

And directly after, when he is provoked by reminders of the news from Rome:—

'Let Rome in Tiber melt, and the wide arch
Of the ranged empire fall! Here is my space.
Kingdoms are clay: our dungy earth alike
Feeds beast as man: the nobleness of life
Is to do thus.'

Here is the tragic excess, and with it the tragic greatness, the capacity of finding in something the infinite, and of pursuing it into the jaws of death.

The two aspects are shown here with the exaggeration proper in dramatic characters. Neither the phrase 'a strumpet's fool,' nor the assertion 'the nobleness of life is to do thus,' answers to the total effect of the play. But the truths they exaggerate are equally essential; and the commoner mistake in criticism is to understate the

second. It is plain that the love of Antony and Cleopatra is destructive; that in some way it clashes with the nature of things; that, while they are sitting in their paradise like gods, its walls move inward and crush them at last to death. This is no invention of moralising critics; it is in the play; and any one familiar with Shakespeare would expect beforehand to find it there. But then to forget because of it the other side, to deny the name of love to this ruinous passion, to speak as though the lovers had utterly missed the good of life, is to mutilate the tragedy and to ignore a great part of its effect upon us. For we sympathise with them in their passion; we feel in it the infinity there is in man; even while we acquiesce in their defeat we are exulting in their victory; and when they have vanished we say,

‘the odds is gone,
‘And there is nothing left remarkable
Beneath the visiting moon.’

Though we hear nothing from Shakespeare of the cruelty of Plutarch's Antony, or of the misery caused by his boundless profusion, we do not feel the hero of the tragedy to be a man of the noblest type, like Brutus, Hamlet, or Othello. He seeks power merely for himself and uses it for his own pleasure. He is in some respects unscrupulous; and, while it would be unjust to regard his marriage exactly as if it were one in private life, we resent his treatment of Octavia, whose character Shakespeare was obliged to leave a mere sketch, lest our feeling for the hero and heroine should be too much chilled. Yet, for all this, we sympathise warmly with Antony, are greatly drawn to him, and are inclined to regard him as a noble nature half spoiled by his time.

It is a large, open, generous, expansive nature, quite free from envy, capable of great magnanimity, even of entire devotion. Antony is unreserved, naturally straightforward, we may almost say simple. He can admit faults, accept advice and even reproof, take a jest against himself with good-humour. He is courteous (to Lepidus, for example, whom Octavius treats with cold contempt); and, though he can be exceedingly dignified, he seems to prefer a blunt though sympathetic plainness, which is one cause of the attachment of his soldiers. He has none

of the faults of the brooder, the sentimentalist, or the man of principle; his nature tends to splendid action and lusty enjoyment. But he is neither a mere soldier nor a mere sensualist. He has imagination, the temper of an artist who revels in abundant and rejoicing appetites, feasts his senses on the glow and richness of life, flings himself into its mirth and revelry, yet feels the poetry in all this, and is able also to put it by and be more than content with the hardships of adventure. Such a man could never have sought a crown by a murder like Macbeth's, or, like Brutus, have killed on principle the man who loved him, or have lost the world for a Cressida.

Beside this strain of poetry he has a keen intellect, a swift perception of the lie of things, and much quickness in shaping a course to suit them. In 'Julius Cæsar' he shows this after the assassination, when he appears as a dexterous politician as well as a warm-hearted friend. He admires what is fine, and can fully appreciate the nobility of Brutus; but he is sure that Brutus's ideas are moonshine, that (as he says in our play) Brutus is mad; and, since his mighty friend, who was immeasurably the finest thing in the world, has perished, he sees no reason why the inheritance should not be his own. Full of genuine grief, he uses his grief like an artist to work on others, and greets his success with the glee of a successful adventurer. In the earlier play he proves himself a master of eloquence, and especially of pathos; and he does so again in the later. With a few words about his fall, he draws tears from his followers and even from the caustic humorist Enobarbus. Like Richard II, he sees his own fall with the eyes of a poet, but a poet much greater than the young Shakespeare, who could never have written Antony's wonderful speech about the sunset clouds.* But we listen to Antony, as we do not to Richard,

* *Ant.* Eros, thou yet behold'st me?

Eros. Ay, noble lord.

Ant. Sometime we see a cloud that's dragonish;

A vapour, sometime, like a bear or lion,

A tower'd citadel, a pendent rock,

A forked mountain, or blue promontory

With trees upon't, that nod unto the world,

And mock our eyes with air: thou hast seen these signs;

They are black vesper's pageants.

Eros.

Ay, my lord.

with entire sympathy, partly because he is never unmanly, partly because he himself is sympathetic and longs for sympathy.

The first of living soldiers, an able politician, a most persuasive orator, Antony nevertheless was not born to rule the world. He enjoys being a great man, but he has not the love of rule for rule's sake. Power for him is chiefly a means to pleasure. The pleasure he wants is so huge that he needs a huge power; but half the world, even a third of it, would suffice. He will not pocket wrongs, but he shows not the slightest wish to get rid of his fellow Triumvirs and reign alone. He never minded being subordinate to Julius Cæsar. By women he is not only attracted but governed; from the effect of Cleopatra's taunts we can see that he had been governed by Fulvia. Nor has he either the patience or the steadfastness of a born ruler. He contends fitfully, and is prone to take the step that is easiest at the moment. This is the reason why he consents to marry Octavia. It seems the shortest way out of an awkward situation. He does not intend even to try to be true to her. He will not think of the distant consequences.

A man who loved power even as thousands of insignificant people love it would have made a sterner struggle than Antony's against his enchantment. He can hardly be said to struggle at all. He brings himself to leave Cleopatra only because he knows he will return. In every moment of his absence, whether he wake or sleep, a siren music in his blood is singing him back to her and to this music, however he may be occupied, the

Ant. That which is now a horse, even with a thought
The rack dislimns, and makes it indistinct,
As water is in water.

Eros.

It does, my lord.

Ant. My good knave Eros, now thy captain is
Even such a body: here I am Antony;
Yet cannot hold this visible shape, my knave.
I made these wars for Egypt; and the queen,—
Whose heart I thought I had, for she had mine;
Which, whilst it was mine, had annex'd unto't
A million more, now lost,—she, Eros, has
Pack'd cards with Cæsar, and false-play'd my glory
Unto an enemy's triumph.
Nay, weep not, gentle Eros; there is left us
Ourselves to end ourselves.

soul within his soul leans and listens. The joy of life had always culminated for him in the love of women: he could say 'no' to none of them: of Octavia herself he speaks like a poet. When he meets Cleopatra he finds his Absolute. She satisfies, nay glorifies, his whole being. She intoxicates his senses. Her wiles, her taunts, her furies and meltings, her laughter and tears, bewitch him all alike. She loves what he loves, and she surpasses him. She can drink him to his bed, out-jest his practical jokes, out-act the best actress who ever amused him, out-dazzle his own magnificence. She is his playfellow, and yet a great queen. Angling in the river, playing billiards, flourishing the sword he used at Philippi, hopping forty paces in a public street, she remains an enchantress. Her spirit is made of wind and flame, and the poet in him worships her no less than the man. He is under no illusion about her, knows all her faults, sees through her wiles, believes her capable of betraying him. It makes no difference. She is his heart's desire made perfect. To love her is what he was born for. What have the gods in heaven to say against it? To imagine heaven is to imagine her; to die is to rejoin her. To deny that this is love is the madness of morality. He gives her every atom of his heart.

She destroys him. Shakespeare, availing himself of the historic fact, portrays, on Antony's return to her, the suddenness and depth of his descent. In spite of his own knowledge, the protests of his captains, the entreaties even of a private soldier, he fights by sea simply and solely because she wishes it. Then in mid-battle, when she flies, he deserts navy and army and his faithful thousands and follows her. 'I never saw an action of such shame,' cries Scarus; and we feel the dishonour of the hero keenly. Then Shakespeare begins to raise him again. First, his own overwhelming sense of shame redeems him. Next, we watch the rage of the dying lion. Then the mere sally before the final defeat—a sally dismissed by Plutarch in three lines—is magnified into a battle, in which Antony displays to us, and himself feels for the last time, the glory of his soldiership. And, throughout, the magnanimity and gentleness which shine through his desperation endear him to us. How beautiful is his affection for his followers and even for his servants, and the devotion they

return! How noble his reception of the news that Enobarbus has deserted him! How touchingly significant the refusal of Eros either to kill him or survive him! How pathetic and even sublime the completeness of his love for Cleopatra! His anger is born and dies in an hour. One tear, one kiss, outweighs his ruin. He believes she has sold him to his enemy, yet he kills himself because he hears that she is dead. When, dying, he learns that she has deceived him once more, no thought of reproach crosses his mind: he simply asks to be carried to her. He knows well that she is not capable of dying because he dies, but that does not sting him; he only calls back his last breath to advise her for the days to come. Shakespeare borrowed from Plutarch the final speech of Antony. It is fine, but it is not miraculous. The miraculous speeches belong only to his own hero:—

'I am dying, Egypt, dying; only
I here importune death awhile, until
Of many thousand kisses the poor last
I lay upon thy lips';

or the first words he utters when he hears of Cleopatra's death:—

'Unarm, Eros: the long day's task is done,
And we must sleep.'

If he meant the task of statesman and warrior, that is not what his words mean to us. They remind us of words more familiar and less great—

'No rest but the grave for the pilgrim of love.'

And he is more than love's pilgrim; he is love's martyr.

To reserve a fragment of an hour for Cleopatra, if it were not palpably absurd, would seem an insult. If only one could hear her own remarks upon it! But I had to choose between this absurdity and the plan of giving her the whole hour; and to that plan there was one fatal objection. She has been described (by Ten Brink) as a courtesan of genius. So brief a description must needs be incomplete. Cleopatra, for example, never forgets, and,

if we read aright, we never forget, that she is a great queen. Still the phrase is excellent; only a public lecture is no occasion for the full analysis and illustration of the character it describes.

Shakespeare has paid Cleopatra a unique compliment. The hero dies in the fourth Act, and the whole of the fifth is devoted to the heroine.* In that Act she becomes unquestionably a tragic character, but, it appears to me, not till then. This, no doubt, is a heresy, but, as I cannot help holding it, and as it is connected with the remarks already made on the first half of the play, I will state it more fully. Cleopatra stands in a group with Hamlet and Falstaff. We might join with them Iago, but that he is decidedly their inferior in one particular quality. They are inexhaustible. You feel that, if they were alive and you spent your whole life with them, their infinite variety could never be staled by custom; they would continue every day to surprise, perplex, and delight you. Shakespeare has bestowed on each of them, though they differ so much, his own originality, his genius. He has given it most fully to Hamlet, to whom none of the chambers of experience is shut, and perhaps more of it to Cleopatra than to Falstaff. Nevertheless, if we ask whether Cleopatra, in the first four Acts, is a tragic figure like Hamlet, we surely cannot answer 'yes.' Naturally it does not follow that she is a comic figure like Falstaff. This would be absurd; for, even if she were ridiculous like Falstaff, she is not ridiculous to herself; she is no humorist. And yet there is a certain likeness. She shares a weakness with Falstaff—vanity; and when she displays it, as she does quite naïvely (for instance, in the second interview with the Messenger), she does become comic. Again, though like Falstaff she is irresistible, and carries us away no less than the people around her, we are secretly aware, in the midst of our delight, that her empire is built on sand. And finally, as his love for the Prince gives dignity and pathos to Falstaff in his overthrow, so what raises Cleopatra at last into tragedy is, in part, that which some critics have denied her, her love for Antony.

* The point of this remark is unaffected by the fact that the play is not divided into acts and scenes in the folios.

Many unpleasant things can be said of Cleopatra; and the more are said the more wonderful she appears. The exercise of sexual attraction is the element of her life; and she has developed nature into a consummate art. When she cannot exert it on the present lover she imagines its effects on him in absence. Longing for the living, she remembers with pride and joy the dead; and the past which the furious Antony holds up to her as a picture of shame is, for her, glory. She cannot see an ambassador, scarcely even a messenger, without desiring to bewitch him. Her mind is saturated with this element. If she is dark, it is because the sun himself has been amorous of her. Even when death is close at hand she imagines his touch as a lover's. She embraces him that she may overtake Iras and gain Antony's first kiss in the other world.

She lives for feeling. Her feelings are, so to speak, sacred, and pain must not come near her. She has tried numberless experiments to discover the easiest way to die. Her body is exquisitely sensitive, and her emotions marvellously swift. They are really so; but she exaggerates them so much, and exhibits them so continually for effect, that some readers fancy them merely feigned. They are all-important, and everybody must attend to them. She announces to her women that she is pale, or sick and sullen; they must lead her to her chamber but must not speak to her. She is as strong and supple as a leopard, can drink down a master of revelry, can raise her lover's helpless heavy body from the ground into her tower with the aid only of two women; yet, when he is sitting apart sunk in shame, she must be supported into his presence, she cannot stand, her head droops, she will die (it is the opinion of Eros) unless he comforts her. When she hears of his marriage and has discharged her rage, she bids her women bear her away; she faints; at least she would faint, but that she remembers various questions she wants put to the Messenger about Octavia. Enobarbus has seen her die twenty times upon far poorer moment than the news that Antony is going to Rome.

Some of her feelings are violent, and, unless for a purpose, she does not dream of restraining them; her sighs and tears are winds and waters, storms and tempests.

At times, as when she threatens to give Charmian bloody teeth, or hales the luckless Messenger up and down by the hair, strikes him and draws her knife on him, she resembles (if I dare say it) Doll Tearsheet sublimated. She is a mother; but the threat of Octavius to destroy her children if she takes her own life passes by her like the wind (a point where Shakespeare contradicts Plutarch). She ruins a great man, but shows no sense of the tragedy of his ruin. The anguish of spirit that appears in his language to his servants is beyond her; she has to ask Enobarbus what he means. Can we feel sure that she would not have sacrificed him if she could have saved herself by doing so? It is not even certain that she did not attempt it. Antony himself believes that she did—that the fleet went over to Octavius by her orders. That she and her people deny the charge proves nothing. The best we can say is that, if it were true, Shakespeare would have made that clear. She is willing also to survive her lover. Her first thought, to follow him after the high Roman fashion, is too great for her. She would live on if she could, and would cheat her victor too of the best part of her fortune. The thing that drives her to die is the certainty that she will be carried to Rome to grace his triumph. That alone decides her.

The marvellous thing is that the knowledge of all this makes hardly more difference to us than it did to Antony. It seems to us perfectly natural, nay, in a sense perfectly right, that her lover should be her slave; that her women should adore her and die with her; that Enobarbus, who foresaw what must happen, and who opposes her wishes and braves her anger, should talk of her with rapture and feel no bitterness against her; that Dolabella, after a minute's conversation, should betray to her his master's intention and enable her to frustrate it. And when Octavius shows himself proof against her fascination, instead of admiring him, we turn from him with disgust and think him a disgrace to his species. Why? It is not that we consider him bound to fall in love with her. Enobarbus did not; Dolabella did not; we ourselves do not. The feeling she inspires was felt then, and is felt now, by women no less than men, and would have been shared by Octavia herself. Doubtless she wrought magic on the senses, but she had not extraordinary beauty, like

Helen's, such beauty as seems divine.* Plutarch says so. The man who wrote the sonnets to the dark lady would have known it for himself. He goes out of his way to add to her age, and tells us of her wrinkles and the waning of her lip. But Enobarbus, in his very mockery, calls her a wonderful piece of work. Dolabella interrupts her with the cry, 'Most sovereign creature,' and we echo it. And yet Octavius, face to face with her, and listening to her voice, can think only how best to trap her and drag her to public dishonour in the streets of Rome. We forgive him only for his words when he sees her dead:—

'She looks like sleep,
As she would catch another Antony
In her strong toil of grace.'

And the words, I confess, sound to me more like Shakespeare's than his.

That which makes her wonderful and sovereign laughs at definition, but she herself came nearest naming it when, in the final speech (a passage surpassed in poetry, if at all, only by the final speech of Othello), she cries—

'I am fire and air; my other elements
I give to baser life.'

The fire and air which at death break from union with

* Shakespeare, it seems clear, imagined Cleopatra as a gipsy. And this, I would suggest, is the explanation of a word which has caused much difficulty. Antony, when 'all is lost,' exclaims (iv, x, 38):

'O this false soul of Egypt! this grave charm,—
Whose eye beck'd forth my wars, and call'd them home,
Whose bosom was my crownet, my chief end,—
Like a right gipsy, hath, at fast and loose,
Beguil'd me to the very heart of loss.'

Pope changed 'grave' in the first line into 'gay.' Others conjecture 'great' and 'grand.' Steevens says that 'grave' means 'deadly,' and that the word 'is often used by Chapman' thus; but his quotations do not prove his statement, and certainly in Shakespeare the word does not elsewhere bear that sense. It could mean 'majestic,' as Johnson takes it here. But why should it not have its usual meaning? Cleopatra, we know, was a being of 'infinite variety,' and her eyes may sometimes have had, like those of some gipsies, a mysterious gravity or solemnity which would exert a spell more potent than her gaiety. Their colour, presumably, was what is called 'black'; but surely they were not, as Tennyson imagined, 'bold black eyes.' Readers interested in seeing what criticism is capable of may like to know that it has been proposed to read, for the first line of the quotation above, 'O this false fowl of Egypt! haggard charmer.'

those other elements, transfigured them during her life, and still convert into engines of enchantment the very things for which she is condemned. I can refer only to one. She loves Antony. We should marvel at her less and love her more if she loved him more—loved him well enough to follow him at once to death; but it is to blunder strangely to doubt that she loved him, or that her glorious description of him (though it was also meant to work on Dolabella) came from her heart. Only the spirit of fire and air within her refuses to be trammelled or extinguished, burns its way through the obstacles of fortune, even through the resistance of her love and grief, and would lead her undaunted to fresh life and the conquest of new worlds. It is this which makes her 'strong toil of grace' unbreakable; speaks in her brows' bent and every tone and movement; glorifies the arts and the rages which in another would merely disgust or amuse us; and, in the final scenes of her life, flames into such brilliance that we watch her entranced as she struggles for freedom, and thrilled with triumph as, conquered, she puts her conqueror to scorn and goes to meet her lover in the splendour that crowned and robed her long ago, when her barge burnt on the water like a burnished throne, and she floated to Cydnus on the enamoured stream to take him captive for ever.*

Why is it that, although we close the book in a triumph which is more than reconciliation, this is mingled, as we look back on the story, with a sadness so peculiar, almost the sadness of disenchantment? Is it that, when the glow has faded, Cleopatra's ecstasy comes to appear, I would not say factitious, but an effort strained and prodigious as well as glorious, not, like Othello's last speech, the final expression of character, of thoughts and emotions which have dominated a whole life? Perhaps this is so, but there is something more, something that sounds paradoxical: we are saddened by the very fact that the catastrophe saddens us so little; it pains us that we should feel so much triumph and pleasure. In 'Romeo

* Of the 'good' heroines, Imogen is the one who has most of this spirit of fire and air; and this (in union, of course, with other qualities) is perhaps the ultimate reason why for so many readers she is, what Mr Swinburne calls her, 'the woman above all Shakespeare's women.'

and Juliet,' 'Hamlet,' 'Othello,' though in a sense we accept the deaths of hero and heroine, we feel a keen sorrow. We look back, think how noble or beautiful they were, wish that fate had opposed to them a weaker enemy, dream possibly of the life they might then have led. Here we can hardly do this. With all our admiration and sympathy for the lovers we do not wish them to gain the world. It is better for the world's sake, and not less for their own, that they should fail and die. At the very first they came before us, unlike those others, unlike Coriolanus and even Macbeth, in a glory already tarnished, half-ruined by their past. Indeed one source of strange and most unusual effect in their story is that this marvellous passion comes to adepts in the experience and art of passion, who might be expected to have worn its charm away. Its splendour dazzles us; but, when the splendour vanishes, we do not mourn, as we mourn for the love of Romeo or Othello, that a thing so bright and good should die. And the fact that we mourn so little saddens us.

A comparison of Shakespearean tragedies seems to prove that the tragic emotions are stirred in the fullest possible measure only when such beauty or nobility of character is displayed as commands unreserved admiration or love; or when, in default of this, the forces which move the agents, and the conflict which results from these forces, attain a terrifying and overwhelming power. The four most famous tragedies satisfy one or both of these conditions; 'Antony and Cleopatra,' though a great tragedy, satisfies neither of them completely. But to say this is not to criticise it. It does not attempt to satisfy these conditions, and then fail in the attempt. It attempts something different, and succeeds as triumphantly as 'Othello' itself. In doing so it gives us what no other tragedy can give, and it leaves us, no less than any other, lost in astonishment at the powers which created it.

A. C. BRADLEY.

Art. III.—THE PRE-RAPHAELITE BROTHERHOOD.

1. *Pre-Raphaelitism and the Pre-Raphaelite Brotherhood.* By W. Holman Hunt. Two vols. London : Macmillan, 1905.
2. *Life and Letters of Sir John Everett Millais.* By John Guille Millais. Two vols. London : Methuen, 1899.
3. *Dante Gabriel Rossetti: his Family-letters.* With a Memoir by William Michael Rossetti. London : Ellis and Elvey, 1895.
4. *Pre-Raphaelite Diaries and Letters.* Edited by W. M. Rossetti. London : Hurst and Blackett, 1900.
5. *Ford Madox Brown: a record of his Life and Work.* By F. M. Hueffer. London : Longmans, 1896.
6. *Memorials of Edward Burne-Jones.* By G. B. J. [Lady Burne-Jones]. Two vols. London : Macmillan, 1904.
7. *The Life of William Morris.* By J. W. Mackail. Two vols. London : Longmans, 1899.
8. *The English Pre-Raphaelite Painters.* By Percy H. Bate. London : Bell, 1899.

Now that Mr Holman Hunt has so ably stated his own case and that of Sir John Millais, as the joint leaders and originators of the movement called Pre-Raphaelite, and now that the Brotherhood has been dead for nearly half a century, we may fairly make an attempt to solve that least clear of æsthetic modern problems : what was Pre-Raphaelism ? Pre-Raphaelism was, of course, a return to Nature—it was nothing more and nothing less. It was a thing, in its inception, as perfectly clear, as simple and as sharp-cut as a ray of sunlight driven through the gloom of a cellar from a keyhole. But it fell, this particular ray, at a moment when there were so many vapours, so many winds, so many cross-currents in the air, and in the ensuing half-century so many other rays have since whirled and flashed from so many other searchlights, that it is difficult now for any who have not studied *au fond* this relatively unimportant byway of human thought and its projections to see the original ray in its clear definiteness.

Pre-Raphaelism was a revolt in the midst of a revolt, a Gironde, a 'mountain' in a very French revolution of the arts. As a producing agency, it gave to the world

ten or a dozen pictures, five or six poems, a few statues; and it has caused an inordinate number of memoirs. It lasted, this brilliant and impracticable manifestation of the spirit of youth, at the very most some five years, from 1848 to 1853; then no one any more wrote P.R.B. after his name. Before it, in so far as the fine arts were concerned, there had existed the grand style and the revolt against it which was called classical art; and the revolt against that, which was called romantic art. The revolt which was called Christian art, or German Pre-Raphaelism, a little preceded and long outlasted the English Pre-Raphaelite Brotherhood.

But Pre-Raphaelism in its English branch left behind it two main currents of æsthetic manifestation. The first is that later style of Sir John Millais which, along with other styles, mostly hatched in French academic studios, is responsible for a large majority of the pictures in present-day Royal Academy exhibitions. These pictures, whether they be 'Returns of Black Brunswickers,' pretty female heads, presentation portraits of small celebrities, or designs for patriotic calendars, have, of course, no æsthetic significance. They supply, innocently enough, 'a felt want'; they form a sort of harmless daily bread; they are the 'pretty picture' of commerce; and they do less harm than did the commercial art that the P.R.B. rendered ridiculous and for ever impossible. This particular art made, of course, a clean break away from Pre-Raphaelism—a break so clean that no one ever thought of claiming that 'The North-West Passage' or 'Bubbles' was in any sense Pre-Raphaelite.

The case is by no means so clear when we come to the later medieval æsthetic school which is misnamed Pre-Raphaelite. Yet it is much easier to deduce even 'The North-West Passage' from Mr Hunt's 'The Awakened Conscience,' from Rossetti's 'Found,' or from Millais' own picture of a fireman rescuing a child, than to father Rossetti's large women of the seventies, Burne-Jones' 'King Cophetua,' or the decorations of William Morris or Mr Walter Crane, upon Rossetti's 'Annunciation,' Mr Hunt's 'Two Gentlemen of Verona,' or even Millais' 'Lorenzo and Isabella.' For it must be remembered that the keynote of the Pre-Raphaelite aspiration was an early or mid-Victorian modernity; the three Pre-Raphaelite

painters, Rossetti, Hunt, and Millais, while they still signed themselves P.R.B., strove before all things to be themselves and to render the world as they saw it, they being young men in England in the forties and fifties.

But one of these young men, going to Oxford to paint, met there the younger men bearing the now honoured names of Charles Algernon Swinburne, William Morris, and Edward Burne-Jones. These younger men, along with Rossetti, the Pre-Raphaelite, formed a new group or coterie—a coterie that was really more literary than plastic-æsthetic. Their particular dominant note was the medieval one; they deepened, as it were, that particular channel of the romantic stream that Walter Scott had first set flowing; they steeped themselves, far more than he, in the spirit of medievalism; they pursued it into France, into Italy, and even into Germany; they exhausted its tendencies until, in the case of William Morris, they became, in letters almost pre-medieval, and in æsthetics altogether of the Renaissance. The upholders of this movement—which was not the Pre-Raphaelite movement—exhausted themselves, in fact, to think, to see, to feel, and to exhale medievalism; and they were nicknamed the *Æstheticists*, just as, earlier, the small band of realists had been called Pre-Raphaelite by a world that was anything rather than sympathetic. Any one who will take the trouble to read the two volumes which Mr Hunt devotes to claiming for himself his true position, and, still more, any one who gives himself the pleasant trouble of really examining the pictures, Pre-Raphaelite and later, of the original trio of painters, will see how true this distinction is.

There is, however, yet another painter, Ford Madox Brown, whose fame obscures the issue. If Rossetti's trumpeters, who were many and loud, succeeded in transferring the very name of Pre-Raphaelite to a movement radically different, Madox Brown's upholders, who were few enough and remain a band as scattered as that of some tiny Nonconformist sect, have continued to label their hero 'the father of the Pre-Raphaelites'—another injustice to Mr Holman Hunt, and one which Mr Holman Hunt very naturally resents.

Madox Brown's figure is one of a singularly luckless man whether as an artist or an individual. It seems

likely that he never did justice to the remarkable powers that were his ; it is certain that he never received any material reward at all commensurate with his diligence, his sincerity, or his very considerable achievements. He was not, either officially or in spirit, ever a Pre-Raphaelite ; but his early career is so typical of the life that any sincere artist must have led in the early years of the last century that it throws a very useful light upon the subject of what Pre-Raphaelism was not. Madox Brown was born in Calais in 1821, at a time when painting of the grand style was still at its height in England. In France and Belgium it had already almost succumbed before the onslaughts of David and the Classicists. This was in itself a civil war, if not a revolution ; but the spirit of the rebellion was much more one of subject than one of technique. The Classicists painted new things in an old way ; they did not change their manner of looking at, or of rendering, the world and humanity ; they simply made mankind put on Greco-Roman chitons or togas, and stretch their arms and legs out further beneath Greco-Roman temples. Nevertheless, Classicism was a revolt ; and, if it merely attacked the type of subject and costume, it proved that there existed a sufficiently widespread dissatisfaction.

At the time when Madox Brown began to paint, in 1835, he being then fourteen, another revolt, or a third party in the revolt, was already on foot. This was the party of the Romanticists. Once more it was a matter of subject much more than of technique. The Romanticists made mankind put on ruffs and trunk-hose and go to the scaffold and to the block, posing as Mary Stuart, as Egmont and Horn, or as King Charles I ; but the method of painting remained, heavy, gloomy, dominated by mathematical rules, shadowed by the enactments of the chambers of commerce of tradesmen-painters. Nevertheless Romanticism was also a revolt, valuable in its way, as must be all movements that set men questioning their accepted ideas.

It was under the banner of the Romanticists that Madox Brown was first enlisted ; he received at least his most salient lessons from Baron Wappers, a Belgian, who was one of the chiefs of that movement. He had, no doubt, other earlier masters of the differing schools, for

his first pictures were a *fête champêtre* that might have been the work of an able follower of Fragonard, a very good portrait in the style of Rembrandt, and other well-leavened subjects painted upon bitumen. By 1845, when he visited the studios of the German Pre-Raphaelites in Rome, he was already a very able painter. His particular romantic mood was that of Byronism; he painted Manfreds and Beppos and Corsairs. One picture of his, 'Parisina's Sleep,' is a really impressive work. The subject, calling for a lamplit interior, is not appallingly unsuited for the then conventional treatment; the drawing is fine and the handling of oil-colours shows a mastery to which he hardly afterwards attained.

The German Pre-Raphaelites, Nazarenes, or Christian-art practitioners, were at that time already living their semi-monastic lives in Rome under the dual leadership of Cornelius and Overbeck. Their movement was one more revolt in that age of revolutions. Like the others, it was more a revolt of sentiment than of technique; they painted Bible stories timidly enough, and with no particular sincerity, except of cult. That is to say, they were such devout Catholics and revivalists that they imitated, not the æsthetic spirit of the painters who painted before Raphael, but the devotional frame of mind. Like Fra Angelico, they worked in cells, and, like the medieval illuminators, prepared themselves for their work by vigil, flagellation, or fasting. So little indeed did they emulate the Primitives in spirit that, far from attempting to go to Nature, they avoided her, putting forth the doctrine that no human models must be used. Thus they avoided all taint of fleshliness. That, of course, was very German and amusing to their contemporaries; and so the name Pre-Raphaelite was spread abroad, a term of wonder and humorous amazement to all who knew. This particular revolt was, perhaps, the least useful of any. Its makers produced mildly creditable pictures in later years, but they exercised no lasting influence upon any present school of art or upon any artist.

They influenced Madox Brown less even than the real Pre-Raphaelites of England, since it was upon his return to England that he set, for the first time, really to work to transcribe from nature. He produced a portrait that he called a 'modern Holbein.' With this not otherwise

very remarkable picture he really did initiate modern art. He seems to have been the first man in modern days to see or to put in practice the theory that æsthetic salvation was to be found, not in changing the painter's subject, but in changing his method of looking at and rendering the visible world. He began trying to paint what he saw. And it is a pathetic symptom of his loneliness in effort that he could go to no modern man to teach him the principles of realism; that, even as the Pre-Raphaelites went later to the primitive Italians, he must go to a long-dead Suabian. If we add to the fact that he discovered this principle the other fact that he first painted upon a white canvas, and discarded the bituminous grounds which every other artist of those days employed in order to give to their pictures a fictitious quality of Rembrandt-esque shadow and golden-brown light, we see the sum-total of the English Pre-Raphaelites' indebtedness to a painter who has been so wrongly styled the father of Pre-Raphaelism. He did, of course, once they were started upon their careers, give them, for what it was worth, his blessing as an older and vastly more capable artist.

Mr W. M. Rossetti, D. G. Rossetti, and F. G. Stephens being Pre-Raphaelite brethren, Madox Brown's grandson, and a great many other outside commentators, have said that Madox Brown was asked to join the P.R.B. and refused, not from any lack of sympathy; Mr Holman Hunt declares that Madox Brown was never asked at all. The matter seems to be immaterial to any comprehension of the Brotherhood itself; the fact remains that Madox Brown never held any official position in the movement. He painted a number of pictures that would have satisfied the Pre-Raphaelite canons of fidelity to nature and dignity of subject; and perhaps, in his diligence, his sincerity, his ceaseless searching after truth to nature, above all, in his avoidance of *chic*, of made rules and conventional tricks, he remained to the end of his days almost as much a Pre-Raphaelite in spirit as does Mr Holman Hunt himself. But that, of course, is a long way from making him in any literal sense a father of Pre-Raphaelism.

The student of these matters, having made out to his

own satisfaction that the æsthetic movement, though it centred round one of the Pre-Raphaelite Brotherhood, was a thing very different from Pre-Raphaelism, and having seen to what extent, in a Europe full of revolutionary movements, the ground was cleared for that particular revolution; having seen further that, in a world of mathematically prescribed shadow, a picture called a 'modern Holbein' had been painted, and that its painter was already employing a pure white ground—the student, having seen for himself these things, will ask, what was Pre-Raphaelism?

The movement, as has been said, has caused a great number of memoirs to be written; and of these the most authoritative are those whose titles are set at the head of this article. The student anxious to discover what Pre-Raphaelism really was, and willing to study seriously the doctrines and the personalities of the seven brothers, could not do better than to read these volumes. Upon the whole, he will do best to trust for his actual facts to the actual documents, of which Mr William Rossetti is the most lavish; and for his views he had better trust to himself. Of the books named, only those by Mr Rossetti and Mr Hunt deal at all exhaustively with the Brotherhood itself; and of these it may be said that Mr Rossetti's comments may generally be trusted, whilst Mr Hunt's views must be taken with caution. But, among them all, Mr Hunt's two volumes form the most agreeable and entertaining reading.

Mr Hueffer's 'Life' of his grandfather is, at any rate, well 'documented.' Lady Burne-Jones' 'Life' of her husband is a sympathetic and charming tribute to a very amiable personality, Mr Mackail's a scholarly chronicling of a very vigorous one. Mr Millais' 'Life' of his father is the least useful as to facts concerning Pre-Raphaelism, and is distinguished by a 'tone' much more creditable to a country gentleman than to a very skilful draughtsman. So far, indeed, as Pre-Raphaelism is concerned, Mr Millais' book is little more than a pale forecast of Mr Hunt's, since it was to Mr Hunt alone that the author went for information. Mr Bate's 'The English Pre-Raphaelite Painters,' if it contains comparatively few first-hand documents, is a careful, a sober, and a diligent compilation, and is worth reading because it sum-

marises most of the matter contained in the other volumes. Its illustrations are, moreover, numerous and well reproduced; they show the later developments of the Pre-Raphaelites and of the *Æsthetes* with a completeness that renders the book very useful.

No doubt we may see in the procession of arts—primeval Assyrian, Egyptian, Greek, Roman, Byzantine, Italian primitive, Renaissance, Grand Style, or Napoleon-Classicist—nothing but the individual desire of humanity in all the ages for something that shall be final in expression; and, in the disgust that each new revolution has excited, we may see the subconscious expression of the weariness of humanity at being forced to face always new problems, at being forced to acknowledge that there never is and never can be a finality. The problem of the artist is indeed a bewildering one. For, on the one hand, skill in rendering—in that subtle trickery of the beholder into an oblivion of himself that is art—this particular skill is gained only by evolving rules for the manipulation of materials. But, as if straightway to set this at naught, the only possibility of evolving a really vital art seems to lie in utterly ignoring those rules once they are formulated. It is as if one should, with infinite care in the placing of each card, build up a tall card-house and then cry out that the only way to build a house of cards is to shake the table and begin in quite another way, because you get tired of the house once it is built. That, no doubt, is the true statement of the problem.

The grand-style painters really *had* evolved a method, mathematical and precise, of building up excellent pictures, so that any one who had a certain minimum of manual skill and docility might erect, as it were, a very creditable house of cards, surely, and with a nice confidence. And then the world got tired of those houses. For it is certain that the world *was* tired of them, otherwise they would not have been so easily swept away before ten pictures and a few small statues. The Pre-Raphaelites were, of course, a long way from initiating that protest. We may find the almost infant Gainsborough, who was in no particular sense a revolutionist, protesting to his first master that, try as he would, he could not see grass of a pleasant and mellow amber colour, such as it was in the sketches that he was set to

copy and to emulate. His master replied with a placid assurance that, sooner or later, the infant genius would see, or would find it convenient to see, that grass, waves, roses, flesh, velvet, armour, or fruit could be made to look so coloured if one took the trouble. And, upon the whole, Gainsborough fell in with his master's ideas, though he never did anything but laugh at the suggestions of his later friends, that he should attempt subjects of a sublime nature. Hogarth of course, in a sense, did look at nature; and justice has never been done to his powers as a painter—other than as a designer of stories—since in Hogarth the painter we do find, if we will only take the trouble to look, the real initiator of modern painting, of painting that is the product of a real outlook upon life, not of a study of Correggios and the rest.

Constable, too, and Turner, and the eastern county landscapists, who were supreme painters, Bonington, in a sense, and even no doubt men like J. B. Pyne, contrived to turn out and even force acceptance for a great quantity of work that was more or less directly inspired by personal observation of real objects—of the charms of real lights and real shadows filtered through and rendered magical by their own personalities. But, upon the whole again, there never resulted, either from the example of their works or from their word-of-mouth teachings, any settled conviction that the secret of their particular charm, of all charm in works of art, was to be won only by observation filtered through personality.

We are far from wishing to set this down as a dogma or a canon, and still farther from wishing to discriminate between the relative value which we personally attach to the study of masterpieces or the study of nature. But this was the particular dogma which the Pre-Raphaelite Brotherhood existed in order to proclaim; and it is convenient to attempt to trace its genesis.

The general idea, then, existed and had been acted upon by a sufficient number of English painters before certain young artists, in a certain studio in a dingy London quarter, stood one day looking at engravings of frescoes in the Camp Santo of Pisa. Callously stated, the dogmas that they set out to scatter were absurd, unreasonable, galling, childish—anything you like with which the contemptible may be contemptuously branded.

What could be more absurd than to say that, a picture being the rendering of a scene or a natural object, every picture must contain two-thirds of shadow, or four-fifths or nine-tenths; that the light must begin in a triangular wedge at the bottom right-hand corner of the picture; that the picture must be painted upon a dark brown ground? Yet all these 'musts' then faced the artist or aided him to produce mediocre works.

Nevertheless, if we stop for a moment to enquire into the psychology of these producers, we may perceive a logic that in its day was seductive enough to hold captive a whole world. For these people, now so long dead and discredited, said simply, 'There were painters of masterpieces before our day; let us seek to discover their secrets, and we shall know how to paint masterpieces.' There could be nothing more logical than that. Accordingly, painter after painter journeyed into Italy, that land from which came the masterpieces. They had, these masterpieces, a uniform and seductive quality of brownness; a rich hue; a 'body,' as it were. That gave charm, repose, and a sort of respectability. Some one discovered that you could attain to that brown colouration by painting upon a dark preparation; therefore every one painted upon such preparations. That, too, was logical; and, if it were easy, it was no less indisputable. The problem of how the great masters got their most delicious of all gifts, their *chiaroscuro*, offered no such obvious solution; but that secret too yielded itself to patient investigation, to scientific comparison. For painters of industry that bordered on genius went from masterpiece to masterpiece making upon pieces of white paper charts of the shadows in each picture, blocking in the regions of shadow and leaving the high lights simply white, as you may distinguish the land from the sea in a map. Then, having made an infinite number of such charts, they struck an average of the proportion of light and shadow; and the secret was revealed. The great masters used in their pictures shadow and light in the proportion of four to one. Henceforth—and what could be more logical?—every picture with any pretensions to being a masterpiece must be painted upon a brown ground and must contain four parts of shadow to each one of light.

Other painters improved upon these theories, varied

in their averages of light and shadow, or discovered, as did the great Hogarth himself, philosophers' stones in the shape of lines of beauty. Mr Holman Hunt was a juvenile disciple of John Varley, the discoverer of zodiacal physiognomy. He tells us (i, 15) that

'One favourite theory of his (Varley's) was that every object in nature was divided into triangles; and, that the lines were at times curved, only veiled this fixed law. The human figure standing upright with arms extended, or again as crucified from its extremities, makes a figure of three sides. The features of the face seen in front are grouped in a triangle. In profile, again, the features form a triangle from ear to chin, chin to eyebrow, eyebrow to ear; and each feature is in its shape three-sided; even parts of each are triangles. A tree is an inverted triangle; a hill is a triangle on its base. Nature, with its light and shade, is always at work dividing squares and parallelograms into triangles. 'The square sails of a boat, he said, are thus transformed in a very striking manner.'

Zodiacal physiognomy was, in fact, a logical product of the human reasoning. Indeed the tendency to seek to discover secret rules is inborn in humanity and undying. For what is *pointillisme* but an attempt to deduce from the theory of light what the eighteenth century attempted to deduce from the practice of the old masters? Only the other day the most modern painter of the most modern of the great nations laid it down that no landscape ever had been or ever could be a masterpiece if its horizon came anywhere near to dividing the picture in half. In the days of the Pre-Raphaelites, criticism was codified into an engine of a strength that is to us almost incredible. It was, literally and demonstrably, considered to be blasphemy to paint a Holy Family without the accessories of bituminous ground and four-fifths of shadow. But he who makes a law makes also criminals; and, founded though these laws were upon reason, precedent, and reverence for the mighty past, by their very strength they were bound to create revolutionists. They came in the persons of the Pre-Raphaelites.

These young men were all born within a year or so of each other, in the twenties of the last century. The times, as we have said, were ripe for revolt; and, had the Pre-Raphaelites not come when they did, their places would

almost inevitably have been supplied by other young men. As it was, we may say that Mr Hunt was a revolutionist simply because he was temperamentally unable to paint in the older manner, and D. G. Rossetti because he was too lazy to learn it. Millais, on the whole, might be said to have been never a Pre-Raphaelite in any very earnest degree. Pre-Raphaelism was, in his brilliant and delightful career, a mere episode; it was as if he were for a moment a swallow flitting through a great hall, in and out and done with it. Before its birth he had already had a brilliant career; after its death he had another. Perhaps he gained something from its discipline; perhaps he did not; we cannot tell. Subsequently, at different periods, he alternately expressed regret for having had to do with the Brotherhood, and regret for having abandoned it. But with Mr Hunt Pre-Raphaelism was a matter of grim earnest; it was at once a faith and a means of justification. So it remains to him. He could never have painted otherwise than as the brethren painted; he could never have conquered the world had not the Brotherhood, to its limited extent, justified its existence.

Thomas Woolner, the fourth of the Pre-Raphaelites to make any serious mark as a practising artist, is a somewhat silent figure. He was a sculptor, sincerely realistic in his aims, but without much sense of plastic grace. His comparatively rare subject-groups betray the least attractive sides of Pre-Raphaelism; his figures, overwhelmed in straight draperies, appear almost to be walking in shrouds; and his rare nudes have little sinuousness of line or beauty of conception. As a portraitist, however, he had a considerable gift for catching the harder characteristics of faces. As a figure himself, he was eccentric and unyielding, with less of fascination than any one of the other six brethren; and, in the later years of his life, he devoted himself more to the collection of pictures and bric-à-brac than to the practice of his art.

Collinson, a painter of very mediocre gifts, was, both æsthetically and metaphysically, a weak, almost poltroonish creature, who might, had he had the courage to work, have produced creditable pictures within certain narrow limits. He had, that is to say, a reasonable skill in rendering still-life and draperies; but he doubted his own powers so much that he left practically no work

behind him; whilst, by his religious waverings, he succeeded very efficiently in ruining the life of one of our greatest poetesses.

The other two members—if we regard the Brotherhood as a working unit, an active and propagandist organisation—must be considered its literary mouthpieces. Mr F. G. Stephens, if he never produced any paintings of his own, did, with a very sharp and effective pen, yeoman service to the principles of the Brotherhood, and has since had a very honourable, active, and useful career as an art critic. Mr William Rossetti's is a figure almost more sympathetic by reason of its abnegations than that of any member of the seven. His several early poems, satisfying, as they do, the literary canons of actual observation and sincere rendering of the world that surrounded the brethren, have a merit that has never yet been acknowledged; and, but for the fact that he devoted all his early life to the support of his brother, his sisters, and his parents, he would assuredly have been a poet greater than his more celebrated brother and only less great in degree than Christina Rossetti. His actual services to Pre-Raphaelism in its earliest days, were very great, since in a number of newspapers and journals he praised their pictures, elucidated their principles, and spread the light vouchsafed to them.

These seven men, then, formed the P.R.B. In the beginning they were united by the common bond of opposition to the then constituted authorities, and their one maxim was 'Death to Slosh.' 'Slosh' was the easy, academic handling of all the self-satisfied practitioners of the day—the Eggs, Copes, Friths, Stones, Mulready, Wilkies, and even the Haydons. At that date, or even before 1848, Millais had already learnt all that was to be learnt of the academicians. His 'Cymon and Iphigenia,' with its mechanically imagined contrasts of dark nude maidens with fair nude maidens, its conventional poses, its conventional simpers, and its brilliant painting, was already, in 1847, to all intents and purposes, as fine a work as the 'Homeric Dance' of William Etty, R.A., himself. That is to say that, if Millais' picture had not the individual quality that leavens the 'Homeric Dance,' still, in spite of its conventions, it was a satisfying work

of art; its painter had learnt of Etty all that he could learn, except the one thing—how to become Etty.

Mr Hunt, on the other hand, had made the discovery that he never could learn anything from academical instructors. By doing violence to his natural tastes he had managed with difficulty to produce drawings from the antique that just enabled him to squeeze into the Academy schools. But even then he despaired of learning anything that had any significance for his intimate self. What, indeed, a student of genius might have learned in the Academy schools of that day was just a certain freedom of the hand, a flowing line, a facility with pencil, charcoal, or the brush. That Mr Holman Hunt has never possessed, and never could have possessed. He therefore had no resource but to strike out a line for himself. And it is pathetic to read that he too spent hours before such masterpieces as were then to be seen in the public galleries, making for himself just such charts of lights and shadows as had been made by his precursors of the Grand Style. He strove to surprise the secrets of the dead masters; but with that attempt, too, he was discontented.

It was probably Mr Hunt who inoculated Millais with the revolutionary virus, since Millais, brilliant, facile, and amiable as he had been, and as he finally became once more, was not a man to indulge in any permanent revolt against authority, if only authority consented to remain moderately tolerable. In any case Mr Hunt and Millais had been student-friends of some years' standing before there was any mention of Pre-Raphaelism in England. While so excellently making out for Millais and himself the claim to be the originators of Pre-Raphaelism, if not of the P.R.B., Mr Hunt gives some very charming pictures of the friendly intercourse between himself and the wonderful child that was Millais, of their lives in the dingy London of the forties, of their working in the dim galleries of the British Museum, of Millais' management of his subjugated father and mother. And he records endless conversations that carry conviction the less because they back up, almost too wonderfully well, the patent contention that Mr Hunt and Millais deserve all the credit of Pre-Raphaelism. It is, that is to say, impossible to believe that Millais uttered the page-long speeches in inverted commas with which Mr Hunt credits

him; and it is equally impossible to believe that Mr Hunt ever really uttered the two-page-and-a-half-long answers. The phrases, too, are too patly conceived in order to support the contentions of the Mr Hunt of 1896-1905. Nevertheless we may well believe that Millais and Mr Hunt were already, in 1848, very intimate; and that, if somewhat less articulate than Mr Hunt would have us believe, they were very genuinely dissatisfied with the then all-powerful conventions—Millais because he had exhausted all their possibilities, Mr Hunt because he was unable even to begin to assimilate them.*

Before this time, however, Mr Hunt had made the acquaintance of D. G. Rossetti, coming upon him one day whilst he himself was in search of that inspiration from the masterpieces that he never found. Later, a bond of sympathy between Mr Hunt and Rossetti arose through their mutual admiration for the poems of Keats.

'Rossetti' (says Mr Hunt) 'came up to me, repeating his praise, and loudly declaring that my picture of the "Eve of St Agnes" was the best in the collection' [at the R.A. exhibition, 1848]. . . . 'Rossetti frankly proposed to come and see me. Before this I had been only on nodding terms with him in the schools, to which he came but rarely and irregularly. He had always attracted there a following of clamorous students who, like Millais' throng, were rewarded with original sketches. Rossetti's subjects were of a different class from Millais', not of newly culled facts, but of knights rescuing ladies, of lovers in mediæval dress, &c. . . . A few days more and Rossetti was in my studio. I showed him all my pictures and studies . . . and it was pleasant to hear him repeat my propositions and theories in his own richer phrase' (i, 105-7).

Rossetti had, at that time, been attracted by Madox Brown's 'Study in the manner of the old Masters, "Our Lady of Saturday Night,"' and had been for two months undergoing a bitter apprenticeship to the older painter, an apprenticeship that lasted exactly four months. During this time Rossetti worked partly in Madox Brown's studio and partly in the studio that he shared

* Mr J. G. Millais' 'Life' of his father is of little use, at this stage, to the student. Millais appears to have kept practically no letters referring to these years of his life; and his son went for information almost solely to Mr Hunt, who, in the matter that he then supplied, merely forecasts the fuller representations that he makes in his own work.

with Mr Hancock, a sculptor. A little later he shared another with Mr Hunt himself. It seems probable that Rossetti did not really learn much at this period either from Madox Brown or from Mr Hunt, though Mr Hunt claims roundly that it was from himself that Rossetti gained all the technical knowledge that he ever had. One may regard that claim with a certain dubiety, since the Rossetti of later years had a certain amount of technical knowledge that was diametrically opposed to all the teachings of Mr Holman Hunt; but it is by no means impossible that Rossetti's first picture of 'The Girlhood of Mary Virgin' did actually gain from the fact that it was painted in the studio in which Mr Hunt also worked. Mr Hunt indeed claims that, down to a certain date, he himself painted at least some portion of the pictures that Rossetti found too difficult.

At about that date there was formed a sketching association called the Cyclographic Club, the members of which agreed to offer designs for each others' criticism and improvement. The club numbered among its members Millais, Rossetti, and Mr Hunt. According to Mr Hunt, he himself and Millais very soon seceded from this organisation, because they could discover no glimmer of talent in the other members; but, upon second thoughts, they decided to allow Rossetti to secede with them, since some talent was discernible in his designs. Other authorities say that Rossetti seceded to please himself. Be that as it may, the fact seems to remain that clubs, brotherhoods, and associations were being founded at that date, even as they are to-day, by a number of art-students. Thus it came into the heads of Hunt, Millais, and Rossetti, according to all other authorities, and into the head of Mr Holman Hunt alone, according to Mr Holman Hunt, to form a club, the members of which should paint according to the revolutionary standard at which they jointly, or at least Holman Hunt and Millais, aimed.

To what extent any one or two of the three young men had by that date elaborated or formulated the doctrines that later were to be called Pre-Raphaelism it is difficult to ascertain, though Mr Hunt states that he and Millais had already formulated everything that was in any way material. But the pictures that Mr Hunt and Millais had ready for exhibition by that date show few

traces of the putting into execution of such ideas. Mr Hunt's 'Eve of St Agnes' differed but little in technical inspiration from many other works of its year; and Millais' 'Cymon and Iphigenia' was a faithful imitation of the works of Etty. Of course the step from holding revolutionary views to putting them into execution without any outside aid, and without the sympathetic contagion afforded by such a coterie as was embodied later in the Brotherhood itself, is a very long step indeed. And we may doubtless believe that Mr Holman Hunt did hold something like the views of the P.R.B. long before the Brotherhood itself actually existed. In any case it matters little, the sole point of importance being the value of the works that Pre-Raphaelism actually produced; and the really important point about the Brotherhood is that it afforded just that atmosphere of sympathy and encouragement that was necessary for the production of works so beautiful as the 'Lorenzo and Isabella' of Millais and the 'Two Gentlemen of Verona' of Mr Holman Hunt.

That this necessary enthusiasm for the works of those two artists really existed in the hearts of the five other brethren and their friends and disciples, every public and private utterance of those five absolutely proves. Mr Hunt and, following his dictation, Mr J. G. Millais try to make us believe that Mr Hunt and Millais did not reciprocate this enthusiasm. They represent the two artists as only very grudgingly allowing admittance to the other five, as making all sorts of mental reservations, as showing, in short, a lack of generosity with which it is hard to credit them. It is the harder to believe when we remember the splendid and generous figure of Millais as a young man; and it is incredible to those of us who have been able to read a whole series of the unpublished letters, written between the years 1850 and 1855, in which Mr Hunt himself speaks in terms of unrestrained friendship and generous admiration of the works and attainments of Rossetti, Woolner, Collinson, and F. G. Stephens. It is much pleasanter, and it is also nearer the truth, to believe that the Mr Holman Hunt and Sir John Millais, P.R.A., of the closing years of the nineteenth century have libelled the generous youths who were known to their friends in the fifties as 'old Hunt' and the 'Lamp-post';

to believe that the Pre-Raphaelites really were a brilliant young band, united to bear torches, open doors, and wear in their hair the vine leaves of a splendid amity.

Mr Hunt insists that it was Rossetti who pressed on the movement the 'Overbeckian' style of a Brotherhood, and that it was Rossetti who insisted that the union should be a close one. Perhaps we may believe what he says, for that was very much in Rossetti's character. He was a man full of the generousities and the enthusiasms of youth; he had a 'richer gift of phrase,' as Mr Hunt puts it, and he had a large share of profound common-sense. We can see very well now that what made Pre-Raphaelism a powerful engine was, precisely, its union. Scattered painters had been working more or less according to its canons for a generation or two in England; as has been pointed out, there had been the Hogarths and the Gainsboroughs and, above all, the Constables and the Old Cromes. But, just on account of their solitariness and of their want of articulate voices, these efforts had done nothing to change the public mode of approach to pictures; and it is more than likely that, without the pen-support of the lesser Pre-Raphaelites, Millais would have gone on working out his salvation in the style of Etty, and Mr Hunt would have been forced to abandon painting altogether in favour of that commerce from which with so much energy he had climbed.

For, on the one hand, any one who has had anything to do with the formulation of critical theories, any one who has even read the journals of the Brothers Goncourt or of Maxime Ducamp, will know how immensely the conversation of a circle of men, of a coterie, of a brotherhood, or even the exchange of ideas of two or three friends, will aid in converting vague ideas into words, and from words into actions. There is little rashness in saying that Millais would never have taken the immense jump from the 'Cymon and Iphigenia' to the 'Lorenzo and Isabella' without the laying down of the law that came to its birth in the conclaves of the seven brothers; and Mr Hunt would have passed many years of experiment before he arrived at the 'Rienzi.' As it was, the 'Lorenzo' and the 'Rienzi' followed the 'Cymon' and the 'Eve of St Agnes' without any break at all. And when later the public abuse of those pictures filled the

press, the pens of W. M. Rossetti and F. G. Stephens were ready to answer the critics in organs of their own—the 'Spectator,' the 'Critic,' and the 'Athenæum' itself.

Moreover, any one who has had, as the present writer has had, the opportunity of reading through the immense mass of unpublished as well as the published letters of the Pre-Raphaelites and their friends, will see at once how much easier, from the point of view of patronage, the painting of Pre-Raphaelite pictures became through the existence of the Brotherhood. Letters were continually passing from one or other of the Pre-Raphaelites to one or other of their patrons, confirming them when they hesitated, pressing them to extend their purchases to the works of other members, defending pictures already bought of brother painters, and suggesting new and glorious subjects for commissioning. In this way the purchaser of one Pre-Raphaelite picture was drawn into buying pictures of all the others. The propaganda, by letter, by word of mouth, by the press, and by uniting in exhibition, created, in fact, a ready market and a steady sale that could never have existed had the brethren painted in solitude and sold to any patron they individually could find. *L'appétit*, in the matter of picture-buying, *vient en mangeant*; and it can be proved beyond doubt that, during the five years of the Brotherhood's existence, each of the four painters concerned was more ready to press a patron into buying the works of his fellows than into buying his own pictures. This is a fine record of generosity; and it would be a pity indeed if erroneous reminiscences could obliterate this aspect of the Brotherhood. Mr Hunt's book suggests nothing so much as George Borrow's stories of his encounters with the 'Man in Black'; some wicked and Protean emissary of the Æsthetics or the Brownists is as continually being detected and covered with confusion. But, upon the whole, the two volumes, when this preoccupation of the author is discounted, will remain as delightful a record of a life of adventure and as effective a collection of characters as even 'Lavengro' or 'The Romany Rye.'

So much of protest against what is, psychologically, misleading in Mr Hunt's and Mr Millais' books having been uttered, we may return to the question what Pre-

Raphaelism in its doctrines and its organisation really was. As we have said, a spirit of revolt against the conventionalism of the day was active in Mr Hunt, in Millais, in Rossetti, and in such other painters as Madox Brown, Arthur Hughes, and Robert Martineau. They had formulated certain doctrines which marked a new stage in the eternal struggle between type and character, between art considered as a thing remote from the actual world and the art that descends for its subjects into the marketplace. Upon the whole, the fight from the days of Raphael onwards had gone all in favour of the typical, of the art that is aloof from life. Now, in 1848, a strong voice was to speak in favour of the life that is around us, in favour of character as opposed to type. And although it is probable that, even amongst all the definitions worked out by the seven brethren in their united séances, no voice actually put the matter in just that phrase, by a sure if blind instinct these youths found the masters they sought. For, if type has predominated in the arts since the days of Raphael, it was precisely to the painters who painted before Raphael that the reformers must go, to get not instruction so much as a text upon which to moralise.

That, to all intents and purposes, is all that they took from the Primitives. They saw that Orcagna and Fra Angelico and Lippo Lippi, Masaccio and Botticelli, had acquired the freshness and grace that charmed them in 1848, not by any attempt to work according to abstract rules of beauty, but by simple observation of the life that was around them; and they determined to set to work according to the principles deducible from those artists. In effect they said that true beauty was to be found in life alone, and that true beauty was to be brought into works of art solely by rendering what they saw.

This formula did not, it will be observed, tie them down to a rendering of modern life, but it guarded them from any possibility of imitating the style of the Primitives; that is to say, if they were to fulfil their own laws, they were not to give their pictures the 'look' of an early Italian work. And it is significant that it was Millais—the weakest intellectually, as he was in execution the strongest, of the brethren—who painted the picture that most nearly had the look of a primitive work.

With these first ideas burning in their minds, the Pre-Raphaelites turned out their first pictures, the 'Lorenzo and Isabella,' the 'Rienzi,' and the 'Girlhood of Mary Virgin.' Fine, finely painted, and inspiring as the 'Lorenzo' really is, it is impossible to avoid seeing how skilful an exercise it is in the manner of the early masters. And, when it is placed side by side with the 'Rienzi' and the 'Girlhood,' one sees how much more imitative it is than either, how much less thoroughly it is inspired by the rules of Pre-Raphaelism. Rossetti's maiden effort is naïve and in places childish, but it is an honest attempt to render what he saw. Mr Hunt's picture has no doubt defects; nevertheless it too is a rendering of what the painter had actually seen. But, whilst painting the 'Lorenzo,' Millais was obviously trying to look at his medieval subject with the eyes of a medieval Italian painter. He was painting an exercise in the manner of the Primitives; and that was not Pre-Raphaelism.

The flat look of the picture, the cramping of the figures into an unreasonably small space, the skilfully falsified perspective of the line of the table as it recedes into the background, the costumes themselves, and the profiles of all the faces save one—all these things go to prove that Millais was not painting a modern reconstruction of an ancient scene. It must be remembered that at that date Millais was a consummate master. He could give to his paintings whatever look he liked, imitating any painter of the Boydell Gallery at his ease. And that at the same time he could render so exactly as to give to his work all the attributes that we to-day associate with photography is proved by the portrait of Mr Wyatt and a granddaughter which was painted just before the 'Lorenzo.' Here every detail is exact and observed, from the ungracious pose of the grandfather 'sitting' in his high chair, and the doll-like figure of the child, to the portraits on the walls and the wonderfully painted gilt frames, mahogany tables, antimacassars, flower-vases, and pots of creeping-jenny. All this, if it takes away from the value of the 'Lorenzo and Isabella' as a Pre-Raphaelite picture, need not lessen our wonder at the skill with which the exercise in imitation is performed. But it should be remembered that exercises in imitation were precisely what Pre-Raphaelism most depre-

cated; and the 'Christ in the House of His Parents' seems to show that Millais perceived this almost immediately. It would indeed appear that Millais, in conceiving the 'Lorenzo,' had started out, brilliant and gifted as he was, before he had really grasped the meaning of Pre-Raphaelism; and that, having started out, he pursued his particular false start for a month or two before turning back to the post.

We may discover much better what, at its first inception, Pre-Raphaelism was by looking at the 'Rienzi' and the 'Girlhood of Mary Virgin.' In both these pictures there is a real effort to reconstitute an old story, to see it with modern eyes, and to render it upon canvas as the painter saw it. Such stiffnesses as each picture displays are the result of want of skill; and such archaisms as are to be seen in them are the archaisms of 1848-9, and not those of the fourteenth century.

Mr Hunt's picture portrays, indeed, in its costumes, a certain attempt at archaism; but the knights with their pot-lid armour, the unmedieval shields, the attempts at modelling in the hindquarters and tails of the horses, and the very wrinklings of the hosiery of the dying child—all those things prove that Mr Hunt had painted realistically. He got together such properties as it was possible for a poor art-student to assemble in a London studio; and then he painted from those properties, and from nothing else, his touchingly naïve picture. In Rossetti's 'Girlhood of Mary Virgin,' these characteristics are even more pronounced. Everything here is just precisely what a poor boy of delicate tastes might have brought to the studio that he shared with Mr Hunt; and the picture is all the more sincere in that it represents a scene that really took place indoors. Mr Hunt calls the picture Overbeckian. The epithet is hardly worth repeating, save that, in characterising a picture, it is so very convenient to say what a picture is not. The scene is rendered precisely as Overbeck would not have rendered it. The touches of realism, the very folds of the gown clothing the Virgin, St Anne, and the tiny angel, would have been missing; and what modelling there is in the faces would have been absent altogether. Overbeck could paint; and, if he painted all flesh as a flat surface, it was because he chose to do so. Rossetti was incapable

of giving to his forms much relief. But he did his best. He borrowed his sister's dresses and painted them; he borrowed a child's night-gown and painted that on a small lay figure; he borrowed big books from his father and window curtains from the home in Charlotte Street. Such oddness of aspect as the picture displays arose simply from a want of skill. Each object in the picture, it must be remembered, he was painting for the very first time; and for the very first time he was arranging any composition at all. In Mr Hunt's picture there is even a certain deference paid to the ruling canons and conventions. The principal figure is in a strong light; it is emphasised by heavy masses of arbitrary shadow; there is practically no attempt at preserving an illusion of the open air. But the 'Girlhood of Mary Virgin,' such as it is, is an absolutely simple and unconventional attempt at rendering what a boy saw.

None of the three pictures has any great artistic value in itself, but they are at least milestones on the long road of the history of art, or rather signposts pointing in a new direction which that road has taken, into the region of that modern art we admire or despise. It is not insignificant that the very month which saw the publication of Mr Hunt's glorification of Pre-Raphaelism saw also the publication of an *édition définitive* of Sir Joshua Reynolds' 'Discourses.' Here once more, after a lapse of some fifty years, in which the canon of Pre-Raphaelism, the apotheosis of character, has remained unchallenged and has seemed unchallengeable, the great protagonist of the typical lifts up once more his voice and is saluted by the most modern of the moderns. For, as was inevitable, the weariness engendered by the individualistic struggle to which Pre-Raphaelism and its successors, Impressionism and all the rest, have condemned both painters and critics, has borne its own fruit. Once more we are almost ready to set out in the search for a formula; we are ready to examine with a sympathetic respect an almost forgotten creed.

Art. IV.—THE GOVERNMENT AND SOUTH AFRICA.

1. *Despatch transmitting Letters Patent and Order in Council providing for Constitutional Changes in the Transvaal.* Presented to Parliament, April 1905. (Cd. 2400.)
2. *Further Correspondence relating to Labour in the Transvaal Mines.* Presented to Parliament, February 1906. (Cd. 2819.)
3. *Parliamentary Debates, 1906.* Hansard. Vol. CLII.
4. *Transvaal Problems: some Notes on Current Politics.* By Lionel Phillips. London: Murray, 1905.
5. *The Africander Land.* By Archibald R. Colquhoun. London: Murray, 1906.

WHEN the late Government, in obedience to their most trusted advisers, sanctioned the importation of indentured Chinese into the Transvaal, they were well aware that they were following a course which in no circumstances could bring them popularity at home. Had they been negligent of the interests of the Empire and looked only to their own credit with the country, they would have waved the question aside with a few imposing platitudes. For in the nature of the case their defence was lengthy and intricate, and demanded a certain knowledge of South African conditions which no electorate possesses. The average voter had neither the patience nor the intelligence to master the facts of the complex economic situation on which their justification was based. On the other hand, the attack was such as the wayfaring man, though a fool, would understand. With many honest people the word 'slavery' is sufficient to suspend all judgment and turn them into noisy abolitionists. Many, again, were impressed with the cry that a war which had been avowedly fought for the white workman had resulted in dispossessing him and filling his place with cheap coloured labour. The old suspicion of the capitalist was awakened; and appeals were made to that *Judenhetze* which is dormant in all northern nations. The Liberal party embarked on their electioneering with as fine a hand of cards as was ever held by an Opposition, and they made good use of their opportunities. The most sacred of moral appeals was prostituted in the party

game. Posters and picture-cards represented mine-owners as Legrees, and the labourers as shivering and tortured slaves, or, with the logic common to such tactics, showed a Chinaman in bloated prosperity driving out an emaciated British workman. In most constituencies the humble voter believed that in the Transvaal a wrong had been committed against civilisation and humanity, and returned their Liberal member to ensure its instant abolition.

The elections are over; and Liberal Ministers with an unparalleled majority at their back, have left irresponsible rhetoric behind them and are face to face with the hard facts of government. Not the least difficult of their problems is that of South Africa and its future; and it is idle to pretend that in their dealing with it they are not handicapped by their conduct in the past two years. An atmosphere of suspicion has been created. Men who see in the gold industry the only guarantee of South Africa's political progress may reasonably fear that the contemptuous attitude adopted in opposition may be followed by a hasty and unconsidered policy in power. And the dread is intensified by another fact for which we cannot altogether hold the new Government responsible. It numbers among its supporters some of the most irreconcilable opponents of the late war. The Bond in Cape Colony and Het Volk in the Transvaal have chosen to claim the Liberal party as their allies, and to look to it for that official countenance hitherto denied them.

The new Government is an Imperialist Government, as every British Government must be. The Empire is not the possession of any one party; and any attempt to claim Imperialism as the perquisite of Liberal or Conservative deserves the gravest reprobation. The Empire is part of the data of our politics; its well-being is, like the monarchy, an axiom of all sane political creeds. Any British Cabinet must be assumed to desire to cherish the fortunes of each colony and dependency as zealously as they foster the prosperity of these islands. We must assume that, if they blunder, they blunder honestly; and that the remedy is fuller information and better logic, and not a change of disposition. This being so, it is surely the path of wisdom to make it easy for them to forget their hasty electioneering dogmas and to welcome any steps taken which point towards sound policy. For this

reason a speech such as Lord Milner delivered in the House of Lords on February 26, with its freedom from party bias and its insistence upon the cardinal facts of the situation, seems to us infinitely wiser than the attempts made in the Lower House by Mr Chamberlain and others to 'corner' Ministers on their past utterances. No doubt it is the business of an Opposition to oppose; but it is also the business of a patriotic Opposition to do nothing to compromise the settlement of a great Imperial question. The Liberal Government has sufficient ghosts from its past, and enough fanatics and doctrinaires among its following, to make its path difficult. The matter is too urgent for wasting time on mere debating points. If, as we are bound to believe, Lord Elgin has the interests of South Africa at heart, it is our business to make a fair compromise easy.

On one matter the new Government is committed. It is bound as soon as possible to shift the responsibility for the continuance of Chinese labour from its own shoulders. The burden must be left to the Transvaal; and that colony must be given the earliest possible opportunity of deciding the question for itself. Three months ago, as Lord Milner pointed out, the wounds made by war were almost healed. Trade returns, railway returns, and revenue, all showed satisfactory results. 'The surplus population was almost absorbed, and there would soon have been a demand for further immigration.' The revival of industrial and agricultural prosperity was raising the spirits of the people—the only cure for the 'asperities of racial rivalry.' Once more everything is in the melting-pot; and uncertainty has brought with it stagnation. Deplorable though the result is, the blame is not altogether on a Ministry which, holding honestly certain views, is placed by the swing of the party pendulum in a position to enforce them. They were bound by their pledges to wash their hands of the Chinese business; and, to this end, while recognising existing licenses, they have refused to grant any new ones, and have announced their intention of giving the colony full responsible government at the earliest convenient date.

To abolish Chinese labour forthwith is, on their own admission, impossible. In the latest Blue-book, Lord

Selborne points out some of the consequences of such a course. Nearly six thousand white miners would be at once thrown out of employment with no hope of finding other work. Nearly eighteen thousand white men, whose living depends indirectly on the mines, would sooner or later also lose their means of livelihood. The money spent locally would be reduced by over 4,000,000*l.* per annum. The Transvaal revenue would lose directly a quarter of a million and, allowing for the drop in the Intercolonial budget, would fall short of expenditure by 870,000*l.*; while the budgets of both Cape Colony and Natal would show heavy deficits. No Government in its senses is prepared to plunge half a continent into bankruptcy for a whim. The existing labour supply—which it is calculated will suffice on the present basis for the first three-quarters of 1906—will be maintained. The conditions of the labour Ordinance will be amended in the interests of humane dealing, so as to approach as near as possible to the Liberal idea of what the terms of importation should be. The letters patent providing for representative institutions will be cancelled, and a responsible constitution provided in their place. Then, having paved a way for an unfettered decision, the Government will ask a self-governing Transvaal to say whether or not it will have Chinese labour, reserving the right to veto any of the terms of contract should the answer be in the affirmative. Such appears to be Lord Elgin's policy.

We do not propose to argue the Chinese question again. In Lord Milner's words, the controversy has reached a stage when no one can any longer hope to make converts. It is sufficient if we profess our belief in the overwhelming necessity for the experiment, and in the substantial justice and humanity with which it has been conducted. All we ask for the moment is that the Government should admit that, as things stand, it is the foundation of Transvaal industrialism; and the fact has been conceded. It may not be the only or the best foundation for the gold industry; but this the Colony must determine at some later date for itself. If, in the meantime, small emendations of the Ordinance will soothe any irritable Radical conscience, by all means let them be made. The changes which Mr Churchill sketched in his speech in the House of Commons on February 22 are

for the most part academic and unobjectionable. It was obvious that in the first stages of a novel experiment there must be mistakes and irregularities. Flogging was administered without proper sanction, as Lord Milner has frankly admitted. But these abuses were speedily remedied; and no one reading Lord Selborne's most recent despatches with a fair mind can find anything to complain of in the treatment of the labourers. The Government proposes to prevent the deduction of fines from wages, to forbid the imposition of collective fines and the infliction of criminal penalties for non-criminal offences, and to have all trials conducted in open court. To these details there can be no objection.

One scheme indeed seems to us highly dangerous, but happily it is also all but impracticable. At present a Chinese labourer may terminate his contract and return home on payment of his passage money, which amounts to 17*l.* 10*s.* If he shows an honest desire to return, and has not the wherewithal to provide the sum, the Government proposes to supply him with it out of Imperial funds. This announcement, Mr Churchill thought, would 'carry relief to many hearts throughout this country.' In our opinion it is more likely to bring a smile to the lips than the tear of sensibility to the eye. If every Chinaman is to be offered a free trip home to China, then, unless he is greatly enamoured of his work, he will accept the offer and, concealing his savings, demand the whole sum. This will mean a considerable cost to the exchequer and that very paralysis of the industry which the Government seeks to avert. If, on the other hand, it demands valid reasons before making the grant, the successful applicants, on the assumption that there is no ill-treatment, will be few indeed. Lord Elgin, who has had practical administrative experience, 'hoped' or 'expected' that few would avail themselves of the offer; and, if it is made on the only conditions under which it is feasible, his hopes are not likely to be disappointed.

The real gravity of the situation lies on its constitutional side, where certain questions of principle have been raised which go to the very root of Imperial policy. The first is the immediate grant of responsible government to both the Transvaal and the Orange River Colony. All the reasons which were urged in these pages

last July in favour of first trying the half-way house of representative institutions are still valid. Neither colony has any real experience of autonomy on British lines. In both colonies the party division must be racial to begin with. Neither has among its permanent population an adequate amount of political talent to deal successfully with the many complex economic problems which are still unsolved. But in the case of the Transvaal there is something to be said on the other side. The most vital question, that of labour, must be settled speedily and finally; and a satisfactory solution can only be reached in accordance with the wishes of the inhabitants. We need not enquire into the reasons which have induced such haste on the part of the Ministry to grant responsible government to the Transvaal; but it is clear that a solution arrived at by an untrammelled assembly in that colony is more likely to be satisfactory and final than one forced on it by the Colonial Office. Again, the voice of the majority of the population is in favour of responsible government; for in recent months the Progressive party have adopted the same ground as the others. Finally, it is practically certain that the elections will, on the existing franchise, show a British majority, in which case the chief danger of autonomy is removed. In these circumstances we are inclined to agree that responsible government without any intermediate stage is the wisest course.

Unfortunately the same is not true of the sister colony. We have always been in doubt about the justice of granting representative institutions to the Transvaal alone, and thereby penalising the Orange River Colony for its quiet behaviour. But, when the question of responsible government arises, there is a very real difference. In the Orange River Colony the British population is a small minority. Is there any security, as Lord Milner argued with all the earnestness of a bitter experience, that the Dutch will not use their power to oust those British settlers, teachers, and officials to whom we are pledged by every tie of honour, and to secure the development of their land on the lines of a narrow anti-British parochialism? They would meet the objections of any British governor with the sacred plea of colonial freedom, and they would get ample backing from many well-meaning politicians at home.

If responsible government must be granted, it is the duty of a British Ministry to make provision for such a contingency by special terms, and also to see that autonomy does not weaken the chances of that ultimate federation on which the fate of South Africa rests. We have no distrust of the ordinary Boer citizen; but the people who will manage his affairs, the predikants of the Kirk and leaders like Mr Fischer and Mr Steyn, have given us small reason to trust them. Unless we are wilfully blind, we must realise that the race question is still the main issue in South Africa, and that it is criminal folly to betray our own people out of some misplaced idea of chivalry and Christian charity. The sonorous words of Lord Durham's Report—much quoted in recent discussions—are not in point. No one denies the value of self-government in most cases as a healing ointment for race differences. But four years after a war in which one race has staked and lost its all, in a colony where that race is in a large majority and has made no secret of its antipathy to certain British ideals, unconditional autonomy may lead to a more irreconcilable strife. We welcome signs that the Government is not ignorant of this danger, and is unwilling to win a cheap reputation for magnanimity at the expense of its own kin.

A more serious question is raised by the statement of the Chancellor of the Exchequer on February 23 as to the nature of the constitution to be granted to the Transvaal. Full and free autonomy is to be given—the Government is never tired of insisting upon this fullness and freedom; but at the same time certain restrictions are to be imposed upon the decision of the colony on its most urgent question. We do not profess to understand very clearly what Mr Asquith means, and we doubt if he is quite certain himself. He seems to suggest that, in order not to handicap the Transvaal in its choice, the present Ordinance is to be repealed. 'If they did inherit this Ordinance, it would be part of the law of the land; and therefore, unless something were done to annul it or repeal it or amend it, all its powers would be in force.' This may refer merely to the emendation of certain of its terms which the Under-Secretary for the Colonies had already announced. But the obvious interpretation of these words is that the Government intends to have the Ordinance

repealed *in toto*—we presume by Order in Council—before responsible government is granted. This would mean that all arrangements for importation would have to be cancelled, all labourers on the spot sent back, and the whole labour organisation scattered to the winds. The industry would suffer precisely the same *débâcle* as, according to Lord Elgin, the Government deprecates. There may be some third meaning in Mr Asquith's cryptic statement which eludes us, for we do not believe it possible that he proposes any such ruinous course. Such action would not give the Transvaal a chance of an unfettered vote, but would compromise the freedom of its decision at the start by plunging it into an economic crisis. It is difficult to regard the pronouncement as anything more than a sop to some of the more noisy elements in the Government's following.

The same vagueness attaches to the matters to be reserved for the Imperial Government. Mr Asquith said :—

'The Transvaal Government have absolute power to determine the economic question whether they will have Chinamen labouring in the country. Not inheriting the Ordinance, they will be required, if they so determine, to frame legislation as to the conditions under which such labour should be carried on. That legislation will, not only by the inherent power invested in the Crown in the case of a colonial Constitution, but by express instructions given to the Governor, be reserved to the consideration of his Majesty's Government. Let me add that, though I do not anticipate any such contingency arising, yet, if such a contingency did arise, so long as we on this bench are responsible for the conduct of affairs, any legislation corresponding to that of this Ordinance, and inconsistent with our best British traditions, would unquestionably be vetoed.'

If by conditions of labour is meant merely Mr Churchill's proposed emendations, then we have no objection, though the whole suggestion is contrary to the spirit of the speeches of the Secretary and Under-Secretary for the Colonies. But, if it means that the Chinese coolie will only be allowed to enter the Transvaal free to roam where he chooses, and settle permanently if he pleases, then the grant of self-government is a pure illusion. From the menacing tone of the Under-Secretary's more recent speeches we fear that the latter is the more likely inter-

pretation. The Transvaal is to be allowed to decide on the importation of labour; but the only condition on which she is prepared to allow such importation is prejudged against her. There may be a difference of opinion in the colony as to whether there should be any importation at all; but Boer and Briton are united on what the primary condition must be.

It is a platitude that the Crown has a right of veto on colonial legislation. It is also a fundamental doctrine of Imperial policy that such a veto is never exercised unless the general well-being of the Empire demands it. It is never exercised, that is to say, when the question at issue is in its nature mainly local, such as this matter of Transvaal labour. We do not want, however, to press the constitutional point too far. We are believers in the preservation of every possible tie between the mother-country and the Colonies, and we can imagine circumstances where a colonial government might propose legislation repugnant to the moral sense of the Empire, which it would be the duty of the Crown to remonstrate against and even to forbid. Our argument is rather that the Government, having admitted that the importation of contract-labour carries no moral stigma, and having admitted the right of the Transvaal to determine the question for itself, is bound to make that right a reality by construing importation in the only sense in which the Transvaal understands it. To do otherwise would be like offering a boy a choice between the Navy and the Church as a profession, after premising that in no case must he leave these shores.

We believe that the Government will be guilty of no such folly, and that Mr Asquith's unfortunate remark arose merely from the lawyer's habit of using any argument which may have a momentary effect upon a tribunal, irrespective of its consistency with his general plea. Nor are we alarmed by Mr Churchill's strange threat that, if the Transvaal decided upon importation, it might be the duty of the Government to use their influence in China to prevent recruiting. The spectacle of the Imperial Government intriguing abroad against one of its colonies, after having given that colony the right to determine its policy for itself, is one which the British people would never endure to look upon. But we are willing to admit

the reality of the Government's difficulties. Misrepresentation has aroused an uneasy conscience in the Liberal ranks; and the saner members have to pay the penalty. Herein lies the value of a Commission of Enquiry, which we regret to see the Government, so far as concerns this matter, is not disposed to appoint. We have no fear of the results of such an enquiry, and it might have done something to allay the suspicions which the campaign of calumny has aroused. The only objection to it is on the score of time. The elections under the Lyttelton Ordinance would have been held in June or July; according to the Prime Minister, under the new constitution they will only be delayed for a few months. We are glad to see that the Cabinet is alive to the need of haste. The existing labour supply will last only till the autumn; and, unless the matter is settled then, or soon after, economic disaster will overtake the colony. The recognition of this fact and the avowal of every desire to avert such a calamity are, so far, the most hopeful points in the ministerial policy.

The question of time brings us to the last and most important of the constitutional points raised—the nature of the franchise under the new constitution. Under the Lyttelton scheme all male white British subjects who had passed their twenty-first birthday obtained a vote if for a period of six months they had occupied premises of the value of 100*l.* or the annual value of 10*l.*, or if for a period of six months they had been in receipt of salary or wages at the rate of not less than 100*l.* per annum '*bona fide* earned within the colony.' Considering the scale of wages and rents in the Transvaal, this represents the lowest possible qualification short of manhood suffrage. Further, as a concession to the Dutch population, the franchise was extended to any person who had been on the voting-roll of the first Volksraad. Now the first Volksraad roll was a generous register; and this provision enfranchised practically the whole burgher population without qualification of property. The number of members was fixed at from thirty to thirty-five; and a Commission was appointed to delimit the electoral districts. The basis was to be the number of qualified voters, but the Commission was instructed to consider, so far as possible, the boundaries of existing administra-

tive divisions (which are roughly those of the old constituencies), and were given discretionary powers as to 20 per cent.—10 per cent. above and 10 below the quota of voters. Finally, provision was made for a system of automatic redistribution of seats—a most necessary provision in a new and growing country. The recent history of Cape Colony has shown that, where population is mobile and the only method of redistribution is a specific act of the legislature, anomalies are tolerated till they take on the character of vested interests, and any reform becomes a party question.

Had the Lyttelton constitution remained, the first elections would have taken place in July. They are now postponed, but, according to the Prime Minister, only for a few months, which seems to imply that no attempt will be made to tamper with the existing electoral divisions. A redivision, it is calculated, would occupy from eighteen months to two years; and, with a burning question left unsettled, such delay is unthinkable. At the same time it is impossible to blink the fact that the Boer leaders are agitating for a change in the whole electoral system. The ablest of their number has been on a mission to this country; and certain sections of the Radical press are prepared to see merit in their plea. They ask for a division of seats on the basis of population and not of voters; and their argument is threefold. First, they say that, on the voters basis, the country districts, where the population is permanently settled, will be swamped by the Rand, where the majority of the inhabitants reside only for a season and for a purpose. Some discrimination, they argue, should be made in favour of the permanent as opposed to the transient elements in the nation. In the second place, it is urged that the voters represent not only themselves, but the disfranchised classes—women and children, and men who do not attain to the property qualification. It is therefore only fair, in delimiting electoral districts, to take into account those who are represented but do not actually vote. Lastly, they contend that the population basis is normal throughout the Empire, and that any departure from it means that the franchise is gerrymandered for a political purpose.

We are far from denying that there is something to be said on general grounds for this view. In a country

where the number of voters in each constituency bears a fairly even ratio to the whole population, the one basis is, in practice, as good as the other. It is even possible to conceive a case in which it might be politic and just to discriminate in favour of the country districts in order to secure a fair representation of interests which have a value for the nation out of proportion to their numerical strength. But, in a colony like the Transvaal, 'fancy' franchises, or anything like them, are out of the question. For the real object of the Dutch leaders is not a franchise more perfect in the abstract, but preferential treatment for their own people—in a word, a Dutch majority. In the towns the British population is largely made up of young bachelors or newly-married men; in the country parts most Dutch farmers have patriarchal families. For the present the old division between town and country is practically synonymous with the division of races. To give a preference to the rural vote would be to give a preference to one race—and that not our own—in the coming elections, which will be fought wholly on the racial issue. In such circumstances there is no room for experiment, which is certain to be misconstrued. We are bound to take some simple democratic rule and stick to it.

The simplest and most democratic of rules is the division of electorates on the basis of voters. Under the form of 'one vote one value' it has long been the avowed policy of radicalism at home. Even if precedents were absent, the Radical party are estopped from opposing, merely because of its novelty, a reform which they have always urged. But we are not without precedents. Though the usual system at home and throughout the Empire is the population basis, the voters basis appears in the constitution of New South Wales and in that most recent of electoral models, the Australian Commonwealth. In a progressive colony like New Zealand, though the basis is population, provision is made for the addition of certain arbitrary percentages in calculating the population of various districts—a provision which, as we understand it, seems an attempt to redress the inequalities of the existing system. It may be answered that these precedents are irrelevant, since they are conjoined with manhood suffrage; but manhood suffrage is not the point of our opponents' contention; and, though it is a matter

which should more properly be left to an autonomous Transvaal to decide for itself, we see no objection to adding it to the new constitution.

The true argument, however, must be founded, not on precedent or even on principle, but on the actual circumstances of the case. There is no intrinsic value in any constitutional device apart from the facts which it is framed to meet. And what are the facts in the Transvaal? A war has been fought at an immense cost to make the country a British colony, and to give our own people, long unrepresented, their just share in the shaping of the future. There is, we devoutly hope, no intention to go back upon the results of that war; but, if the British interest is to be strengthened and the colony developed permanently on British lines, then we are bound to do nothing to lessen the voting power of our race.

The Dutch have chosen to fight the election on racial grounds; and the choice came voluntarily from them, as any reader of Mr Lionel Phillips' careful analysis of their tactics is bound to admit. Since the issue is forced upon us, it would be madness to cripple our fighting power at the start. We propose the normal democratic franchise, discriminating in favour of neither one side nor the other. If the larger count of men happens to be on our side, why, in the circumstances, should we surrender this advantage, when the issue is the clear alternative of British or Dutch, a free colony within the Empire, or a free colony outside of it? That the latter is the ultimate goal of the policy of *Het Volk*, Mr Colquhoun points out clearly in his recent work; and every man with any first-hand experience of South Africa will agree with him. The proposal is to penalise those men who represent the British ideal, who contribute nearly all the revenue of the country, and who stand for the forces of liberalism, progress, and democracy. It is arguable that a British Government should discriminate in their favour; it is almost incredible that it should discriminate against them.

We are bound, as we have said, to credit the Ministry with having the welfare of the Empire at heart, and honestly desiring to do justly and wisely by South Africa. Even if it were otherwise, it is not their interest, on the mere ground of party tactics, to rekindle a fiercer strife there and drive a wedge into the centre of their own

following. For the country which has given them their huge majority is Imperialist at heart, and will not tolerate any repetition of the Majuba policy. The unseemly and unconstitutional motion of censure on Lord Milner for a minor blunder which he readily admitted, the disingenuous device adopted to evade its consequences, and above all the insolent tone of patronage in which Mr Churchill reflected on the conduct of one of the greatest of living public servants—whose assailants, moreover, he stigmatised, five years ago, as ‘rebels, traitors, and pro-Boers’—have already done much to alienate the better class of public opinion from the Government. We have no desire to hurry them in their decision, for they have themselves admitted that time is of the essence of the question; and that, if things are not settled soon, they will not be settled at all. But their utterances before and since taking office have undoubtedly caused grave uneasiness in the Transvaal and among sober-minded people at home; and it is well that they should be alive to the gravity of the question with which they are dealing. Nor let it be forgotten that the appointment of a Commission of Enquiry in no way relieves them from their responsibility. Can it be that the appointment of this commission is merely intended to play out the time until the close of the session shall enable the Government to manipulate the franchise at its pleasure, without the risk of facing parliamentary criticism?

Nationalism is bound to come in South Africa, for it is the logical development; and our business is to see that it does not take a wholly anti-British character. The problem, let it be repeated, is not now one of the wisdom or folly of Chinese labour, but of our loyalty to those constitutional principles which have hitherto guided our colonial policy. If we create artificially a Dutch majority, nothing remains for the British element but to make their terms with *Het Volk*; and from the mind of our own colonists every particle of affection for the mother-country will be expelled. The British-born will feel themselves betrayed by the power in whom they trusted; and the betrayal will never be forgiven or forgotten. Or if, after a grant of responsible government, we make that responsibility a farce by vetoing the decision of the Transvaal people on their chief problem, without any

justification in ethics or Imperial policy—by assuming, too, that their moral code is lower than ours, and that they are not to be trusted to refrain from wrong-doing—we shall make their loyalty incompatible with their independence. More, we shall have paved the way for a certain disruption of the Empire, for we shall have violated the central principle of Imperial unity. If the Government appeal to Lord Durham's Report, we are well content. From that charter of colonial freedom we quote what follows :—

'It must henceforth,' Lord Durham wrote, 'be the first and steady purpose of the British Government to establish an English population, with English laws and language, in this province, and to trust its government to none but a decidedly English legislature.' And again, 'They do not hesitate to say that they will not tolerate much longer the being made the sport of parties at home; and, if the mother-country forgets what is due to the loyal and enterprising sons of her own race, they must protect themselves. . . . The colony's connexion with the Empire is not strengthened, but greatly weakened, by a vexatious interference on the part of the Home Government with the enactment of laws for regulating the internal concerns of the colony.'

If the Government is guided by the Durham Report, let it be guided by the whole document, and by its spirit, not by an isolated paragraph. For the only arguments by which the immediate grant of self-government can be defended are also cogent as to the necessity of making that grant a substance and not a shadow. To declare a policy with one breath and deny it with the next—'*suarum legum auctores ac subversores*'—would be strange conduct in a party which has often claimed a monopoly of principle. We make all allowances for the difficulty of the situation and the ignorance and fanaticism of many of the rank and file, but we cannot believe that a British Ministry will ever make itself responsible for so startling a violation of British traditions.

Art. V. — SOME LETTER-WRITERS, ANCIENT AND MODERN.

1. *The Correspondence of M. Tullius Cicero*. Arranged and edited by R. Y. Tyrrell and L. C. Purser. Seven vols. London: Longmans, 1885-1901.
2. *The Letters of Cicero*. Translated by E. S. Shuckburgh. Four vols. London: Bell, 1899-1900.
3. *C. Plinii Cæcili Secundi Epistolarum Libri IX*. Recognovit Henricus Keil. Leipzig, 1889.
4. *Letters of Philip Dormer, Earl of Chesterfield*. Edited by Lord Mahon. Five vols. London: Bentley, 1845-1853.
5. *The Autobiography and Correspondence of Mary Granville, Mrs Delany*. Edited by Lady Llanover. Six vols. London: Bentley, 1861-1862.
6. *Lettres de la Marquise du Deffand à Horace Walpole et à Voltaire*. Four vols. Paris, 1812.
7. *Correspondance complète de Madame, Duchesse d'Orléans*. Traduction, par Gustave Brunet. Paris: Charpentier, 1857.

And other works.

MANY persons, even among the more cultivated classes, vote the reading of letters dull work; and a still larger number neglect the writing of them. The chief agents at work to bring about the latter result are facility of locomotion and the penny-post; for, on the one hand, what can be done with too great frequency is apt to be ill done, a sense of ease being thereby engendered, which in its turn breeds slovenliness; and on the other, the constant hope of a speedy meeting not unnaturally tends to relegate to the confidences of conversation what would otherwise have been anticipated upon paper. The excessive stress of life and society to-day has also its share in this particular form of literary decadence; but we recognise the weakness of this apology when we reflect that most of the letters of Cicero, and all the best of them, were written in the midst of that political turmoil which gave birth to the Roman Empire; and that the sprightly correspondence of Mrs Delany and her group of charming female friends represented precious hours admirably stolen from the thousand-and-one 'impertinencies' which, in London and great country-houses alike, invaded the

leisure of all the highly-placed women of their time. It is possible that many a collection of letters, as yet unknown or unborn, may one day redeem our own society of the last and the next thirty years from a charge of inarticulate intimacy; but this hope is unhappily slight.

Another cause which has contributed to the decay of letter-writing, and, for the matter of that, of conversation too, is the multiplication of magazines and the growing fashion of signed articles. Good talkers are reluctant to give up to a dinner-party what they mean for mankind; and friends are apt to reserve material, which would have made a delightful letter, for less valuable though more lucrative amplification in the pages of some weekly newspaper or monthly review. It is not given to everybody to show that generous jollity of Charles Lamb, which led him to anticipate his more elaborate essay on Roast Pig by his equally immortal, if slighter, letter to Coleridge upon the same succulent and savoury topic. Yet, if sympathy be worth more than notoriety, the recognition which begins with privately reaped esteem is better at the moment, as it may well be more enduring in the long-run, than that temporary effervescence of public praise which, after a brief sparkle, leaves nothing in the goblet of self-consciousness save a few flat and sour dregs of disappointment and oblivion. That fame is best which grows slowly; and there is a thrift peculiar to the laying-up of renown.

There is one great claim which letter-writing may urge upon the attention of the world. Nothing else makes manifest in the same direct and domestic fashion the kinship of the ages. How much better should we know, and how much more closely related should we feel to the ancient Athenians and Corinthians than we do, if such a series of Greek letters were extant as we possess in those of Cicero, Pliny, Symmachus, and Apollinaris! And how are the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries lighted up and made akin to us by the correspondence of Madame de Sévigné, Lord Chesterfield, Horace Walpole, Voltaire, Gray, Madame du Deffand, Cowper, the Duchess of Orleans, Mrs Delany, and Madame de Staël!

A family likeness is apparent among the letters themselves, for kindred conditions of society created them all; and the lack of such conditions, whenever and

wherever it has existed, has left society unproductive. Leisure, the unconscious heritage of generations of culture—for 'bon écrivain,' like 'bon chien, chasse de race'—a due sense of social position, wit and wits of course, good taste, and a certain seriousness and soundness of heart, never obtruded and easily worn, are one and all essential to good letter-writing. All these can only be found together in a long established aristocracy, in the best sense of that term. To write letters which the world hereafter shall value, not as ethical, scientific, or political essays, like many of the letters of Fénelon, Montaigne, Bossuet, and Swift, or the 'Epistolæ ad Lucilium' of Seneca, but as social records bringing epochs together, people must be well-placed, well at ease, and sure of themselves and of each other. One special charm attaches itself to the letters of persons so seated in the world. Their sense of security makes them generous in the expression of reciprocal appreciation. Theirs is no mere 'mutual-admiration society.' The quality is at once spontaneous and earnest, gracious and graceful, and makes a refreshing contrast to that half-cold, half-critical reception of things well done which is supposed to spring from reserve, but, if it does, begets in its turn a frugality of acknowledgment that easily degenerates into spleen.

Little reflection is needed to see that the age which produced the letters of Cicero and those of the many distinguished Roman gentlemen to whom they were addressed, had equipped its society with most, if not with all, of the qualifications we have mentioned. The correspondents were all well-born, for even Cicero himself, though not a Roman patrician, came of an ancient family of Arpinum, and his father was of equestrian rank; they were mostly, too, men of ample fortune, and, though frequently in political danger, were at least socially sure of themselves and their position. They were, further, in full course of endowment with the fast growing literature of their own country. To its poetry Ennius, Nævius, Plautus, and Terence had already made their contributions; Catullus was even then happily acclimatising some of the lyric measures of Greece, and Lucretius, with still greater success, her mighty hexameter; while Sallust, and their own great protagonist

Cicero, were consolidating the native prose style. Lastly, it is to their credit that, with an avidity which was as much greater as it was more respectable than the greed of acquisition which had stripped cities and temples, they had seized upon and assimilated the accumulated treasures of the Grecian tongue.

This first conjunction of the requisite accidents straightway produced its own first-fruits in the matchless collection of correspondence which it has bequeathed to us. Thus it is that Cicero has been well called the 'Father of Letter-writers.' Such a manifestation had never been possible before; it was inevitable as soon as it was possible. Though we may admit that the chief value of Cicero's letters is the basis they make for the history of their period, we must do this with a due sense that they are more; they are models of their style itself. They may not sparkle like Walpole's, to say nothing of Byron, who stands in brilliancy alone and apart—'e solo in parte vidi il Saladino'; they may lack the sober dignity of Gray, the pathos of Cowper, the vivacity and infinite variety of the lightsome and adorable Mrs Delany; still they form a marvellous and, on the whole, with due deference to Mommsen, a not altogether unpleasing self-portraiture. All the man is laid bare to us with a frankness more real and less calculated than Rousseau's. We see the alternations of courage with cowardice, of philosophy with fretfulness; we recognise the generosity, the meanness, and the impulsive Italian temperament in conflict with a self-debate by no means averse from intrigue. But we detect too the warm heart and the conscience never completely satisfied with the result of its own introspection, and never quite silenced by the clamour of an almost unrivalled and quite insatiable vanity.

At his worst, it must be conceded to Cicero, after a perusal of these letters, that he had a genuine love for republican institutions, and a no less genuine hatred of the more unscrupulous among the leaders of the party by which they were being too surely undermined. At the same time, his principles did not prevent him from being at one moment ready to dally even with a temptation to defend Catiline himself, and at another to accept a brief from the equally hateful Clodius. Towards such pitfalls of dishonour, which after all he avoided, he was doubtless

led in part by the professional instinct. But, if not in these cases, he discloses that in others he was decoyed into almost equally perilous adventure, now by vanity, now by fear, and again by a political opportunism that almost reached fatuity. It amuses and distresses us to watch him swinging, as on a pendulum, between adoration of Pompey and adulation of Cæsar, swayed by alternating suspicion and disillusion as to the character of the one and the projects of the other. It is his own correspondence between the years B.C. 68 and B.C. 43 which determines his claim to be considered a patriotic statesman and a man of political honour. The same period saw the production of the various treatises by which his place in the philosophic literature of his country was achieved. With these last we have nothing to do here; but it is worth while to say that, while his general love of letters is refreshing, the results of his strenuous and learned leisure, though not of the highest rank in philosophy, are still far above the level of desert implied in the epithet 'considerable.'

Cicero constantly displays a mind only half at ease about his public conduct. In a letter to Publius Lentulus Spinther he launches upon an elaborate defence of his compromise with the Triumvirs. The same letter contains an apologetic disquisition, rather Pitt-like than Gladstonian, on the value of political inconsistency. But it is to be observed that he does not countenance a change of goal, but only a change of route in altered circumstances. He certainly does not seem to sanction any such *volte-face* of opinion as those to which recent generations of Englishmen have become accustomed if not reconciled. In a still more remarkable epistle to his brother Quintus, he enlarges upon kindred matters. He insists that his letters are only distractions from his discontent. He has not the freshness of soul required for poetry. He had started with a high ideal; his aim had been, as he puts it, quoting the *Iliad*, αἰὲν ἀριστεύειν καὶ ὑπείροχον ἔμμεναι ἄλλων. But he finds himself forced by circumstances into a change of party. His forensic ability, his main weapon in the battle of public life, has been diverted to base uses. He has left his real enemies, that is, those of his country, unattacked. He has even defended some of them, and gone too near to defending others.

Pompey and he are half estranged; Pompey has failed him, and he Pompey. Cæsar is said to love him, and he is disposed to love Cæsar; but that love is at best a suspected consolation, and smacks of humiliation and intrigue. The lament is noble and pathetic, and discloses a sadness which, since his time, must have repeated itself in many a man of lofty nature to whom the exigencies of public life have savoured of self-degradation.

The letters of his great period, not only those to Atticus and Quintus, but those also to his unsympathetic and unsuitable wife Terentia, to Cæsar, Pompey, Crassus, Appius Claudius Pulcher, and a miscellaneous group of less prominent acquaintances, form a kaleidoscope of human character. He lays himself, and them too, bare with a frankness greater than is compatible either with self-respect or friendship. For himself, he lets us see him shivering with terror of the hired bravoës of the Clodian party, and sobbing along his oft-changed route on his way into exile. He tells us how many marble or bronze statues he bought under the auspices of Atticus, how little he loved them after he had bought them, and how ready he was to part with them again, if only there were a bit of profit to be made upon the bargain. He is as loud-tongued in his own praises as in his condemnation of others. He enlarges upon the splendour of his speeches; upon the effect which he produces in the senate and upon juries; and of course he never tires of referring to that immortal consulate. One of the worst blots upon his forensic fame he does worse than pass over. Not only does he never allude to his pitiful breakdown at Milo's trial, but he has even the audacity, when writing to the brother of Clodius himself, to call his actual speech on the occasion his 'vehement pleading' for Milo. And he had the still wilder temerity, if an old story can be believed, to send to Milo himself in his exile at Marseilles a copy of the really magnificent oration which he had prepared, but dared not deliver. How devoutly we may trust that its receipt really provoked that most graceful among all recorded retorts. 'Many thanks, my dear Cicero, for the copy of your speech on my behalf; I am truly glad that you did not deliver it, for, if you had, I should not now be eating the delicious mullets of this charming watering-place'—this from a man justly con-

demned perhaps, but less than half defended, and who had doubtless paid his fees. A homicide possibly, but he must have been a gentleman. Does the story leave us able to say quite the same of Cicero?

A weakness in the historic value of the correspondence is that we never can be quite sure that he is giving us a trustworthy idea of his own opinion of his contemporaries. At all events we cannot trust what he says to them of themselves. His letters to Appius Claudius Pulcher, the brother of Publius Clodius, are fulsome. His references to Pompey and Cæsar, especially those contained in his letters to Atticus, both during his exile and from Cilicia, are self-contradictory, and bend to every breath of opportunism. It is not easy to believe that he thought as highly of his brother Quintus as he affected to think. He wrote, in phrases that have too much of the coo of the turtle-dove, to Terentia, at a time when they were reciprocally tired of each other, and indeed were all but legally divorced. Nor is it within the range of belief that he should have been beguiled so thoroughly as he pretended by the flippant half-wit of the dissolute and shallow Cœlius Rufus.

His hesitation, unblushingly shown in the letters, as to his course upon the outbreak of open hostilities between Cæsar and Pompey was altogether discreditable. He never had any doubt as to which side he ought to take; his self-questioning was strictly limited as to the side which he had better take. He may have been wrong in supposing that the cause of the Republic was bound up with the success of Pompey; but he held that opinion without the slightest qualification. The letters make this abundantly clear; but they equally disclose the cause of his long sojourn at Formiæ while Pompey was in Epirus and Cæsar in Spain. It was not until exaggerated accounts of Cæsar's difficulties upon the river Segre reached Italy, that the timid and time-serving republican, whole-hearted but faint-hearted, finally set out to join the outclassed leader of the Optimates. Nothing could well go beyond his self-exposure here; in fact there is hardly anything like it in political literature. He evinces no compunction, no reserve, no sense of shame. It matters not that we may know now that, whether Pompey won or Cæsar, republican institutions were alike doomed.

It is the motive which actuated Cicero and too many of his friends, and which the correspondence discloses, that gives the moral sting to its preservation. It shows the political degradation to which the Roman oligarchy had fallen; a degradation which could only play the prelude to a new order of things.

As has been so often the case in history, modern and ancient, the class which is called 'Society' had, in that crisis of the fate of Rome, made a faulty estimate of the two great competitors. It backed the wrong horse, and 'plunged' upon Pompey. It was not till the very eve of their collision that the celerity, energy, and grasp of Cæsar seemed to strike even Cicero in contrast with the vacillation, lassitude, and incompetence of Pompey; and what was true of Cicero was doubly so of the well-placed, heavy-pated gentlefolk of Rome. It was the discontented, the rabble, and the discredited adventurers who took part with the genius of Cæsar and the veteran legions which that genius had trained.

It is the exposure of all this which makes the letters of Cicero and his correspondents a very treasure-house of history. It was the first of its kind to be built and stocked; and the world has never since inherited a richer. It is an archetype that has had no surpassing successor.

'Unde nil majus generatur ipso,
Nec viget quidquam simile aut secundum.'

An interpolated feeling of moral consolation is aroused by the letters written between the fall of Pompey and the assassination of Cæsar. It is much to recognise in these the noble discontent of Cicero's inner nature with the calm which succeeded Pharsalia. It refreshes us to mark how letter after letter shows that the personal security of life and fortune, which his opportunism had won and his truncated adherence to Pompey had not sufficed to throw away, was as nothing to him in comparison with his regret for liberty. Life, as he understood life, with its stress, its conflicts, its clash of ambitions, and its alternations of victory and defeat, was over. He laments like Othello when he felt his occupation gone. He sees that the highest magistrates have come to be mere officers of the Dictator; and that even the senate-house of Rome

only gives back muffled echoes to the mandates of one man. He is like Cassius exclaiming, but alas too late:

'Now is it Rome indeed, and room enough,
When there is in it but one only man.'

There was no hope, no power, no outlook. The Conscript Fathers indeed still haunted their historic hall; but it had become the place where their honour had died. They were but as the poor shades of those who had sat and dared death at the hands of the Gaul. They were like those dwellers in the Castello of Dante's matchless canto, who, from long silence, had grown faint of voice, and who lived 'a life without hope eternal in desire.'

But against what we have called this moral consolation we must, with a sadder justice, set the very last section of the letters, written after the death of the great Julius. These are surely more disastrous than any of their predecessors to the good name of Cicero. Their shameless exultation over the cowardly murder of one of the most illustrious of mankind leaves nothing unspoken or unthought. Writing to more than one of the conspirators, he calls their deed 'the banquet of the Ides of March,' and upbraids them for not having bidden him to 'the feast.' Had they done so he would have taken care to save them from their one fatal blunder. He would have had no leavings, no '*reliquias Danaum atque immitis Achilli*.' Not that he was in a position to quote the '*Æneid*'; but he would have served up Octavius, Antonius, and all the rest, to complete what Shakespeare makes Brutus call 'a dish fit for the gods.' We cannot forget that all this was written contemporaneously with flattering effusions to Antony himself; and that these last, in their turn, were dated but a few months before he began his long string of 'Philippics.' We recall, too, from the same period his incomprehensible declarations of affection to the dissolute and worthless Dolabella, whom his long-suffering daughter Tullia, at her father's own instance, was even at that moment reluctantly consenting to divorce.

Such a string of counts, but too clearly provable, goes far to make us accept the contemptuous verdict of Mommsen. But at the last, in spite of our irritation and distaste, we pause. Cicero was, after all, too brilliant, too

versatile, too full of happier contradictions, for unqualified condemnation. He also achieved too much. Then we also bethink ourselves that there is no contemporary indictment against him. His own generation always admired, and at one time idolised him. Cæsar, Pompey, and a host of worthy men, were prepared to love him. He is his own accuser; and, but for himself, he would have gone down to posterity with a reputation unsmirched. If the Rousseau whom Rousseau exposed has still his bust in the temple of fame, room may well be found for one of the greatest of the later sons of republican Rome. Looking back on the Frenchman and on the Roman, few persons would find it difficult to decide which of the two they would rather have chosen as a friend in this world, or which of the two they would prefer to encounter in the next. On the whole, we are inclined to conclude, with one of the most graceful of modern English scholars, whose death the world of scholarship but recently had to mourn, that 'the world owes a great debt to Cicero.'

Before we pass on, it would be ungracious not to recognise, in terms of praise, two notable contributions to our knowledge of Cicero which have appeared of late years—one the elaborate edition of the letters, by Professor Tyrrell and Mr Purser of Dublin, and the other a very careful and scholarly rendering of them by Mr Shuckburgh of Cambridge, the translator of Polybius. The work of Professor Tyrrell and his colleague has received a warm welcome from competent scholars on the score of textual criticism and elucidation; while, as to the value of the introductory essays upon the public and private life of Cicero, the style of the letters, and the sources of the text, we can ourselves certainly testify. The translation of the letters by Mr Shuckburgh and the introductions, mainly historical, with which he opens each of his four volumes, seem to us alike interesting and well done. It is pleasant to notice that this, perhaps the most useful of all the great Roman's contributions to literature, should have received such full and adequate attention from two of our own countrymen.

The period between the death of Julius Cæsar and that of Trajan completed the distribution of a leisurely,

cultivated, and wealthy class of nobles throughout the various provinces of Italy. The tyranny of the five bad emperors—for Galba, Otho, and Vitellius may be left out of count—spread, at the most, over less than half of the period; and the horrors of their reigns left untouched those who lived outside Rome itself and its perilous court circle. The rapacity, fear, and cruelty of Nero and Domitian left the rural nobility almost unattacked; and the residential amenities of Campania, Etruria, and the district round Como were perhaps but little impaired by the reign of terror set up from time to time in the capital. The exclusion of the upper classes from their natural share in the conduct of public affairs tended to enhance the security of those who were content to live on their estates, and to avoid the ‘*fumum et opes strepitumque Romæ*,’ of which Horace would hardly have spoken as lovingly as Lamb did of London, if he had lived under Domitian instead of under Augustus. There were even fields of action, such as the bar and the military and civil services abroad, where a gentleman, by prudence, conciliation, and the avoidance of compromising intimacies, might find employment at once engrossing, lucrative, and fairly secure. But home-life in the provinces was no doubt the safest and most general asylum, until the first two Flavian emperors, and later Nerva and Trajan, did their best to recall the dispersed nobility to a share in the business of the State.

Meanwhile, the nobility had been consolidated by a century and a half of neighbourhood, ancestral friendship, and intermarriage. The ‘Society’ thus formed was much like that of the English counties in the eighteenth century. The members of the aristocracy, even where personal acquaintance was lacking, knew all about each other; and the spirit of class had grown as strong with them as with us in the same period. Almost the first thing which we remark in the letters of the younger Pliny is the very great number of his correspondents, and the circle of persons, as large, or larger, to whom he refers in terms of friendliness and good feeling, apparently for no other reason than because they belonged to his order, though not perhaps to the set among whom he actually moved. They all seem to have interested themselves in the births, deaths, marriages, fortunes, and

general health and pursuits of a circle so wide as to preclude common acquaintance, to say nothing of intimacy. They 'lay at' each other's houses on their 'progresses,' exactly after the fashion of the Boscauwens, the Foleys, the Granvilles, the Portlands, and the Walpoles who figure in the letters of our Georgian era.

It is this eighteenth century flavour which imparts for us so keen a relish to the correspondence of Pliny. It is the kinship, as we have called it, of the two epochs which fascinates us; while the self-drawn character of the main contributor appears as strongly in it as in the time of Julius. There is the same frankness of self-dissection, very much the same vanity, though hardly so transcendent, and a touch of the same self-deception as well. If Cicero in his heart thought himself as good an orator as Demosthenes, Pliny obviously fancied that, shaping himself after Cicero, he had at times even surpassed his model. It might be that the more stirring topics of the last years of the Republic had been denied to him; but his own forensic genius had given importance to a hundred law cases, and had raised as many second-class occasions to the level of his own brilliancy. Self-laudation was as native to him as it was to Cicero. If he was eloquent, he must proclaim it; if generous, as he undoubtedly was, the world must hear of it; so also must it be made aware of his conjugal affection, his yearnings for paternity, his genius for friendship. The commodiousness of his homes must be made known to men; and hence we have two or three descriptions of the Roman villa, in which antiquaries may revel, though wiser men may think triumphantly of modern comfort, even while they sigh for a climate which made such abodes tolerable.

Whatever Pliny's letters lack on the side of political history they make up in social variety. He shows us a typical boar hunt, tells two capital ghost-stories, and gives an indirect lesson in match-making, which might have come from Mrs Delany or her beloved Duchess of Portland. He illustrates by several saddening examples the facility with which Roman gentlemen, and even matrons, justified suicide whenever life seemed no longer worth living. He describes a supper with a vulgar millionaire, and boasts that he thinks it compatible with

his quality of guest to satirise his entertainer. Like his uncle, he is a curious and instructive connoisseur in Italian wines. His stories about their longevity suggest that the old classic vintages possessed cyclopean stamina. The two hundred years claimed for them recall Horace's '*cadum Marsi memorem duelli*,' and the still bolder '*Ipse capillato diffusum consule potat, Calcatamque tenet bellis socialibus uvam*,' of Juvenal. But surely no modern vintage would reach any such age, though we seem to have heard that, at a famous dinner given by King Victor Emmanuel after the Peace of Villafranca, a certain Tokay was produced which had been sent as a present to a Duke of Savoy in the reign of our Charles II.

Pliny gives to one of his correspondents a careful and pleasant analysis of the way in which the worthy Spurrinna spent his days after a well-earned retirement from strenuous public life. It is worth repeating because even now it would be worth imitation. It seems that he rose at six and studied till eight. So might an Englishman meritoriously get up, drink his tea, open his letters, and read during those same two hours. He then dressed himself, and walked for three Roman, or say, something under two English miles. This would bring him to nine o'clock, when we may assume that he would break his fast, though Pliny does not say so. He reads quietly from that time till eleven. He then takes a drive for seven Roman, or some four English miles—a longer round than it seems, till we consider the roads and the mode of progression. He reaches home about one o'clock. Again nothing is said about food; but we must take leave, for our stomach's sake and our modern infirmities, to interpolate a snack. He then plays tennis or strolls, according to the weather, until three, when he bathes. At six he sits down to supper, which answers to our dinner, and was the Roman's serious meal. It did not last so long as the famous banquet discussed in the fourteen volumes of *Athenæus*, but he probably dawdled over it, and talked until nearly bedtime. On the whole, it may be thought that the Roman gentleman of the first and second centuries was almost as comfortable as his analogue of the eighteenth.

Far less pleasant is the account which Pliny gives, with unmingled approval, of the fashion in which his uncle

spent his day—no relaxation; time neither lost nor enjoyed; nature and pleasure alike neglected and despised. We are told in full tones of panegyric how he took a shorthand-writer in the carriage with him when he drove out, to whom he dictated by the way, and whose performance the nephew thus epigrammatically belauds:

‘Currant verba licet, manus est velocior illis;
Nondum lingua suum, dextra peregit opus.’

In truth, Pliny’s sense of humour was weak; and it is characteristic of this default that, although he quotes Virgil, Ovid, Catullus, the Iliad and the Odyssey, he only mentions Horace once, and that in the last book of his general correspondence; and he certainly never quotes him. He explains, naïvely enough, to the great Tacitus that they had common claims to be remembered by posterity; but that does not prevent him from praying the historian to give his name a place in his pages in order to render his chance of immortality more secure. A favourite topic with Pliny is the recitation of a man’s literary work, prose and verse alike, to his friends. His philosophy in the matter comes in effect to this.

‘Be sure, first, that you can trust your friends. They may be partial, or, on the other hand, they may be incompetent, timorous, jealous, or splenetic. They may be intellectually unable to believe in the genius of a man with whom they have been long intimate; for just as we are loth to believe in the extreme badness of an old friend, so in the domain of intellectual creation we are afraid to dower him with supreme power. But, if an artist has in him that nice balance of self-trust and self-mistrust which alone enables him to appraise the value of the censure, approval, or silence of his friends, then recitation is an excellent stimulant to correction.’

So far Pliny; but may it not be doubted whether a man’s own judgment and candour, if only he possess them, are not even a keener touchstone than those of others? Still, perhaps it is difficult to pull out one’s own teeth, however loose they may be; so much nerve does it need to hurt oneself of set purpose. At all events Pliny clung to his habit of recitation.

We might fill many a page with miscellaneous scraps from the nine books of his letters. He says happily of an

accomplished orator, 'Nihil peccat nisi quod nihil peccat.' The idea has been repeated in many shapes since his day, and it is as improbable that he expressed it for the first time as it is that Lord Tennyson's 'faultily faultless' will prove to have been its final variant. By his letter on the advantages of sickness we are gratefully reminded of our own banished Duke's reflections on 'the uses of adversity.' Pliny's account of his tragic and comic villas recalls vaguely Horace Walpole and Strawberry Hill. His praise of thrushes (not a sea-fish so named, as certain Pelagians have vainly taught) as birds eminently companionable after death, sets one, who is ignorant of the range and habitat of such minor fowl, wondering whether he was aware of the superexcellence of the fieldfare among its congeners. And so we might run on with him interminably from trifle to trifle. But we must part from him with one final reflection. If the tenth book of the correspondence, containing his letters to Trajan, be genuine—and we suppose that it is acknowledged so to be—how, as proconsul of Bithynia, he must have bored his patient but much tried emperor!

A leap from the second to the eighteenth century is like those performed by the Swiss and Norwegians over their snow-slopes, gigantic but sure. We find ourselves in England and France in circumstances sufficiently analogous to those prevailing in Italy during the latter half of Pliny's life to produce, as they surely did, a great epoch of letter-writing. At the commencement of the later period want of national unity had stood in the way of a similar revival in the Italian peninsula; and the same defect, along with a more rudimentary condition of social culture, had prevented it in Germany. But, as modern history differs from ancient in that the student can no longer at his ease follow the fate of one or two great races at a time, but finds the stream of narrative parted into a hundred branches, so, in the case of letters, instead of studying a Cicero or a Pliny as the one representative of his time, we have to distribute our attention over a large assemblage. In England, amongst others, we have Chesterfield, Bolingbroke, Pope, Walpole, Gray, Cowper, and Mrs Delany, who were all practically contemporaries, a group for some years overlapped by the

still unclouded genius of Swift. In France the catalogue of names is even longer; and the brilliance of many of the writers as clear as that of the brightest stars in the English galaxy.

A complete survey of both groups would plainly be beyond the compass of a single article. Even the space that we have given to Cicero and Pliny as the fathers of the art is not available. Nor is this necessary; Walpole and Cowper have been lately treated in the pages of this Review, and we only propose now to notice in a few other writers such characteristics as seem to illustrate the family likeness of which we have spoken. We would only say of Walpole that although, for his letters' sake, he has been called the English Cicero, he gives us rather a foretaste of Newstead than echoes from Tusculum, and that we are more inclined to bestow upon Lord Chesterfield than upon Walpole what is at best perhaps an unnecessary nickname.

Lord Chesterfield, moreover, himself betrays, in a passage in which he commends the cultivation of letter-writing to his son, that he had endeavoured to model his own epistolary style on that of the great Latin master. In one sense he succeeded. Nothing is more complete in its way than the triumphant mastery of his ease and polish. Indeed it is partly because his method is so obviously predetermined that critics have been unfair to him. It is not true to say that his letters show him to have been without spontaneity or genuineness. We defy anybody to hold that view after reading dispassionately the first two volumes of Lord Mahon's collection, which contain the letters to his son. These form a valuable treatise upon self-education, and abound not only in good feeling, but in good principles. Take the letter upon what he calls the greater and lesser talents, that is, upon the cardinal virtues and those graces of manner and arts of social success which he is careful to base, and surely with reason, upon honesty and consideration for others. Every line of it might well be addressed to-day to a lad of sixteen. What could be more downright and earnest than his denunciation of lying, or his disgust with the German aristocracy for its preference of 'their thirty-two quarterings as against so many cardinal virtues'? How aptly on this last point does he quote Ovid's

'... genus et proavos et quæ non fecimus ipsi
Vix ea nostra voco.'

Here are a few phrases taken at hazard from these two volumes :—

'Trust to nature for genuine pleasures. . . . An uninterrupted life of pleasure is as insipid as contemptible. . . . Low sensual pleasures are human sacrifices to false gods. . . . A man who does not solidly establish and really deserve a character for truth, probity, good manners, and good morals, at his first setting-out in the world, may impose and shine like a meteor for a very short time, but will very soon vanish and be extinguished with contempt.'

He commends honesty even in enmity. 'Veneno non fas est uti,' is the text of one letter upon the subject. He also warns his boy against seeming to tolerate raillery against marriage or abuse of the priestly caste. He apologises, indeed, for not more frequently referring to religious subjects. 'I have left these, I own,' he says, 'to your tutor (a clergyman), but beware of those *esprits forts* who laugh at religion.' It is worth while on this subject to refer to one of his letters to Crébillon *fil*—admirable, but too long for quotation—on the blame attaching to a man who writes against the religion of his country.

All this and much more of it from the heartless, unprincipled, and mundane Lord Chesterfield! Cynic to some extent he was, and in outward show, as in social position, somewhat too like the great Neronian courtier Petronius Arbiter, though by no means coarse enough to have written the grosser scenes of the 'Satiricon.' He was a man of the world whose conduct was not on the plane of his principles, and he knew it; he recognised that the inculcation of religion was not in his province. He would be no hypocrite; but it was quite within his scope to insist upon morality, honour, wisdom, and the other main virtues, without making an appeal to divine sanction.

Upon other characteristics of his general correspondence we have little space to enlarge. Whenever he deals with history and politics, whether it be in writing to Lord Townshend, Lord Harrington, Mr Tilson, or his

godson and friend Mr Solomon Dayrolles, he displays statesmanlike qualities which his hostility to Sir Robert Walpole probably prevented him from putting to active use. His literary and artistic tastes were those of his time. Of the Italian masters in painting and sculpture, who have since then risen into high repute, he says nothing. Of poets he cites as classic a fairly representative list of Frenchmen; among Italians the only authors whom he recommends are Ariosto, Tasso, and Boccaccio; he omits Dante. Of English poets again he only names three—Milton, Dryden, and Pope, forgetting Shakespeare. He owns that Homer too often tires him. 'When he slumbers, says he, 'I too go to sleep.' He likes Virgil, in fact, better than his model, though he has 'to take a good deal of snuff to keep awake during the last half of the "Æneid." Milton has 'his sublime passages and flashes of light, but a good deal of "darkness visible."' In making this last confession, he adds, 'Keep this secret for me, for if it should be known, I should be abused by every tasteless pedant and every solid divine in England.' He expatiates upon the supremacy of the 'Henriade,' and generally upon 'the wondrousness' of Voltaire. As this judgment occurs in a late letter, it is possible that, as he lived on, congeniality of nature told upon his taste. With a grateful recognition of one more pleasing touch we leave him. In a letter congratulating his son upon having been in danger, because he was then out of it, he quotes, we know not from whom:—

'Condisce i diletti
Memoria di pene,
Nè sa che sia bene
Chi mal non soffrì.'

A set-off in *allegretto* to the 'Nessun maggior dolore' of the neglected Dante.

Is it rank heresy to say that, bearing in mind their great reputation and our own earlier recollection of them, we rise from a perusal of the letters of Gray with a slight sense of disappointment? What is it that they lack? The too obvious answer is, that which was lacking in the nature of the man; and unfortunately the defective element in his genius was just one which is pre-eminently injurious to letter-writing. He did not sparkle. Humour

he had, but it was not brilliant; it lacked spontaneity. Like his poetry, it was too deliberate; sometimes he mistook coarseness for it. The truth is that Gray's was no impulsive nature. Fine as some of his poems are, one sees in them, no less than in his letters, a trace of that slight lethargy which kept him back from the highest achievement. It was probably this temperament which made him dislike regular academic studies, and caused him to leave Cambridge without taking a degree. What Mr William Watson has well called the 'frugality' of his 'note,' though partly due, no doubt, to ill-health and fastidiousness, must also in some measure be laid to the account of indolence; and these three elements combined to keep his letters only next door to the best. He had also one further drawback, which it is not easy to define with exactness, but which perhaps we may express by saying that he would have been old-fashioned in whatever age he had lived.

Other great Englishmen of the eighteenth century, especially Cowper, of whom, for the reason given above, we forbear to speak, were writers of excellent letters; the existence of their productions goes to support the thesis with which we started. The names of Bolingbroke, Pope, and Swift, will occur to everybody. So far as we are aware, an independent collection of the letters of Bolingbroke has yet to be made, although many good ones are scattered up and down in the published correspondence of several of his contemporaries. Parke's four volumes are entirely confined to letters written by him as Secretary of State during the last four years of the reign of Queen Anne. Swift's letters to his friends have been overshadowed by those written expressly for publication as political essays, and also by the deservedly famous *Journal to Stella*. As to Pope's published correspondence, considering the calibre of the men with whom it was carried on, we must in all candour admit that the letters of the group were upon the whole rather flimsy. Nor are Pope's own contributions generally pleasant reading. They seldom strike the notes of amiability or deep feeling. Of those written to Martha Blount and her sister, the less said the better. Even in some of his more serious letters to Steele, the tone of professed sadness is not so much sad as cynical. 'What care I for the house!' he

cries, in reference to the disposal of the body after death, 'I am only a lodger.' Elsewhere he writes:—

'The morning after my exit the sun will rise as bright as ever, the flowers smell as sweet, the plants spring as green, the world will proceed in its old course, people will laugh as heartily, and marry as fast, as they were used to do.'

Besides this, the letters give us incidentally glimpses of the worst side of Pope—of his spite, his dishonesty, his turpitude. For his obliquities he is perhaps not to be condemned as unrelentingly as if he had been a well-formed, handsome, and healthy man. His tortuous nature was a reflex of his physical deformity; his was, so far, '*mens curva in corpore curvo*.' He was his own best self in his writings, his worst in his deeds. His fine qualities of mind, constantly distorted or thrust aside in his life and conduct towards friends and foes alike, had uninterrupted play in his poetry; but his letters are not upon that plane morally or intellectually; they are associated rather with his life and conduct.

For Mrs Delany, because she occupies a niche in the temple of remembrances apart from, and neither above nor below others with whom she might bear comparison—illustrious possessors of qualities which she does not claim, and against whom, content to charm alone, and secure in her feminine self-withdrawal and reserve, she asserts no rivalry—we have kept our last few words of recognition. A lady born and bred, a creature of bodily grace and of mental accomplishments, many, no doubt, fantastic and trivial, but others sufficiently substantial, with no pretension to great wit, but gay, loving, outspoken and sincere, bright, clever, and a model of purity amid surroundings which were sometimes not overpure, gifted, above all, with a consummate genius for friendship, she passed her long life in as charming a coterie of her own sex as one woman has ever collected. In this department of her attraction her light never burnt low. Long after the flow of her own sprightliness had run almost dry, and death or growing age had thinned or dimmed the stars in her youthful circle of associates, she continued to play the part of an *accapareuse* of sweet intimacies; and, as her old friends fell silent, a new crop of correspondents rose about her, hardly less devoted or

less sprightly than those she had to mourn. She was born in the very first year of the eighteenth century, and she came near to seeing it out; and with her, therefore, our sporadic reminiscences of its English letter-writers may not unfitly come to a close.

Society reached the letter-bearing stage sooner in France than in England; and the array of writers is proportionately larger. Their published correspondence forms an almost incompressible mass of material, demanding and deserving careful assortment and treatment in detail. Perhaps no one but a Frenchman, and one with the genius of a Sainte-Beuve, could make an adequate survey of it. The *nuances* of the language alone, where style has to be considered, bespeak French appreciation; and it must also be admitted that the recognition of French sentiment is apt to put more than a slight or occasional strain upon English tolerance. In making a selection, which must of necessity be very small, we not unnaturally turn first to a collection wherein style confronts us with no responsibility, and sentiment certainly makes no difficult claim upon our forbearance.

Elizabeth Charlotte, daughter of Charles Louis, Elector Palatine, was married, at an age when she could have had no say in the matter, to Philip, Duke of Orleans, brother of Louis XIV, and widower of Henrietta of England, the daughter of Charles I. 'Madame' was a German of the Germans in physique, instinct, habits, character, and predilections. A residence of fifty-one years in France wrought no change whatever in her. 'J'étais trop âgée,' she says, 'quand je vins en France, pour changer de caractère.' There never was an instance of Horace's proverb more unqualified; assuredly 'Cœlum non animum mutavit.' It is well, perhaps, to mention that nearly all her correspondence was carried on with her relatives in the Palatinate, and in her native tongue; and that on the few occasions when, for some reason or other, she condescended upon French, she showed how completely in that, as in other matters, she was unable to 'tame her nature down' to the acquisition of any outward or visible sign of her French adoption. She was, indeed, received without delay into the Roman Church, but her conversion can hardly be said to have been even

skin-deep. She no more surrendered her Lutheranism than her nationality; and, though she was never troubled by them, her hatred and suspicion of priests was almost inexcusably strong. In this vein she writes:—

‘Croyez moi, le but du christianisme est le même chez tous les chrétiens; les différences qu’on voit ne sont que des chansons de prêtre, qui ne concernent pas les honnêtes gens.’

Doctrinal points, she insists, are mainly kept alive by ‘messieurs les prédicateurs’ in order to make laymen quarrel, and so to keep up the sacerdotal prestige and consequence which the unity of Christendom would infallibly impair. She returns again and again to the charge against professional theologians, often with intemperance, but seldom without some quaint touch of humorous intelligence. In all essentials of religious conduct she was rigid; but to minor observances, fasting for instance, she gave little quarter.

As a set-off against her emancipation from non-essential practice and ceremonies she never forgets to insist upon her love for and study of the Bible. She delights to chronicle her daily readings. In one letter she says that she has read, the day before, the 54th and 55th Psalms, the 14th and 15th chapters of St Matthew, and the 3rd and 4th chapters of St John. That was in 1705, when she had been settled no less than thirty years among the distractions and infidelities of the French Court. And the habit rather grew than declined in her. Only three years before her death we find a letter containing a far longer morning list; and later still she writes, ‘La Bible est une bonne et salubre nourriture, et de plus fort agréable.’

Conformable to her religiousness was her charity, and her feeling for the sufferings of the poor. She assisted those about her, so far as her limited resources allowed, with an unsparing hand; and she never forgot the population of her native Palatinate, which had long been exposed to all the privations and devastations of war. Her marriage was of necessity unhappy, and she had to bear with the frivolities and indiscretions of her husband for thirty years. She never, however, complains of her lot, though it is manifest that it darkened her outlook upon life. The note of her philosophy is resignation, not

untempered with a fatalism which refers everything to the unexplained will of God. She writes of the married state as a subject for despair. Though life had lost all illusion for her she had no desire to quit it.

'Je ne désire pas la mort' (she says), 'et je ne la redoute point. . . . Nous savons bien que tout est le résultat de la volonté de Dieu, et n'arrive que comme il l'a fixé de toute éternité; mais le Tout-Puissant ne nous ayant consultés sur ce qu'il voulait faire, nous sommes dans l'ignorance sur les causes de ce que nous voyons arriver.'

Though she generalised thus about life and marriage, it is clear that she took her own ugliness to be one of the chief causes of her ill-success. Her self-portraiture is drawn so unflinchingly that it is worth transcription.

'Il faut que vous ne vous souveniez guère de moi si vous ne me rangez pas au nombre des laides; je l'ai toujours été, et je le suis devenue encore plus des suites de la petite-vérole; ma taille est monstrueuse de grosseur, je suis aussi carrée qu'un cube; ma peau est d'un rouge tacheté de jaune; mes cheveux deviennent tous gris; mon nez a été tout bariolé par la petite-vérole, ainsi que mes deux joues; j'ai la bouche grande, les dents gâtées, et voilà le portrait de mon joli visage.'

There is independent testimony that her description was without exaggeration. But her loving nature and her strong, if not brilliant, intellect must have pierced through her uncomeliness with sufficient clearness to win the heart of her husband, if only he had had one to win. But as it was, she despaired of him, as of the rest of her *entourage*, and solitude was her refuge from disillusion and disgust.

It is not surprising that she found herself, both at Paris and Versailles, as it were in a desert. She was not by any means to the taste of those about her. The brilliant, beautiful, and abandoned ladies of the Court were not likely to seek for the intimacy of the rough repulsive German, so downright, so outspoken, so genuine, so impatient of intrigue, and so little lenient to their elegant frivolities and unreserved profligacies. And on her side it was not so much severity as loathing. If possible, she hated the men worse than the women. She does not scruple to accuse them of the most abominable

vices. Without the slightest circumlocution she expresses her astonishment that Paris does not suffer such a vengeance as fell of old upon the Cities of the Plain. There is no doubt that she was prone to accept rumour and gossip, serious and trivial alike; and that she cordially detested France and the French, and all their ways—food, habits, and principles alike. We may admit that in this there was something of prejudice, as there was undoubtedly in her unreasoning and ignorant dislike of us English, of whom she had had no personal experience, and of whose history she knew little.

Her choice of foods was as essentially Teutonic as her Protestantism. Here is her culinary creed:—

'Un bon plat de choucroute et des saucissons fumés sont, selon moi, un régal digne d'un roi, et auquel rien n'est préférable. . . . Je ne peux souffrir ni le thé ni le café ni le chocolat; ce qui me ferait plaisir, ce serait une bonne soupe à la bière, mais c'est ce qu'on ne peut se procurer ici.'

The whole *menu* forebodes nightmare; but what of the last-mentioned fluid? It must be the German *Bier-suppe*. Providence has ordained good beer and good soup, but surely sets its seal, except in Germany, against their *mésalliance*.

There are many reflections and judgments, historical, poetical, and personal, which are not only interesting but generally creditable to her insight, and this, although she does seem to have had a genuine respect and affection for Louis Quatorze. She would have us believe too, what is likely enough, that he had an equal regard for her. She seems to have been especially struck by the dignity and courage with which he met death. She says that, very shortly before he actually died, he turned to Madame de Maintenon and said with a smile, 'J'avais entendu dire qu'il était difficile de mourir; je vous assure que je trouve que c'est chose très aisée.' To this the last words that Byron puts into the mouth of the expiring Manfred, addressed to the Abbot of St Maurice, 'Old man, 'tis not so difficult to die,' form a perfect parallel. Her two strongest passions seem to have been hatred of Madame de Maintenon and the love of bodily exercise. For the unacknowledged wife of Louis XIV, 'La vieille,' 'La

vilaine,' 'La sorcière,' 'La guenipe,' 'La truie,' form the ascending series in her vocabulary of vituperation. She once calls her 'La personne qui est ici toute puissante'; and the phrase sounds by contrast quite complimentary. Her love of the chase, up to the time of her widowhood, was insatiable; and even after her husband's death she followed the hunt, as well as she could, in a carriage, but apparently from that time she rode to hounds no more. A hundred good stories are scattered through her correspondence. One can only encourage the reader to search for them, albeit with a warning. Several of them are beyond endurance; and of many more it must be owned that for very delicate palates or hypersensitive nostrils they are too highly flavoured or too pungent. But robust folk may be assured that the value of the sacrifice they may be called to make of their sense of propriety will be generously expressed in terms of undeniable and not altogether illegitimate fun.

The letters of Madame du Deffand evoke a remembrance of Mrs Delany. There is something akin in the fate, if not in the character, of the two ladies. They were born within three years of each other. They were both members of good but not wealthy families; both were over-persuaded, if not coerced, into marriages of convenience which turned out ill. Each had considerable personal beauty, an abundance of the lighter mental gifts, and an imperfect education, which good taste, and that industry which comes of self-respect, enabled them to supplement. Both alike lived in the society of their time which was best worth knowing; both had a consummate genius for friendship; and both lived to be very old women. But there the likeness ends. It were useless to pretend that the fascinations of Madame du Deffand in her later life do more than partially erase the indiscretions of her youth. But, if ever a beautiful and engaging woman could plead the fashion of her times in extenuation of frailty, it would be in the unblushingly vicious *milieu* into which Madame du Deffand was born. In France, at that time, highly born men and women stepped into vice as into an inheritance; and contemporary society in England seems immaculate in comparison.

Purism apart, Madame du Deffand becomes chiefly interesting for us when her period of questionable friend-

ships had come to an end; and though, during her earlier womanhood, she had lived and corresponded freely with many of 'the choice and master-spirits' of her age, it is in the four volumes of her letters to Horace Walpole that the fascination of her correspondence lies. She did not make the acquaintance of Walpole till she was in her seventieth, and he in his fiftieth year. They were both, therefore, beyond the reach of indiscretion; and the disparity of years was greatly against the lady. But there was so strong an element of romance in their intimacy that, could we be as sure of his feeling for her as we are of hers for him, we should say that her letters alone formed a history of the most tender and delicate friendship between two elderly people that was ever put upon record. His letters to her he was careful to keep from the world. Some few years before her death he insisted that they should all be either burnt or restored to him. Beyond a few extracts of which the French editor of Madame du Deffand had become possessed, none of them have been published; and probably very few are now in existence. Walpole obviously shrank from the notion of figuring as a lover favoured with '*les restes*' of an old lady of seventy, who, by-the-bye, was totally blind before he knew her, and was eventually threatened with total deafness to boot. She was conscious of their fundamental differences. '*Je finis en vous disant,*' she says in one of her early letters, '*que je suis femme, très femme, et femmelette*'; but she knew him to be of a different stamp. No effusiveness, no flavour of youth was left to him. '*Suis-je fait,*' he had written to her, '*pour être le héros d'un roman épistolaire?*' and she obviously recognised his refusal to accept the rôle. But she had no notion of losing the full enjoyment of the impulsiveness of her own nature. She constantly alludes to his repeated requests for more reserve, and invariably replies with entreaties for forgiveness and promises of amendment. But her resolves soon melted like snow in her own warmth; and, though she declared that she would only do as she was bidden, and was '*comme les petits chiens qui ne sautent que pour le roi,*' she soon renewed that '*épanchement de cœur*' which was indeed to her the chief necessary of life. Of this she was critically conscious.

'Vous avez raison' (she writes on one occasion) 'de vous étonner qu'à mon âge mon âme ne vieillisse point; elle a les mêmes besoins qu'elle avait à cinquante ans, et même à quarante.' And again: 'Pardonnez-moi, mon ami, suivez l'exemple du Seigneur avec la Madeleine; dites comme lui, "beaucoup de péchés lui sont remis, parce qu'elle a——" Ah, je n'achève pas, je gâterais mes affaires au lieu de les racommoder. Au nom de Dieu, ne me grondez pas, ou, ce qui serait pis, ne me boudez pas; nous étions si bien ensemble.'

And so they doubtless were. Walpole did feel, though he feared to expose himself. His touching letters, written after her death to his nephew in Paris, and lately printed by Sir Spencer Walpole, put this beyond doubt. She herself lets us know that he used to address her as 'ma petite' and 'ma mie.' They both came very near to love, she probably nearer than he, owing to his greater power of self-restraint, in alliance with his self-consciousness and fear of ridicule, though what ridicule there can be in real love at any age it is difficult to imagine.

But Madame du Deffand was not only a writer of sentimentalities; she had wit, and literary as well as historic insight, and she was a keen judge of character. She has left half a dozen excellent portraits of her intimates, both men and women, and she saw at once through what we may call the shambling moral gait of Charles James Fox. Her letters to Voltaire show a genuine appreciation of literature and history. In Shakespeare she saw a likeness to Homer. His 'Coriolanus' revolted her; she thought its hero abominable and senseless; 'Macbeth' horrified, but interested her; the terrors of 'Lear' spread a gloom over her which she could not express; 'Cymbeline' interested and pleased her. She found 'Don Quixote' insupportable, and was bored by Gluck's 'Iphigénie' and 'Orphée,' and by the 'Barbier de Séville' of Beaumarchais. She preferred Ariosto to Tasso, much to her credit; and she admired our own Richardson, as all good people do. She hated Rousseau and all his works. She disapproved of the Crusades and disliked all stories of mad or eccentric persons and all romances of chivalry, preferring plain histories and memoirs of natural folk. Her love for poetry was not sound enough to save her from calling Racine's 'Athalie' her favourite work. She attributes

her acknowledged want of breadth in taste to her lack of early education and good companionship. The plea may be admitted; but, all the same, she was not a Madame de Sévigné, and she knew it; and we, in spite of our liking, cannot raise her to any high place among female intellects. It says, however, much for her spontaneity, that her letters show no signs of having suffered by their dictation to a secretary. There was much love in her even to the end; and one of her last letters concludes with the passionate cry: 'Adieu l'Angleterre! Adieu les Anglais! et, pour dire tout ce que je regrette, adieu mon Ami!'

It would be absurd to attempt at this moment a further survey of the great French epistolary school. Voltaire and Madame de Sévigné confront us as only two out of a dozen personages deserving ample treatment; and their twenty-seven volumes alone are bulky warnings against an overvaulting exhaustiveness. To the subject of Voltaire's letters an antecedent appreciation of the mighty spirit that produced them would be an indispensable introduction. It is not the common case of going to a man's letters for his character; with Voltaire you must go to his letters with his character in hand. His countrymen appraise him as the greatest manifestation of the French mind. He was certainly a supreme exhibition of the intellectual genius and moral contrasts of their race. We must resist the temptation to say more of him than that his letters and Cicero's stand together and alone. If Cicero's lay bare his epoch as well as himself, Voltaire's display his epoch in himself. But, except for Cicero, Voltaire is to all of those whose claims to attention we have advocated, as a Himalayan peak to a Cumberland hill. Both of these are admirable forms of terrestrial scenery, but we may only plead for the beauty of the one upon condition that we concede the supremacy of the other.

Art. VI.—ROBERT CANDLISH AND THE DISRUPTION
OF 1843.

1. *A Century of Scottish History*. By Sir Henry Craik. Two vols. Edinburgh: Blackwood, 1901.
2. *Scotland's Battles for Spiritual Independence*. By Hector Macpherson. Edinburgh: Oliver and Boyd, 1905.
3. *Ten Years of the Church of Scotland*. By James Bryce, D.D. Two vols. Edinburgh: Blackwood, 1850.
4. *The Ten Years' Conflict*. By Robert Buchanan, D.D. Two vols. Glasgow: Blackie, 1849.
5. *Memoirs of the Life and Writings of Thomas Chalmers, D.D.* By Rev. W. Hanna, LL.D. Four vols. Edinburgh: Constable, 1851-2.
6. *Memorials of Robert Smith Candlish, D.D.* By William Wilson, D.D. Edinburgh: Black, 1880.
7. *A Faithful Churchman: Memoir of James Robertson*. By A. H. Charteris, D.D. London: Black, 1897.

THE bitterness, not to say the ferocity, of the Disruption controversy is familiar to every one who knows the religious life of Scotland. There are, however, many signs that this animosity, so inexplicable to the English mind, is on the eve of disappearance. The generation which fills the churches to-day does not understand, or, if it does understand, does not value, the causes of division. That the fires of the Disruption are still smouldering, was revealed in the Free Church case and the Lords' decision. But the feelings which that decision aroused were very different from those that marked the period of the Disruption. If here and there a veteran may be found who imagines that the slogan which thrilled his youth can stir his grandchildren, it is abundantly clear that in a very short period it will be possible to study the great battle of the Moderates and the Evangelicals as dispassionately as the equally fierce strife between Resolutioners and Protesters in an earlier period.

The popular account of the Disruption is eminently suitable for the writer of a novel 'with a purpose.' It is as accurate as an account drawn chiefly from platform speeches and partisan pamphlets might be expected to be. The Disruption cannot be explained save as the culmination of a century of Church history. It was

the result of influences liable to be forgotten; and it is not a sufficient description to speak of it as an outburst of righteous anger against a palpable iniquity.

The most eloquent speeches of that epoch were those of Chalmers; and, as Chalmers is the greatest figure in Scotland in the early nineteenth century, it is usually supposed that the Disruption was the result of his leadership. But, though the adhesion of Chalmers to the Disruption Church was one source of popular support, and though the Free Church has been often called the Church of Chalmers, it is probably more correct to trace its inception to Robert Candlish. Chalmers 'went out' in 1843 with a heavy heart. The reader of the life of Candlish is aware of an uneasy suspicion that he was bent upon the organisation of a new church. Yet Candlish must not be dismissed as a mere adventurer. He was himself the product of forces against which Chalmers was always inclined to protest. Though he regarded himself as an Evangelical, Chalmers remained to the end of his days a Moderate at heart. Candlish threw himself unreservedly into the cause of the Evangelical party.

As a personality, Candlish cannot claim the interest which Chalmers arouses. Perhaps this is due to his biographer, who, in his anxiety to give the public utterances of his hero, almost forgets to let us see the man. In his day, Candlish must have been a man of strong and impressive character. While a mere stripling, he was judged worthy to occupy the pulpit adorned by the great Andrew Thomson. That this was not due to an outburst of enthusiasm among a people not prone to emotionalism, is shown by the further fact that in 1843 Candlish became the founder of Free St George's, a church whose position in Scotland is unique. In the Disruption controversies he leapt to the front, when only a few years over thirty, and revealed himself as the possessor of the strongest will, the stoutest heart, the most passionate nature of all those who 'went out.' If it is correct to speak of the Free Church as the work of Candlish, then he deserves some notice. For he must be accounted the author either of the greatest of Scotland's blessings, or of the most disastrous of her calamities; and he is to be judged as one whose actions determined the course of Scottish religion for at least a century.

The details of the Disruption controversy need not be referred to in this article. Those who are curious may unravel a very tangled skein by reading one or two of the histories or biographies which cover the period. In a ponderous work, Dr Bryce gives the Moderate version. Dr Buchanan states the Evangelical case. His narrative is sufficiently judged when we observe that, from beginning to end, he does not once mention the name of Hugh Miller. Now, if the Free Church commanded any popular enthusiasm, it was due less to Chalmers or to Candlish than to Miller. In the 'Witness' Miller at once interpreted and instructed the mind of the laity. It is a sufficient condemnation of Buchanan's book to note his neglect of Candlish's greatest ally.

The Disruption is often described as the result of a quarrel about the election of ministers. The particular apostasy which the Free Church flung off in such anger is said to be the unscriptural and unpresbyterian system of patronage. In this statement there is at once truth and error. Scotland never acquiesced kindly in the system which allows a landed proprietor or a corporation to impose a minister upon a parish without any reference to the wishes of the people. Sir Henry Craik, in his 'Century of Scottish History,' has shown how the Act of 1712, which instituted patronage, was justified by the political exigencies of the moment. But political exigencies could not make patronage congenial to a Presbyterian Church. Presbytery bases its system on the principle that the people may be trusted and ought to be trusted, and that the responsibility of their judgment should not be lightened by any parental supervision. It cannot sympathise with the logical fallacy that a spiritual call mediated through the people is *ipso facto* a call from 'below' rather than from 'above,' and that the promise of power from 'on high' has any reference to the grades of social or hierarchical rank. Presbytery has recognised the rights of the laity in the institution of the eldership; and a polity, which admits the laity to its courts in equal numbers with the clergy, is not likely to view patronage with much favour.

As a matter of fact, patronage had worked badly. The 'lairds' of Scotland have never shown great sympathy with the National Church, and the records of the courts

in the eighteenth century are full of disputed settlements. An impetus to popular feeling was given by the Reform Bill of 1832; and the natural desire for rights in the Church, similar to those which had been secured in the State, was fostered actively by a new commercial class, which was anxious to try conclusions with the aristocracy. When such a feeling was strong in the country, a body so sensitive to public opinion as the General Assembly could not long avoid dealing with it. Andrew Thomson had often fulminated against patronage. The party which afterwards built the Free Church were his disciples. Yet it is not accurate to describe their measures as aimed directly against patronage. The Veto Act of 1834 was not so much an attack upon patronage as an attempt to buttress it in face of a popular agitation. Dr Chalmers, who introduced the Bill, was to the end of his days suspicious of the populace. But, ere the critical period arrived, the abolition of patronage had become a war-cry, and secured for the Free Church a popular support which could not have been gained by the cause that appealed most strongly to the clergy.

Patronage was an occasion rather than a cause. They are nearer to the truth who say that the root of the strife is to be found in the problem of spiritual independence. In his little book on the subject, Mr Macpherson has sought to prove, what to a Scottish reader requires no proof, that all the controversies of the Reformed Church in Scotland have raged round this matter. It is not unusual to represent the Church of Scotland as delighting in 'heresy-hunting.' As a matter of fact, the cases of heresy in Scotland have not been very numerous. Among all the secessions and subdivisions which have marked the course of the Church in Scotland, only one, and that a secession of little moment, has been definitely traceable to a theological dispute. The rival organisations in Scotland do not represent contradictory versions of the Christian religion, but only different views as to the content of the phrase 'spiritual independence.' The contention of the Church of Scotland has always been that the Church must be regarded as in possession of a life of its own. It is not a department of State, nor is it on the same footing as a club, a friendly society, or a

joint-stock company. Mr Macpherson has laboured to maintain, what neither Established Churchmen nor Free Churchmen will deny, that spiritual independence is essential, and that establishment is only accidental. His error lies in conceiving that the particular interpretation of spiritual independence put forward by the Evangelical party at the Disruption is the only possible application of the principle. With the principle the Moderates had no quarrel. Their complaint was that the Evangelicals were reading into the term a meaning which it could hardly bear.

The saying concerning the old priest and the new presbyter contains more truth than is always perceived. There is a High-church Presbyterianism which combines with its love of evangelical doctrine a conception of the clerical office and an assertion of the authority of the Church as lofty as Ultramontane or Tractarian could desire. Its greatest exponent was Andrew Melville, the Scottish Hildebrand; and the principles for which he fought are nowhere more clearly put than in his famous words:—

‘There are two kings and two kingdoms in Scotland. There is King James, the head of this Commonwealth; and there is Christ Jesus, the King of the Church, whose subject James VI is, and of whose kingdom he is not a king, nor a lord, nor a head, but a member.’

The history of the Church of Scotland is a commentary on these words; and the effort of the ecclesiastical statesmen of Scotland has been to translate them into constitutional forms.

The difficulty arises in the debatable land. The strongest High-churchman will confess the supremacy of the State in matters of property; but what has he to say when the particular property in dispute happens to be in the form of stipends or church buildings, or when the spiritual interests over which the Church is sovereign affect the relation of citizens to houses and incomes? The case arose of the settlement of a clergyman in a parish. The Evangelicals offered an apparently simple solution. Let the State give at its pleasure the emoluments and the social status of a parish minister; but let it not dare to say who shall have the cure of souls.

They insisted on the independent jurisdiction of the Church; but, when pressed to give their definition of this jurisdiction, they retreated behind vague statements, which seemed to suggest that it was for the Church to say where the line of division was to be drawn. The Moderates retorted that such a position was pure popery. If the contract between the Church and the State had been wrongly drafted, or had been broken by the State, then it was their duty to use their powers as citizens to amend the law. The proposed solution of the case by voluntary disendowment only put the difficulty a little way back. Though the Evangelicals protested that the Moderates were bringing the Church into bondage, events occurred within a few years of the Disruption which seemed to support the Moderate contention; but all that has happened since 1843 has not put the relation of Church and State on a footing perfectly satisfactory to either Moderate or Evangelical.

The complexity of the problem served to exasperate the disputants; and, when a leader like Candlish appeared, the atmosphere did not become less fiery. The parties broke off all communications. There is a tradition that Chalmers would fain have healed the breach, and that the greatest vigilance had to be maintained lest he should correspond with the Moderates. It is impossible to resist the impression that, at some stages, an hour's quiet conversation would have removed all misunderstandings. That neither party was anxious for a truce was seen when they drew to battle at Strathbogie. When the Evangelicals considered that they were justified in passing sentence of deposition for views at variance with their own, or when the Moderates, the children of the men who had settled the procedure of the courts, openly announced their defiance of the judgment of the Assembly, it was evident that a crisis was near. Nothing was done on either side to avert it.

For the struggle, after all, was not a trial of strength between the supporters and the enemies of patronage, or a debate as to the meaning of the term 'spiritual independence,' but a battle made desperate by a deep religious divergence. Though the line of division in Scotland is drawn by ecclesiastical rather than by religious considerations, it is nevertheless true that behind all the divisions

we can trace the influence of theological tendencies. The difference between Moderate and Evangelical was really a religious difference, none the less real because it could be felt rather than stated, and appeared as a divergence of sympathy or of tendency, rather than of formulated conviction. In the days of the Disruption, the 'marks' of the rival schools of thought could be detected by any intelligent member of the Church; and he that would understand the Disruption must make some endeavour to find out the characteristics of the parties.

The Moderate represented the spirit of the eighteenth century. When the ten years' conflict began, he stood sadly shorn of the glory that had been his. Moderatism, in its strength, was far from being the disreputable thing which partisans have loved to call it. One of the services yet to be done is the rescue of Moderatism from the calumnies under which it has been buried. Sir Henry Craik has made a partial contribution, but has not said all that can be said. The bitterest enemies of Moderatism recognise its services to literature and learning. But what is required is a vindication of Moderatism as a spiritual movement; and this has not yet been done. Dean Stanley made a brave attempt; but the Dean was an Englishman of a particular school, and it was hardly possible for him to make a trustworthy estimate. By its enemies Moderatism is generally accused of being essentially pagan; but is it a likely supposition that an essentially pagan movement should command for so long the all but exclusive support of the strongest men in Scotland? Moderatism is dead; and in all the presbyteries of the Church it is not probable that more than one or two ministers could now be properly described as Moderates. But this does not imply that, in its day, Moderatism did not stand for something both timely and true.

Perhaps the best description is that which sees the origin of Moderatism in an ethical reaction against the intolerant dogmatism of the Covenanting age. Its effort was to reap the fruits of the conflict through which the Church had recently passed. It refused to believe that learning was ungodly and profane. What might have been necessary and congenial in the old days, when true religion had to flee to the hills and to worship in constant

dread of the dragoons, was by no means either necessary or congenial in an age of peace and safety. Moderatism sought to restore some of the geniality and warmth, which are at least as native to the Scottish character as the severity that has developed the 'Scottish Sabbath.' Moderatism is not to be regarded as spiritually blind, because it insisted that knowledge was a better vehicle for truth than ignorance, that dignity was to be preferred to vulgarity, and that the procedure of a church court should be a model of decency and order. The unsettled period of the troubles had engendered a spirit of restlessness that might easily become anarchic; and Moderatism resolved to put the chaos in order.

Such an attempt was not without its perils. It cost the Church two secessions. It brought the Church under the influence of the period. Moderatism forgot that, in the Christian religion, an ethical system must be based upon doctrinal truth; and, when its enemies charged it with unfaithfulness to the fundamental verities, and with concealing beneath a mask of tolerance a strong hostility to all definite conviction, they were but perverting facts. But they indicated at the same time the real service done by Moderatism when they accused its preachers of seeking to feed their flocks on 'cauld morality.'

The greatest and most typical of the Moderates was William Robertson, the historian, in his day the king of the General Assembly. Under his influence the Assembly became a court in which the keenest minds of the nation were not ashamed to compete for eminence. Though it might seem a mere provincial gathering of ministers and elders with homespun garments and a broad accent, its debates were worthy to rank with those which took place at Westminster. Under the influence of such men as Robertson, the Scottish Church attracted to its ministry the strongest men in the nation. If Robertson was a type of Moderate ecclesiasticism, the representative preacher of Moderatism was Hugh Blair. Moderate preaching was apt to degenerate into the delivery of essays upon the virtues; but the accounts which have reached us of the preaching of Blair prove that, in its highest flights, Moderatism was possessed of great spiritual power. Week by week, St Giles' was filled with an immense congregation, representing the keenest insight

and the highest culture in a city of learning; and the sermons which drew these multitudes were thought worthy of translation into many languages.

The frequent accusation that Moderatism encouraged a low standard of life is not borne out either by Robertson or Blair. Indeed, in the day when they ruled Edinburgh, the most convivial soul was Dr 'Magnum Bonum,' Webster of the Tolbooth, the darling of the 'elect,' and the leader of the Evangelicals. There is more truth in the charge that Moderatism tended to degenerate into rationalism. It formed a congenial environment for such a philosophy as that of Hume. In 1781 a proposal was made to get rid of the Westminster Confession of Faith. Robertson, by this time a man of mature years, retired precipitately from the leadership of his party as a protest against such an alarming project; and the rebellion against the Confession slumbered till a recent period.

With the retirement of Robertson, the Scottish Church entered on a new phase, of which the best mirror is seen in the life and career of Chalmers. Moderatism gave way to a steadily increasing Evangelicalism, which soon rose to such vigour that it was seen to be something very different from the Evangelicalism of the Covenanters, of the 'Marrow Men,' or even of the disciples of Dr Webster. Chalmers, who began life as a Moderate, ended as the titular leader of the Evangelicals. We call him the titular leader advisedly; for, though he was regarded both by himself and by his contemporaries as thoroughly Evangelical, he remained to the end a Moderate at heart; and the significance of his life lies in its remarkable sensitiveness to the successive phases of popular feeling. Though he was incomparably the greatest man who ever bore the name of Evangelical, the real leader and the most typical representative of the party which rose upon the ruins of Moderatism was Dr Andrew Thomson, the powerful minister of St George's, Edinburgh, the very narrowness of whose character made him a more efficient party-leader than Chalmers, with his broader mind, could ever have been.

Thomson took the place in Edinburgh society which had been occupied in a previous generation by Blair. St George's stood in the same relation to the extended city as that in which the High Kirk had stood towards

the older and smaller Edinburgh. Thomson's voice was the most arresting of its generation; and in him might be seen, in their intensity, the religious fervour, the dogmatic severity, the sacerdotal temper, which are the distinguishing marks of Scottish Evangelicalism. Edinburgh society changed in the direction of greater austerity. The preaching of Thomson laid the foundation of the strongly conservative Evangelicalism which is to this day the characteristic of church-going Edinburgh. Thomson's sun went down at noon. He was cut off with alarming suddenness in 1831, ere the faintest whisper of the Disruption controversy had been heard. But, though dead, he yet spoke. The Disruption was carried out by men who had drunk deep of the well of Thomson; and in their zeal and fury might be traced the effect of the principles which they had learned from the great minister of St George's. It is idle to speculate whether, if he had lived, Thomson would have 'gone out'; it is equally idle to enquire whether his guidance of his party would have obviated so extreme a step. The fact remains that the real force behind the Disruption was that of Thomson.

The chief feature of Scottish Evangelicalism was its vehement and aggressive orthodoxy. It accepted the Confession literally; and, down to a period within the memory of men still in their prime, this was the mark of Free Church theology and Free Church preaching. The Evangelicalism of the nineteenth century differed from the Evangelicalism of earlier periods in that it was not apt to be suspicious of learning. Its choicest exponents, Thomson, Moncrieff, Erskine, Chalmers, were men of high intellectual stature. But learning was not allowed to break through the barriers of Confessional orthodoxy; and the slightest deviation from the standards was regarded with genuine horror. It is permissible to see in this the working of the same spirit which had provoked the latitudinarianism of the Moderates. The mouth never protests so loudly as when the heart is beginning to feel the pressure of doubt. Religious restiveness is not a truer herald of a period of upheaval than an increased severity of dogmatic assertion. The boisterous orthodoxy of Thomson and his disciples was perhaps only an attempt to still the voice of doubt. Their dogmatism was born of the same mother

who had given birth to the scepticism of Hume ; and the severity of the Disruption Church was, as we can now see, the necessary prelude to the fearless liberalism which has since become the honourable characteristic of her children. Such a result was equally beyond the dreams and the hopes of the founders of the Free Church. 'Rabbi' Duncan alone seemed to have any foresight of what was coming ; and, down to the time when the Robertson-Smith case threw light on her true attitude, the Free Church could pride herself on her fidelity to the Confession.

Scottish Evangelicalism, like its sister, English Tractarianism, was a fruit of the spirit which in literature and art brought in the Romantic age. It was not the only sign in the firmament. Carlyle had thrown over the project of entering the ministry. His friend, Edward Irving, had by his vagaries drawn upon himself the heavy censure of the Church. Macleod Campbell of Row gave a version of the doctrine of the Atonement which, while destined to colour deeply the thought of the Established Church, was so far at variance with the orthodox interpretation of Calvinistic doctrine that Moderate and Evangelical combined to unfrock him. Chalmers, indeed—and the incident throws a flood of light on his real position—absented himself from the debate, unwilling either to vote for condemnation or to speak for acquittal. 'Would one vote have saved him ?' he asked, when they told him the result. The dissenting Presbyterians, the children of earlier secessions, were in a state of ferment, which produced some complicated processes of subdivision and reunion, and finally burst forth in the first disestablishment campaign. The course of events in literature, in politics, in religion, as well as the conduct of the ecclesiastics, prevents the reader from being taken by surprise when he comes to a chapter which tells how the National Church was rent in twain.

The final act was ushered in by a great 'Convocation,' which was held in Edinburgh in November 1842. The idea of such a gathering sprang up in the fertile mind of Candlish, and was swiftly translated into action. The meetings were held in the Roxburgh Chapel, a small place of worship in an obscure street, and were attended by ministers from all parts. The proceedings were

private, and the only record consists of the notes of one who was present. In many cases the members had attended under the impression that they would not be required to take a pledge; and some had announced their intention of returning to their manse as free as when they went. But so adroit was the management of the meetings, and so overpowering was the personal influence of the men who had organised them, that, though some faint remonstrances were made at the outset, nearly every man returned from the 'Convocation' pledged to vacate his living in the event of a continued refusal by the Government to grant their demands. It is probable that the leaders knew very well the mind of the politicians; if they did not, their blindness to the meaning of what they had learned in deputations and correspondence was scarcely creditable to such astute and capable men. But many of those who accepted the pledge had no expectation that they would be required to fulfil it, and fancied that they could sway the Government by what in working-class circles would be called a strike.

Funds were gathered with the utmost diligence; public meetings were held; in some cases churches were built; and Candlish showed what hope was in him by procuring the erection of a large building for his own use. An unsuccessful attempt was made to secure a majority among the representatives commissioned to the General Assembly by the different constituencies.* On May 18, 1843, the decisive step was taken. The proceedings were carefully arranged to hide the fact that for once the Evangelicals were in a minority. The procedure of the Assembly does not allow it to proceed to business until a Moderator has been elected, the roll of members made up, and the royal Commissioner received. Had the Evangelicals secured the majority, they would in all probability have waited for the proper moment, and, by passing a formal resolution, have made the act of secession the formal act of the supreme court. As it was, they resorted to a method which could not fail to strike the imagination.

Dr Welsh, the retiring Moderator, took the chair in

* It must be kept in mind, however, that the whole question of representation had been complicated by the decision of the civil courts in the Stewarton case (Jan. 1843).

St Andrew's Church in the presence of a great and expectant multitude. After prayer he intimated that, in consequence of the attitude of the civil power, he and those who agreed with him were unable to continue in that house. He read and laid on the table a document signed by the great majority of those who were prepared to follow him, in which they protested against the violence done to their consciences, and asserted that in withdrawing from that house they were proving their claim to be regarded as the true Assembly of the Church of Scotland. He then bowed gravely to the Commissioner and left the building, followed instantly by almost the whole of the Evangelical party. In silent and solemn procession they continued to walk out, until the Moderates found, to their dismay, that the whole of one side of the church was left vacant. Outside St Andrew's a large concourse watched the procession as the seceders marched three abreast down the steep hill to a spacious hall at Canon-mills, which had been made ready for the occasion. There a new Assembly was constituted, with the claim that it, and not the disconsolate 'remnant' in St Andrew's, was the true successor of former Assemblies.

Dr Chalmers was elected Moderator, and forthwith gave out 'one of those Psalms which, in the metrical version, have for ages moved the Scottish people':—

'O send Thy light forth and Thy truth;
Let them be guides to me;
And bring me to Thine holy hill,
Even where Thy dwellings be.'

The chronicler relates how the day had been overcast by a heavy thundercloud, which made the interior of the badly lighted hall so dark as to render it almost impossible to distinguish the faces of those present. As the familiar psalm rolled up from a thousand voices, the sun shone through a rift in the cloud, and a ray of dazzling light filled the hall. There were not wanting those who saw in so striking a coincidence a manifest token of divine favour. Nor could it be denied that the circumstances were such as to convey the impression that the right lay wholly with the seceders. The popular mind is not prone to look below the surface; and what the crowds in the streets of Edinburgh saw that day was

that a large body of ministers and elders, including most of the clergy of the city, men justly honoured for sincerity and strength of character, were voluntarily resigning the whole of their worldly possessions rather than be false to their consciences. Many who were not usually susceptible to religious influences were ready to applaud so impressive an action. Jeffrey, whose best friend could not accuse him of religious enthusiasm, said that he was proud of his country. But all who watched the procession were not one in spirit with burly John Cairns, as, like David before the ark, he demonstrated in front of the seceding ministers; and Sir William Hamilton, not the least interested or the least shrewd observer of men and things, said something about being martyrs by mistake.

If we are correct in supposing that Candlish desired and worked for a secession, he had good cause to be satisfied with his labours. Perhaps the remarkable outburst of hatred and abuse, with which the Free Church assailed the brethren whom they had deserted, was due to a lingering suspicion that all was not as well as could be desired, and that the victory of the Evangelicals existed largely in the fervid speeches of their leaders. It was expected that the Establishment would collapse; and it was with no small vexation that the Free Church beheld her rival, after a period of staggering and weakness, rise to greater strength than ever. Under such guides as James Robertson, the Established Church refrained from railing and controversy; and this did not tend to sweeten the temper of the Free Church. But, on the whole, Candlish had achieved a satisfactory success. About four hundred and fifty out of twelve hundred clergy had with him forsaken the walls of Zion; and in nearly every case the secession of the minister implied the secession of at least the bulk of his congregation.

In many parts of the country the rout of the Moderates was complete; in some parts it was irretrievable. In the chief cities—Edinburgh, Glasgow, Dundee, Aberdeen, Perth—the pulpits were nearly all emptied. The strongest support which the Free Church received was in the class which fills the ranks of town councils; and, as in the cities the town councils were the patrons of the parish churches, an opportunity was given which was

not neglected. In the cities the steady influx of new population from the rural districts changed in course of time the relative position of the churches; and some of the deserted parish churches were again filled with large congregations. But in the Highlands beyond the Great Glen the Moderates were utterly swept away. Men like Kennedy of Dingwall and Macdonald of Ferintosh wielded an authority as absolute as any that could be enjoyed by chiefs of ancient pedigree; and at their bidding the counties of Ross and Sutherland and the Outer Isles 'went out' almost to a man. In many parishes the minister's family formed the only congregation that could be gathered to the parish church. A system as perfect as an Irish boycott crushed, in all but the strongest, any lingering inclination to cleave to the Establishment. To a date within recent memory, the Free Church held the northern Highlands in the hollow of her hand.

It must in all honesty be added that many of the defects which are so plainly visible in the Highlander of the northern counties can be traced directly to the influence of the Free Church. If the northern Highlands are guilty of the belief that vital godliness is not to be found south of the Grampians, the blame must be laid at the door of the Disruption leaders. Possessed of an almost papal authority over the consciences of a simple and unlettered people, they used it rather to secure the interests of their party than to fulfil their moral responsibilities. While the Lowlands went on with the times, the Highlands were encouraged to stay behind. Ignorance was pampered and self-righteousness was stimulated. Advantage was taken of the superstitious character of the Highlander to force the religion of a people naturally buoyant and poetical into the mould of a harsh and awful Puritanism. The troubles which in recent years have befallen the Free Church in the Highlands are the result, the inevitable result, of the policy that was followed in the heyday of the Disruption.

It is usual, in speaking of the Disruption, to lay stress on the sacrifices which were made by the men who 'went out.' It is not to be doubted that in many a family there was hardship; and, where hardship had to be borne, it was borne in a spirit honourable both to the ministers and to their wives. Yet it is at least

permissible to doubt whether the current descriptions are not exaggerated. It should be remembered that a half year's stipend was due at the time of the Disruption, that large funds had been gathered in anticipation of the Disruption, and that these were greatly augmented in the months which followed. If the rank and file were put to some hardship, it has been doubted by many whether the leaders did not actually profit. Chalmers resigned one of the worst salaries in Edinburgh University to become the Principal of the New College. Candlish resigned the living of St George's; but all who know Edinburgh will ask if it was so great a sacrifice to become minister of Free St George's. Cunningham, the third leader in the Disruption, had been minister of Trinity College Church. He was appointed deputy to England and America for the purpose of gathering funds, and returned to a chair in the New College. If in such cases there were sufferings, there were at least substantial and tangible consolations.

It is more likely that the sufferings of the period were borne by the men who remained in the Established Church. The task left for them to do was almost beyond their power. A third of the churches were vacant; the foreign missionaries had all 'gone out'; the students at the universities had joined the Free Church; and, in every step that was taken, the fierce and determined hostility of the Free Church had to be reckoned with. In the performance of its duty, the Established Church received none of the encouragements which were lavished upon the Free Church. The seceders had gone forth amid the plaudits of admiring thousands; but the parish minister had to put up with being banned as 'the one excommunicated man in the district.' To see a new church built in close proximity to his own, to find everywhere in the parish a new element of aggressive hostility to be abjured as a mere 'stipend-lifter,' were burdens not easy to be borne by the member of a profession which after all does not live by bread alone. Attendance at the parish church was regarded as a sign of religious indifference and moral laxity; and those who remained in the Establishment were to be excused if they imagined that they had done enough in being faithful in spite of such odds. The life of such a man as James Robertson reveals

admirably the temper in which the Moderates set themselves to build up their broken walls. The historian of the Disruption, if he must mention the sacrifices of the Free Church, must give equal prominence to the brave and resolute spirits of such men as Robertson of Ellon, Story of Rosneath, or Norman Macleod, who, out of the broken church of 1843, built up the massive institution which in the eighties repelled the onset of the Disestablishment crusaders.

With the history of the Free Church after the Disruption we need not deal here and now. The most significant point is the manner of its origin. It claimed, as every seceding body in Scotland has claimed, to be the true guardian of the traditions of the Church of Scotland. It described itself as the 'Church of Scotland Free,' and had no other name for its rival than the 'Residuary Establishment.' It waited to see the ignominious end of the Establishment. But that this collapse did not come, in spite of the dominance within the church of a moribund Moderatism, was in itself a proof that Moderatism still contained a seed of life and, even in its decay, was capable of becoming the parent of a new school of thought which would conserve a vital element of Scottish religion. On the other hand, many expected the Free Church to expire after a brief period of aggressive fanaticism. That it succeeded in establishing an organisation nearly as complete as the church which it had left, that in the course of time it gathered to itself the varied streams of Presbyterian dissent, were signs that it also preserved a vital truth. If, however, we have been correct in our estimates of Moderatism and Evangelicalism, no further argument is necessary to explain the stability of the Free Church or the resuscitation of the Establishment. The story will also make clear how impossible it was for the Free Church to remain in the position of extreme conservatism which she had adopted in 1843.

Chalmers, indeed—and his words have been strongly pressed—imagined that the Free Church could hold aloof from the other churches, and, amid right-hand and left-hand defections, go steadily forward in the narrow way. But Chalmers was not the victorious general so much as the illustrious captive led in the procession; and for the real spirit of the Disruption we must look to the precept

and the example of such men as Candlish. The policy which he was responsible for shaping quickly showed the real tendencies of the secession. For a time, indeed, there were no signs that Free Church thought would depart from its rigidity. To the end of his life Candlish was a pattern of orthodoxy; and the charge which he and others were never weary of hurling at the Church of Scotland was that it was unfaithful to the Scriptures. The school of thought represented by F. D. Maurice had many disciples in Scotland; but they were chiefly in the Established Church. Macleod Campbell was near of kin to Maurice; and the most living school of thought in the Church of Scotland, the school which moulded it anew and gave it a new life, was hewn from the same rock as Maurice and Campbell. Robert Lee, Robert Wallace, John Tulloch, Norman Macleod, John Caird, Robert Story—these and others formed a galaxy of extraordinary brilliancy. It would not be difficult to show how their freshness and vigour sprang from that Moderatism whose tendencies were so alarming to Principal Robertson. Nor would it be hard to show how their message was the message most useful to Scotland in a period of transformation. But the very process of showing these things would explain why Free Church conservatism scowled on such daring, and why so typical a Free Churchman as Candlish thought it his duty to attack the heresies of Maurice.

The real tendency of the Disruption first revealed itself in ecclesiastical policy. Chalmers had maintained that the Free Church was not 'voluntary,' and that it must abide by the principle of Establishment. But, even before the Disruption, Candlish had declared that the necessity of leaving the Church would entail the further necessity of attacking and demolishing it. The character of the standards of 1843 was too academic to be sustained. For a time, men might seek to reconcile their proceedings with their standards by declaring that what they sought was the disestablishment of the existing Established Church in favour of the Free Church; but, in the end, they were bound to come to the position, which, whether right or wrong, was at least consistent, of agitating for disestablishment *per se*. If this position were accepted, the Free Church must of necessity draw

nearer to the other dissenters, now consolidated into the United Presbyterian body. It is easier to alter the policy of an assembly than to change the wording of a symbol; and this is why, in the end, the Free Church presented the strange spectacle of a church which, while holding by standards that affirmed the principle of Establishment, yet acted in concert with the most determined foes of the Established Church.

Ecclesiastical policy is but an outer garment. 'Rabbi' Duncan, as we have said, was keen-sighted enough to see the change of attitude; but he was probably regarded as a saintly dreamer. It is doubtful if Candlish foresaw the developments in Free Church thought. Orthodoxy did not allow a whisper of discontent to become audible. It is said by those who are able to judge, that the evangelistic tour of Moody and Sankey was one of the first forces to break through the crust of Free Church rigidity, as it was also one of the first influences to open the eyes of a somewhat complacent and self-righteous body to the fact that godliness and zeal might be found in other communions. Whether this be the case or not, the explosion was bound to come at last. Evangelicalism, as we have said, was a desperate attempt to stifle doubt. Norman Macleod said that the Free Church could not live, because it was the church of a dead past; but he was unable, as most of his contemporaries were unable, to see the fires which glowed beneath the surface. The storm burst when, in 1875, Prof. Robertson Smith proclaimed himself a disciple of the higher critics.* From that to doctrinal unsteadiness was a short step. While the Established Church showed signs of increasing conservatism, the Free Church flung her fears to the winds. The New College in Edinburgh rose to a position of great eminence among the theological colleges of Britain. In the 'Declaratory Act' (1892) beliefs which were dear to the fathers were explained away. The church which had once gloried in her soundness came to boast of her freedom.

* The date given is the date of the publication of the article 'Bible' in the *Encyclopædia Britannica* (9th edition). In 1876 the article was condemned so severely in a report to the Free Church Assembly, that Professor Robertson Smith next year demanded a formal trial. In 1879 he offered to retire. In 1881 he was removed from his chair.

If the view here presented be correct, it indicates that the union in 1900 with the United Presbyterian Church, and the adoption at the Assembly of 1905 of a deliverance asserting complete independence, were in the direct line of descent from the influences which led to the Disruption. The trend of policy and the movements of thought within the Church of Scotland are also very significant. If the descendants of the Evangelicals owe more to Moderatism than they are perhaps willing to admit, the sons of the Moderates have accepted evangelical views to a surprising extent. This goes to prove the saying that in Scotland there are no sects, only parties. It proves also that if, instead of being represented by two rival organisations, the opposing tendencies could react upon one another across the floor of one Assembly, the benefit to both churches and to the nation would be incalculable. It is open to believe that in the Church, as in the State, two parties of differing sympathies might dwell together; for, in spite of past and present divergence, Moderatism and Evangelicalism are children of one parent. That the Disruption was in many ways a calamity is not doubted; but those who are inclined to pour vials of wrath upon the memory of the fiery men who consummated that event may perhaps find it in their hearts to pardon them after all, if the issues of the Disruption should unexpectedly lead the nation to a point at which its national religion might again be symbolised by a united National Church. And, if this desirable consummation should be brought about, the jarring sects south of the Tweed may well learn a lesson from so excellent an example.

Art. VII.—THE LITERATURE OF THE FRENCH RENAISSANCE.

1. *The Literature of the French Renaissance.* By Arthur Tilley. Two vols. Cambridge: University Press, 1904.
2. *Women and Men of the French Renaissance.* By Edith Sichel. London: Constable, 1903.
3. *Catherine de' Medici and the French Reformation.* By Edith Sichel. London: Constable, 1905.
4. *Gaspard de Coligny, Admiral of France.* By A. W. Whitehead. London: Methuen, 1904.
5. *The Cambridge Modern History.* Vol. I, The Renaissance; vol. II, The Reformation. Cambridge: University Press, 1902-3.
6. *Histoire de France.* Edited by E. Lavisse. Vol. V, La France sous Charles VIII, Louis XII, et François I^{er}. By H. Lemonnier. Paris: Hachette, 1903.

No period in the past, with the exception perhaps of those years during which the genius of Greece touched perfection, can be more interesting alike to the scholar, the theologian, the artist, the man of science, and the politician, than that to which the name of the Renaissance is generally given. The invention of the printing-press enabled the enthusiasm of the learned to diffuse the knowledge of antiquity, and gave vigour to the growth of national literatures. Impatience of the abuses of Rome and of ultramontane domination, together with a more critical study of the title-deeds of the Papacy, broke up the unity and distributed the energies of the western Church. The development of civil life and the diffusion of taste at the courts of princes stimulated the productive activities of artists inspired by the perfection of ancient models. An era of rapid and continuous scientific progress began with the discovery of the New World and of the place of the earth in the universe, and with the substitution of experiment and observation, however imperfectly applied, for the *a priori* methods of scholastic science. Among the western nations, personal monarchy, more or less despotic, took the place of the looser feudal organisation; while international relations came, for a time, to be solely determined by considerations of self-interest. Such, no doubt, had ever

been the ruling motive, but it had not hitherto been openly avowed, so long as men accepted the ideal of a Christian commonwealth, the members of which were regarded as communities subject to the same divine laws which govern the actions of individuals.

Nor was there ever an epoch more picturesque and more eventful, more fertile in men of marked individuality and conspicuous genius. Never was vice more splendid, corruption more refined, and virtue more heroic. The sense of a newly-gained freedom, of a new and vast inheritance of knowledge, stimulated for good and evil the development of strongly-marked characters. Almost all that was picturesque in the trappings of feudalism and the usages of chivalry was retained or revived, heightened by a pagan delight in the joy of living, all the more poignant because it conflicted with a renewed sense of the vanity of all earthly things and of the supreme importance of man's spiritual life.

In no country can the various impulses and tendencies which composed those multiform movements which we call the Renaissance and the Reformation be better traced than in France; nowhere did they produce more marked and divergent types of character; nowhere was the struggle between them and the old order and between their own conflicting principles more striking. It may therefore excite some surprise that so little should be told us about the French Renaissance in the two first volumes of the 'Cambridge Modern History.' The progress of the Reformation in France is the subject of the excellent chapter written by Mr Tilley. Dr Fairbairn gives a sympathetic and most interesting sketch of the career and doctrines of Calvin. But, while the French Reformation is adequately treated, two pages in Sir R. Jebb's masterly account of the Classical Renaissance, as many in Dr Barry's somewhat tightly packed chapter on Catholic Europe, and three more, devoted to a sensible but rather slight appreciation of Rabelais and Montaigne, in Dr Fairbairn's essay on the tendencies of European thought, contain all that is told us of the progress and results of the Renaissance in France. Various reasons may be given for this omission, the strongest perhaps being that a detailed account of literature and of the arts was not contemplated in the scheme drawn up by Lord Acton, that limits of

space enforced a selection in which politics and international history necessarily took the lion's share, and that while the origins of a movement which affected all Europe were described in the brilliant chapters contributed by Sir R. Jebb and Dr James, the details of the after-growth as affecting separate countries could only be lightly touched. Fortunately the student who desires a guide to the literature of the French Renaissance has only to turn to Mr Tilley's book on that subject. To commend the sound judgment and critical insight of an author does but mean that one agrees with him; and the value of such praise must depend on the source whence it proceeds. But Mr Tilley's thorough knowledge of his subject, the self-restraint and sobriety of his appreciations and the skill with which they are illustrated by his references and quotations must be obvious even to those who might be disposed to dissent from his carefully considered criticisms.

Some account of the literary and artistic side of the French Renaissance is also to be found in Miss Sichel's entertaining books; but she is at her best when dealing with the social and lighter aspects of her subject. She is more fortunate in the central figure of her first than of her second volume. It is scarcely an exaggeration to say that Margaret of Angoulême—that 'unworldly woman of the world,' so interested in literature in art and religion, the student of Dante, the author of spiritual poetry and of the *Heptameron*, that strange medley of edifying sentiment and coarse adventure—was an 'epitome of the earlier French Renaissance'; but Catherine de' Medici was assuredly not 'one of those figures which sum up whole periods.' It is the more surprising that Miss Sichel should so describe the Queen-mother, since she analyses her character, with all its limitations, very well.

Catherine was essentially Italian, the type of nothing French. Her difficulties were often due to the fact that she neither understood nor sympathised with the people among whom she lived. Her politics were those of the later Italian Renaissance. The State appeared to her to be an artistic mechanism existing for the benefit of the ruler, power an end in itself to be pursued by the politician regardless of the restraints of law, morality, or tradition. But this could not be the ideal of either Leaguer or

Huguenot. The common-sense which was, as Miss Sichel says, the best side of Catherine, only made her more incapable of foreseeing or understanding the actions of men swayed by fanaticism or passion rather than by their own personal advantage.

But although Catherine's disregard of religious questions and her studies in Italian statecraft—Machiavelli was said to be her Bible—led her to miscalculate the force of motives of which she had no experience, it must not be forgotten that she introduced into French politics a new principle, and one full of future promise, when she regulated her policy without any care for the interests of this or that creed, and accepted indifferently the services of Romanist or Protestant. The Chancellor l'Hôpital has been often praised as the first truly tolerant French statesman, because he was averse from persecution, and desired some large measure of compromise which should reconcile the Huguenots to the Church. But he still believed in the intimate connexion of Church and State, and declared that two religions could not possibly exist side by side in the same country—a belief held as an axiom in the Middle Ages, and accepted alike by Catholic and Calvinist, but one which made toleration impossible, or at all events illogical. Catherine was really tolerant because, like the Italian tyrants, she believed the State to be a purely secular institution, existing for the benefit of the Prince. This conception of politics, as something wholly apart from religion, was afterwards adopted by great and patriotic statesmen, by Henry IV and Richelieu, but with the essential difference that they identified the interests of the State, not with those of the ruler, but with those of the community. The reign of Lewis XIV was a period of reaction and retrogression, and perhaps in nothing more so than in rejecting this idea of a secular State, which the modern world owes to the Italian Renaissance.

The modesty of Miss Sichel's preface disarms criticism. But, when a 'minor' historian writes so much that is good and in a manner so vivid and attractive, we are justified in regretting all that suggests careless workmanship. Miss Sichel, for instance, says that Admiral Chabot who, although he was the patron of the discoverer of Canada, had not much more to do with the sea than Admiral

Coligny, was perhaps 'the greatest sailor of later times,' and so leads us to suspect that she was confusing the favourite of Francis I with the navigator Cabot. When she calls du Bellay's 'Deffence et illustration de la langue françoise' the 'Défense de poésie,' has she not allowed her mind to wander to Sidney's 'Defence of Poetrie'? while to describe the minister Briçonnet as 'the son of a priest whom Julius II excommunicated,' inspires suspicions probably unjust. The 'bouc,' the tragic goat given by his friends to Jodellé, a beast famous in the history of the French drama, figures in Miss Sichel's pages as a 'buck.' Not to be familiar with Horace or the origins of the Greek stage is no reproach to a lady; but so good a French scholar must know that similarity of sound is a trap for the unwary translator. Sometimes also the reader is led by Miss Sichel's lively exuberance to wonder what may be the extent of her acquaintance with the authors of whom she is speaking. It is a compliment to her judgment to doubt whether, if she had lately read Des Perier's 'Cymbalum Mundi,' she would have called it 'a great book.'

Miss Sichel in an interesting chapter insists that the sceptical temperament of the French was the main cause of their indifference to the Reformation. She would agree with M. Faguet that his countrymen are inclined to compromise and averse from extremes, swayed rather by common-sense than by enthusiasm. This is true, but there has always been in France a minority among whom a passionate devotion to ideals has been combined with a logical impatience of middle courses; and sometimes, as in the earlier days of the Revolution, this minority has dominated the apathy of the majority. Had there been among the Jacobins a real statesman, a leader of genius, capable of seizing the opportunity, the Republic might have been established on a more enduring foundation. So, too, it is just possible that Protestantism might have prevailed, had the reformers been united under the guidance of a man of transcendent political ability. Yet it may be doubted whether, in the most favourable circumstances, Jacobinism aspiring to be a rule of life could have been imposed on France, and whether a people not oppressed by a sense of the graver problems of existence, nor generally emotional, could have been induced to

accept a creed so austere as that of Calvin. France might possibly have become Protestant in the sixteenth century, republican at the end of the eighteenth; but a France Calvinist or Jacobin at heart is scarcely conceivable.

Mr Whitehead, in his excellent life of the one great Protestant leader, prefers Coligny as a statesman to Cromwell. Some partiality is excusable in a biographer; but Mr Whitehead is generally so unbiassed in his judgment that we cannot but be surprised at this estimate. Perhaps he rather underrates the Lord Protector than overrates the admiral. However this may be, when once the sword had been drawn, when the Protestant congregations had become Calvinist and militant, when the passion of the Catholic mob had been excited, and a fanatical Romanist party had been organised, then, even apart from all the discordant aims and selfish ambitions of his followers, and the ambiguity of his own position, it had become impossible for Coligny, as it would have been for any other man, however great his genius, to convert France to Protestantism. Francis I might perhaps have established a reformed Gallican Church; Henry IV could not have done so, even had his title to the throne been undisputed and his Huguenot army four times as numerous.

Yet, although the Protestants were destined to remain a small and oppressed minority, they were a most valuable element of the nation. The men who were most under the influence of the Renaissance were critics and not reformers. Imperturbability was, as we shall have occasion to notice, the moral attitude they most prized; they were no more disposed than their intellectual descendants in the eighteenth century to attack the existing order of society, although they might apply the most destructive criticism to the principles on which it rested. They were wanting in the passion required for effective action. Protestantism—what remained of the Calvinistic Church after the revocation of the Edict of Nantes—and Jansenism, an orthodox Protestantism or Catholic Calvinism, supplied much of the fervour, the motive power, needed to carry the principles of the Renaissance and of the philosophers beyond the sphere of theory. Rousseau himself came from Calvinistic Geneva; and the number of men trained in dissent who

played a prominent part in the Revolutionary assemblies is remarkable.

The great event in modern history is the Revolution—not the cataclysm which overwhelmed the old order of society in France, but the great change still in progress, of which that was but a startling episode. The French Renaissance did much to prepare the way for that Revolution; and for this reason it is in France rather than in Italy or England that the interest of the Renaissance mainly lies, if we regard not so much the splendour and the savour of the fruit as what was to spring from the seed it contained.

The Renaissance, like the Reformation, was a revolt against authority and tradition, although those who led the way thought that they were but substituting one authority for another, abandoning one tradition for another which was both older and better; that they were reviving the culture, the philosophy and the art of antiquity, or restoring the primitive simplicity of the Christian Church. Unfortunately the teaching of antiquity was not simple or easily intelligible. It gave not one but several and contradictory answers to the questions, ethical, social, and metaphysical, the scholastic solution of which no longer sufficed. Moreover, these moderns, fresh from the disputations of the schools, although full of reverence for the wisdom of the ancients, examined their speculations, if not with subtler, yet with more logical minds. A famous teacher of our time used to tell his pupils that a little logic is an excellent thing, but too much very dangerous. And so no doubt it is to a metaphysician, since it is apt to lead him to conclusions repugnant to common-sense or equivalent to a contradiction in terms. The disciple of antiquity, after using his own judgment to determine whether he would be Aristotelian or Platonist, Stoic or Epicurean, often found little satisfaction in the conclusions which might be deduced from the premisses he accepted. Hence it came to be doubted whether absolute truth in these matters be attainable by the human intellect, whether, at all events, suspension of judgment, scepticism, were not the most rational attitude.

In the sphere of religion the influence of the Reformation was analogous. Like the Renaissance, it upheld the

independence and self-sufficiency of the individual; it asserted that each human soul, without the mediation of priest or church, is in direct contact with God. Luther, renewing the Hussite doctrine, that every Christian is a priest, maintained that the sacrament of baptism is in itself an ordination. But, as we have said, the Reformation claimed also to be a Renaissance, the new birth of a past perfection. Anathematising or ignoring the times of superstition which intervened, the assailants of Rome sought to recall into being the pure church of the apostles and their immediate successors, the church of St Paul and St Augustine. But how far did that purity extend? When did the Fathers and councils of the church begin to stray from the right path? Every doctrine, Calvin said, must be brought to the test of the Scriptures. Before the decisions of a council are accepted, it must carefully be considered who were the men thus assembled, at what time, under what conditions, for what purpose. But who is to decide these questions? Calvin, no doubt. But, if Calvin, why not Servetus? Why not you or I? Who made Calvin a judge and a ruler over us? He would admit reason into partnership with faith. '*L'intelligence est conjointe avec la foi.*' In practice this can only mean that each individual has the right—or duty—to determine, by the use of his reason, how far his faith shall extend. Hence many divergent creeds. Yet, as Bossuet argued, truth is not many, but one. Here also an appeal to reason and to the individual judgment leads to agnosticism. Like the Renaissance, the Reformation gave nothing definite in place of the doctrine it rejected.

Now, while the tendency of the Reformation and of the Renaissance was anarchic in that it left everything to be decided by the judgment of the individual, the tendency of Humanism, of the reverence for, and the imitation of, the masterpieces of antiquity, was to limit individual caprice, to eliminate the particular and the personal, and to produce works consciously modelled after accepted types, and in conformity with recognised rules. The Italian scholars were almost all humanists, intelligent and critical admirers and imitators of the ancients, whom the French at first studied rather in the spirit of philosophers and grammarians. The great

works which are the glory of French erudition during the earlier part of the sixteenth century, such as Budé's book '*De asse et partibus ejus*,' his '*Commentaries on the Greek Tongue*,' and those of Dolet on the Latin tongue, are treasuries of information put together with little care for form and method. Even Henri Estienne, though zealous for the improvement and purity of the French language, gained little by familiarity with classical models; his writings are desultory and formless.

These men of erudition were not humanists in the narrower sense, but they were almost all of them imbued with the spirit of the Renaissance. They despised the Middle Ages as times of ignorance; they rejected the teaching of the schoolmen; and they brought the same independent and critical spirit with which they investigated the texts of the classics to the study of the Bible and of the documents which were the title-deeds of the Roman Church. They were therefore the natural allies of the Reformers.

'At first' (says Mr Tilley) 'there is no doubt that "the whole band of the learned," as a contemporary writer puts it, looked with a favourable eye on the reformed doctrines, on the preaching of Lefèvre d'Étaples and his friends, and the writings of Luther.'

But, when it became necessary to take one side or the other, and the boldness of the Reformers provoked the anger of Francis I, then the majority of these votaries of the New Learning adhered to the old faith—some from fear or interest, some from indifference, because they were not theologians or had advanced so far as to find little to choose between the superstitions of Rome and those of Augsburg, but the majority from repugnance to the form which Calvin had given to French Protestantism.

Never, even in her most ascetic mood, had the old church been more opposed to liberty, more indifferent to all things connected with the culture of the intellect and the imagination, more resolute in condemning all care for physical beauty and in asserting the natural depravity of man's carnal nature. Men who would have been glad to see 'the ancient and apostolic form of religion restored by moderate means' did not wish to bow their necks to a yoke heavier and more galling

than that which they had cast off. Nowhere can the attitude of the scholars and men of the earlier French Renaissance towards the Reformation be better studied than in the writings of Rabelais. The whole of the earlier French Renaissance is summed up in him. In him we can find the germ of all those 'principles' of which the world was to hear so much two centuries later—impatience of tradition, contempt of the 'Gothic' ages, faith in the inherent goodness of human nature, in freedom, in the supremacy of reason as the interpreter of nature, in fraternity, for we are born to help each other, in equality, for there is no folly in the world, he says, so great as the belief that the stars concern themselves more about kings and popes than about the poor and needy.

It is true that all this supplied him rather with a standard by which to try and to condemn that which existed than with a basis on which to erect anything new. He lacked the enthusiasm or the fanaticism needed by one who would set the world right; and in this he resembled most of the men of the Renaissance. Yet he indicated the path on which mankind was to stumble forward towards a light still too dimly perceived for us to be certain whether it is a treacherous and wandering fire or a beacon marking the harbour in which future generations may find their rest. Faith in scientific progress, belief in whose infinite possibilities is often the modern agnostic's antidote to despair, sprang up in Rabelais side by side with a rudimentary scepticism. For he was above all a man of science and a physician. Science, a science based on observation and experiment, was the serious pursuit of his life. Immortality might be to him a great possibility, and God the inconceivable; yet he did not, like Montaigne, insist on the imbecility of man's intellect. If we cannot know what man and God are, we may yet learn much about the little flower in the crannied rock. He agreed with Bacon that the schoolmen had gone astray because 'they sought truth in their own little world and not in the great and common world, because they had withdrawn themselves too much from the contemplation of nature and the observation of experience, and tumbled up and down in their own reason and conceits.'

Although Rabelais, like so many of the scholars of

the Renaissance, was a man of encyclopædic knowledge and wide experience, although he took a lively interest in whatever men thought or did, we would protest with Mr Tilley against 'the tendency to represent him as a grave person who, under colour of a buffoonery alien to his character, was solely concerned with the teaching of profound philosophic truths.' He did not assume the cap and bells in order that he might utter truths only tolerated from a jester's lips. His chief object was to amuse others, and perhaps also himself. Those who would have us believe that he means more than meets the eye, quote his Prologue, where indeed he says in effect—

'Cucullus non facit monachum: things are not always what they seem. You may find marvellous matter in this book if you treat it as a dog does his bone. How devoutly he watches it, how carefully he guards it, how passionately he clings to it, how cautiously he begins to crack it, how diligently he sucks it—and all for a little marrow.'

But we must not forget what immediately follows.

'What? did Homer ever think of the allegories men have found in his works? or had Ovid, when he wrote his *Metamorphoses*, the mysteries of the Gospel in his mind? Why, then, not take these merry chronicles for what they are? Since, when I composed them in my leisure moments, I thought no more than you do of these profound interpretations.'

The books which have made Rabelais' name immortal were not the serious occupation of his life, but the relaxation of his leisure. When the day's work was done and he chanced to be alone, after he had eaten and drunk, the bottle perhaps still at his elbow, he gave free rein to his fancy and poured out his thoughts, sometimes touching on serious matters, just as he would have done in conversation with a friend. And this is the great charm of his book, that it is talk, not writing.

Montaigne said that the style he most admired was one '*decousu et hardi, le même au papier qu'en la bouche.*' Probably he was thinking of his own; but the description, it has been well said, is even more applicable to the style of Rabelais. Rabelais was the first master of that lucid, concise, and flexible prose, as natural as the most unstudied conversation, as harmonious and well-balanced

as the most laboured rhetoric, which is the glory of French literature. Calvin, the only contemporary who might be preferred to him, although admirably clear and sober, has less ease; and his periods, though never obscure, are sometimes lengthy and involved. Rabelais is at his best when he is borne on, *lege solutus*, by his wonderful 'verve' as a teller of stories. When he pauses to polish his style, harmony of cadence sometimes tempts him to become obscure; when he aims at dignity, as in the letters of Gargantua and Pantagruel, his construction ceases to be simple and idiomatic.

He knew almost all that was to be known in his day—Latin, Greek, Hebrew, Italian, and Spanish, medicine and jurisprudence, astronomy, chemistry, and botany. He had seen the manners and cities of many men, both as a wandering scholar and as the companion of ambassadors. He had associated intimately with men high in church and state, with the most learned scholars and most celebrated authors of the age. He had a jovial and sympathetic disposition, sound common-sense, a judgment unclouded by prejudice, and warped by no fanaticism. Allowing his fancy and humour to guide his pen, he poured forth all that was in him with genial and generally felicitous exuberance.

There were few things that he hated. There is nothing about him of the '*sæva indignatio*' of Swift. Pantagruelism is, he says, 'indifference to all fortuitous matters,' among which he classed, not only the folly, but apparently even the wrong-doing of our neighbours. Pantagruel, he tells us, never tormented himself, never took offence. He is humane, decent in his own life and conversation, but he loves and delights in the knavish, cruel, cowardly, foul-mouthed and licentious Panurge. He never rebukes him; and he witnesses, if not with approval, certainly without blame, such acts as the drowning of the shepherds whom Panurge beat back into the sea. If Rabelais hated anything, it was the Friars—their filth, their ignorance, and their intolerance. 'They are,' he says, 'contemptible drones, useless to society; they mock God with *aves* and litanies recited by rote; and they have no better occupation than to make love to their neighbours' wives.' He derides the superstitions by which they profited. 'Go home,' said Grandgousier to the pilgrims,

'abandon these vain journeys, and live as the apostle bids you, "not slothful in business, serving the Lord."' Gargantua and Pantagrue refuse to tolerate these false prophets any longer, and determine to show their gratitude to God for their victories by allowing His gospel to be preached.

In the dedication of the fourth book of Pantagrue to Cardinal Odet de Châtillon, the author declares that those who had accused him of heresy are cannibals and liars. King Francis had caused his writings to be read to him and had found no suspicious passage. If so, Coligny had a clearer insight into their tendency than the king when, according to Granvella, wishing to sap the faith of Charles IX and to inspire him with hatred of the Catholic clergy, he placed Pantagrue in his hands.

Lord Beaconsfield in his cynical mood remarked, as Mr Tilley reminds us, that a wise man does not tell his religion. Rabelais was both wise and cautious; but we need not the *flair* of an inquisitor to discover that he was no good Catholic. Like other men of the Renaissance, he had rejected the teaching of the schoolmen, the philosophic basis of orthodox belief, and sympathised with the Reformers, who searched the Scriptures for arms against Roman superstitions. He invariably speaks with reverence of the Gospels and of the cardinal dogmas of Christianity. Pan, whose death a mysterious voice proclaimed to the terrified sailors, was (he says) the Saviour, our all, in whom and by whom we live and have our being. The inscription on the gates of the abbey of Thelema invites the preachers of God's word to enter; and all who dwell within are to be girt with the gospel. Yet the motto of the order, '*Fay ce que voudras*,' the precept to follow the dictates of honour which reigns supreme in gentle souls, who are only led to do wrong by a not ignoble resentment at constraint, is hardly consistent with the doctrine of man's fall, his corrupt nature and redemption. If, as *curé* of Meudon, Rabelais celebrated mass, it must have been in the spirit of Rousseau's Savoyard vicar, with a full recognition of the moral beauty of Christ's life and teaching, but with indifference to the dogmatic significance of a ritual hallowed by antiquity.

'Rabelais,' says M. Faguet, 'believes in God, in reason, and in knowledge.' Knowledge—of things, not words—

is, as he conceives it, the end of education. His scholar is bound, after prayer and thanksgiving, to begin and end the day by noting the position of the stars; he is to learn the natural sciences, to visit the workshops of all artists and artisans. Gargantua would have his son seek to penetrate the secrets of nature by careful study and observation. Languages and literature are not to be neglected; but it is significant that the only books expressly mentioned are practical—the ‘Works and Days’ of Hesiod and the ‘Georgics’ of Virgil. Knowledge, and reason the interpreter of nature, will free the scholar from the delusions of magic, of astrology, of alchemy, and from all superstitions. It is impossible to doubt that Rabelais believed in the existence of a beneficent deity, who was well pleased that man should live happily, and, by following the dictates of his reason and his knowledge, secure the highest good, a cheerful and contented mind in a healthy body. The piety of Gargantua and Pantagruel is neither hypocrisy nor conformity to fashion. But of God little can be known, except that He is the Hidden One; and, if he is defined, it is as a sphere whose centre is everywhere and circumference nowhere; that is to say, he can only be described in meaningless terms, for that which has neither centre nor circumference is no more a sphere than it is a triangle or a pentagon. But, if the religion of Rabelais was that of Rousseau, a vague but not cold nor unemotional deism, in politics, like most of the scholars of the Renaissance, he was the precursor of Voltaire. His ideal appears to have been a just, humane, and enlightened despotism. The prince should be a wise man. Unfortunately it is not likely that Rabelais’ wise man, who lives in and for himself, will care to be a prince. Pantagruel would not tarry even in the divine mansion of reason, should he there find sadness and disquiet. For nothing in heaven and earth is so precious as tranquillity of mind.

Rabelais, in short, like Montaigne, was a critic, not a reformer. In this, as in so much else, he resembles the majority of his nation, who are prone to prefer acquiescence in what is established to the turmoil of political conflict, but yet are able to discern what is amiss, and are therefore disposed to tolerate the violent action of an enthusiastic minority, especially if that action accords

with principles they have in theory accepted. Hence it comes that a nation, naturally conservative and averse from extreme courses, has undergone violent revolutionary movements, partly from the readiness of the majority to accept ideas and their inability to resist a logical conclusion, partly from their incapacity for, and dislike of, political activity.

What there was of moral fervour, of earnestness sufficient not only to desire but also to carry out reforms, was to be found, not among the scholars and humanists, but among the Protestants. Many students of Plutarch and Cicero had, like Brissac, the leaguer and hero of the barricades, become republicans in theory; but, if they believed in freedom's cause, it was at a distance from Paris. Even a tract so passionate as the '*Contr' un*' is but a school exercise, a variation on themes of Tacitus and Sallust; and, had la Boëtie lived, he would probably have been just as little disposed as his friend Montaigne to spend himself in a struggle against despotism.

The noblest characters, and those who had the energy to stake their lives on the truth, were they who combined strong religious convictions with no little of the culture of the Renaissance. 'France,' says Mr Tilley, 'produced no second Bayard'; and this is true. Bayard was the last representative of the chivalry of which Froissart is the chronicler, full of courtesy to knights and ladies, whether friends or foes. But France produced better than Bayard, men of more perfect humanity as well as of wider culture, who, like the dying Sidney, would have handed a cup of water to a fellow-sufferer without pausing to look whether his spurs were gilt. Unfortunately these men belonged to a party which was in a minority, and professed a faith unacceptable to the mass of their countrymen. Moreover, the Huguenots lost much of their moral fervour and purity in the course of a desperate struggle for existence. The two elements, Renaissance and Reformation, which in rare combination produced a Taligny, a la Nouë, a Duplessis Mornay, fell apart; the man of culture lost his earnestness, the Puritan lost 'sweetness and light.'

The name of Montaigne is not less pre-eminent in French literature at the end of the sixteenth century than that of Rabelais at its commencement. Neither wrote systematically, both aimed at entertaining; yet both

express the most advanced thought of their generation, and both, but especially Montaigne, had a vast influence on future speculation. Buckle, an authority in his own too short day, a memory to the older among us, to the younger barely a name, says that the French, down to the close of the sixteenth century, 'had not put forth a single work the destruction of which would now be a loss to Europe.' No doubt, a thinker so calmly dogmatic had little sympathy with Montaigne, who held that '*la peste de l'homme c'est l'opinion de sçavoir*'; and what a writer in this Review has called 'the ironical sinuosity of Montaigne's leisurely speculations' must have been singularly distasteful to one who was nothing if not direct, strenuous, and matter-of-fact. Yet it is strange that any educated man should believe that the world would not be the poorer for the loss of one of the most delightful books ever written, one, too, which so greatly furthered the cause that Buckle had at heart, the rejection of ideas founded on theological or metaphysical hypotheses.

The principles subversive of the existing social and religious order, of which the germs are to be found in Rabelais, were further developed by Montaigne. The scepticism of Rabelais has been questioned; and the majority of his critics believe that, if not a Romanist, he was at least a Christian; but Montaigne is an avowed agnostic. Mr Tilley apparently endorses Joubert's remark that Montaigne admitted Christianity as a belief, but put it aside as a moral code—an attitude, as he justly says, not unusual with men of the world. But it could hardly be that of Montaigne. He was too much addicted to self-analysis; and he insists in more than one place that belief, if it deserve the name, must influence conduct. It is because they do not really believe that men's acts are so inconsistent with their professions. For his own part, Montaigne says elsewhere if he had to live his life over again he would live it not otherwise—a state of mind which is hardly that of a Christian nor consistent with his own conception of belief.

Mr Tilley doubts whether Montaigne was a thorough-going sceptic, because, 'so far from conforming to custom as the only possible moral law, he hated every kind of cruelty and protested against duelling as a barbarous and irrational practice. He also believed firmly in the exist-

ence of a beneficent and all-directing God.' To this it might be replied that Montaigne does assert custom to be the only source of moral law. '*Les loix de la conscience, que nous disons naistre de la nature, naissent de la coutume.*' Elsewhere he asks, 'What are natural laws? where are they? Not one of those alleged is universally received; yet that only is a law of nature which is everywhere the same. If such laws once existed, they have been obliterated by our vaunted reason.' Yet it must be allowed that his utterances are by no means consistent. Speaking of the American savages, he says, 'they are governed by the laws of nature, as yet but little corrupted by ours.' Before Rousseau put forth his paradox, Montaigne suggested that reason, with the arts and sciences in its train, had marred the primitive happiness of man. Perhaps he had learnt from Seneca to regret a golden age of savage simplicity. The people of Brazil live healthy lives, dying only of old age, '*Comme gents qui passoient leur vie en une admirable simplicité et ignorance, sans lettres, sans roy, sans loy, sans religion quelconque.*'

Nor is it inconsistency, as Mr Tilley supposes, on the part of an agnostic to object to cruelty, injustice, and fraud. The senses, Montaigne says, are as little to be trusted as the reason; their evidence is contradictory and variable; yet in practical life we must act as if we could rely upon their guidance. So also we must obey our conscience, whatever its origin may be; or the pangs of remorse will disturb our cherished tranquillity. But we must not look for consistency in Montaigne; he is free from that as from all other affectations, unless absolute sincerity be itself an affectation. If the mind of the most systematic philosopher who ever lived, a Bentham or a James Mill, were bared before us, should we not find in its recesses strange inconsistencies, half-conscious prejudices and feelings, half-obliterated traces of rejected creeds, yet not without influence on action? Montaigne was not a systematic thinker, and he delighted in ransacking the hidden corners of his mind for his own and his readers' entertainment. He was himself the subject of his book, and he regarded himself as the typical man—a subject, to use his own much-quoted words, '*merveilleusement vain, divers et ondoyant.*'

But the extent and the nature of Montaigne's Pyr-

rhonism is a subject which has been fully discussed in a recent number of this Review. It is sufficient for our present purpose to point out that he summed up in a most attractive form the scepticism which was the outcome of the French Renaissance, and was to prove a powerful solvent of beliefs hitherto accepted. Montaigne, as Mr Tilley says, believed in a beneficent deity; but his god was the god of Plato and Seneca rather than of the Bible. It is true also that he appears, as in the essay 'On Prayer,' to be not wholly incapable of religious emotion. But, if he did not attack the orthodox faith, he is a most damaging apologist. No concession, Montaigne declares, must be made to heretics, since the evidence for one dogma is as good as that for another. Accept all or none. Nothing can be proved by reason. The arguments by which it is sought to show that the soul is immortal '*somnia sunt non docentis sed optantis.*' We cling to the belief partly from our natural desire of life, partly because it supplies a sanction to the moral law. What we really *know* is that our souls grow to maturity with our bodies and decay with them, that drugs affect the mind not less than the body. As for future punishments, may not Epicurus object to Plato that the gods cannot justly punish us for sins which are the necessary consequence of our faulty composition, and which the slightest effort of will on their part would prevent. As our reason is no guide in these matters, the religion of the country in which we live must for us always be the true one. Montaigne's attitude towards political questions was not very different. The student of Plutarch and Tacitus, the friend of La Boétie, could not but hold that, in the abstract, republican government is the best, but for each country the best constitution is that to which it is accustomed.

Sometimes, as we have seen, he asserts, like Rousseau, that our reason and our civilisation have corrupted our lives; and yet, like the followers of Rousseau, he believes that human nature may be improved by regulation and careful training. The laws of Lycurgus were, he observes, well-nigh miraculous in their perfection. This belief in the omnipotence of the legislator was one of the most momentous of the ideas of antiquity handed down by the Renaissance to the men of the Revolution.

The seventeenth century was in France a period of reaction. But of Montaigne it may be said, as of Horace, 'admissus circum præcordia ludit.' His admirable style, his suggestiveness, his vivacity, as unfailing as the exuberance of Rabelais, the multiplicity of his interests, raised his reputation and popularity above the reach of changing currents in taste and opinion. His influence was great even on those who rejected his conclusions. Pascal did but use in grim earnest the argument ironically suggested in the apology for Raymond de Sebonde; and doubt is the starting-point of the system of Descartes. But, when we are estimating the forces which shaped the destinies of their country, Pascal and Descartes are negligible quantities; not so Bayle and Voltaire, the true heirs of Montaigne.

Although Italian artists had been welcomed and liberally patronised at court during the reign of Francis I, and even earlier, yet the influence of Italy on French art was small in comparison with that of Germany and the Low Countries; and French scholars crossed the Rhine more frequently than the Alps. But theological controversy and religious wars blighted the Teutonic Renaissance, while in France greater interest began to be felt in that side of the New Learning, the humanistic and æsthetic, which had from the first been cultivated in Italy. At the same time the accession of a Florentine princess to the French throne, and the presence at court of many of her relations and countrymen, made all things Italian fashionable.

Although not uninfluenced by classical models, the literature of France, like her art, had hitherto been national and popular. Marot, the one true poet of the earlier sixteenth century, translated some Virgil and Ovid; but he knew little Latin and no Greek, and was still under the influence of the old school of French poetry. Thomas Sebilet, whose 'Art Poétique' was published in 1548, while praising Marot as the most perfect French poet, refers to Alain Chartier and Jean de Meung as accepted standards of excellence. But a generation had sprung up educated on the classics, acquainted with the masterpieces of Italian literature, and intolerant of what seemed old-fashioned and medieval. Even if it was presumptuous folly to hope to rival Homer and

Virgil, might not France produce an Ariosto? Why were even the second-rate Italian writers so superior to the French *rhétoriciens* and Petrarchists? The Italians themselves were ready with an answer. One and all, like Dante, they attributed 'the good style that did them honour' to careful study of classical models. Du Bellay, in his '*Deffence et illustration de la langue françoise*,' the manifesto of the new school, urges his countrymen to endeavour to attain by the same methods to the same excellence. Let them not allege the poverty of their tongue. Even now it is richer than they suppose, although no pains have hitherto been taken to bestow upon it that perfection of which it is capable. He calls upon the future poet of France, happily endowed by nature, instructed in all liberal arts and sciences, versed in the classics, experienced in life but free from public cares and sordid anxieties, to choose some subject from his country's history, and to produce in French some 'admirable Iliad or laborious Æneid.' Du Bellay wrote under the inspiration of his friend Ronsard; and the latter, at all events, suspected where the poet so invoked was to be found.

Ronsard, before he was nineteen, had abandoned the career of a courtier and soldier, to prepare himself, by seven years of earnest study, for the poetic venture. He died in the belief that he had succeeded. The applause of his contemporaries was so loud and unanimous that it might have deluded a man less vain and more capable of self-criticism. The literary supremacy of Ronsard was as little questioned by his contemporaries as was that of Voltaire two centuries later. De Thou thought that the birth of the poet in 1527 compensated his country for the defeat which she suffered in the same year at Pavia. Passerat would rather have written one of his odes than receive the duchy of Milan. Tasso sought an introduction to him, and submitted his epic to his judgment. He solaced the captivity of Mary Stuart, and received a diamond of great price from his 'cousin' Elizabeth. In praising him, Scaliger forgot to be scornful; and the dispassionate Montaigne held that he had equalled the ancients and carried French poetry to perfection. Never was a great reputation so evanescent. Malherbe came; and the poet who, fifteen years before, had been mourned

by the whole of France, was forgotten. And yet it was Ronsard rather than Malherbe who prepared the way for the masterpieces of the Classical school. Du Bellay's tract appeared in 1649. The first four books of Ronsard's odes were published in the following year, and mark the beginning of that Classical period in French poetry which lasted till the beginning of the nineteenth century.

It would be difficult to give a juster appreciation of Ronsard and of his followers, a better account of what they attempted and of what they achieved, than that which is to be found in Mr Tilley's book. Yet it may be that he underrates the work they did in breaking with old tradition and in preparing the way for Malherbe and the seventeenth century. It was rather the standard they set up than what they themselves produced, that made the influence of the Pleiad so great and, in some respects, so beneficial. They were more successful in discovering where their predecessors had gone wrong and in pointing the way to the desired goal than in the race which they themselves ran. They strove to elevate, to confer sublimity and dignity on the French language. They gave to French literature some of the refinement in which it had hitherto been wanting; they freed it from the taint of the tavern. They saw that it was by study of the Classics that the Italians had acquired their purity of style, but they were wanting in the critical insight needed to distinguish between classic and classic, or to see what were the qualities in each most to be imitated. To form our taste by copying what is good, we must already possess the taste to choose the good—a circle out of which we can escape only by accepting the authority of some teacher who will point out what we should imitate.

In the case of the writers in question, the difficulty was solved, at least in part, by the example and authority of the Italians. But some things, such as measure and restraint and rigorous self-criticism, they never learnt. Even the great and fertile truth which they enforced—that the language of poetry is not the same as that of prose—was the source of defects, such as the too frequent use of periphrasis and a reluctance to employ common words, which a more intelligent study of the best classical models would have prevented. Hence also experiments

in syntax which sometimes resulted in an obscurity very alien to the genius of the French language. Yet it must be allowed that in the works of almost any Elizabethan poet passages may be found more difficult of interpretation than anything in Ronsard. No member of the Pleiad would have passed such a line as that which ends one of Sidney's noblest sonnets, 'Do they call virtue there ingratitude?' leaving the reader to infer from the context that the poet means just the opposite of what he says. As Wordsworth is at his best when his practice gives the lie to his theory, so the few poems in which these French poets have attained immortality are generally those in which the language, like the thought expressed, is quite simple and only differs from that of prose in the perfect harmony of the rhythm.

Ronsard and his followers, in their determination to imitate the classics, substituted literature for life as the source of their inspiration. He who prepared himself for his poetical career by seven long years of study cannot have been urged on to sing by any irresistible impulse; such long tuning of the lyre was incompatible with the impatience of inspiration. The poet who has painfully made himself will necessarily think more of his manner than of his matter. We feel, when reading these writers, that, with the exception of Du Bellay, they have nothing to tell us that they would not just as soon have left unsaid. They are generally at their best when translating or imitating an Italian or classical original. They were out of sympathy with the thoughts and aims of their nation. They proclaimed their scorn of the profane vulgar, and, turning away from the conflict between the traditions of the past and the hopes of the future which raged around them, they sought the repose of a learned antiquity. Their aloofness, their bookishness, their reliance on the patronage of a court, which itself vacillated without faith and without convictions, are sufficient to account for their short lease of fame. Their popularity was not rooted in their country's soil; it was an exotic which put forth luxuriant growth while sheltered and watered by the gardener's care, and withered even more rapidly when this was withheld. Their one serious aim was to give classical form to the literature of their nation; and they have therefore been

regarded as the offspring and exponents of the Renaissance. Yet their principles were not those which inspired the revolt against the old order. With freedom of thought they had little sympathy.

Notwithstanding this, they did their part in preparing the way for the triumph of ideas which they would have been the first to repudiate. They were, as has been pointed out, the pioneers of the Classical school. They made possible that perfection which, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, won the ear of Europe for French literature, and enabled Voltaire and his contemporaries to disseminate throughout the civilised world doctrines derived in part from England, but even more from those true sons of the Renaissance, Rabelais and Montaigne. The tendency to substitute types for individuals, the general for the particular, which is the characteristic of the Classical school, is already marked in Ronsard and his followers; and that it persisted down to the end of the eighteenth century and the rise of Romanticism may in some measure be ascribed to their influence. The evil consequences which result from ignoring the effects of race, of education, of social and economic conditions, of all, in short, that distinguishes one man from another, are a commonplace. It is less often pointed out that it was just because the *philosophes* dealt with abstract men that their principles appeared capable of universal application.

This, then, was the twofold issue of the Renaissance in France. In the first place, a body of ideas critical and negative, destructive of dogmas whose utility was passing away, together with a few positive principles indicating the direction of future progress, such as the belief in the natural equality of men, in the right of each individual to be guided by his reason, to form and proclaim his own creed without hindrance or molestation. In the second place, a literature the most universal, the most impersonal, the most free from provincialisms, which the modern world has seen, and one which therefore supplied the most effective instrument for propagating those ideas and principles.

P. F. WILLERT.

Art. VIII.—THE ART OF GAMBLING.

1. *Monte Carlo: Facts and Fallacies.* By Sir Hiram S. Maxim. London: Grant Richards, 1904.
2. *Betting and Gambling: a National Evil.* Edited by B. Seebohm Rowntree. London: Macmillan, 1905.
3. *The Theory of Stock Exchange Speculation.* By Arthur Crump. London: Longmans, 1874.
4. *Chance and Luck.* By R. A. Proctor. London: Longmans, 1887.

IN the middle of the nineteenth century the small estate of Monaco, on the Riviera, brought in to its princely owner a revenue of a few thousand francs a year. The Corniche road, busy with diligence and carriage traffic, conveyed travellers through La Turbie, above the dull village of Monte Carlo, to Mentone and Italy on the one side, or to Nice and Cannes on the other. None knew that they were passing what was to become one of the most famous spots in the world. At that time Homburg, Baden-Baden, Ems, Wiesbaden were flourishing watering-places, with crowds of visitors in the season and every kind of social entertainment; they even provided opportunities for distraction at *rouge-et-noir* tables, where amusing games could be played by those who were bored by everything else. Then came, in 1866, the victory of Prussia over Austria, and, as one of its indirect consequences, the closure of the German gambling-rooms and the dispersal of the gamblers. Amongst those who were thus deprived of their visible means of subsistence was a certain M. Blanc, who, after searching about for some time, at last found a new home at Monaco. There he brought his old lamp, the roulette wheel, which, with his assiduous polishing, in the end entirely transformed the place. The fables of Monte Cristo have become facts at Monte Carlo. The income of the Prince has been increased a thousandfold. His small property has become a scene from fairyland, where a visitor may pick up gold and silver, and, when tired of that occupation, refresh himself with all that money can buy in art, music, sport, beauty, fashion, physical comfort, and intellectual recreation. It is, of course, the advantage reserved to the 'bank' at the

gambling-tables that has done all this. Let us see what that advantage is.

The roulette is a wheel which lies on its face with its centre on a fixed pivot. The croupier causes the wheel to revolve rapidly about its centre, and then jerks a small ivory ball in the opposite direction around the rim. When the ball loses its momentum, it falls into one of thirty-seven stalls cut into the surface of the wheel. These stalls are marked in irregular order with the numbers from zero to 36 inclusive; and they are coloured alternately red and black, except zero, which has no colour. The even chances, so called because a successful bet upon one of them earns the value of the stake, are red against black, odd against even, first eighteen against second eighteen. Zero does not belong to any of these groups. When zero appears, the bank takes half the stakes, and thus gains, on the average, $\frac{1}{2}$ in 37, or 1·35 per cent. on the even chances. If the gambler bets on a number and wins, the bank pays him thirty-five times his stake instead of thirty-six times, and thus wins on the average one stake in thirty-seven, or 2·7 per cent. from the numbers. 'Trente-et-quarante,' a game of cards, is also played at Monte Carlo. There are only even chances. The advantage of the bank, called *refait*, can be insured against for 1 per cent.

These small percentages of from 1 to 2·7 suffice to bring in an annual profit of about 1,250,000%. This, then, must be nearly the whole of the amount taken into the gambling-rooms in the course of the year for the purpose of being staked. If no money were staked twice, but fresh coins every time, and the winnings taken away, the public would have to produce a sum which has been estimated at 60,000,000% to give the bank a profit of 1,250,000%. But most of the gamblers do habitually stake their winnings until they are lost; and the bank wins a sum nearly equal to what the public provides for the purpose of gambling. The action of the public affects the proportional but not the actual loss. If fresh money were staked every time, the gamblers' loss would be only $1\frac{1}{2}$ in 60. Using the same coins over and over again, they lose 60 in 60. The actual loss is the same in either case; but the loss in proportion to the money carried into the rooms and staked there is very different.

The bank is sure to win, provided the stakes are numerous, for in that case its losses over one even chance will be nearly balanced by its gains over the opposite chance, and the difference between the two (if a loss) will be more than compensated by zero and *refait*. The correct guesses upon the numbers are nearly equalled by the incorrect, any slight preponderance in the proportion of one over the other being (if a loss) more than liquidated by the bank's percentage of 2·7. In the long run, the excess of one colour over another is less than 1·35, of one number over another, less than 2·7. M. Blanc well said: 'Rouge gagne quelquefois, Noir souvent, mais Blanc toujours.' The real opponent of red is not zero but black for zero takes only half a stake and appears seldom, while black takes a whole stake and appears as often as red.

It may be thought that, if the gamblers, instead of dividing their forces into two hostile, mutually destructive camps, were to abandon their civil war and unite against the common enemy, betting on one colour, say red, continuously, their chances would be improved. They would gain nothing. Black would appear as often as red. Their losses on black would equal their gains on red; and Blanc would win as much as ever. As between the aggregate public and the bank, the results are the same, whether the public backs red only, or red and black simultaneously, or makes any other bets.

Is it, then, of no importance to the individual how he bets? That is a different problem. The individual is a link which, for the purpose of examination, has been separated from the chain. We shall find that, to some extent, this separation has lessened the power of the owner of the chain over the escaped link. Sir Hiram Maxim tells a story of a husband and wife who divided their spare cash equally, and agreed to bet in level stakes at different ends of the same table. They found afterwards that one had backed red continuously and the other black, the net result of their operations being a small loss to zero. They could not win; but, on the other hand, they could not lose, except to zero, which appears seldom, and takes only half a stake. Thus they would be sure of a long bout of wagering before their money was exhausted. If they intended to stake a great many times they were doomed to lose all, whether they staked on red

only of on red and black simultaneously. But, if they did not intend to bet often, they would have a chance of winning, which they should take care not to destroy by backing opposite chances simultaneously. The public cannot win by backing red, for their wagers are so numerous that black's appearances will be nearly the same as those of red, while zero will make up for any deficiency; but the individual who bets seldom may obtain an excess of red over black, and should keep open this chance of winning. Hence the occasional bettor may ignore zero and *refait*, for they occur but seldom.

For those who can prophesy the future with any approach to certainty, fortunes are ready waiting. A great many think themselves prophets. Nearly every stake pushed on the board carries with it the confidence of its temporary owner, who believes that the risk of loss is, in his own case, overborne by a special individual gift of luck. Few would admit that they have been lucky in life generally. Most men believe that they have deserved greater rewards than they have received. It is precisely this feeling of being misunderstood, of having virtues which human beings are too dull to recognise, which gives rise to the idea that, when omniscient Fortune is consulted, inherent merit will at last be appreciated. The pangs of despised worth are then exchanged for the crown of divine recognition.

An egotism which has its good side is the main generator of gambling in games of chance. The desire to gain money is not the only motive. If the maximum and minimum were reduced by one half at Monte Carlo, so that the average stake were halved, the number of bets would scarcely be affected. Even if no money were at stake, but only counters provided gratis, many would be found to use them; and inventive enthusiasts would still spend much of their time, cooped up in the heated atmosphere of the gambling-rooms, laboriously following a system of their own. The winning of a stake produces a sense of elation far out of proportion to its value. The winner is one marked out from his fellows by the approval of a non-human power called chance. Moreover, he has evidently a peculiar faculty for perceiving the drift of things. Those who win are very clever; those who lose exceptionally stupid. There are persons who lose money

every year at Monte Carlo, and nevertheless return again and again; their explanation being that their occasional successes give them so much pleasure that they readily submit to the aggregate loss.

This belief in oneself and one's judgment produces the systems which bring the gambler day after day to the rooms. If there were no systems, there would be so little gambling that it would not pay to keep the saloons open. Indeed it is practically impossible to make a number of bets without falling into the use of a system. One cannot join in the game and keep an absolutely impartial, open mind. Insensibly one forms a preference, which develops into a series of preferences; and some plan of co-ordinating the wagers will inevitably emerge. Even the convinced disbeliever in systems will find that there is only one method of avoiding the use of a system, and that is to abstain from making any stakes at all.

Now a system is nothing but a mental connexion applied to a number of isolated events. The gambler has control over the number and value of his stakes; but, as these are subjected to an unknowable power which we call 'chance,' no method of varying them has any effect upon the chance of winning or losing. Therefore, so long as opposite chances are not backed simultaneously, no system is either good or bad. This conclusion is so abhorrent to human nature that in practice it is disregarded by all who bet; and scarcely any writer completely and entirely subscribes to it even in theory. That a system is merely an idea, that its influence is merely nothing, except in so far as it increases or decreases the sum exposed to chance—this is altogether too repulsive a view. Nobody follows it in practice: it is difficult to find one who consistently supports it in theory. Nevertheless it is the only true view.

The systems in use are of two kinds. The gambler either risks a uniform stake at each venture, hoping to win a majority of the stakes; or he increases the stake after a loss, hoping to win the bigger stakes and leave the bank the smaller ones. Let us examine these two sorts of systems in order.

All systems, whatever their nature, rest upon the belief that at roulette the past affects the future. If red has appeared, expect black, and so forth. But we cannot

estimate what forces are applied to the wheel and ball, and have no reason for supposing that a past appearance of red can be an important item in these forces, or that it has any influence whatever. Even if we did know this, the knowledge would be useless, for we should have to take into consideration all past chance events, which is obviously impossible.

In the present day, very few system-mongers will assert openly their belief that the past affects the future in games of chance. They will take refuge in an argument which is, in fact, based upon the same idea. A long run of a colour is rare. Red, for instance, has not, in the history of Monte Carlo, appeared more than twenty-eight times in succession. The chance against a long run of one colour is so great that, if you bet against it by backing the other colour, you increase (so it will be said) your normal chance of winning. 'It is quite true,' says the inventor of a much-advertised system, 'that because there have been twenty-eight reds there is no reason that the twenty-ninth *coup* should not be red too; but will any person explain to me why there has not been, in the history of the Casino, a run of more than twenty-eight reds?'

Suppose we estimate the total number of spins made at Monte Carlo in the last thirty years at 40,000,028. In that number there are 40,000,000 series of 29. Each of these series is as unlikely as a series of twenty-nine reds. Yet 40,000,000 of them have actually appeared. It is, therefore, puerile to base any course of procedure on the mere fact that twenty-nine reds have not yet appeared. Perhaps a series of twenty-nine intermittences (red, black, red, black, etc.) has not appeared either; nor a series of fifteen reds followed by fourteen blacks. Whether amongst the 40,000,000 series of 29 there has been a series all of one colour, or a series of alternate colours, or a series variegated in any other specified manner, is a matter of no significance. The non-occurrence of any particular series proves nothing. To have a hand at whist consisting only of trumps seems wonderful, but it is no rarer than any other hand. The odds against the particular series of 40,000,000 which has appeared at Monte Carlo were, before the series began, beyond human conception. Merely to state the odds in figures would

absorb many thousand pages of print. Whenever the roulette is set in motion, a new series of 40,000,000 is completed, the odds against which were, before it began, so great as to be, for practical purposes, beyond the range of human comprehension. When compared with events of this stupendous character, which are completed with every additional spin of the ball—that is, about once a minute at each table—all series of twenty-nine are mean and contemptible, and of no interest whatever.

It will be said that red cannot go on appearing for ever. D'Alembert put it in this way: 'We cannot imagine red continuing to appear an infinite number of times; therefore it must appear a finite number of times; therefore there must be a point where the chance of black is greater than the chance of red.' The argument is unsound, for the results of play are not affected by the limit to our powers of imagination. Indeed infinity is merely a term, a word, used to denote more than we can imagine. But there is no difficulty in imagining the complete absence of black at the gambling-rooms of Monte Carlo for the next thirty years. No other result of thirty years' spinning is more likely. It is an even bet between 40,000,000 reds and 40,000,000 changes of colour, or any other stated result. We may illustrate this conclusion by a simple practical example. X and Y take their seats at a roulette table at Monte Carlo before the play has begun. X remarks that the result of the day's play is as likely to be a uniform series of red as any other result; Y demurs. X suggests that Y should offer slight odds in favour of a series for the day selected by himself as against X's selection of reds. Y, on hearing the matter put in that light, will doubtless decline, for he must perceive that the chance of his series is exactly equal to X's reds. It is only even money that any given series of four would happen rather than four reds, of forty rather than forty reds, of 40,000,000 rather than 40,000,000 reds. If we could form a complete mental picture of any given variegated series of reds and blacks extending in a chain of 40,000,000 links, and express it as shortly as we do when it is all red, we should have no tendency to regard 40,000,000 all red as in any way remarkable.

It is said that the chances right themselves in the

long run, the total number of reds being equal to the total number of blacks; therefore, when red has appeared oftener than black it will pay to bet on black. The error here is the confusion of actual with proportional results. The longer the play is continued the less is the proportional excess, and the greater the actual excess, of one colour over the other. In ten ventures it may well happen that red appears six times and black four times, an excess of two reds in ten, or 20 per cent. In a million ventures it is very unlikely that red will appear more than 525,000 times to 475,000 blacks. This would give red an excess of only 5 per cent., but 50,000 units altogether. For the gambler on black it is small consolation to know that the longer he bets the less will be his proportionate loss, so long as his actual loss increases. When he has lost two in ten on black there is no reason to suppose that he will ever win back those stakes; for, though black will in the long run increase the percentage of its appearances compared with red, we have no ground for expecting it to make up for the two stakes already lost.

Many gamblers will admit, or think they admit, the truth of these propositions, and yet will advocate some system of the second class, which prescribes increased stakes in certain events. They argue that although the past does not affect the future so far as concerns the appearances of red and black, the pocket of the gambler is affected by the success or failure of his past bets, and therefore it is not unreasonable to increase the stake after a loss. The chance of winning two (they say) is not either increased or decreased by the fact that you have already lost one, but it is an even chance; and, if you win, it will have the effect of retrieving your previous loss. A common progression is the simplest 'martingale,' doubling the stake after a loss, until a win gives you a net profit of the original stake. The series, in case of successive losses, is 1, 2, 4, 8, 16, etc. At roulette the minimum is 5 francs and the maximum 6000 francs. Beginning with the minimum, the gambler will, in case of loss, bet as follows: 5, 10, 20, 40, 80, 160, 320, 640, 1280, 2560, 5120. After eleven losses the maximum is reached, the position then being that 10,235 francs have been lost; and it is only permitted to stake

6000, which, if won, would still leave a loss of 4235. A series of eleven losses will, on the average, occur once in every 2048 series. When 2048 average series have been played, and the gambler has been prevented, by the maximum, from further doubling after a sequence of eleven losses, his account will stand thus:—

Gains . . .	5 francs × 2047 = 10,235 francs.
Losses . . .	10,235 „ once = 10,235 „
Balance . . .	0

In the meantime a considerable sum will be lost to zero. The gambler's reply to this will be that theory and practice do not agree; that such a run as eleven sequences of one colour is so uncommon that it may be disregarded. The records of play show that the series do appear in accordance with mathematical probability. They show that after five reds the sixth spin does in fact, as well as in theory, give another red as often as another black, and they show this for every series. Here is a list of the sequences of the same colour, from five repetitions onwards, compiled from the records of actual play:—

Sequences of

5	6	7	8	9	10	more than 10
1002	534	279	152	84	30	32

It will be seen that, after a series of five reds, the sixth spin gave about as many reds as blacks; and that, after six reds, the seventh result was as often red as black—the series of six reds being about half the series of five reds, the series of seven about half the series of six, and so on. Theory and practice are not opposed. Both point to the same conclusion, namely, that, where red has appeared ten times, the chance of another red is the same as before.

Many believe that the maximum is the real enemy of the progressional systems. Its very existence shows (they say) that the bank finds protection in it. Therefore a slow progression, which requires a long sequence of losses to bring the stakes up to the maximum, is profitable. There are many such progressions. That invented by d'Alembert in the eighteenth century is one of those most frequently employed. You add one after a loss and

subtract one after a gain. If you lose five times and then win five times the stakes would be—

Losses	1 + 2 + 3 + 4 + 5 = 15
Gains	6 + 5 + 4 + 3 + 2 = 20
Net gain	5

If the number of losses is only slightly greater than the number of gains, there is a net profit; if they are not more than the number of gains, the net profit is one for every two stakes. On the other hand, if the number of losses is much greater than the number of gains, the net loss is enormous. There is no limit to it. The whole of your wealth may be absorbed in the endeavour to win back a lost stake. The gambler who embarks upon a progression has no reason to suppose that he will ever win a single unit unless he is prepared to carry out the system unflinchingly. If he is determined to use the progression, to make it do the work for which it is intended, he risks, every time it is put in operation, the whole of his wealth. With a slow progression, such as that of d'Alembert, the maximum will never be reached, for it would take 1200 losses in excess of the gains to bring the stake from five francs to 6000; and the gambler would be ruined long before that point was attained by the combination of high stakes lost and zero. Any increased chance that the gambler may have of winning one is exactly balanced by the increased size of the sum he will have to produce when he loses. An adverse series is as likely to appear at the commencement of his bets as at any subsequent period.

The maximum is, in the first place, a practical convenience to the bank; for, if there were no limit, enormous sums of cash would have to be stored in the rooms in preparation for possible losses. This is a reason quite sufficient of itself to make a limit essential. It is also important for the bank that the difference between the usual stake and the possible stake should be moderate. If the average amount on the table is only 50*l.*, and a rich man stakes 50,000*l.*, a few losses on that scale might take away the whole of the profits so laboriously earned. The greater the sum on the table, the greater is the profit of the bank, provided there be no considerable difference between the maximum aggregate stake and the minimum

aggregate stake. It is the minimum that limits the maximum; and the minimum is prescribed to suit the desires of the public. If the public were prepared to stake in nothing less than thousand-franc notes, the maximum would be correspondingly raised.

The maximum is no disadvantage to the gambler; on the contrary, by compelling him to keep his stakes down to a certain amount, it is a safeguard. It is no defence against a progression, for the gambler can lose just as much by a slow progression that never reaches the maximum as in any other way. It does prevent a gambler from doubling his stake more than ten times; but that is not its object. If there were no maximum fixed by the bank, and the gambler had unlimited money and an endless life, he would be certain of winning by incessant doubling. But both his money and his years of life are limited. Nature has prescribed, for each individual, a maximum in the value and the number of his stakes, which would be just as effective as the bank's limit. The only object, and the only effect, of the maximum is to keep the stakes within a certain moderate range.

It is often said that the individual is at a disadvantage because his wealth is less than that of the bank. This is not true. An individual richer than the bank would lose all his wealth if he went on betting for a very long time. His wealth would enable him to last longer than a poor man; but the final result would be ruin in both cases. A rich man, betting seldom, has no advantage over a poor man. Ten men with a reserve of one are as strong as ten men with a reserve of a thousand, if the reserves are not brought into the fighting line. On the other hand, if the fight is to a finish, and the enemy kills on the average one in every seventy-four shots with no loss to himself, ten men with their reserve of a thousand will all be killed in the long run as surely as ten men with their reserve of one. The longer purse, like the larger army, will last longer, but it will have no greater chance of ultimate victory.

The bank, it is true, has neither nerves nor temper; but the result of a spin is not affected by the mental or moral condition of the gamblers. Their chances are always the same, whether they are cool and collected or

crazy with passion. To put it shortly, if the stakes are many, there is no chance of winning; a monkey would not lose more than a man. If the stakes are few, there is a chance of winning, which would be equal for monkey and man, provided neither of them destroyed it by making simultaneous bets on opposite chances.

To the bank it is immaterial how the gamblers bet, provided they bet often, and provided the aggregate amount on the board does not vary to an excessive degree. The bank derives no advantage from its absence of nerves, or the amount of its resources. It suffers no disadvantage from the fact that the gambler may choose the moment for a wager, may bet or abstain as he pleases. Such considerations are of no value whatever. The bank provides gamblers with the opportunity of testing their powers of prophecy. The money of those who guess wrongly is used to pay those who guess correctly; and a small percentage is retained as the bank's commission for its trouble.

Betting on horse-races, though under conditions very different from those prevailing at Monte Carlo, is governed by the same general principles. The change is great from the unhealthy atmosphere of the gambling-rooms to the tonic breezes of Newmarket Heath or the popular festival of Doncaster. We seem to have come from a private club specially created for indulgence in vice, to an open assemblage of healthy and hearty persons gathered together for rational out-door enjoyment. They have not come here to earn money, but to spend it; not to solve problems requiring a cool and subtle intellect, but to watch horses galloping on the green turf, and to make a sociable picnic of the intervals between the contests. This, however, is only the surface of the picture. If there were no betting, there would be no racing. Bookmakers and backers, whose one object is money, provide the entertainment. The gambler is to horse-racing what roulette is to Monaco—he keeps it alive.

In horse-racing, unlike roulette, the conditions are never exactly the same on two occasions. In every race there is a multitude of new factors. The issue depends, more or less, on the weights carried, the quality and

number of the competitors, the length and nature of the course, the weather, the season, the health and training of horses and jockeys, the moods of horses, trainers, owners, and riders. These incessantly changing conditions prevent the result of one race from being a sufficient guide as to the result of another race. It has, however, been found that the horse most generally fancied, the 'favourite,' wins oftener than any other horse. Sometimes there is a false favourite, that is, a horse supported by more money than brains, either a popular idol, or the pet of a wealthy and reckless stable; but, as a rule, the favourite carries the best opinion. Records show that the favourite wins, on the average, two races in five, the 'field' providing a winner in three races in five. The odds are therefore not more than 6 to 4 against the favourite—a clear evidence that deductions of some value may be derived from past results. If the bookmaker were to lay 6 to 4 against every favourite, and had no bets on the other horses, he would have to pay his expenses out of his own pocket. As he is a money-maker and not a sight-seer, he takes care to lay less than the fair odds. It has been calculated that his percentage of profit from bets about the favourite is small; but, as these form the bulk of his bets, he can afford to be content with a slight average gain. He gets a much larger percentage from bets about the second favourite, still more from the third favourite, and a very large profit from the 'outsiders.' He makes his prices suit the public. A backer who thinks an outsider worthy of support is generally so confident that he will readily accept 20 to 1 when 100 to 1 would have been a truer statement of the horse's chance.

The bookmaker earns his living by laying false odds, their falsity increasing as the chance of the horse diminishes. Backers have no right to complain. They themselves control the situation. Bookmakers often have more bets about the favourite than about all the other horses put together; and there are many dishonest backers who decline to pay gambling bets. If backers always paid cash, and were not so one-sided in their opinions, bookmakers would be able to give better odds.

The backer knows that the favourite is the most likely horse to win, but that it does not pay, on the

average, to back favourites. He may decide to rely upon his own judgment. But the combined knowledge of the racing world is already proclaimed by the various odds offered against the candidates. If the bookmaker lays 3 to 1 against A and 20 to 1 against B, the backer would, by supporting either of those horses, be disputing the verdict of owners, trainers, jockeys, handicappers, tipsters, and all the other experienced observers of racing, whose verdict as to the relative chances of the two horses in question is roughly stated in the odds offered by the bookmaker. To back your own opinion is to assert that your judgment is worth more than that of all other racegoers put together.

Many backers rely upon the advertising tipster for advice. The tipster will, for a small fee, tell you what horse is going to win. He does not actually assert, as a rule, that his horse is certain to win, but he guarantees the secrecy and the value of his information. Those who buy the opinion are singularly credulous. If the tipster really thought his horse could beat the favourite, he would back it himself, and make a fortune. If asked why he does not bet, he will reply that it is not his business. Why is it not his business? For one reason only—that he knows his tips are not worth following. The Select Committee of the House of Lords collected some curious evidence about the practical value of the advertising tipster's selections. The Duke of Portland stated that, out of curiosity, he sent money to four tipsters, whose 'special selections' gave one winner and thirty-five losers. Another witness had been given forty successive losers. In some cases these tipsters choose at random, having no knowledge of racing, and never visiting a racecourse. Most daily newspapers give hints from their sporting correspondents, who are generally men of some character and ability. These are, however, only suggestions, without any oracular emphasis, generally, indeed, qualified by copious doubts and cautions. Experience shows that they are practically worthless. A calculation has been made of the results that would have been obtained by staking a uniform sum, throughout a whole season, on each of the horses recommended in the columns of a number of the best-known London daily papers. In the case of one newspaper there would

have been a slight profit. The tips of the other widely circulated London journals would have entailed losses greater than a similar stake on the favourite would have produced. The horse which, just before the race, when all the latest information is available, carries the suffrages of the best informed people gathered together on the spot, is obviously more likely to win than the selection of an individual prophet writing in London the day before the race.

The backer's own judgment being of no value, the advice of tipsters being inferior to the opinion of the public, and the favourite losing in the majority of cases, what course is left? Some backers do not despair, but try a system, that is to say, a progression, the stake being increased after a loss. The arguments against systems are the same, whether applied to roulette or to racing. If, after a loss, we increase the stake, we merely increase the sum of money that is exposed to the bookmaker's percentage of profit. For, though the result of one horse-race may, to some slight extent, point to the probable result of another race, that factor has already been taken into account by the bookmaker, is stated in the odds he offers, and is of no commercial value to the backer. It is said that a favourite must win some day. There is no reason why it should. At the end of a season favourites do not win oftener than in the early part of the year, although much has been learned of the capacity of the various horses during the spring and summer racing. The element of chance still exists. Why then should it be supposed that a favourite is more likely to win because other favourites have lost? Even if the horses were the same on every occasion, the backer would not gain any advantage, for the odds offered would still be in favour of the bookmaker.

These arguments, which to ordinary men appear to be unanswerable, are of little avail against the backer with a system, who is amenable to no reasoning but that deduced from his own experience. He has to learn for himself that there is both a minimum and a maximum in the ring, as at Monte Carlo. If the backer goes to the racecourse to pick up the bets himself, he must begin with a stake large enough at least to pay his expenses. If he stays at home and employs a 'starting-price com-

missioner,' he has to pay a commission on his winnings. Thus he is weighted, at the start, with either his own expenses or his agent's percentage. At the other end there is the maximum, the sum beyond which he will fail to get a bet. This is, doubtless, a high figure; but there are special dangers about the wagering of large sums. Important races are rare events. The backer will probably be wanting to risk a big sum about a minor race for a small prize, where the horses engaged are worth very little. His own wager will have become the dominant feature of the situation. In these conditions the price he will obtain from the bookmakers will be totally false; and, considering the temptations of the moment, we may be sure that the backer's horse will be struggling against many unexpected difficulties. At roulette the chance of winning the maximum is the same as that of winning the minimum. On the racecourse the plunger is the creator of the cheat.

Even if this danger did not exist, the rapid increase of stakes when using a progression would stop almost any man; those whom it would not stop would be the wealthy race-goers who can pay their expenses without betting. After a run of eight losses, which is quite common, the backer would probably be betting in hundreds of pounds; after twelve losses, also far from unusual, in thousands. The man who uses a system will not risk such sums. For one reason or other, he will be obliged to stop the progression before it has had time to do its work.

It is well known to be foolish to prophesy unless you know; it is equally foolish to risk a serious sum in a bet about a horse-race, unless you have very important and very secret information—a thing of the rarest occurrence even to professionals. In nearly every case the whole sum of human knowledge about the various horses is already stated in the bookmaker's odds. To choose a horse from the 'field' is to contest the general verdict. Nothing is gained by taking the advice of an individual, however honest and able; for his choice is unlikely to beat the favourite, and it does not pay to back even favourites.

Amateur speculation on the Stock Exchange is carried

out with the assistance of 'brokers,' who, for a commission, find 'jobbers,' who will either buy or sell at stated prices. Japanese Four percents, for instance, the jobber will buy at, let us suppose, $92\frac{1}{4}$ and sell at $92\frac{3}{4}$. The difference between these prices is called the 'turn' of the market. The jobber has not in his possession either the stock to sell or the money wherewith to buy, though he generally knows where to get both. He sells you Japanese at $92\frac{3}{4}$ in the hope of being able to buy from some other person at a lower price. Experience has shown him that, owing to the large amount of the stock, and the constant gambling, he may rely upon this with some confidence. In any active stock in which there is much speculation, the jobber is sure to make the 'turn,' a small percentage which will suffice to bring in a steady income. What, then, is the position of the amateur speculator who has to pay a broker for introduction to the jobber?

Bargains on the Stock Exchange which are for the account, and not for immediate sale and transfer, are postponed for completion till a stated day, occurring once a fortnight, called the 'settlement' day, when a 'making-up-price' is fixed for each stock. For instance, if Japanese Fours should on settlement day still be quoted by the jobbers at $92\frac{1}{4}$, the making-up-price would be $92\frac{1}{4}$. The amateur who had bought at $92\frac{3}{4}$ would have lost $\frac{1}{4}$ to the jobber and $\frac{1}{8}$ to the broker for his commission, or $\frac{3}{8}$ altogether, and this although the stock which he bought had not fallen in value. If not satisfied, he might 'carry over' his bargain for another fortnight. Instead of buying the stock and trying to sell it at a higher price during the next account, he might borrow the money to do so, at a price that depends upon the value of money at the time, and the amount of Japanese stock available for purchase. The money borrowed is called 'contango.' The broker will probably charge $\frac{1}{16}$ for his trouble in finding it; and, when a bargain is not settled in the first account, the broker charges his full commission of $\frac{1}{8}$ for settling it in the second account. The speculator paid $\frac{3}{8}$ at the first settlement; he now pays $\frac{1}{16} + \frac{1}{8} = \frac{3}{16}$, or $\frac{9}{16}$ altogether. He can make no profit unless Japanese stock rises more than $\frac{9}{16}$, that is, at least $\frac{5}{8}$, and also such further amount as may be necessary to meet the cost of the contango, within the short space of four weeks.

Other methods of speculation are by 'cover' or 'margin' system, or by options. As to the first of these, it should be enough for most people to know that the men who conduct the speculations of amateurs in these directions are not, as a rule, members of the Stock Exchange; that they cannot be compelled to pay the fortunate amateur any winnings that he may have made; and that they take advantage of their freedom from liability whenever it suits them. Moreover, the charges of 'outside brokers' are higher than those of members of the Stock Exchange. In Japanese stock a rise of $\frac{1}{8}$ would have to be won in the first account before a profit could be obtained, whereas the Stock Exchange broker and jobber between them only take $\frac{3}{8}$ for their trouble. Options are still more expensive. In Japanese, a 'call' option for a month might cost $1\frac{1}{2}$ for 100% stock. The stock must rise $\frac{1}{2}$ (the jobber's turn) plus $1\frac{1}{2}$ (price of option), or 2 points altogether, before the money already paid is returned. It must rise more than 2 points before any profit is earned, and as much as $3\frac{1}{2}$ before the gain equals the stake. The amateur is betting even money that the stock will rise $3\frac{1}{2}$ points in a month, which is absurd. For options on mines and industrial companies the outside broker's charges are even greater, making a rise, in some cases, of as much as 20 per cent. necessary before the gain equals the stake.

The gambler may think he has a profitable advantage in his power of selecting the propitious moment. But the price of a stock is a statement of the value put upon it by the expert world after considering all the essential factors—interest-earning capacity, public opinion, financial influences, the value of money. No sensible man would have the temerity to suppose that he, as an amateur, can estimate the quantity and value of these conditions better than the professionals. The amateur who uses a roulette system, or backs a horse, or speculates on the Stock Exchange is, in fact, assuming powers of prophecy which are not natural to human beings; for he is asserting that he can, without special training, see more clearly than those whose business it is to understand these subjects, and that his divining power will enable him to beat the professional, even when weighted with that functionary's fee for introduction to the gambling arena. He is claiming superhuman qualities,

In the following list the various methods of wagering that have been noticed are placed in order of demerit, the most hazardous standing first. Statistics are not available with regard to the percentage of loss incurred in amateur speculation on the Stock Exchange. It is greater than the loss over the favourite in a horse-race; but the relative demerit of the fourth and fifth items is not exactly determinable, and can only be guessed at.

1. Options on mining and industrial shares.
2. Other options.
3. Cover or margin system.
4. Speculation with the introduction of a member of the Stock Exchange.
5. An outsider in a horse-race.
6. The second favourite.
7. The favourite.
8. The numbers at roulette: loss, 2·7 per cent.
9. The even chances at roulette: loss, 1·35 per cent.
10. Trente-et-quarante, with insurance at a cost of 1 per cent.

} With 'outside
brokers.'

Among the poor classes betting on horse-races is a grave and an increasing evil. The big bets between wealthy owners, which used to form the bulk of the wagering, have given way to starting-price transactions in small amounts, undertaken by those who can ill afford to lose. One of the worst features of this kind of betting is its secrecy. It is easily done through the post, or in other ways on the sly. For clerks, factory hands, shop-assistants, and others, there is a strange fascination in the 'sport of kings,' even though in their case it can be but seldom enjoyed, except through the imagination. Their gains do them little good. Their losses are often enormous in proportion to their income. Similar to this, though in a higher social grade, is the gambling in stocks, carried on by persons totally ignorant of such matters, much of it done secretly, by post, through 'outside' brokers.

These harmful forms of gambling could be lessened by legislation. But perhaps the only radical cure for reckless gambling will be found at last in the cultivation of the human brain. No individual having a true conception of the principles that govern roulette would risk

any serious sum of money at Monte Carlo. Now there is a steady growth in the understanding of roulette, Modern mathematicians know more of the laws of probability than did Pascal or d'Alembert. Modern system-mongers, great as is their folly, have at least got beyond some of the puerile superstitions of their predecessors. Few now believe in an infallible system. Thus the gambling at Monte Carlo becomes, by slow degrees, less irrational. While the total volume may be maintained, the operations of individuals are more discreet. There is less belief in luck or in systems, less hope of winning, and less persistence. So much of the gambling in stocks and on horse-races is secret that improvement must be slow in these directions; but understanding will, in time, reach these circles also.

It is not suggested that wagering on games of chance, on horse-races, on the rise and fall of stocks, will come to an end; but, when the individual understands what he is about, he will have less confidence. He will stop sooner; and the average wager will be reduced to a comparatively harmless amount. The spirit of gambling is nearly allied to, and may easily be transformed into, the spirit of rational enterprise. The man who, for a worthy object, risks a carefully prepared amalgam of money and knowledge may sometimes be a loser; but such losses can be utilised as steps towards future gain. The gambler may never be abolished; but we may hope that in time, with the growth of intelligence, he will be domesticated and harnessed for the use of mankind.

Art. IX.—TRADE-UNIONS AND THE LAW.

1. *Report of the Royal Commission on Trade Disputes and Trade Combinations.* (Cd. 2825.) Printed for H.M. Stationery Office, 1906.
2. *The Thirty-eighth Annual Report of the Trade-Union Congress.* London: Co-operative Printing Society, 1905.
3. *Trade-Unionism and British Industry.* By Edwin A. Pratt. London: Murray, 1904.
4. *Labour and Free Trade.* By John Burns, M.P. London: Simpkin Marshall. *n.d.*
5. *History of Trade-Unionism.* By Sidney and Beatrice Webb. London: Longmans, 1894. (New edition, 1902.) And other works.

CIRCUMSTANCES are combining to subject to the fiercest light of criticism the principle of free exchange as an organising influence in our associated life. Mr Chamberlain's campaign in favour of tariff reform and the trade-unionist's dissatisfaction with the Taff Vale judgment are alike to be referred to a distrust of the advantage and the equity of freedom of exchange. It is pertinent therefore, whether such criticism points to the abrogation or only the regulation of exchange, to consider how much our social system already hinges on the automatic co-operation which results from the right accorded to individuals to exchange their property and their services. If we pause and allow our imagination to dwell for a moment on the organisation which provides a town like London with its daily bread, we shall be carried to the ends of the earth, and called on to view a vast series of exchanges dating from the remotest past down to the last humble service which to-day brings our food to table. So familiar is the operation of the principle that we are apt to overlook the silent all-compelling force of its influence. Exchange is to our industrial effort what the laws of gravitation are to the celestial bodies; and, relatively to the vast superstructure to which it furnishes the vivifying principle, the temporary frictions which, at any given period, obstruct its development are of infinitesimal importance.

It has sometimes seemed to us, as students of economic problems, matter of reproach to our academic

economists that we have from them no reasoned apologia for this inevitable incident in modern civilisation. Little effort has been made to impress the imagination with the stupendous fabric which turns on the pivot of exchange; and the air is full of querulous complaints of what, after all, are minor difficulties which still await solution. In the open competition and experience of the ages, free exchange has largely superseded the earlier regulative instincts of mankind. Voluntary co-operation, under which labour is exchanged for wages, has taken the place of compulsory co-operation, in which slavery was a necessary part. Private warfare and a state regulation of prices have yielded to the superior equity of settled industry and the impersonal verdict of the market, both based on the principle of exchange. Our ideas of equity have reached their highest level in our recognition of the individual right of each to a free disposal of his powers.

Politics is not a very logical trade, but it would be an injustice to the memory of Cobden if we overlooked the fact that Cobden was much more than a politician. The nearest approach to a philosophical defence of the principle of free exchange is to be found in the exposition of Cobden's esoteric teaching by his friend and disciple, Sir Louis Mallet, published, with other works, in a volume entitled 'Free Exchange.' From a somewhat different point of view, as following from his definition of economics as the theory of exchange, and without any attempt to give it practical application, the same thought has been worked out by the late Mr Dunning MacLeod, a writer whose peculiar idiosyncrasies have unfortunately obscured the very great merit of his work; and the tradition of Bastiat, Cobden's most distinguished foreign exponent, has been ably maintained by the so-called liberal school of modern French economists. Though in England our economic interest seems for the moment to have drifted away in the wake of German historical research, the real issue (which we admit may be elucidated by the heavier ordnance of Teutonic speculation) lies here—in the coming struggle between the liberal ideal, the ideal which underlies the thought of Cobden, a belief, in other words, in the principle of liberty and in the inherent equity of free exchange as an organising influence, and on the other side, the principle

of socialism, whose strength lies not in the teaching, so far as we can discover, of any recognised authority (for the crudities of Marx are, we understand, disavowed by educated socialism), but rather in the general feeling of discontent caused, legitimately enough, by the imperfections of our present social system.

This country is within sight of a great reconstruction of political parties. In every civilised country in the world, with of course many local differences, the moving forces of the future are the gospel of socialism and state regulation on the one hand, and on the other, the doctrine of personal liberty and responsibility, of which the Cobdenic teaching, as developed by his authorised interpreters, has given us, within the limited field of international trade, the most celebrated practical exposition and example. The English people is at heart sincerely conservative, in that it has a deep distrust of experimental legislation. Rightly understood, the result of the recent election is a great conservative victory. On the main issue submitted to the constituencies there is a clear determination not at present, at any rate, to reverse the fiscal policy of the last sixty years. If questions of principle have anything to do with the dividing lines between political parties, as in the long run must undoubtedly be the case, the position in the near future must be modified in view of the fact that liberalism, using the term in its scientific and etymological sense, is the true antithesis to socialism; but in the meantime there is much confusion of thought.

The hope of those who impugn our settled policy of free-trade is to bring home to the working population that trade-unionism, a policy which it favours, is a phase of the same principle of protection which, in respect of international trade, it condemns. If it is right, so the tariff reformer argues, to regulate and restrict the free exchange of labour for wages, why should it not also be advantageous to regulate and restrict the free sale of the products of labour. The predominant opinion in this country has approved the policy of free exchange with respect to our international relations, but apparently with almost equal unanimity it rejects the assistance of the same principle as applied to the relations of employers and employed. There is a logical inconsequence here

which justifies the persistence with which controversy fastens on the point.

In the very interesting and valuable Report which is the main subject of this article, there is a separate memorandum by Mr Sidney Webb which contains a very suggestive sentence:—

'I cannot accept' (he says) 'the assumption underlying the Report that a system of organised struggles between employers and workmen, leading inevitably now and again to strikes and lock-outs—though it is, from the standpoint of the community as a whole, an improvement on individual bargaining—represents the only method, or even a desirable method, by which to settle the conditions of employment. . . . I cannot believe that a civilised community will permanently abandon the adjustment of industrial disputes—and incidentally the regulation of the conditions of life of the mass of its people—to what is, in reality, the arbitrament of private war' (p. 18).

The suggestion that the current methods of trade-unionism, necessitated by a departure from or a refusal to adopt the principle of free exchange, must often result in the arbitrament of private war is a notable admission. In other departments of our associated life, men have voluntarily sought an escape from such intolerable conditions by accepting the principle of personal liberty and private property as defined and developed by the science of jurisprudence. A common enjoyment of things that are limited in quantity is an impossibility; and private ownership, that is, monopoly as regards the particular object in question, has been the economic alternative to a system of universal scramble. The next difficulty which confronted, and still confronts, economic society is to find a remedy for monopoly; and hitherto the most efficient and equitable expedient has been the subdivision of labour and the right of exchange. If we may assume that the ideal of the social reformer is the largest possible common enjoyment of the good things of this world, the doctrine of free-trade liberalism is that the nearest approach that we can make thereto will be through that tendency to 'gratuity' (to use Bastiat's phrase) which, under the system of free co-operative effort, is lowering the price of the commoner necessities of life.

Obviously this ideal involves a belief in the versatility

and mobility of industrial effort—a term which must be held to include the combined forces of industrial capital, direction, and labour. Fluctuations and changes in the course of industry are inconveniences which dog the path of industrial progress; but their cumulative result is the efficiency of modern productive methods as compared with those of more primitive times. Statistics give no countenance to the idea that, in this long process of readjustment of industrial effort, the interest of labour has suffered. In the price of labour, at all events, there has been no tendency towards gratuity; and the theoretical explanation of the fact is simple enough. Industrial products are inanimate things which, as processes of manufacture are perfected, tend to grow cheaper. Labour, on the other hand, is a versatile and mobile force, able to turn itself to its most profitable market.

Even if we admit the popular apology for trade-unionism, as embodying the undoubted right of lawful combination, and accept without question its record of service rendered to the cause of labour, it remains true that the principal force in the advancement of labour has been, not the trivial regulation of it by protective agencies, but the continuous readjustment of industrial force in response to the changes of the market.

Competition, it is said, tends to lower the price of commodities, and it is assumed that its influence is the same in regard to the price of labour. This, from the free-trader's point of view, is a complete misapprehension of the situation. In recommending his system for universal adoption, he relies not only on the price-lowering forces of competition, but on its power to readjust and distribute to its best advantage the living forces of industrial effort.

The tariff reformer represents to us that, if our industry is to absorb the unemployed portion of the community, we must have freer access to foreign markets; the free-trader looks with more expectation to the home market. In this country, the proportion of our home to our foreign trade has been estimated by competent persons to be in the proportion of ten to one. The expansion of the purchasing power of the home market is therefore the most important consideration. We cannot, if foreign nations refuse to buy, force our way into their market, but we

can remove every impediment to the employment of our own people in our own markets ; and here it appears to us that trade-unionist policy is open to criticism. The trade-unionist's mistrust of the market seems to us exaggerated. His efforts in the interest of labour are to some extent sterilised, because he ignores the beneficent readjusting forces of freedom of exchange. To some extent he may have an answer to the indictment of Mr Pratt, whose narrative of the restrictive action of trade-unionism is a document not to be ignored. The fact may be condoned ; but no impartial person can altogether acquit the trade-unionist of obstructing the readjusting current of the market. There is on the part of trade-unionists an objection to unskilled men being promoted into skilled employment ; there is a demand on the part of certain unions for a monopoly of their respective trades ; there is, in some quarters, an arbitrary restriction of the number of apprentices or learners ; there is a practical prohibition to the employment of the aged and the less efficient workman unless he can win the wages paid to efficient and able-bodied men. The whole system presses heavily on the less skilled and the aged, and by excluding them from the circle of wage-earners sensibly reduces the purchasing power of the home market. These powers are still further depleted by the burden which this policy throws on the rates ; and the free organisation, which should have allowed those who are ill-clad and ill-fed, and inadequately supplied with the necessities of civilisation, to exchange their services and to satisfy their several wants, is choked and brought to a standstill.

Meantime the trade-unionist is importunately solicited to revise his opinion of tariff reform, and to seek protection, not only for the price of his own services, but for the general products of home industries. Indeed he is told that the one cannot be maintained without the other, an argument which it seems to us is very difficult to meet. In a pamphlet—'Labour and Free Trade'—Mr Burns makes what we may consider a representative declaration on the subject. He dwells, however, entirely on the plea that protection will raise the cost of living, curtail the purchasing power of the community, and so reduce the employment of the people—arguments which we believe to be absolutely irrefutable ; and he does not here attempt any justifica-

tion of the trade-unionist protection of labour. Yet this is surely a relevant and necessary part of the argument. The trade-unionist party, of course, is not identical with the socialist party. Naturally enough, the only favourable response to Mr Chamberlain's appeal comes, as yet in rather faint tones, from the socialist section of the trade-unionist party. Mr Keir Hardie and his friends see more or less clearly that an adoption of socialism would inevitably involve them in a conflict with free-trade; and they openly declare that their support can be purchased by the party which will advance farthest in that direction. The socialist party knows its own mind; and, in any alliance which it makes with the protectionist section of the Unionist party, it will be the capturer and not the captured. Generally, so far as our observation goes, the answer given by the labour advocate to the blandishments of the protectionist takes this form—that the interest of labour is a paramount interest, and that the secure enjoyment of a progressively advancing scale of wages is a social necessity. To this we may agree; but we demur to the corollary which is generally added, viz. that without the protection of the coercive devices which trade-unionists assert their right to employ, wages would fall and the condition of the wage-earners be depressed.

Apart from its truth or falsehood, it is worth while to consider what necessarily follows from this melancholy assumption. It involves what Mr Webb, a sincere well-wisher to trade-unionism, describes as a continuance of private warfare. The alternative that he suggests is a further step into the policy of protection, namely, compulsory arbitration and, 'incidentally,' the fuller regulation of the socialist State. When brought face to face with this proposal for compulsory arbitration, the trade-unionist world realises that its freedom is at stake; and at the Trade-Union Congress of 1905 a motion in its favour was rejected by a large majority.

The assumption, then, that the pacific influence of free exchange is inapplicable to this problem involves either an adoption of a regulative socialism, for which the trade-unionist is not prepared, or a continuance of methods of barbarism—a fact which receives melancholy confirmation in the records of industrial strife as set out in Mr Pratt's volume and elsewhere. On this point, however, let us

quote the latest judicial utterance, namely, the verdict, unanimous on this head, of the Royal Commission:—

‘The evidence on this matter laid before us is on this point really overwhelming, and is evidence which the trade-unions have made no attempt to contradict. What it comes to is this, that watching and besetting for the purpose of peaceably persuading is really a contradiction in terms. The truth is that picketing, however conducted, when it consists in watching or besetting the house, etc.—and it is to be observed that the statute places no limit to the number of persons attending for the purpose only of obtaining or communicating information, or to the length of time during which such attendance may be maintained—is always and of necessity in the nature of an annoyance to the person picketed. As such it must savour of compulsion; and it cannot be doubted that it is because it is found to compel that trade-unions systematically resort to it. It is obvious how easy it must be to pass from the language of persuasion into that of abuse, and from words of abuse to threats and acts of violence. A considerable proportion of the cases of physical violence which occur during times of strike arise directly or indirectly out of picketing’ (p. 11).

Leaving on one side the question of technical legality, we need have no hesitation in saying that many of the methods used by trade-unionists are contrary to the comity of social intercourse, and, as such, are reluctantly adopted by the labour leaders—whose good citizenship we do not question—in the belief that they are imperatively necessary to the welfare of their followers.

For this reason we are disposed to think that relaxation in the tensy of the situation is perhaps more likely to come from a recognition on the part of trade-unionists that, after all, the market distribution of labour is the factor which has contributed most to the improvement of industrial conditions. Such an admission would not discourage the wish, which appears general, to conduct the bargain for the sale of their labour on a collective basis; but it should win a larger measure of toleration for those workmen who, for one reason or another, decline to surrender their initiative to trade-union guidance. The feeling with which we rise from a consideration of the various legal points on which issue is joined in the controversy between trade-unionists, as at present

advised, and the law of the land, is one of despair. As we have said, the assumptions which, as we believe erroneously, the trade-unions think themselves compelled to make, must necessarily lead them into acts which, whether they are legal or not, are distinctly destructive of the comity of social life.

We do not think, therefore, that it would be wise to attach much importance to the precise details which have brought about the present deadlock between trade-unionists and the law. The quarrel is a very old one. Earlier phases of it have been marked by illegalities which would not now be defended. The smashing of machinery is now, it is to be hoped, a thing of the past. Fair-minded representatives of trade-unionism like Mr George Howell, the historian of the movement, have condemned intimidation and violent treatment of dissentient workmen. Mr and Mrs Sidney Webb, it is true, in their work on *Trade-Unionism* (p. 280), point out that, notwithstanding this disavowal, the union to which Mr G. Howell belonged was 'notorious for the success with which the unions had maintained their practice of excluding non-society men from their jobs.' The disavowal, however, is characteristic, and will be found to have its counterpart in the admissions made by some of the most respected trade-unionists in regard to certain details (to be hereafter noted) of the present controversy.

Mr and Mrs Webb—logically enough from the point of view of those who distrust free exchange but yet view present methods as savouring of barbarism, and who advocate, as an alternative, compulsory arbitration and the other incidental steps that lead to the complete organisation of labour by the State—remark, in the work above quoted, 'that this universal aspiration of trade-unionism—the enforcement of membership—stands, in our opinion, on the same footing as the enforcement of citizenship' ('History of Trade-Unionism,' p. 280); and, they add, 'no trade-unionist can deny that, without some method of enforcing the decision of the majority, effective trade combination is impossible' (p. 281). For ourselves, we are optimistic enough to believe that the various expedients 'for enforcing the decision of the majority,' like older methods of coercion, will ultimately be disavowed and abandoned. Meantime, though condemned by the

law-courts as illegal, and by Mr Webb as survivals of private warfare, the trade-unionists are loth to give them up; and we must now consider in more detail the verdict of the Royal Commission on one or two of the most important of their claims.

In carrying out their policy trade-unions have come into conflict with the law mainly on three points:

1. The liability of trade-union funds for the wrongful acts of the agents of the union.

2. The statute law relating to picketing and other incidents of strikes.

3. The law of conspiracy as affecting trade-unions.

First, as to the liability of the funds of trade-unions. Up to the date of the decision of the House of Lords in the Taff Vale Railway case, there had been in some quarters an opinion that, by the Trade-Union Act of 1871, and subsequent legislation, a trade-union was exempt from the liability which attached to other similar associations, and could not be sued in tort under the general rules of legal procedure. The trade-unions have argued that this decision, which adjudged the Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants liable to the extent of 23,000*l.* for illegal acts committed by its officers in a quarrel with the Taff Vale Railway Company, was practically a new and judge-made law. A Bill was introduced in 1905 by Mr Whittaker to restore the unions to the position which, it was alleged, they previously held.

Sir R. Finlay, speaking in opposition to Mr Whittaker's Bill, March 10, 1905, pointed out that there was nothing in the Act of 1871, nor even in the debates on the passing of that Act, that expressed any intention to deprive an aggrieved person of his means of redress against a union for acts committed by its authority. This seems only in accordance with equity and common-sense. In the same debate Mr J. Wilson, the much respected Labour member for Mid-Durham, although supporting the second reading of the Bill, said that 'where the committee of a trade organisation gave instructions, there was, in his opinion, no reason why they should not be responsible.' Similarly Mr R. Bell, M.P., a high official of the Railway Servants' Union, speaking at the Trade-Union Congress, 1903. ('Times,' September 10, 1903),

'failed to see how they could meet their opponents in the House with an argument for being placed in a position different and apart from all others under the civil law. Having argued that employers should be responsible for all accidents to workmen, no matter by whom or how they were caused, they were now, on the other hand, asking that whatever act might be committed, intentionally or deliberately, under the rules of an organisation by its executive government or by an official organisation, they should not be responsible for any action thus committed. He thought that illogical. In the Taff Vale case the rules were defied, the rules were violated; and, if the executive had adhered to the rules, there would have been no Taff Vale judgment (cheers).'

Mr Burt, M.P., also, in a monthly circular to the Northumberland Miners' Association, as quoted in the 'Times,' February 6, 1906, said :—

'The unions should, in my opinion, frankly accept responsibility for the action of their agents when their agents are acting by the authority of executive councils. The law as to conspiracy and picketing should be amended and clearly defined. Trade-unionists are, for the most part, democrats, avowedly opposed to privilege; and yet they are to ask to be treated differently from everybody else. The unions, I am glad to say, have in recent years increased enormously in membership, in funds, and in power. It will be difficult to argue that this increase of power should not be accompanied by some responsibility, and that the agents of the unions, when acting under the authority of their executives, should not be amenable to law.'

There remains, of course, the question of agency. Opinions may differ as to what constitutes agency; but, so far as the question of corporate liability is concerned, these trusted leaders of trade-unionism do not dissent from the distinguished lawyer whose opinion is quoted above.

This view is now confirmed by the Royal Commission, which also gives a very interesting and convincing explanation of the way in which the misunderstanding arose. Previously to the Act of 1871 a trade-union was a mere aggregate of individuals; but there never was a time when, if all the individual members could have been included in an action for tort, their own and the union's property would have been exempt from legal damages. The conditions for bringing a successful action, namely, the inclusion of all the members, were prohibitive; and

no such actions were brought. This defect in the law made itself felt with regard to clubs and other associations; and two forms of remedy were adopted. One is incorporation; the other, a relaxation of the rules of the courts so as to permit an action against representative defendants on behalf of the members of the associated body. This last expedient was confined to suits in Chancery; and the common law courts adhered to the rule requiring an exhaustive enumeration of the individual defendants, with the result that trade-unions remained unamenable to actions in tort.

The Act of 1871 was designed to give trade-unions a limited corporate existence. Incorporation was deemed inexpedient; they were accordingly given a special form of registration. Hitherto, having been societies in restraint of trade, they were outside the law, and without right to sue. The Act of 1871 removed this disability, more especially for the purpose of protecting their own funds from dishonest officials. For special reasons of policy, which have nothing to do with the present controversy, the Act 'did not enable any court directly to enforce agreements between a trade-union and its members, or between one trade-union and another.' Neither the Act of 1871 nor that of 1876, nor any other Act, betrays any intention to exempt trade-unions from liability for actions in tort. The Taff Vale judgment established the point that a trade-union could be sued in tort under its registered name; and the opinion was also expressed that any trade-union, registered or not registered, could be sued in tort by means of a 'representative' action.

On the question of equity the finding of the Report, on this point unanimous, is very emphatic.

'It remains now to consider the question on the ground of justice and equity; and here the objections against disturbing the law as laid down in the Taff Vale case appear insurmountable. There is no rule of law so elementary, so universal, or so indispensable as the rule that a wrongdoer should be made to redress his wrong. If trade-unions were exempt from this liability they would be the only exception, and it would then be right that that exception should be removed. That vast and powerful institutions should be permanently licensed to apply the funds they possess to do wrong to others, and by

that wrong inflict upon them damage, perhaps to the amount of many thousand pounds, and yet not be liable to make redress out of those funds, would be a state of things opposed to the very idea of law and order and justice' (p. 8).

From the course that the argument has taken, it is obvious that the question of agency is of very great importance. Trade-unions have their branches and their officials; and the majority Report recommends that the central executive should be given means whereby they can protect themselves against unauthorised and immediately disavowed actions of branch agents. Sir Godfrey Lushington, whose impartiality and knowledge of the subject will not be questioned, expresses the opinion that this is unnecessary. It would be impracticable, he thinks, to allow any private association to frame rules which would exempt its officials from the control of the ordinary law of the land. Agency is not a matter to be determined by rules, but by the general circumstances of the case. We do not know how this deadlock can be resolved. It seems inevitable that the determination to depart from the impersonal arbitrament of the free market, however necessary this attitude may be thought for the well-being of those asserting the right, must involve such dissentients in a struggle with the civilising influence of the law.

The question is also raised whether it would be possible to exempt the provident funds of trade-unions (there is a difference of opinion as to how far the out-of-work funds come under this head) from liability incurred in the course of a labour dispute. The proposal, we understand, does not meet with favour from trade-unionists, who prefer to have their whole resources available, when necessary, for the prosecution of disputes in which they may from time to time be involved. In many, we believe in most, unions the funds are massed, and only become 'provident' when they are not required for the other purpose. In the view of general equity, Sir Godfrey Lushington puts the matter thus:—

'Thrift is a good object; but thrift comes after payment of just debts, and, certainly not least, debts incurred in consequence of wrong-doing to others. . . . That workmen should collectively do wrong, and be able to refuse to those who

have suffered from such wrong any reparation out of the funds they have collectively saved for their own use and benefit, is contrary to justice' (p. 71).

Next, as to the question of picketing. We have already quoted the strong and unanimous opinion of the Commission. The majority, however, believe that the oppressive action of picketing would be sufficiently struck at if the sub-section of the 7th section of the Conspiracy and Protection of Property Act, 1875, which prohibits 'watching and besetting,' were relaxed and made to restrain the person who 'acts in such a manner as to cause a reasonable apprehension in the mind of any person that violence will be used to him or his family or damage be done to his property.' Relying on the above-quoted general condemnation of picketing as necessarily a coercive proceeding, Sir G. Lushington and Sir W. Lewis protest against this concession. The proposal made by Mr Whitaker's Bill was to legalise picketing for the purpose of 'peacefully obtaining and communicating information and peacefully persuading'—a wider concession which the Commission unanimously condemns.

The third point of those enumerated, which has engaged the lengthened consideration of the Commission, is the law of conspiracy. By section 3 of the Conspiracy and Protection of Property Act, 1875, trade-unionists were put in a favoured and exceptional position.

'An agreement or combination by two or more persons to do or procure to be done any act in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute between employers and workmen shall not be indictable as a conspiracy, if such act committed by one person would not be punishable as a crime' (p. 13).

The section excludes indictments for conspiracy, but leaves unaffected the civil remedy for conspiracy. It is now suggested by the majority Report, and with some reservation by Sir G. Lushington, that the policy of the Act of 1875 requires to be completed by exempting such actions from civil liability also. Sir William Lewis dissents, on the ground that the fact of an immunity from criminal liability in respect of acts which in other persons would be criminal is no argument for an extension of exceptional treatment in respect of civil liability.

Of necessity the law of conspiracy is very complicated. The nature of the law and of the protection which it is designed to give to the community is very well illustrated by an *obiter dictum* which occurs in the majority Report. Disclaiming any right to question the policy of existing Acts of Parliament, the Commissioners express a doubt, in connexion with the above-quoted section 3, 'whether in truth an act done by a combination of persons can ever be the same as an act done by one.' The common-sense justification of a law of conspiracy is that it takes cognisance of the changed aspect of actions when they are done in combination. The demand, which on the face of it seems reasonable and plausible enough, that the law of conspiracy should be made clear and definite, is really attended with much difficulty. As the Report points out, the law of conspiracy 'is a valuable preservative of order; and modern times have shown that there are certain forms of oppression, generally known as boycotting, which can scarcely be met except by its aid.'

In this connexion, and to show how many interests are involved, it is worth while to note that, according to the speech of the president of the Trade-Union Congress, 1905, as a result of negotiation with the Irish party, the council 'are under an obligation to submit to this Congress the question of including in their next Bill words which will cover the conspiracy laws as affecting Irish agricultural organisations.' This proposal to obtain, by a side wind, immunity for political associations like the Irish Land League is a sinister, but still a logical development of the policy proclaimed. A codification of the law of conspiracy, it is sometimes suggested, might in effect be nothing more than a help to evasion for combinations anxious to escape liability for coercive persecution of their neighbours.

Notwithstanding these apparently irreconcilable differences, there are signs that in practice a more conciliatory attitude is being adopted. Negotiations between the unions and the employers are probably now more harmoniously conducted than they ever were. Many schemes for the automatic adjustment of wages have been tried, and some of them have worked satisfactorily. Most of these turn to some extent on the price obtained for the manufactured product of the industry concerned. Any scheme,

even one for settling differences by 'tossing up,' is preferable to a dispute involving suffering and loss through an extended circle. It still remains, however, that the price of the product and the profit of the manufacturer have nothing to do, economically speaking, with the price of labour. All sound extension of industry such as is beneficial to the community at large involves a steady demand, and this in its turn, by the operation of the simplest laws of competition, involves a reduction of interest and profits. These favourable conditions cause, and are further stimulated by, a cheapening of products. It appears to us, therefore, that plans which make it to the interest of the workman to keep up prices and profits or to restrict output are bound in the long run to prove detrimental to his interests. A continuous rise in the value of his services is assured to him by the versatility and mobility characteristic of modern labour, if we take a survey of its distribution over any lengthened period. It is not, of course, possible to transfer large numbers of adult labourers from one trade to another; but the supply is largely affected by the yearly recruitment of the young; and if, as we argue, the distributory force of the market is the factor on which depends the ascent of labour, it is a condition to be fostered and encouraged rather than thwarted and rendered feeble by over-regulation.

We are disposed to doubt if the ideal form of contract between employer and employed has yet been evolved. Arbitration and conciliation are admirable things, even when they are based on unstable foundations; but for the reasons given we cannot regard the more familiar forms of automatic wage-scales, depending as they do on economically irrelevant facts, as altogether satisfactory. We are disposed to look in other directions for more hopeful developments.

Trade-unions have ceased to be proletarian institutions; and it is when men begin to realise the value of their liberty and their property that they grow more ready to respect the similar rights of their neighbours. It is suggested in the Report, very wisely, as it seems to us, that trade-unions should be given additional powers for entering into contracts. The claim to a monopoly of employment in a given industry, or in a given piece of work, can only be obtained by a specific contract with

the employers, who supply the plant and material and direction. It would be unreasonable to prevent unionists from making a collective bargain to supply labour on terms favourable to themselves. They can give what is now too often withheld from captains of industry, cheerful and energetic co-operation, encouraged thereto by equitable terms of agreement. They have capital at their disposal; opportunity might be made for them to share the greater security and profit which is supposed to be reserved for the capitalist. If, for the purposes of practical discussion, we exclude schemes for the nationalisation of the instruments of production—the chimerical proposal which is passed with a contemptuous unanimity at trade-union congresses—any true scheme for the protection of labour must include methods for facilitating the conversion of the proletariat into a property-owning class. It is absurd to suppose that in this twentieth century the mere willingness and ability to labour—a condition which after all extends only over a brief portion of a man's life—are sufficient to enable him to live the civilised life. Some capitalisation, made on his behalf, by his own favourite association, would supply a solution of more than one pressing difficulty of the workman's life. Such a solution would be in accordance with a principle of whose pacific guidance human nature has shown itself receptive, and would rescue industrial society from methods of private warfare as well as from the alternative suggested by Mr Webb—the complete regulation of labour by the socialist State.

The financial power of the trade-unions is great; their political power is even greater; and *noblesse oblige*. We are not without hope that moderation will prevail. If the fierce searchlight which is being thrown from so many quarters on the principle which, after all, is the basis of a civilisation not altogether bad, should enable us to take a juster and better proportioned view of the good and evil which it contains, this controversy and this deadlock may prove to be a blessing in disguise.

This, however, is taking a long view. Meanwhile, with the introduction of the Government Trade Disputes Bill, the controversy is removed still farther from a solution. Sir J. Lawson Walton, in the course of his speech, quoted with approval the remarks of Mr Burt

and Mr Bell cited above, but used the argument, sounding strangely on the lips of an Attorney-General, that consideration by judge and jury is consideration by an unfriendly tribunal. The Government was pledged to make concessions; and, in effect, the Bill, so far as relates to the liability of trade-unions, abolishes the law of conspiracy, gives a special and limited definition of agency, and legalises picketing for the purpose of persuasion.

These concessions, even though they amount indirectly to a complete surrender, were not satisfactory to the Labour party, whose view was expressed by Mr Shackleton as follows:—

‘They were told,’ he said, ‘that it was the intention of the Government to remove from the trade-unions all the liability possible, and they proceeded to carry out this intention in a certain way. But the Labour party preferred to take what they deemed to be an honest course, not seeking to obtain immunity by false pretences, as it were. Under the Bill the officials of the unions could do the very acts about which complaints were made; and all that was needed to evade the consequences was that the executive should say that they repudiated those acts. They preferred instead to say that they would not take responsibility for those actions at all.’

Two nights later Sir H. Campbell-Bannerman, in a speech of amazing levity and recklessness, yielded to the clamour behind him, threw over his Attorney-General, and accepted the second reading of Mr Hudson’s Trade-Unions and Trade Disputes Bill, expressly conferring on trade-unions the powers which the Government had refused.

It is a poor defence for such a surrender to lawlessness that the original policy of the Government may possibly be restored and its authority protected against its own followers by the action of the House of Lords. Meanwhile the situation is not one which inspires confidence or respect. Only the most robust faith in the ultimate triumph of liberty and justice can survive such sinister betrayal of trust by those who ought to be specially solicitous for the King’s peace, but are doing their best, by their recent action, to legislate it away.

Art. X.—A PLEA FOR CAMBRIDGE.

1. *Endowments of the University of Cambridge*. Edited by John Willis Clark, M.A., Registry of the University of Cambridge. Cambridge: University Press, 1904.
2. *Report of a Meeting held at Devonshire House on January 31, 1899, to inaugurate the Cambridge University Association*. Cambridge: University Press, 1899.
3. *Statements of the Needs of the University*. Cambridge: University Press, 1904.
4. *University accounts for the year ended December 31, 1904*. Cambridge University Reporter, March 17, 1905.
5. *Abstracts of the accounts of the Colleges*. Cambridge University Reporter, February 10, 1905.

THE grant of a charter to the Victoria University in 1880 marked the beginning of a new era in English education. Not to speak of Scotland and Wales, there are in England to-day six universities which bring the new learning and the old to the very doors of the vast populations which surround their seats. Birmingham claims the Midlands; Manchester, Liverpool, Leeds and Sheffield instruct the manufacturing and commercial centres of the north; while the University of London, full of new aspirations, does its best for the huge and somewhat apathetic population of the capital. The calculated prodigality of the state endowments of Germany, the individual generosity of the citizens of the United States, the vigour of the young universities of Canada, have smitten the national conscience, if not with shame, at least with fear. But, while so powerful a lever as the dread of industrial decay may have been necessary to overcome the intellectual inertia of the country, the consequent impetus given to the study of science and (it may be hoped) of letters is not dying away, but rather taking permanent shape; and it is now impossible to say, as was said in 1903 by one of the members of the Mosely Educational Commission, that 'in this country . . . we seem to be doing nothing for its own sake, and least of all in education.'

The new edition of the 'Endowments of the University of Cambridge,' suggests other though kindred reflections. The book has for its basis a series of documents, beginning with the year 1293, and ending with the year 1904.

The learned Registry has prefaced the account of each bequest with an explanation, and, by his discriminating comment, has invested his material with something of that charm which characterises all his work. In one aspect his book serves, and is intended to serve, as a history of the progress of education in Cambridge; and the large amount of new matter which has been incorporated since the previous edition of the 'Endowments' in 1876 is, in this aspect, highly satisfactory. Yet, though it is a mistake to suppose that the flow of benefactions to the ancient universities has entirely ceased, the fact remains that Cambridge has twice appealed, once in 1898 and once again in the spring of 1904, for help without which she cannot meet her national responsibilities. Oxford has at last been constrained to confess that she is in a similar if not yet so dire a strait; and it is easy to understand the effort which it has cost her, as well as her sister university, to sue *in formâ pauperis*.

In truth the neglect, almost absolute, of Oxford and Cambridge, while the new universities are finding generous benefactors, either leads to the conclusion that the old universities are condemned and found wanting, or has its origin in a profound misconception of their efforts and resources. It may be urged that neither alternative is true; that the needs of the new universities are more urgent, and that the needs of Oxford and Cambridge will in turn receive attention. But a delay of a few years may in these days involve damage which will not be repaired for more than one generation. Of Cambridge, at any rate, it is asserted that she is at the end of her means; that in the last forty years she has, in her efforts at development, strained her resources to the utmost; and that without assistance, which, to be effectual, must be both prompt and generous, no further advance is possible. Science has emptied the University chest; yet, as the late master of Trinity Hall said, 'Science' is still 'hungry and aggressive.' As the result of her straitened resources, Cambridge can no longer satisfy the just demands either of science or of letters. When we compare this state of things with that in Germany, where the University of Berlin enjoys a state endowment of 170,000*l.* per annum, or in the United States, whose universities have received from private benefactors alone

42,000,000*l.* sterling in the last thirty years, apart from large funds provided by the State, we are forced to recognise that much yet remains to be done in England.

It is not difficult to suggest some reasons for the comparative neglect of the older universities in the matter of benefactions. In the first place, neither of them can appeal to local patriotism; and an appeal on the wider ground of national efficiency is not so easily nor so effectively pushed home. Next, it is hard to imagine that a university whose colleges enjoy a corporate income of something like 300,000*l.* a year can be in serious want of funds. Moreover, if this deficiency really exists, it is generally regarded as the result of the squandering of revenue on an extravagant system of 'prize fellowships,' that is, fellowships given as the reward merely for a high place in examination, and held by barristers, doctors, and civil servants, professors and lecturers in other universities, and even successful men of business—persons who do not contribute in any way to the efficiency of the University as a teaching or as an investigating body.

We propose briefly to examine the University balance-sheet, the college system, and the question of the fellowships, and to endeavour to give the candid enquirer some ground for a judgment on the claims of Cambridge. But we must first discuss what is perhaps the most serious obstacle to the satisfaction of her needs. This obstacle is the belief, apparently ineradicable, that the older universities teach and care for nothing but the ancient languages, theology, and mathematics. For the persistence of this belief the daily press and public speakers are in a great measure to blame. Scarcely a week passes without an allusion which betrays, if not a culpable levity, a most unfortunate ignorance. Cambridge men have listened with amazement to the covert attacks on Cambridge science, and have wondered how long it may be before Cambridge letters are also disparaged. Of late, too, another note has been heard; and, notwithstanding the just aspiration of the new universities to a many-sided activity, alike in the literary and scientific fields, an attempt, which must be stigmatised as ungenerous and illiberal, has been made in the press and on the public platform to limit the functions of the ancient universities, and to drive

them back into the grooves of the thirties and forties, from which Cambridge, to say nothing of Oxford, has so completely escaped. Whatever the reason may be, it is at least certain that Cambridge is frequently written and spoken of as if she were still the Cambridge of 1850.

It has been suggested, even in responsible journals, that Oxford and Cambridge would do well to keep to the older lines of education, and to leave newer studies to their younger rivals. The obsession of men's minds by an ideal which passed away half a century ago can alone account for the impression that the policy of restriction to the ancient learning is in any way possible, or has been possible for these fifty years. Those who know Cambridge may well be astonished that responsible persons should gravely speak of the university of Newton and Charles Darwin, of Maxwell and Rayleigh, as still shrouded in medieval shadow.

It cannot be too often repeated that since the Commission of 1850, or rather since the promulgation of the new statutes in 1856, the University has advanced without pause to claim as her own the whole field of modern knowledge; and that it is the rapidity of her advance which has depleted her treasury. The state of things before 1850 need here be referred to only for purposes of contrast. The only avenue to an honours degree was then the Mathematical Tripos, or, for students of classics, the Mathematical combined with the Classical Tripos. Science formed no part of the regular course of instruction. Adam Sedgwick himself, pre-eminent geologist as he afterwards became, knew nothing of geology when admitted to his professorship. When he was appointed to his chair, classics, mathematics, and, in a less degree, theology and law, were well endowed; but effective provision for modern studies or for science there was none. In 1851 was founded the Disney professorship of archæology; and the creation of this chair may fairly be considered to be the first step towards the recognition of the sciences of ethnology and anthropology. The imperial value of ethnological and anthropological research is incontestable; and to this research no more important contribution has been made than by the bands of Cambridge travellers and students.

Mention has been made in the first place of the studies

more closely related to the 'humanities,' because it does not seem generally to be realised how thoroughly even the ancient learning is to-day imbued by the scientific spirit. But, so early as the year 1851,* new avenues to an honours degree were opened by way of the Moral Sciences Tripos (embracing at present psychology, logic, and methodology, political economy, ethics, metaphysical and moral philosophy and psychophysics), and the Natural Sciences Tripos (embracing chemistry, physics, mineralogy, geology, botany, zoology, human anatomy, and physiology). In 1857 the Sadlerian professorship of pure mathematics was founded by the consolidation of an old endowment; and Cayley was the first occupant of the chair. In 1863 the block of buildings known as 'The Museums' was commenced, with a view to providing accommodation for the professors of the natural sciences; additions were made to the original buildings in 1877, 1880, 1882, 1884, and 1890, as new branches of science became important. In 1858 the 'Civil Law Classes' were replaced by the Law Tripos; the professor of civil law and the Downing professor of the laws of England were given a colleague by the creation of the Whewell professorship of international law in 1867; and the Law School has since 1904 possessed a worthy habitation, built partly at the expense of the University, partly by the help of eminent Cambridge lawyers, and completed by the generous donation of the law library by Miss Squire. In 1866 the professorship of zoology was founded.

The School of Medicine has grown continuously; and its progress is associated with the great names, to mention no others, of Sir George Humphry, Sir George Paget, and Sir Michael Foster. In 1883 were founded the professorships of surgery, physiology, and pathology. The diploma of public health was instituted in 1875, and the diploma in tropical medicine—the first of its kind in the kingdom—in 1904. The latter diploma is destined to a brilliant future in Cambridge; and the University, together with the schools of tropical medicine in London and Liverpool, is doing much to raise the scientific standard of research in a study so vitally important to

* The dates given for the triposes are those of the first public examinations held.

the teeming populations of our tropical possessions. The students attending the School of Medicine in Cambridge number nearly four hundred, despite the high standard of the attainments necessary for qualification. In 1904 important new buildings, with provision for bacteriology, pathology, and public health, were opened by the King.

The year 1869 was marked by the foundation of the Slade professorship of fine art, and the professorship of Latin. The endowment of the latter chair is but 300*l.* a year, half provided by the University and half by the friends of the late Dr Kennedy, the famous head-master of Shrewsbury School. That the University should have had to wait till 1869 for the foundation of a chair of Latin, and that the parsimonious contribution of 150*l.* a year was all that could be spared towards the stipend of the professor, scarcely lends colour to the prevailing belief that the University, kindly and naturally as she may be disposed towards the old learning, squanders on the teaching of ancient languages resources which ought to be otherwise employed. In 1875 the Historical Tripos was founded; and the School of History, starting under the influence of Seeley, has become one of the most popular avenues to an honours degree. A professorship of ancient history was founded in 1898.

The Historical Tripos already provided in some measure for the study of political science and political economy as component parts of a liberal education. But latterly the need for a more thorough study of economic conditions has been felt to be imperative for those who look forward to a career in the higher branches of business or in public life; while, as regards the professional economist, it has been realised that his work as a student must be carried much farther than has hitherto been customary, if he is to attack with success those problems which bring his science close to reality and to the needs of the practical man. A Tripos in Economics has therefore been established, the first examination for which was held in 1905. The advanced portion of it includes such subjects as modern methods of production, transport and marketing, trusts, the recent development of joint-stock companies, railway and shipping organisation and rates, banking systems, stock exchanges, foreign exchanges, investment markets, international aspects of credit and currency, tariffs and

bounties ; and it is expected that, as in the second parts of most other triposes, a mass of new work, the result of current research, not yet available in text-books, will be placed before the students.

The Medieval and Modern Languages Tripos dates from 1886. It provides for the study of English, French, German, Spanish, and Italian. A colloquial test has recently been added ; and it is now proposed that Russian should be assigned a place in this tripos. The Semitic Languages Tripos was established in 1878 ; the Indian Languages Tripos was founded in 1879, and merged in the Oriental Languages Tripos in 1895. The University founded a professorship of Sanskrit in 1867 ; and a chair of Chinese has existed since 1888. The University possesses the finest Chinese library in the world outside of China, the gift of Sir Thomas Wade. Provision is made for the teaching of Russian, Arabic, Persian, Turkish, Hausa, Burmese, and the Indian vernaculars of Bengali, Hindustani, Marathi, and Tamil. The teaching of living Oriental languages for the benefit of practical students is carefully co-ordinated under a recently appointed director of studies ; and not only are the most necessary languages taught in their living forms by competent scholars, but these latter are assisted by a staff of carefully selected native *répétiteurs*. Towards the expenses of this work the University contributes about 2800*l.* a year. A professorship of Anglo-Saxon was founded in 1878.

In 1871 the chair of experimental physics was founded, a chair held in succession by Clerk Maxwell, Lord Rayleigh, and J. J. Thomson ; and in 1874 the famous Cavendish laboratory, the munificent gift of its late chancellor to the University, was opened. The laboratory was designed by Maxwell ; and the chancellor himself, soon after its completion, provided all the instruments which were immediately required. In 1894 the area of the laboratory was increased, the cost being defrayed, in part, by a sum of 2000*l.* saved by Professor Thomson out of fees received from students ; but the constant pressure on the available space by research students coming from all quarters of the globe renders further extension urgently necessary. Astronomy has a traditional home in Cambridge ; and the observatory, which in 1706 found a strange temporary site over the gateway of Trinity College, began

to be built on its present site in 1822. The observatory, which takes its regular share of the work mapped out for the observatories of Europe, has received important additions in the shape of both building and equipment in recent years.

In 1875 the professorship of mechanisn and applied science was established; and in 1878 the first engineering workshops were built in the University, and fitted with machine tools and other necessary equipment. In 1894 the new engineering laboratories were opened during the tenure of the professorship by Dr Ewing, now director of naval education. In 1894 also the first examination for the Mechanical Sciences Tripos, which gives a degree in honours to students of engineering, was held. In 1899 the generosity of Mrs Hopkinson and her family made possible the addition of a much needed new wing to the laboratory. The buildings of the department now contain lecture-room accommodation which seats about 360 students simultaneously, a drawing office for a class of ninety, two rooms for elementary heat and mechanics, a boiler-room, an engine-room with ten heat-engines of different types, arranged so that the measurement of all quantities concerned may be systematically made by the students, a large room for dealing with strength of materials and with hydraulics, a dynamo-room fitted with various kinds of dynamos, a motor-room fitted with motors of all the usual types, and several other rooms for special purposes. The greater part of the staff have had practical engineering experience of some kind; and it is usual during the long vacation for one or two members of the staff, as well as a number of the students, to go into a drawing-office or into works in order to keep in touch with practice. The school numbers at present more than 250 students, and supplies young engineers with a scientific training to various public services as well as to mechanical and electrical firms.

The University chemical laboratory was built in 1887; and, while planning it, the professor of chemistry spent some months in visiting the newest laboratories on the Continent and in America. The importance of botany has of late years so greatly increased that its study is represented in Cambridge by a professor, a reader, and two University lecturers, besides demonstrators, assistant

demonstrators, and attendants. In 1904 botany was housed in a separate building of its own, the finest devoted to that science in the United Kingdom, and one of the finest in Europe. The physiology of plants, bacteriological research, and the cultivation of hybrids and seedlings, are completely provided for. The extensive botanic garden belonging to the Senate is at the disposal of the staff and the students, the more distinguished of whom, after completing their degree course in Cambridge, start on a course of research in this country or abroad. The importance of the department as touching agriculture on its scientific side can hardly be overestimated.

The professorship of agriculture was founded in 1899, and endowed for a term of years by the munificence of the Worshipful Company of Drapers, a body which, with commendable breadth of view, recognises alike the importance of applied scientific instruction for the artisan and of scientific investigation in all forms of the national activity. The department of agriculture is conducted on the most practical and progressive lines. It provides instruction in the principles of agriculture for the sons of land-owners, farmers, and others. It conducts experiments on crops and live-stock, making every effort to secure the intelligent co-operation of farmers. The University experimental farm, for the use of which the department is indebted to the generosity of a member of Clare College, has an area of 140 acres. The county councils of Cambridgeshire and nine neighbouring counties co-operate in the work and assist it by subsidies. The field experiments of the department extend over ten counties. Parties of farmers visit the experimental plots every season in order to see the results of the experiments and to discuss them with members of the staff; and reports which summarise these results are widely distributed in the districts concerned. Of the suitability of Cambridge as a site for a school of agriculture, and of the importance of the work undertaken by the school, it may be well to leave the professor to speak for himself.

‘I have but recently become a member of the University, and like a good many others I at one time doubted the possibility of founding a thoroughly satisfactory school of agriculture in one of the old English universities. But I no longer doubt; and as one who, before coming to Cambridge,

was a teacher or student in five British universities, I will venture to say that nowhere else do such opportunities exist. Apart altogether from the exceptional facilities for the study of science possessed by the University, and apart too from the exceptional practical skill of the farmers in the surrounding counties, the old University appears to me to be more disposed to extend a helping hand to agriculture than many of her younger sisters; and nowhere has a more friendly reception been given than at Cambridge to the new organisation fostered by the activity of the Board of Agriculture. . . .

'American experience leaves no room for doubt that modern scientific methods are capable of greatly increasing the prosperity of agriculture, and that the farmer has no better ally than the laboratory worker. But, if we wish to make these benefits ours, we must cease to be satisfied with imported information; . . . we must aim at securing for agriculture the services of British specialists, men who will give their whole time to the study of one subject under the conditions which prevail in our own country. To the extent of our resources this has been the policy of our agricultural department in Cambridge.

'We are in the centre of the finest land in England; we already have an organisation by which we reach the farmer; we know his wants; and the University has supplied us with well-qualified teachers of applied science. If we were in possession of suitable laboratories, properly equipped for research, we should find competent investigators and willing assistants among the younger members of the University who are always ready to engage in original work, either with the view of gaining knowledge or in order to qualify themselves for appointments.'

In considering the development of all these departments, and the foundation of the chairs and other teaching posts made necessary by them, it must be remembered that the professorships already existing before 1850 included, among others, those of chemistry, anatomy, botany, geology, mineralogy, medicine, phisic, political economy, moral philosophy, modern history, Arabic, and music; that these chairs had, before the Commission of 1850, no very important duties attached to them; and that in the last fifty years each has been adapted to its place in the University system, and each has in turn become a new centre of activity round which, to use a convenient term unfamiliar in Cambridge, a 'faculty' has

crystallised. To many important developments it has been possible to allude only in the most cursory manner. The merest mention must suffice for the diploma in geography; the diploma in mining engineering, with its provision for practical experience in mines in this country or abroad; the diploma in forestry, which is a logical outcome of the development of the botanical and agricultural schools; the provision for military studies, and the Day Training College for teachers. The latter has both a primary and a secondary department, and the certificate given by the University in the theory, history, and practice of education, and for practical efficiency, attracts teachers in great numbers from all parts of the country.

Development so wide and so rapid as that which we have sketched has been of necessity costly. The expenditure since 1862 on buildings devoted to science alone must have considerably exceeded 300,000*l.*, the greater part having taken place in the latter years of the period; and it must be remembered that the University has had also to equip and maintain the observatory, the cost of which is not included in the amount just mentioned, and to spend large sums on the University library. Except in one or two cases, in which a special benefaction fund had been appropriated to adornment by the desire of the benefactor, these buildings have been erected with the strictest regard to economy. The amount expended cannot be said to be an inordinate sum for a modern university to have spent on scientific buildings and equipment. Yet even this expenditure would have been impossible without external help.

The cost of the maintenance of the buildings erected and of the very inadequately paid staffs, now presses on the limits of the available income; and it is contended that but little more can be attempted for many years, if ever, without external aid. We will proceed then to a rough analysis of the resources of the University and colleges, and of the allotment of these resources. Before doing so, however, it may be well to state that the colleges provide adequately but not extravagantly for the teaching of classics and mathematics, for elementary teaching in many other subjects, and for individual assistance to the student and supervision of his work in the subjects

taught in the University. The collegiate system also ensures a close contact and intercourse between teacher and student not otherwise or elsewhere attainable. The University, in its teaching aspect, may be regarded as an organisation for providing instruction in all those branches of knowledge the teaching of which cannot be economically undertaken by the colleges. Thus, for the teaching of science, and for the provision of costly laboratories, the University is responsible; and the higher and more specialised teaching in most other departments is also provided by the University. The ancient endowments are, in the main, college endowments; but the history of the development of modern subjects is also the history of the development of the University; and it is the University rather than the colleges which is at present in need of substantial financial help. But to suppose that the colleges do not heartily co-operate in the University teaching would be erroneous; at the present time one college may be better organised than another for this particular purpose, but the colleges may safely be trusted soon to come into line.

The corporate income of the seventeen colleges is, roughly, 310,000*l.* per annum. This, with a sum of about 52,000*l.* (called the Tuition Fund), received annually from the lecture and laboratory fees of the 3200 students, and 30,000*l.* received annually by the University for degree and other fees, constitutes the whole available income for college as well as University purposes, if we except certain Trust Funds for the endowment of some professorships, and those funds of the nature of charities of which the colleges are merely administrators.

The corporate income of the colleges consists of (1) endowments, usually in the form of estates, which bring in 220,000*l.* a year; (2) fees, rent of rooms, profits on kitchens, and so forth, which bring in 90,000*l.* But the colleges are great land-owners and have the outgoings of land-owners. Though the expenses of the estate management are only about 7 per cent. of the revenues arising from the estates, yet 130,000*l.* a year are spent on management, repairs, and improvements on the estates, rates and taxes, interest on loans, and the maintenance of the costly college buildings in Cambridge. Many of the latter are national monuments of surpassing interest,

the proper care of which is a duty to the nation. When allowance has been made for the inevitable expenditure under these heads, there is left only 180,000*l.* for all other purposes. The fellowships and the stipends of the heads of houses absorb 78,000*l.*; and the contributions of the colleges towards scholarships, as determined in the main by statute, and as distinct from any separate endowment, account for 32,000*l.*

An analysis of the distribution of the fellowship money may conveniently be deferred for the moment; but it may be stated that the sum spent on scholarships finds, inside the University at least, many critics. The expenditure on scholarships is undoubtedly, however, in the main, a fulfilment of the intentions of their founders, and, if we may judge by the recent expenditure of county councils, is in accordance with public feeling. After deduction of fellowships and scholarships, there is left of the corporate income a sum of 70,000*l.* Of this sum, 32,000*l.*,* or nearly one-half, is paid as a direct contribution to the University; but, as will be seen immediately, the colleges contribute to the University in many other ways. Of the 38,000*l.* remaining, 4000*l.* goes to supplement the Tuition Fund of 52,000*l.* received from the students as fees; the sum of 56,000*l.* so obtained is applied to the provision of college and University lecturers. A large proportion of these fees is paid to the scientific departments of the University; and of the fees so paid the greater part is assigned as a contribution to the maintenance of the several departments, and not, directly at least, to the payment of lecturers.

Deducting the sum of 4000*l.*, contributed by the colleges to the Tuition Fund, we have left over of the corporate income a sum of 34,000*l.*, or about 2000*l.* per college, available for the payment of college officers and servants, interest on loans, the expenses of the college libraries, printing, and other expenses. If, then, it can be shown that the 78,000*l.* spent on the fellowships is not extravagantly allotted—and of this more below—it is clear that the colleges can contribute but little more than they do at present to the University teaching. It is an eloquent comment on the depleted condition of the college

* Including about 10,000*l.* capitation tax.

treasuries that the Duke of Devonshire, exercising his discretion as chancellor, has reduced the statutory contribution of the colleges to the University income for the years 1903, 1904, and 1905, so that the full contribution required by statute will not be reached till the present year, and even then only if the chancellor does not further exercise his discretion. An idea of the serious effect of the fall of agricultural rent on the college incomes may be gathered from the fact that one of the larger colleges has in the last thirty years suffered a loss of revenue amounting to 10,000*l.* a year.

We now turn to the question of the fellowships. The sum of 78,000*l.* was in 1904 divided among seventeen heads of houses and about 315 ordinary fellows. Of this sum the heads of houses received among them, as far as can be ascertained, the not excessive amount of 15,000*l.*, very unequally divided. The average stipend of a fellow is thus about 200*l.* per annum. When the last Commission sat, the maximum stipend of a fellow was fixed at 250*l.*; and it was thought that this sum would usually be reached. But, except in the case of one or two colleges, which are the fortunate possessors of town property, the maximum is now never reached; and in certain cases the value of a fellowship has fallen to less than 100*l.* per annum. Of the 315 fellows, some 245 were in 1904 resident and some 70 non-resident. Of the residents, about 225 were holding some university or college office, educational or administrative. Of the non-residents, and of the residents who were holding no office, the greater number had earned their fellowships by holding some qualifying position, such as a lectureship, for a given number of years, usually twenty. Among the non-residents, in addition to fellows who hold their fellowships as a pension, were to be found students who are prosecuting research away from Cambridge; such students are, as a rule, liable to be summoned to reside, as college exigencies may demand. Several other non-residents are fellows who have but recently received appointments away from Cambridge; their fellowships will, under the new statutes, lapse in a year or two.

The analysis shows that the number of 'prize fellowships' is small; and it is believed that they are steadily vanishing. To assist the reader in obtaining a general idea of what is done with the fellowships, the combined result

in the case of two colleges is here given. The two colleges in question have been chosen because the writers happen to be in a position to account for the occupant of every fellowship in each college. As will be seen, the two colleges render most valuable assistance to the University; and they have practically rid themselves of the burden of prize fellowships imposed on them by the Commission of 1856. The two colleges dispose, according to the university calendar of 1905-6, of forty fellowships between them. Of these, five are pension fellowships; five are held by professors in the University, as part of their stipend; twelve are held by University lecturers, demonstrators, or other University officers; eleven are held by college officers or lecturers; five are held by research students in Cambridge; two junior fellowships are held by non-residents. One of the latter was recently appointed to a professorship in another university and his fellowship has just lapsed; the other holds a prize fellowship. It is unlikely that, when his fellowship lapses, another prize fellow will be elected in his place. There are in residence at each of the two colleges a number of University lecturers and officers, and of college lecturers, for whom no fellowship can be found. Speaking generally of the fellowships allotted to college teaching, it may be said that, with the help of a portion of the Tuition Fund, they enable the colleges to provide the college lecturers with stipends on which an unmarried man, occupying rooms in college, may comfortably live. When we turn to the University lectureships, there is often another tale to tell.

The University income, which has to bear almost the whole cost of modern developments, is made up of the following items: matriculation, degree, examination, and other fees, 30,000*l.*; direct contributions from colleges, 32,000*l.*; income from endowments, 2000*l.*—64,000*l.* in all.

In 1904 the University, in the course of its ordinary work, expended 65,300*l.*, distributed roughly as follows:—

	£
Officers, secretaries, and servants	4,100
Maintenance of business offices, registry, senate house and schools	1,300
Rates and taxes	3,400
Obligatory payments from income	1,300
Stipends of professors	12,400
„ of readers, university lecturers, demonstra- tors, and other teachers	9,100

Maintenance and subordinate staff of scientific departments (including the botanic garden and observatory)	9,600
University library, staff, and up-keep	6,300
Examiners' fees, etc.	5,900
Debt on buildings, sites, sinking fund, and interest on building loans	8,500
Printing and stationery	2,600
Pension funds (professors, 200 <i>l.</i> ; servants, 150 <i>l.</i>)	350
Miscellaneous expenses	450
	<hr/>
	£65,300

There are 44 professors; very few of them receive 800*l.* or more a year (including fellowships), while the lowest limit of a professor's stipend, unless he holds a fellowship, is about 90*l.* a year. The average annual income of a professor is not more than 550*l.*; and of the yearly revenue of 24,000*l.* required to produce this average, 7000*l.* are paid in the shape of fellowships by the colleges, and about 4600*l.* from the income of special trust funds and other benefactions, one payment of 800*l.* a year being for a term of years only. One or two professors at most receive a proportion of the fees paid for lectures and laboratories in their respective departments. There are twelve University readers (or sub-professors). The new statutes contemplated for a reader the salary of 400*l.* a year; but, owing to the inadequacy of the University income, none receives more than 300*l.*, and in several cases only 100*l.* is paid. There are fifty-three University lecturers whose stipends range from 200*l.* a year to 50*l.*, and it is melancholy to note how many of these receive the lower sum without any assistance from endowments such as fellowships or the like. There are thirteen University teachers, almost all of them appointed by the Board for Indian Civil Service studies, and occupied, in the main, in teaching eastern dialects; and there are forty-four demonstrators, curators, and superintendents of museums, whose stipends range from 200*l.* a year to nothing at all.

The incomes of some of these gentlemen are supplemented by fellowships, of others by a share of lecture fees; a few, too, may hold two such offices as curator and lecturer simultaneously. But, when the addition from all sources (about 8000*l.* from fees or special funds, and 13,000*l.* from fellowships) has been made to the annual sum (9100*l.*) which the University has to give, we arrive at a total of about 30,000*l.*, giving the surprisingly low

average income of 250*l.* a year for any University teacher other than a professor. A few of the older teachers may hold some college office which adds a little to their income, but these are rare exceptions. There are no resources from which these incomes may be increased according to the service of the holder; and there is practically no provision for pension, except in the case of those teachers (less than one half of the whole number) who hold fellowships, and may expect, after many years of service, to earn the right to retain them permanently.

In these circumstances it is not surprising that the University finds a difficulty in retaining many of its abler teachers. At the beginning of 1904 it was estimated that over two hundred professors and lecturers at other universities (as distinct from university colleges) in the United Kingdom had been educated at Cambridge; and, though that is by no means a matter for regret, yet it is not too much to say that, in supplying this demand for teachers, the University has done a great national work for which she is poorly requited by her difficulty in retaining a sufficient staff for herself. Fortunately, when all other funds are exhausted, the fund of patriotism remains inexhaustible. It is not known how many fellows, possessed of some private means, and attached to the University through sheer love of their work, return their stipends to their colleges to be employed for the general good; such men are always anxious that their names should be concealed, but the present writers know of three in the restricted circle of their immediate personal friends. The special correspondent of the 'Times' writes, on the occasion of the royal visit in 1904:—

'I may be permitted to say, as the result of my personal enquiries, that the amount of work done either gratuitously or for very inadequate remuneration by professors, readers, lecturers, demonstrators, and other teachers in many departments of study and instruction, really constitutes a very substantial endowment, freely contributed by men who have no worldly goods to give, but who give lavishly of their time, their energy, their intellectual capacity, their acquired knowledge, and their disinterested devotion to the advancement of learning. If this asset were evaluated in pounds, shillings, and pence, the University balance-sheet would wear a very different aspect.'

On a consideration of the analysis just made, and of the additional facts that the Reserve Fund set aside by the University for building and equipment during the years of her development is now exhausted, and that her borrowing powers have been seriously reduced, it would appear that further progress is almost entirely dependent on an increase of endowment.

A few years ago, certain of the University authorities, foreseeing the approach of a financial crisis, put away their pride and, with the countenance of the chancellor, boldly begged for help. Their appeal resulted in the collection of about 100,000*l.*, which has been expended on the erection and equipment of various buildings devoted to science, such as the museum of geology and the botany school, the University itself contributing a large proportion of the expense incurred. In the list of contributors occur the names of no fewer than 500 Cambridge men, past and present, out of a total of 620 names. This number is a sufficient retort to the suggestion which has been made that Cambridge does not help herself. It must be remembered, too, that a sum of about 14,000*l.* a year is contributed by members of the Senate to the funds of the University and of the colleges for the privilege of continued membership; and that these fees are often paid out of very slender incomes, on grounds which are as a rule purely patriotic.

In enumerating the needs of the various departments, it is fitting that the older studies and their modern developments should be first passed in review; for, though in certain respects these studies are well equipped, and though the provision of what is necessary would not be so costly as in the case of science, yet, in the deficiency of income available for development, there is real danger that the humanities may be starved.

Theology is well endowed by the piety of former generations. Yet the present Bishop of Winchester, when Hulsean professor of divinity, pleaded for an increased stipend for the professors which would permit them to save enough to retire upon; and, in view of the small sum, 200*l.* a year, which the University is able to pay to its pension fund, such an increase cannot be said to be unreasonable. In law a new post for the teaching of

jurisprudence, or of jurisprudence combined with Roman law, is the chief requirement. The teaching of Latin and Greek is largely and effectively supplemented by the provision made by the colleges; but the demand for a professorship instead of a readership in classical archaeology cannot be called extravagant; while it is little short of scandalous that the University possesses no professor, and can make no permanent provision for the study, of ancient philosophy.

The teaching of Oriental languages is perhaps more dependent than that of any other subject on the self-sacrificing generosity of the staff. Though but a nominal stipend and a nominal duty attach to his chair, the Lord Almoner's professor of Arabic voluntarily undertakes a large share of the teaching. The payment of the Talmudic reader, depending mainly on the generosity of a private person, is guaranteed only during the tenure of the present reader. The cost of the colloquial teaching of spoken Arabic, Turkish, and Persian by native instructors is guaranteed, and sometimes in part provided, by the Sir Thomas Adams professor of Arabic. The professor of Chinese has the inadequate stipend of 200*l.*; and the professorship terminates with the tenure of the present holder. Apart from the necessity of providing teaching for practical students, the proper care of the Chinese library alone renders the permanence of the professorship a necessity. There is no professorship or readership of Japanese. The stipends of the present lecturers in Persian and Aramaic are inadequate. Egyptology is not provided for, although there is a fine collection of mortuary objects in the Fitzwilliam Museum; and Assyriology, although the professor of Assyriology at King's College, London, lives in Cambridge, is wholly unrepresented. No provision is made for the teaching of the Iranian dialects. Altogether some 2000*l.* a year could well be spent in Oriental languages alone.

There is no chair of English literature in the University. The professorship of Anglo-Saxon is a recent endowment. By the exertions of the occupant of that chair a sum of 2100*l.* has been collected, which yields an endowment of 60*l.* a year for an English lectureship. To this small stipend the University adds 50*l.* a year. It is not surprising that the distinguished student who has so long

occupied the post should at last have been attracted to London by a higher stipend.

French and German are represented by two readers, who in the last twenty years have taken a large share in the development of a sound and growing school. In the provision for the teaching of modern languages, Cambridge ought not to be behind the northern universities; and it is most desirable that professorships should be established in at least French and German. The University is indebted to a private fund for a small endowment for the lectureship in Russian and other Slavonic tongues. This lectureship should be made permanent; and lectureships should be established in Spanish and Italian.

As in the case of classics and mathematics, the University teaching in history is largely supplemented by the colleges; but the Regius professor pleads for an additional reader and two lecturers. A central building with professors' rooms and lecture-rooms and accommodation for the professorial library cannot be thought of in the present state of the University finances; yet this provision is urgently required.

The newly-established school of economics and politics is in urgent need of three or four lectureships, to which definite duties in research should be attached, in order to extend the present range of economic study and to bring it close to the great problems of modern industry. While in the universities of Edinburgh, London, Manchester, Leeds, North and South Wales, and Montreal, political economy is taught by economists trained at Cambridge, their *alma mater* is starved of the means necessary to produce their successors.

The anthropological collections are, for want of space, in a chaotic state. The University is fortunate in possessing many ardent workers; and its collections are most valuable. The existing museum of archæology and ethnology is, however, quite inadequate for their display or even for their storage; and a disused warehouse has been hired at Newnham to accommodate the further collections which generous donors continue to present. To such an extent has it been necessary to carry the economy practised in this department that the shelves of the warehouse have been made from old boxes. A site for a new museum has been provided by the University,

and plans have been prepared; but without the help of extraneous benefactions it is impossible to build at present. An adequate building would cost perhaps 25,000*l*. The removal of the museum to a new site would set free space greatly needed for other purposes. The Disney professor of archæology and the curator of the archæological museum plead also for the foundation of a chair, or at least a readership, for the comparative study of religions; and, in view of the relations of the Empire to every kind of cult, it is scarcely creditable that neither of the older universities makes any provision for this study.

The present staff consists of the Disney professor of archæology, who, apart from his fellowship, receives from the University the inadequate stipend of 195*l*. a year, and a lecturer on ethnology with a salary of 50*l*. a year. The only accommodation for the latter is a room in the basement of the medical school, where he takes classes in practical work. Physical anthropology is associated more directly with the department of human anatomy, and is represented by another lecturer at 50*l*. a year. The collection of skulls brought together by Professor Macalister affords unrivalled material for demonstrations; and, as two recent volumes from the pen of Dr Duckworth show, good use is made of the material. The University has recently recognised the importance of anthropology by adopting a scheme for granting degrees on research in this subject.

The growing importance of the architect's profession, and the widespread recognition of the fact that the young architect must have a preliminary scientific training, point to the desirability of establishing a school of architecture at Cambridge, resting on the one hand on the engineering school, and on the other on the Slade professorship of fine arts, and the school of archæology. The school might be organised on lines similar to those of the medical school; and the young architect would pass his early years of professional study on thoroughly practical lines, in the midst of admirable examples of almost all the different styles.

In 1877 Cambridge led the way in that difficult science called sometimes physiological psychology, sometimes experimental psychology, and sometimes psychophysics.

In that year the present professor of mental philosophy and logic, and Dr Venn, made a vigorous effort to establish a psychophysical laboratory. They unfortunately failed; had they succeeded, Cambridge would have possessed the first laboratory of this kind in the world. In 1878 Wundt opened his laboratory at Leipzig; and there are now some seven psychophysical laboratories in Germany, two in Russia, ten in the United States, one in Copenhagen, one in Paris, one in Geneva, and one in Canada. It is not that psychophysics is not studied in Cambridge, for Dr Rivers, the lecturer on the subject, and Dr Myers have formed a school here which is second to none in Great Britain; this school has recently supplied a reader to Oxford. But the work is done under most discouraging circumstances. The laboratory is at present established in a dilapidated cottage in Mill Lane and in an adjacent disused granary. Further and better provision for this growing subject is urgent; and the present lectureship should be converted into a readership. The interest which is taken in the subjects under the control of the Board of Moral Science is shown by the successful launching of the 'Journal of Psychology,' the first number of which was published by the University Press in 1904. Lecture-rooms and a departmental library are wanted; and the establishment of a readership in pedagogy should not be long delayed.

In mathematics two new professorships are needed, one in pure mathematics and one in applied mathematics; two of the present lecturers should be made readers; and the salaries of all the lecturers should be raised to 100*l.* a year. One pressing need is that for two lecture-rooms, with an adjacent library and a museum of mathematical models. Cambridge is perhaps the most renowned mathematical school in the world; yet its provision for the accommodation of the staff is far behind that of the chief American universities. A munificent benefactor has recently left a sum of 5000*l.* for repairs, etc., to the Newall telescope; but there is no stipend forthcoming for Mr Newall, who for sixteen years has discharged the duties of observer without remuneration. The Lowndean and Plumian professors pay the salary of a demonstrator.

The Cavendish laboratory, owing to the position it

has for years taken in the promotion of physical research, is overcrowded with students and researchers. Lord Rayleigh has most generously given to the University the Nobel prize gained by him in 1904. Of this benefaction 5000*l.* have been assigned as a contribution towards the desired new wing; but money will be required for maintenance; and the professor estimates that a sum of 7500*l.* is now wanted for instruments, machinery, and laboratory fittings. The professor of chemistry asks for more apparatus and higher stipends for his teachers. He draws attention to the need for a metallurgical laboratory, the provision of which, in view of the recent establishment of a diploma in mining engineering, is urgent. Mineralogy asks only for a trained attendant and 35*l.* a year; but for meteorology there is no real provision.

The Sedgwick museum, in which the department of geology is now housed, has involved much expense in furnishing. Although the existing furniture was all retained, there is still a demand for more cabinets; and Professor Hughes would like to spend 2800*l.* on these alone, while a large sum should be set apart for maintenance, wages, and the increase of stipends. The demands of botany are not yet completely satisfied. A professorship and a lectureship to deal with the newly recognised study of scientific forestry are especially needed.

In zoology, if we leave out of account the need for higher stipends for teachers and higher wages for attendants, which runs like a thread through all the departments, there are two chief requirements. The first is for a new or at any rate a greatly enlarged museum. It is doubtful if the existing site is large enough to allow an adequate increase to the present structure; and to build a new building on another site would probably cost 30,000*l.*; nevertheless, with the ever-increasing collections housed in rooms already overstocked, this expenditure must soon be faced.

A branch of experimental science dealing with the study of variation and heredity in plants and animals has recently arisen, and has already attained very considerable proportions in Cambridge. It seems indeed that we are entering on a period when such studies will absorb the energies of most of the younger biological students. Under Mr Bateson some twelve researchers are already

at work following out Mendel's law in many varieties of plant and animal. The extreme importance of these studies, which, if they prove a key to heredity, will place in man's hands an instrument as powerful as Watt's application of steam, is shown by the fact that Mr Biffen has already discovered that susceptibility to rust in wheat is Mendelian, and is thus a property which may be eliminated by breeding. For all these studies land is required, as well as a greenhouse, outbuildings, and a trained gardener. None of these is as yet attainable.

The recent discoveries of the protozoic origin of malaria, sleeping-sickness, and other human and many other animal diseases, has directed attention both to the protozoa, with their complicated life-histories, and to the insects which convey them from one creature to another. Both protozoa and insects are highly specialised groups of animals. The establishment, by the aid of the Quick bequest, of a chair of protozoology will do something to meet the necessities of the case, so far as the protozoa are concerned; but some provision for the study of the insects will still be needed.

A chair of physiological chemistry is urgently wanted. The pressing problems of the day in physiology require a chemical solution. Remarkable strides have already been made in this subject; the interaction of the various tissues of the body by means of the blood, the functions of the ductless glands, the problems of immunity, are all being worked out upon a chemical basis. In this country there are but two professors of physiological chemistry, whereas in Germany there are eleven, in Austria eight, in France six. That Great Britain is lamentably behind in this branch of learning is even more markedly shown when we consider the output of original memoirs. In 1903 over 3000 papers, written by some 2500 workers, were published; to this total the United Kingdom contributed no more than seventy. Cambridge has produced many brilliant physiologists; but the school cannot afford the outlay for even a necessary piece of apparatus costing 10*l.*; and the demonstrators pay, out of their pittances, part of the wages of their attendants.

The new medical schools, opened by the King in March 1904, are but a portion of the original plan; and, until the remaining laboratories can be erected (at a

probable cost of about 12,000*l.*), the various departments must necessarily be cramped. Many more teachers in special subjects are wanted; and the need of a professorship or at least a readership in hygiene is pressing. A new lecture-room is wanted in the department of human anatomy, which at present shares a room with physiology. A considerable sum is also needed for instruments, fittings, attendants, and libraries.

The school of engineering needs provision in metallurgy, mining subjects, and naval architecture; of the latter, in the greatest shipbuilding country of the world, but one chair—at Glasgow—exists. New workshops and engine-rooms are also greatly needed. The present workshops date from 1878, and are far too small for the demands on them. The provision of a sum of money which can be expended by the professor on the encouragement of research is much needed.

The department of agriculture is fairly well staffed, but at present is obliged to carry on its indoor work in four rooms in the basement of the chemical laboratory. The amount of research carried on by the staff has fully justified them in establishing the 'Journal of Agricultural Science,' which appeared for the first time in 1904. This is the only periodical in the country devoted entirely to scientific agriculture. A laboratory for agriculture is a most pressing necessity; a site is available, but at present there is not sufficient money for the building, which, including provision for maintenance, would cost 20,000*l.* The Drapers' Company has promised a conditional 5000*l.* towards this sum. The lease of the experimental farm expires in 1909; and some new arrangement by which the University can acquire a farm of from thirty to forty acres near Cambridge will then be imperative.

Besides numerous smaller needs, there are two of primary importance which have not yet been mentioned. The first is that for the provision of examination rooms. The University examinations are at present held in the Guildhall, the Corn Exchange, and other hired rooms, often badly lighted, badly heated, and badly ventilated, and in no case well adapted to the purpose of conducting examinations. The hiring and arranging of the rooms costs the University at least 450*l.* a year.

The other great need is some adequate provision for

that priceless national treasure, the University library. Mr. J. W. Clark has himself inaugurated an appeal on its behalf. The list of donors which he is already able to print is headed by his Majesty the King; and a sum of over 18,000*l.* has already been collected. This sum includes a donation of 5000*l.* from the Goldsmiths' Company, and 2700*l.* assigned by Lord Rayleigh from the Nobel prize; to the remainder, resident masters of arts have largely contributed. When it has been shown by their contributions how keenly the residents feel on the subject of the library, it is hoped that some generous measure of help may be forthcoming from hands more able to give it. The library is the mainspring of university activity; and its well-being and good organisation are important to all departments alike. Every member of the Senate, and every other person entitled to use the library, have access to the shelves; and no serious student, whether a member of the University or not, is refused.

But, in its restricted area, the library cannot expand further; and the result is congestion and inevitable disorder. The furniture and fitting up of the rooms recently rendered available for the library will cost some 15,000*l.* Towards this expenditure the Financial Board has been able to grant only 5000*l.*, spread over three years. The cost of furnishing a reading and reference room is estimated at from 800*l.* to 1000*l.* Further, an increase of the staff is urgently needed. The library grows at the rate of about eleven thousand books per annum; and there are considerable arrears of cataloguing to be overtaken. The magnificent gift of Lord Acton's library, for which the University is indebted to Mr Carnegie and Mr John Morley, has involved considerable outlay. The number of volumes presented is about fifty-nine thousand; the binding, cataloguing, printing of titles, and the provision of bookcases will cost about 8000*l.*, to which the University has contributed 6900*l.* Gifts such as these are of priceless value to Cambridge; but they entail heavy expenditure. Additional assistants, moreover, are needed to look after them; and every new room added to the library increases the cost of maintenance. Altogether, it is estimated that a sum of 21,200*l.* is required for present use; and that 3800*l.* a year is required for additions to the staff, the purchase and binding of books, and for the additional expense

entailed by the Acton library. This annual income, if capitalised, represents a sum of 126,700*l*.

Modern education is a costly thing; and when, in 1904, the heads of departments in the University made an estimate of the outlay necessary to place their several provinces in a state of efficiency, their deliberate and responsible calculations showed that a sum of 270,000*l*. was required for building and equipment, and an additional annual income of 38,000*l*. for the increase of salaries on the very moderate scale suggested, and for maintenance; in all, say a capital sum of a million and a half. Even this estimate takes no account of the desirability of providing pensions for professors who have reached the age of seventy. As the published list of benefactions shows, Cambridge has reason to be grateful to her recent benefactors. But to raise an endowment comparable to that of 1,400,000*l*. which the Johns Hopkins University received from private munificence seems in this country to be hardly within the bounds of possibility.

Had an appeal such as that issued by Cambridge been made in the United States, there is little doubt that it would have met with a prompt response. There is in Montreal a university, officered largely by Cambridge men, and equipped with a princely magnificence of which Cambridge dares not even dream. Dr Ewing's comment is pertinent. 'It is good,' said he, 'to see the colonial daughter sitting down to so lavish a table; but is it well that the *alma mater* at home should be left looking wistfully at the crumbs?' Nearer home, Mr Carnegie has shown what a large-minded liberality can do for the Scottish universities. A great benefactor who would free the University of Cambridge from a sordid struggle, in which every pound spent on development has to be laboriously begged, would earn enduring fame in the annals of British education. It has been the earnest desire of the authors of this paper to show that the University is not unworthy of such generosity; that she has displayed great courage and great self-denial in facing modern conditions; and that her reputed wealth is a fiction, while her poverty is a grim fact.

Art. XI.—PASCAL'S APOLOGIA.

1. *Blaise Pascal : Pensées.* (Les Grands Écrivains de la France.) Three vols. Edited by Léon Brunschvicg. Paris : Hachette, 1904.
2. *Blaise Pascal : Pensées et Opuscules.* By Léon Brunschvicg. Third edition. Paris : Hachette, 1904.
3. *Pascal.* By Émile Boutroux. Paris : Hachette, 1903.
4. *The Religions of Authority and the Religion of the Spirit.* By Auguste Sabatier. With a Memoir by Jean Réville. London : Williams and Norgate, 1904.
5. *Angélique of Port-Royal, 1591-1661.* By A. K. H. London : Skeffington, 1905.
6. *Problems and Persons.* By Wilfrid Ward. London : Longmans, 1903.
7. *Reason and Revelation : an Essay in Christian Apology.* By J. R. Illingworth. London : Macmillan, 1902.
8. *Descartes : his Life and Times.* By Elizabeth S. Haldane. London : Murray, 1905.

'THE first book which filled my young heart with passionate ardour,' says M. Sabatier in the personal note preceding his 'Esquisse d'une Philosophie de la Religion,' 'was that of the "Pensées," undoubtedly because in these, where the mind of Pascal reveals itself in flaming words, I felt myself sharing the struggle between reason and faith, science and conscience, of which I had then become painfully conscious.' Such, we take it, is the experience of many minds in the present day, which accounts for the peculiar attraction of Pascal's 'Pensées' and the spell they still exercise over those who think. Hence the reappearance from time to time of new editions, critical commentaries, learned monographs, or such works as the superb reproduction of the original manuscript of the 'Pensées' in phototype, and the new edition in the collection of 'Les Grands Écrivains de la France,' by M. Léon Brunschvicg.

Some few books stand the test of time in spite of their imperfections; and this is one of them. Disjointed, fragmentary, 'mere memoranda,' this collection of loose thoughts, edited in the first instance in a garbled version by the Port-Royalists, headed by the appropriate motto, 'Pendent opera interrupta,' still maintains its high position unquestioned in the literature of France. In the

introduction to the latest edition, M. Brunschvicg tells us that his object is to give us the 'Pensées' in the logical order in which Pascal would have placed them if he had lived, so far as the plan can be discovered by a careful study of the original manuscript and other remains. This method is the very opposite of that adopted by his immediate predecessor, M. Michaud, who conscientiously reproduces the fragments in 'the beautiful disorder' in which they were found among Pascal's papers. The friendly tone of these two editors, starting from opposite standpoints, but inspired by the same loyal desire to present Pascal's thoughts intact, is beyond praise.

M. Brunschvicg, moreover, does justice to all his fellow-workers in the same field, and is remarkably free from carping criticism where he differs from them. He has even a kind word for the manipulation of the text by the Port-Royalists, draws attention to the claims of Bossuet (as a mathematician in sympathy with Pascal) to be the author of the 'textus receptus' generally in use, and judiciously refers to the revolution in Pascal criticism since Cousin. He carefully cites the fact that it was Faugère, not Cousin, who, in his laudable efforts to restore the true text, went back to the autograph, Cousin having apparently consulted only the two authorised copies. He speaks with due respect of M. Havet as a commentator, though he finds fault with him for the hypercritical tone of some of his notes. His own 'apparatus criticus' is admirable.

Not all will accept as final the present arrangement of the 'Thoughts,' as given in the two works placed at the head of our list, though it is true that on it were based the lectures of M. Boutroux at the Sorbonne some time ago. But, on the whole, we have here a valuable summary of recent criticism and comment, with a good deal of biographical and bibliographical matter, which will be welcomed by all students of this most interesting but puzzling relic of religious thought.

The 'Pensées' are the unfinished product of one of the most original men of genius, the outcome of a mind singularly lucid, and therefore, in accuracy of expression, approaching almost geometrical precision, and yet aglow with a fire of impassioned eloquence rarely met in such combination. Pascal speaks with the authority of a

scientific expert and discoverer, the equal and keen critic of Descartes in the discussion of philosophical problems, though his junior in years, and also as the creator of a new style in theological polemics, unrivalled in the brilliancy of its wit and the elevation of its moral tone. Jotted down from time to time, apparently without system, though intended as notes, memoranda, or materials for a systematic treatise on Christian apologetics, the 'Pensées' do not constitute, like Amiel's journal, 'an itinerary of an obscurely conditioned soul,' but a transparent self-revelation of the writer.

The attractive personality of Pascal, the sensitiveness of a poetic nature in conflict with the rigidity of the thinker, the playful ease of the man of the world in curious contrast with the severe austerity of the religious controversialist—even these dissonances and apparent contradictions of character, almost incongruous in one called 'Le dignitaire dans le monde des esprits,' present a fascinating riddle which three centuries of intermittent but strenuous study have not yet unravelled. 'Il ne faut pas se flatter,' says one of his latest critics, M. Faguet, 'd'arriver à une définition exacte de cette âme aux profonds replis.' For Pascal is at once earnest believer and mocking sceptic, religious revivalist yet uncompromising critic in the region of pure thought; and for this reason he appeals to the most diverse minds, rationalists like Voltaire, romanticists like Chateaubriand (who speaks of him as 'cet effrayant génie'), Protestants like Vinet, and Catholics like Bossuet. Dean Church and Sir Leslie Stephen are among his admirers, and seem to agree with Bayle in the estimate he forms of him as 'l'un des plus sublimes esprits du monde, un prodige, et, pour ainsi parler, un individu paradoxe de l'espèce humaine.'

This paradoxical character forms indeed one of his chief attractions. It is hard to reconcile the man with himself—the Pascal before and after his first conversion; the Pascal thus changed, with the same man after his 'conversion définitive'; Pascal the youthful aspirant of science with Pascal the pietist; the *mondain* with the Jansenist *de rigueur*; the philosopher with the gloomy ascetic of the latter days. It is especially interesting, and more important for our purpose here, to see reflected in the apparent contradictions of his capacious intellect

and his spiritual struggles some of the conflicts agitating the mind and heart of the Western world at this moment. For in our time, as Mr Wilfrid Ward, referring to Mr Balfour's 'Foundations of Belief,' observes,

'the temperament of a Pascal is so general—the combination, that is, of a deep sense of the difficulties of man's position, and of the need for light we do not possess, with an equally deep sense that a practical acquiescence in scepticism or agnosticism would be to ignore what is best in our nature. That a great Reality beyond us is the source of all that is highest in us is for Mr Balfour a central belief which no detailed defeat of the reason can shake.' ('Problems and Persons,' p. 183.)

Pascal has, indeed, much in common with modern thinkers. 'Always and in everything truth was the sole object of his mind,' says his sister; 'and nothing satisfied him but its attainment. . . . From his childhood he could only yield to what seemed to him evidently true.*' He had a clear perception of a continuity of thought in humanity, considered as one man growing in experience through centuries of existence. Like our moderns, he was profoundly impressed by the grandeur of nature—the infinitely great and the infinitely little—and the corresponding insignificance of man and our own planet, that '*petit cachet où l'homme est logé.*' To the modern love of applied science and mechanical invention—his experiments on the weight of air and researches on the cycloid and the discovery of a calculating machine assign a prominent position to his own scientific contributions—he adds an insatiable desire for spiritual enlightenment. Like our modern men of science, he is unwilling to accept anything which does not admit of mathematical demonstration; '*ce qui passe la géométrie nous surpasse.*' Like them, he relegates the highest truths of religion to the region of intuitive apperception: '*c'est le cœur qui sent Dieu, et non la raison.*' Like some of them, again, he takes refuge in a higher mysticism.

In his case, too, the passion for truth is matched by his intense love for man. He is appalled at once by

* '*Vie de B. Pascal, par Madame Périer, sa sœur,*' preceding the '*Pensées*' in the edition published by Firmin Didot. All references in this article are made to this as the most widely known edition.

the grandeur and abjectness of humanity. He stoutly maintains the dignity of human nature, but, with Rochefoucauld, accepts the theological view of human depravity, though, as Hallam remarks, 'he adorns and ennobles the degeneracy that he exaggerates.' With Pascal, as with the moderns, it is suffering and struggling humanity which inspires sorrow and pity. Where he differs from them is in the central aim pervading his work—to find in Christianity the sole solution of all problems and the reconciliation of human antinomies. Not unlike our modern agnostics, he reaches the loftiest altitudes of 'l'ignorance savante qui se connaît'—we owe this expression to him—but unlike them he does not rest satisfied till he has found a key to the riddle of the universe in religion. Thus, as Professor Flint says,

'he rendered, by the way in which he applied in the "*Pensées*" the psychological or experimental method, the method of spiritual verification, to the probation of the Christian faith, an inestimable service, one which fully justifies his being regarded as one of the most original and profound of Christian apologists.' (*Agnosticism*, p. 114.)

Thus he may be regarded as the intellectual leader of the religious reaction against the scepticism of the Renaissance, and as the inaugurator of a philosophy of religion in the seventeenth century, trying to reconcile faith with reason by a device subsequently applied with a view to discredit reason in order to enthroned theology; or, in modern phrase, from the assumed 'bankruptcy of science,' its failure to solve the deeper problems of life, to deduce the provisional acceptance of the claims of authoritative religion. 'Voulez-vous connaître la vérité? Commencez par détruire votre raison.' This is called by M. Saisset, in his critique on Pascal, '*le scepticisme théologique*.' But neither Pascal nor his modern imitators go quite so far as is here stated. 'Il y a des raisons,' he says, 'qui passent notre raison.'

True, in the war between pyrrhonism and dogmatism Pascal takes his stand on the side of authority, for, as he says, to remain neutral is to be 'pyrrhonien par excellence.' But the opponents he assails were quite unlike the doctrinaires of the eighteenth century, the adversaries of Christianity in the 'age of reason,' or the agnostics of

our own day. They were indifferentists in matters of religion rather than irreligious. The 'libertins,' who then upheld the rights of reason, really wanted freedom from the moral restraints of religion; they were willing to accept Montaigne's 'religion de coutume,' treating its ordinances with a graceful nonchalance regarded as *le bon ton* in those intellectual circles to which Pascal was readily admitted. Among them were his friend Méré, 'maître de bel air et d'agrément,' and other 'bels esprits,' the 'honnêtes hommes' and the 'précieuses' who met in the salon of Madame de Sablé to discuss freely matters appertaining to morals, religion, and philosophy. Pascal himself was never quite one of them, for he was abnormally sensitive to religious impressions at all times. In him 'l'homme n'est produit que pour l'infini.' This religious sensitiveness became more acute with the advance of his nervous malady, producing a morbidly sombre reflectiveness, which did not amount, however, as some have surmised, to a 'mental cataclysm.'

Nor does he seem to have passed through 'a wild storm of unbelief,' like some deeply religious men who subsequently became firm defenders of the faith. His final conversion was, as Michaud correctly describes it, 'un simple retour à la ferveur janseniste après un instant d'attiédissement de la foi et de sécheresse de cœur.' The age in which he lived, unlike our own, was not one of dissolving creeds; but, as the author of 'Angélique of Port-Royal' points out, it was an age of sensational religion. Disbelief in miracles and historical doubts affecting the authenticity of the Scriptures had not yet appeared. Undisturbed in his belief in the supernatural, Pascal, as M. Havet puts it, stands on Tabor, whilst we are at the foot of the mountain. In his apologetics he still accepts the Bible, as a whole, uncritically. On the other hand, our modern sceptics are more serious than those of Pascal's day, 'severely but serenely sad' in contemplating the enigmas of life, often adopting the language of Pascal in giving expression to their sombre thoughts. He, indeed, is more hopeful than they, by reason of his unshaken faith in the divine ordering of things, whilst they place their only confidence in the rectifying forces of human and cosmic development.

Modern sceptics cannot accept Pascal's low estimate of

human nature. 'Tous les hommes (he says) se haïssent naturellement. 'L'homme n'est ni ange, ni bête; et le malheur veut que qui veut faire l'ange fait la bête.' If he has for these reasons been called 'ce sublime misanthrope,' they are apt to err in excess on the side of optimistic philanthropy. When he speaks of man's former grandeur as a monarch now dethroned, of man's misery as the result of the fall, and of his restoration by Christ's redeeming work, they fall back on the evolution theory and see humanity slowly advancing. They see the man of the future in a 'nimbus of coloured dreams,' where he sees man's salvation in the mystic light of faith. Modern wisdom descends from heaven to earth; its aim is not the conversion, but the conservation of mankind, the formation of higher human types of perfection rather than reformation, the discovery of new methods of social amelioration rather than the recovery of a lost happiness, 'the substitution,' in short, as Renan puts it, 'of the category of *evolution* for the category of *being*; of the conception of the relative for the absolute, of movement for immobility.'

This great difference has to be borne in mind in considering Pascal's theistic and theological standpoint, in any endeavour to determine his proper place in the development of philosophic thought. 'Se moquer de la philosophie c'est vraiment philosopher.' In this cryptic expression Pascal seems to depreciate the value of philosophy; and it has led some of his critics to refuse him a place among philosophers. In reality it is only Pascal's way of putting things. He speaks of eloquence and ethics in the same strain. 'La vrai éloquence se moque de l'éloquence, la vraie morale se moque de la morale; c'est à dire que la morale du jugement se moque de la morale de l'esprit, qui est sans règle.' In this paradox, he appears to refer to the Rhetoric and Morality, the philosophy of the schools, and to suggest that the true orator, moralist, and philosopher, should follow an inner light independently. As a master of method and a profound thinker, tracing things to their causes, he proves himself to be a genuine philosopher. He admits the insufficiency without asserting the absolute impotence of philosophy to solve the problems of existence. Its deficiency, in his opinion, demands the complement of revealed

religion. He nowhere denies the relative importance of philosophy. 'Ramener les esprits des distractions qui les leurrent à l'étude d'eux-mêmes, et de la connaissance d'eux-mêmes à la connaissance de Dieu—n'est-ce pas encore les ramener à la philosophie?' asks M. Nourrisson, one of his defenders. To know the limitations of philosophy is to be a true philosopher; this seems to be Pascal's meaning in the saying quoted above.

If we want to know what Pascal thought of philosophy we must read his 'Entretien' with M. de Saci, as reproduced in its entirety by Havet, not the mutilated form in the ordinary editions. Here, comparing Epictetus and rational Stoicism with sceptical Epicureanism, Pascal lays bare the weak side of each, whilst fully admitting what truth they contain. He shows that the former exaggerates the moral force in man, and thus ministers to human pride; while the latter, dwelling in excess on his weaknesses, has the effect of relaxing the moral fibre by selfish indecision. Thus they mutually destroy one another; whereas Christianity, in acknowledging both man's strength and his weakness, his pristine dignity and present abject condition, supplements their one-sidedness, and so presents us with a more complete philosophy of life. In this way Pascal paves the way for modern apologists in trying to make good the claims of Christianity against the neo-stoicism of the Positivist and the hedonistic preconceptions of scientific materialism. Epictetus teaches what is owing to the deity and to the moral dignity of man, but fails to make allowance for human limitations. Montaigne, a universal doubter, finds rest on the pillow of sceptical indifference, and thus engenders moral weakness and a tendency to relapse into routine and custom. Christianity, as the arbiter in the presence of philosophic contradiction, reinforces the human will by means of divine succour, and so promotes strength of character with a deep sense of humility which enables the mind to attain to true wisdom.

The attempt to substitute philosophy for religion had failed; and Pascal felt this more strongly perhaps than any of his contemporaries. A vigorous religion, it has been said, is a superstition which has enslaved philosophy; but this definition does not apply to his religion. He may be regarded rather as the forerunner of that broader

school of religious thought which, making its appearance in a philosophic age, regarded the Christian religion as a philosophy, i.e. 'a general theory of the world.' It contained 'an appeal to the intellect,' to use Professor Illingworth's phrase, 'and may be regarded as advancing rather than superseding philosophy'; for 'Christian theology means philosophy become Christian.'

When Pascal speaks of philosophy, it should be remembered that he has in his mind the philosophy of Descartes. Readers of Miss Haldane's candid, luminous, and altogether interesting volume on Descartes will find in it all that is required on the mutual relations of these two great thinkers. Pascal attacks Descartes more than once, directly or indirectly, and speaks of his view of the universe as '*le roman de la Nature*.' He had, indeed, especially at an earlier period, a certain regard for the great philosopher of the day—'*Descartes que vous estimez tant*,' writes Méré in one of his letters to Pascal. They had met on several occasions. Moreover, there was much affinity in their intellects, in their proneness to philosophic doubt combined with a strong desire for certitude. '*Je veux que tout soit clair*' is a Cartesian expression which could find a ready echo in Pascal's mind. Among Pascal's Jansenist friends the Cartesian philosophy was held in great honour, so that in the Port-Royalist edition of the '*Pensées*' those passages in which it is censured were either cancelled or modified. Pascal, too, was undoubtedly influenced by Descartes in his views of the infinite extent of the universe, the essence of the soul, and the conviction that '*la pensée fait la grandeur de l'homme*.' But he will not go all the way with him.

'*Je ne puis pardonner à Descartes; il aurait bien voulu, dans toute sa philosophie, pouvoir se passer de Dieu; mais il n'a pu s'empêcher de lui faire donner une chiquenaude, pour mettre le monde en mouvement; après cela il n'a plus que faire de Dieu.*'

And he joins issue with Descartes when he suspects him of deism and latent scepticism as to miracles, in which he himself has an unreserved belief; it was the miracle of the Holy Thorn which formed the turning-point of his final conversion.

Here he differs *toto cælo* from Descartes and the moderns, though he comes nearer to us in the bold

expression of his doubts and difficulties. 'Il y a des gens qui n'ont pas le pouvoir d'empêcher de songer, et qui songent d'autant plus qu'on l'aura défendu.' These have become more numerous since; and for them Pascal's 'Pensées' have a profound interest, as an honest and courageous attempt to meet objections on reasonable grounds, in marked contrast to the timorous and inconclusive attempts of other defenders of the faith, who, starting from an apologetic standpoint, are determined beforehand to reach a traditional conclusion.

Pascal takes his stand on higher ground. He regards himself as an apologist by the grace of God, and undertakes his task 'par ordre de la providence,' not to satisfy intellectual curiosity, or to prove a thesis as 'ductor dubitantium,' by virtue of his office, but, like his contemporary Sir Thomas Browne in the 'Religio Medici,' with the independence of a layman addressing himself to laymen, consecrating his high intellectual powers to the vindication of religious truth. Therefore the 'Pensées,' 'cette apologie mutilée,' occupy a place quite by themselves in this kind of literature. As Sainte-Beuve expresses it in one of his 'Causeries': 'Le premier il a introduit dans la défense de la religion cette ardeur, cette angoisse et cette haute mélancholie que d'autres ont porté plus tard dans le scepticisme.'

In the 'Pensées' Pascal speaks, as he tells us, in his triple capacity as 'géomètre, pyrrhonien et chrétien'; and the work bears the impress of these qualities. As an accomplished mathematician he introduces the famous probability argument, founded on the doctrine of chances, to meet the objections of scientific sceptics. He shows that the chances are entirely in favour of those who stake all on belief in revelation. If they win, they win everything; if they lose, the loss is small in comparison. Wager then, he insists, without hesitation that God exists: you may gain thereby eternal life. In so doing you only stake a finite quantity, but you stand the chance of gaining an infinite possession; if you lose your 'chance de vérité' you have at least your 'chance de salut.'

This argument, as an appeal to prudent calculation and a self-interested inducement to accept the claims of religion, was of greater force to the cultured mind of that day than it would be to ours. 'Rien n'est si important

à l'homme que son état; rien ne lui est si redoutable que l'éternité,' is a thought which weighed heavily on Pascal's mind and that of his contemporaries. For most of them the terror of damnation was a grim reality; we meet with it in 'the trembling apprehension' of Angélique and the terrible creed of Port-Royal. Interest and fear, according to Hobbes, who had published the 'Leviathan' shortly before, constitute the principles of social life, and are supposed by him to be also the foundations of religion. Even Lessing, a century later, could say: 'Perhaps in the hour of death I may tremble,' though he adds proudly, 'I will not tremble before it!' Modern thinkers, like J. S. Mill, in his well-known reply to Dean Mansel, would rather lose their chance of salvation than believe in an unverifiable religious theory; they would scorn the idea of sacrificing truth from a selfish fear of possible consequences hereafter. With Pascal, as with Butler, religion is a matter of awful solicitude, on which 'man's whole interest and being and the fate of Nature depend.' Hence both use the argument which then seemed the most powerful in reasoning with unbelievers, 'Knowing the terror of the Lord, we persuade men.'

Such reasoning, based on a belief in a deity inexorable and inflexible in his judgments on dogmatic error, fails in its appeal to the cultured and thinking portion of modern society. But it is only fair to Pascal to quote a passage from the 'Pensées' in which he very nearly approaches our own standpoint.

'La conduite de Dieu, qui dispose toutes choses avec douceur, est de mettre la religion dans l'esprit par les raisons, et dans le cœur par sa grâce. Mais de vouloir la mettre dans le cœur et dans l'esprit par la force et par les menaces, ce n'est pas y mettre la religion, mais la terreur' (II, xvii, 4).

As 'pyrrhonien,' Pascal will not admit the possibility of demonstrating religious truths, and denies the validity of the usual arguments advanced by writers on natural theology. As for himself, he says

'la nature ne m'offre rien qui ne soit matière de doute et d'inquiétude. Si je n'y voyais rien qui marquât une divinité, je me déterminerais à n'en rien croire. Si je voyais partout les marques d'un Créateur, je reposerais en paix dans la foi,

Mais, voyant trop pour nier, et trop peu pour m'assurer, je suis dans un état à plaindre. . . . Au lieu qu'en l'état où je suis, ignorant ce que je suis et ce que je dois faire, je ne connais ni ma condition ni mon devoir' (II, vii, 1).

He rejects physical proofs of the existence of God, and falls back on inspiration or revelation. From the inconclusiveness of philosophy and speculation he turns to the certitudes of faith; to him, as to Bishop Westcott, 'the proof of our religion is the religion itself.' At the same time Pascal's mind is too acute and too candid not to recognise the conflict between faith and reason. He carefully distinguishes 'la volonté de croire' and 'la valeur de la croyance.' Hence the confession, 'Il faut savoir douter où il faut, assurer où il faut, et se soumettre où il faut.' Here he paves the way to further developments in delimiting the knowable from the unknowable, that which lies within the province of demonstrable truth from that which belongs to the region of subjective faith. He finds the proof of the Christian religion in its power of adaptation to human nature and of being able to satisfy its spiritual cravings.

When, therefore, he says 'le pyrrhonien c'est le vrai,' he means that critical thought discovers the incompetence of human reason to arrive at absolute truth or to solve the intellectual difficulties affecting religion, and shows that the only way to remove these is by means of 'intuitive belief.' His aim is not to 'exploit the incompetence of reason in the interests of faith,' but rather to show that supernatural religion is indispensable as a complement to natural reason. From the 'misery of man,' i.e. man as a thinking and feeling being, who finds himself out of harmony with the sum of things and in contradiction with himself, Pascal deduces the duty of learning how to 'humiliate reason' and accept as a gift of divine grace revealed religion. 'C'est Dieu lui-même qui les incline à croire; et ainsi ils sont très efficacement persuadés.' The antinomies of human thought and the incongruities of human life find their explanation and reconciliation in Christianity.

About the veracity of the Christian faith he has no doubt. Both the transparent clearness of the words of Christ and their occasional obscurities convince him of their truth. As for contradictions which prove a stumbling-

block to others, 'toutes ces contrariétés, qui semblaient le plus m'éloigner de la connaissance de la religion, c'est ce qui m'a le plus tôt conduit à la véritable.' Ambiguities of style and equivocal utterances serve the twofold purpose of enlightening the elect and of visiting unbelievers with judicial blindness. It is enough for him that Christianity is the only religion which gives a true view of human nature and attempts to solve the enigmas of life. In his later days Pascal writes rather as a saint than as a sage, as a Christian revivalist rather than a cool philosopher. He has no patience with those who demand proof for every statement. In his own 'convulsive piety,' he expects from others instant acceptance as the result of ecstatic illumination. His subjective faith is the result of spiritual experience, as revealed in the touching confession—'the Amulet,' as Condorcet contemptuously calls it, 'ce colloque sublime' between God and the soul, as it is styled by a later critic—which Pascal wore next to his heart as a sacred memento of his conversion.

Pascal, as 'chrétien,' simply follows the religious bent, though the latent antagonism between his scientific genius and spontaneous religion, differentiating 'son credo de ces méthodes scientifiques,' may be traced even in those passages which bear the most eloquent testimony to the victory of faith over reason. 'Holy Scripture,' he said, his sister tells us, 'is not a science of the mind, but a science of the heart.' His desire is to possess God rather than possess the truth about God; and in this way the 'Pensées' adumbrate a change in Christian apologetics, appealing to inner experience rather than external proof. To quote M. Boutroux (p. 201):—

'Selon cette méthode la condition première de toute démonstration de la religion serait l'éveil en l'âme humaine du désir de posséder Dieu, désir qui à la vérité en fait le fond, mais qu'a opprimé notre vie sensible; il s'agirait de démêler dans la nature même l'exigence du surnaturel; or, c'est en partie sous l'influence de Pascal, lu et médité en toute simplicité de cœur, que se développaient ces côtés de l'apologétique chrétienne.'

Of the three methods for arriving at truth mentioned by Pascal—discovery, demonstration, and defence—it is the last which henceforth occupies him entirely. The pursuit of scientific discovery is abandoned on religious

grounds; the attempt to demonstrate religious truth by the ordinary process of reasoning is discarded. His sole aim is to subdue the pride of intellect, and humbly to accept the mysteries of faith as revealed directly in the heart and conscience.

This leads to an interesting enquiry. What would his attitude have been, in view of later intellectual changes in the relative claims of science and religion, had he lived in the twentieth instead of in the seventeenth century? Had he applied his keen mathematical mind, his logical acumen and quickness in spiritual perception to questions which have arisen in the so-called conflict between science and faith, what would be his attitude as to recent speculations on this head? We can only guess. When writing to the Queen of Sweden in 1650, i.e. four years before his 'conversion définitive,' in the letter accompanying the calculating machine invented by himself, he compares the empire of the savant over inferior minds to that of rulers over their subjects, thus putting in a proud claim for the paramount authority of science. So, too, at the suggestion of Roannez, he engaged in studies on the cycloid, to prove 'que des esprits forts et solides peuvent être bons chrétiens en même temps.' Also, in the two fragments 'De l'esprit géométrique' and 'De l'art de persuader,' there are indications that he started originally with the idea of applying the scientific method to his apology of religion. It is only in his declining years, after his final conversion, that he flies to faith as a refuge from the uncertainties of science and philosophy, though he had spoken at times of the certitudes of religion as quite equal to those attainable by the methods adopted in the concerns of everyday life.

Under the influence of modern thought and learning, Pascal would probably have adopted a more conciliatory method towards scientific doubters whose present attitude towards religion differs greatly from that of the scientific world in his day. The 'cosmic emotion' which satisfies their religious yearnings would have found a ready response in his own heart, though he would have pointed out to them that the feeling produced by the immensity of the universe is one of oppression rather than of helpfulness towards devout aspiration. He would have sympathised with Spencer when, in one of his later

utterances, he avers that 'the consciousness that, without origin or cause, infinite space has ever existed and must ever exist, produces in me a feeling from which I shrink.' But he would have added that, in the absence of belief in a divine Providence to soothe the anxieties of human atoms, the presence of inexorable laws without a law-giver, of an all-powerful force at work in the cosmos, leaves the mind in a state of bewilderment and the will enfeebled by an appalling sense of its own impotence; and that Nature, immoral, cold, cruel, pitiless towards human struggles, can of itself neither evoke feelings of reverential regard and affection, nor subdue the lower passions or stimulate the higher aspirations of humanity in the fierce struggle for existence.

Had Pascal lived in our day, i.e. under intellectual conditions more favourable for the full display of his genius, he would, along with many of our contemporaries, have been impressed by the truths of science, and, fully recognising the spiritual side of our nature not touched by it, have willingly assented to the proposition that, 'though a man of science may disbelieve theology, a theologian cannot, consistently with his own first principles, disbelieve science' (Illingworth, p. 84). In the course of time and with the progress of thought this standpoint has been reached, as science has become more spiritualised and theology more scientific, so that the progress of science is regarded by leading Christian apologists of the day 'as part of the divine guidance of the human mind.'

Scientific men like Huxley and Haeckel may be impatient of miracle, more so perhaps than the 'esprits forts' of Pascal's day, who shared some of the superstitions of the age; but, unlike these, they bow reverentially before the unknown force, under whatever name (or no name), behind the cosmos. Nor would theologians in the present day use such an argument in favour of miracles as the following, quoted from Pascal's 'Pensées':—

'Miracle, c'est un effet qui excède la force naturelle des moyens qu'on y emploie; et non-miracle, c'est un effet qui n'excède pas la force naturelle des moyens qu'on y emploie. Ainsi ceux qui guérissent par l'invocation du diable ne font pas un miracle; car cela n'excède pas la force naturelle du diable' (II, xvi, 10).

Nor must it be supposed for a moment that Pascal was disloyal to science when, from religious scruples, he ceased to follow scientific pursuits. On the contrary, he speaks in the '*Pensées*' of the duty of '*créance à la science*,' though he becomes '*un dogmatique malgré lui*' in defending religion against its scientific opponents. We need not be surprised at this attitude of mind on the part of Pascal when we find Amiel, a child of the nineteenth century, speaking of the attempt at constructing a philosophical system of Christianity as 'to some extent an illusion, since faith cannot be entirely resolved into science'; or, again, affirming almost in Pascal's own language, 'Faith is a certitude without proof . . . the postulate of a higher truth which is to bring all things into harmony.' This was in 1871. A generation has passed away since then; and now we hear another voice speaking in a similar environment, but in a more hopeful tone, of a possible harmony when, in the words of M. Sabatier, 'piety and science shall have become so mutually interpenetrated as to be thoroughly united into a single entity: inward piety the conscience of science, and science the legitimate expression of piety.'

What has been said of Pascal's view of the relationship between faith and science applies equally to his view on the relative importance of reason and revelation. He is fearless in his appeal to reason; it was the tendency of the day to examine and handle religion rationally; and, though theology was still regarded among 'disputing theologians' as the 'empress of sciences,' to depreciate reason would have been absurd in an age of argumentative subtlety, when Molinist and Jansenist, Arminian and Calvinist, Jesuit and the author of the '*Provincial Letters*' were pitted against one another, each relying on the force of argument quite as much as on the appeal to antiquity. Writing to his sister two years after his first conversion, and referring to the defence of the Christian verities, Pascal remarks that '*le raisonnement bien conduit portait à les croire quoiqu'il faille les croire sans l'aide du raisonnement.*' In the '*Pensées*' he says, '*Si on soumet tout à la raison, notre religion n'aura rien de mystérieux ni de surnaturel. Si on choque les principes de la raison, notre religion sera absurde et ridicule.*' In innumerable passages he insists on the

dignity of reason, as well as on those infirmities and contradictions of the human mind which limit its scope and vitiate its conclusions. Yet he is careful to observe that 'Cette impuissance ne conclut autre chose que la faiblesse de notre raison, mais non pas l'incertitude de toutes nos connaissances.' He draws a clear distinction between the respective claims of reason and revelation.

'Il n'y a rien de si conforme à la raison que le désaveu de la raison dans les choses qui sont de foi; et rien de si contraire à la raison que le désaveu de la raison dans les choses qui ne sont pas de foi. Ce sont deux excès également dangereux, d'exclure la raison, de n'admettre que la raison' (II, vi, 3).

This does not mean a complete divorce between reason and faith; it is simply a balanced statement of their respective spheres and relative bearings to each other. It is the same with regard to the claims of authority and personal conviction: 'Si l'antiquité était la règle de la créance, les anciens étaient sans règle.'

Pascal had his doubts; probably he never doubted more than when he most believed, or thought that he was most firmly persuaded of, his beliefs; and the 'Pensées' afford many a glimpse of this state of mind. The fact that these doubts exist forms the rational ground, according to Pascal, for accepting authority for our guide, 'la raison étant flexible à tout.' He takes up here the same ground as Montaigne, but with a far more serious intention of vindicating the truth of religion. This leads us to a further stage of our enquiry, namely, whether Pascal was a devout sceptic, and, if so, how his scepticism compares with that of Montaigne and the subconscious or unconscious scepticism of some modern religious thinkers and apologists.

If scepticism be regarded simply as the expression of the philosophical theorem that it is absolutely impossible to arrive at truth, Pascal cannot be called a sceptic. If he deserves the name at all, it is in the sense in which Vayer speaks of St Paul as 'our beloved sceptic,' i.e. as of one who places scant reliance on the results of human speculation unless enlightened from above. Pascal's theistic agnosticism comes nearer to that of the late Dean Mansel in 'The Limits of Religious Thought

'Nous ne connaissons ni l'existence ni la nature de Dieu, parcequ'il n'a ni étendue ni bornes.' For this reason Pascal, in the first part of the '*Pensées*,' dwells with much emphasis and pathos on the imperfection of human nature, and this by way of preparation for the second part which was to have formed his apology.

Like Descartes, he uses provisional doubt as a stepping-stone to faith. He is not the sceptic as sketched by Cousin with an eye on his own contemporaries, tormented by doubt and not always successful in finding an asylum in faith. Pascal's scepticism resembles rather the 'theological scepticism' of some of our modern apologists, adopting the sceptical method of reasoning for the purpose of establishing the Christian doctrine, as for example Mr Balfour in his '*Defence of Philosophic Doubt*' and in the '*Foundations of Belief*.' The '*Pensées*' are '*les paroles d'un croyant*'; the author starts from the Christian standpoint. Had it been otherwise, the Port-Royalists would have disowned the book. They published it in due time, with their own emendations and excisions, no doubt, but as a work calculated to guide men from the errors of unbelief to the verities of the Christian faith. On this point we could not find, perhaps, a better witness than Sir Leslie Stephen. 'Was Pascal then a sceptic,' he asks in his acute study on the subject, 'or a sincere believer? The answer is surely obvious. He was a sincere and humble and even an abject believer precisely because he was a thorough-going sceptic.'

From first to last, as we are informed by those who knew him best, Pascal was a convinced Christian, although his convictions were not always equally strong nor his religious fervour altogether free from fluctuations. In the end, the Christian supplanted the sceptic the Jansenist conquered the Pyrrhonist. '*Il n'essaye pas, as Havet says, 'd'échapper au doute; il s'y enfonce au contraire, espérant tirer du doute même le secret de son salut.*' People say scepticism made Pascal a Christian, remarks Vinet; it would be more true to say that Christianity made him a sceptic. It is through the vestibule of scepticism that he would make men enter the sanctuary of faith. In this Pascal entirely differs from Montaigne, who feigns to be religious when he propounds

the doctrine of universal doubt, whereas Pascal poses as a sceptic when he wants to press home more effectually his arguments in favour of religion. In their respective attitudes neither was a pretender; but the blurred atmosphere around them and the state of their own mind produced certain obscurities and apparent contradictions which make it hard nowadays to know how far the one was subject to occasional fits of scepticism and the other to a temporary afflatus of religious sentiment. This invites comparison between the two men, and the consideration how far Pascal is influenced or repelled by his great predecessor and, to some extent, his master.

Of the two types of mind described by Pascal, one possessing 'force et droiture d'esprit,' and the other 'étendue d'esprit,' his belongs to the former, that of Montaigne to the latter; yet, notwithstanding this radical difference in their mental constitution, Pascal had much of Montaigne within him. Also, in the five years between his first and second conversions, he was a diligent reader of the 'Essays,' his 'profane Bible,' and during that time became Montaigne's ardent disciple. From him he derived his low estimate of human nature, its inconstancy, vanity, and feeble self-complacency. He does not indulge in Montaigne's mocking humour, and has little sympathy with his moral nonchalance; and he is much more severe than his mentor, as when he dwells on the unreliableness of our fellow-men; 'Nous ne sommes que mensonge, duplicité, contrariétés.' Where Montaigne speaks with good-humoured tolerance, Pascal speaks with a pitiless scorn of human inconsistency and perverseness; where Montaigne only sees man swerving unsteadily from side to side, Pascal sees a fallen creature whom nothing can save but a miracle of grace.

In politics Pascal follows Montaigne, criticising with cool, urbane irony human institutions, putting his finger on the weak points in the argument by which the sacredness of property and the divine right of kings are defended. He speaks of the 'fantaisie des lois,' and says, with something like a sneer, that the basis—justice and truth—on which they are professedly founded, are two fine points which our instruments are too blunt to touch. Like Montaigne, Pascal approaches dangerous ground in speaking of the natural right of insurrection. From Mon-

taigne he learns to smile at the trifles which produce important issues in public affairs. The shape of Cleopatra's nose can change the face of the Roman Empire; 'ce petit gravier,' cutting short the career of Oliver Cromwell, puts a new complexion on English politics and society.

Both are equally ready to laugh at their own follies as well as at those of others, and both are above all staunch upholders of 'honnêteté'; 'la règle c'est l'honnêteté,' is the moral code of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries; like 'the religion of all sensible men' of our own day, it is the humanistic ideal of perfection. Nevertheless, in their moral conceptions, they differ *toto cælo*. In Pascal's view, 'la vraie nature de l'homme, son vrai bien et la vraie vertu et la vraie religion sont choses dont la connaissance est inséparable.' He has no patience with Montaigne's laxity in matters of religion and morality. This divergence receives further illustration from their respective views of death. For Montaigne death has no terrors; he stoically steels his mind so as calmly to await the end without troubling himself overmuch about that 'something after death' which weighs so heavily on Pascal's mind. The latter is in the thrall of Jansenism, its horror of eternal death. 'Je mourrai seul,' he exclaims; the dread solitariness of the soul in the supreme moment is to him an overwhelming thought. There is something after the manner of Montaigne in the sentence, 'Le dernier acte est sanglant, quelque belle que soit la comédie en tout le reste. On jette enfin de la terre sur la tête, et en voilà pour jamais.' But there is something utterly at variance with Montaigne's view of death in that grandly lugubrious passage:—

'Qu'on s' imagine un nombre d'hommes dans les chaînes, et tous condamnés à la mort, dont les uns étant chaque jour égorgés à la vue des autres, ceux qui restent voient leur propre condition dans celle de leurs semblables, et se regardant les uns les autres avec douleur et sans espérance, attendent leur tour; c'est l'image de la condition des hommes' (I, vii, 6).

There is one more important difference, with the consideration of which we must bring this comparison to a close, namely, the tone of the 'Apologie of Sebonde' as compared with that pervading the 'Pensées,' which some regard as another version of, or sequel to it. 'Les "Pensées"

de celui-ci ne sont, à les bien prendre, que le chapitre de "l'Apologie de Sebonde" refait avec prud'homie,' says Sainte-Beuve in his history of Port-Royal. But in tone they differ widely. They are like each other in expatiating on the impotence of natural reason; they therefore tend alike towards 'theological scepticism.' But, whereas Montaigne smiles at the pretensions of man, with his feeble grasp of facts and principles, to solve the enigmas of existence, Pascal trembles, overpowered by a sense of his own infirmity, in face of the great problem. 'L'immense énigme de l'univers, pesant sur l'homme et l'écrasant, fait sourire Montaigne de la vanité de nos prétentions. Elle épouvante Pascal' (Faguet). He, too, could laugh at human error; and in the 'Provincial Letters,' those 'immortal liars,' which contain more wit, says Voltaire, than the comedies of Molière, he employs, as he says himself, 'un style agréable, railleur, et divertissant.' But in the 'Pensées' there is none of the *raillerie sinistre* of the 'Apologie de Sebonde.' Pascal's *rire* differs from the *ricanement* of Montaigne. The one employs laughter to conceal doubt under cover of smooth accommodation to current beliefs; in the other we are reminded of the words of Tertullian quoted in the eleventh of the 'Provincial Letters': 'C'est proprement à la vérité qu'il appartient de rire . . . parcequ'elle est assurée de la victoire.' There is nothing in Pascal of Sainte-Beuve's 'démon malin.'

Pascal is a Christian satirist whose incisive dialectics and fine irony, expressed with the eloquence of noble passion and transparent earnestness, deal a deathblow to the false presentment of religion and the moral casuistry of the Jesuits. Mingling 'subtle irony with grave attack,' he exposes 'les subtilités d'une chicane théologique' of his wily opponents. There is laughter; but, as Pascal, referring to it, says, there is a vast difference between laughing at religion and laughing at those who profane it by their extravagant opinions. For this reason, Bossuet, when asked what he would like to have done in place of his own work, promptly replied, 'to have written the "Provincial Letters."' These letters were composed for the world at large, not the theologians; they were intended 'to confound with laughter the errors' of the Jesuits. A different tone pervades the

'Pensées.' Here, too, there are gleams of wit, flashes of a sombre grandeur, shining, but with a subdued luminosity, the gloom of human sorrow and the shadow of the cross brooding over them. If there is a spirit of *raillerie*, it is that of a modern Elijah severely rebuking the religious indifference of the age, warning it not to halt between two opinions, and exposing the hopelessness of scepticism in order to convert the sceptic.

There is a passionate tone of earnest animadversion in addressing the sceptic which marks off Pascal's method of apologetics from that of writers dealing with doubt in the present day, a change of attitude illustrated in the most remarkable manner in Mr Ward's book already referred to. Following J. H. Newman in his theory of development, this writer postulates the principle of 'theological evolution' as, concurrently with 'the persistency of certain religious ideas,' producing 'a living and developing theology, capable of organic growth.' He regards it as the 'analogue to a science which contemplates and investigates the laws of evolution in other departments.' In this, he thinks, will be found 'the key to a solution of our present difficulties,' which should 'eventually prove an antidote to doubt' and serve to repel the charge of rigidity preferred against the Roman Church by showing that she is willing to take up a position quite compatible with 'assimilation of contemporary culture.' Unlike Pascal, attempting to exorcise doubt by arguments resting on supernatural authority, and scornfully rejecting the help of science and philosophy, the modern Roman Catholic apologist accepts ancient theological propositions with a new explication, as 'the chief intellectual remedy from the epidemic of doubt arising from the threatened divorce between the view of the world long associated with Christian theology and that suggested by the modern development of the positive sciences.'

A similar *rapprochement* we note in the last work of M. Sabatier, as representative of liberal Protestantism in France. It serves to measure the distance between the Protestantism of the seventeenth and that of the nineteenth century. Pascal himself has been called a 'Protestant monk,' on the strength of his unreserved acceptance of the Augustinian determinism of the Jansenists.

But Pascal never swerved in his allegiance to Rome, and by his asceticism proved himself more than a good Catholic. Yet, like a Protestant in his controversy with the Jesuits and his opponents at the Roman Curia, he takes his stand on the Bible and the autonomy of conscience. He claims the right of private judgment even in matters of faith. 'If my letters are condemned at Rome, that which I condemn in them is condemned in heaven,' he says, adding, 'Ad tuum, Domine Jesu, tribunal appello.'

On these counts we may compare his standpoint with that of modern Protestant thinkers in their efforts to meet the difficulties raised by the 'elegant incredulity' of the intellectual class. With some of the concessions made by them he would have had no sympathy, as when, e.g., M. Sabatier speaks of the Bible, 'the last bulwark of authority,' as a collection of historical documents which give positive evidence for the special religious evolution of which they are the product' (p. 240), or when he adds that its value does not consist in 'the documentary evidence it affords for dogmatic theology to formulate itself, but the moral and spiritual force which it contains for the formation of character and the reformation of life' (p. 244). Pascal would never have penned words like these. He might, however, have agreed to a statement such as the following: 'Free enquiry with regard to authority is not only a right, it is a duty. The new truth discovered by free enquiry is older and more venerable than the most venerable society' (preface, p. xxxiv). There are fragments in the 'Thoughts' to that effect. But that the course of religious development is from authority to liberty, from the 'evolution of the religion of the letter towards the religion of the spirit,' is an idea far beyond the reach of the most advanced theologians of the seventeenth century.

Thus we see a marked change of front in modern apologetics. It now aims at greater simplicity. It is less concerned with documentary proof to establish the claims of revelation. 'It is not miracles that matter,' says Professor Harnack in his work, 'What is Christianity?' 'The question on which everything turns is whether we are helplessly yoked to an inexorable necessity, or whether a God exists who rules and governs, and whose power to

compel Nature we can move by prayer and make a part of our experience.' It addresses itself to those deeper problems which lie behind dogmatic formulæ, i.e. the divine fatherhood as the central fact in human life, 'the transmutation of values' as presented to the mind by the Christian religion, itself regarded as the soul of morality, and morality as the body of religion, and 'the gospel as a social message with the love of Christ as a binding force in the social nexus, and the law of love as a prime factor in the "social province."' Beyond this, and in its transcendental aspects resting 'on the conviction that Jesus lives, we (i.e. the modern apologists who follow Harnack) still base those hopes of citizenship in an eternal city which make our earthly life worth living and tolerable.' Thus, comparing religion with knowledge, and distinguishing a spiritual from a material view of the universe, it sets itself to show the superiority of Christianity as a theory of life and an explanation of human development.

'Where and how the curve of the world and the curve of our own life begin—that curve of which it shows us only a section—and whither this curve leads, knowledge does not tell us. Yet, if with a steady will we affirm the forces and the standards which, on the summits of our inner life, shine out as our highest good, nay, as our real self; if we are earnest and courageous enough to accept them as the great reality and direct our lives by them; and if we then look at the course of mankind's history, follow its upward development, and search in strenuous and patient service for the communion of minds in it, we shall not faint in weariness and despair, but become certain of God, of the God whom Jesus Christ called his Father, and who is also our Father.'

These words form the concluding sentences of Harnack's book; they are the last words of Protestantism. They indicate an abandonment of the outer lines of defence and a falling back on the line of inner fortification. The Christian apologist here takes his stand on Christian theism, personal attachment to the 'Deus absconditus,' 'le Dieu qui se cache' of Pascal, and a mystical union with Christ as the 'basal principle' of modern belief.

Is there any gain or loss by this change of front? To answer this question we must critically compare Pascal's standpoint, as a whole, with that taken up by modern

apologists. In his case we note two periods, the first, when the study of abstract science predominates in his intellectual life, when faith and knowledge are studiously kept apart; the second, when the pursuit of religion overshadows all else, when faith ranks as the highest attainment of wisdom, and science and philosophy are discarded as guides to divine knowledge; when, in the language of his critic, 'this modern Archimedes prostrates himself in tears before the foot of the cross, a touching picture of intellectual abasement.' The development of recent apologetics follows a contrary course by an inverse intellectual process. Whilst assigning their relative importance to faith and science respectively, it endeavours to fuse rational and revealed truth, determined to pursue the study of religion on scientific principles. Its antagonists, on the contrary, are inclined to accentuate the cleavage between faith and science, claiming for the latter alone the right to establish truth, and relegating the former to the region of emotion.

Accordingly we find the modern apologist entrenched behind 'the bulwark of rational theism' as a principle necessary to science for its own completion. He emphasises 'the rational necessity of an adequate spiritual cause for the cosmos, and the ethical experience of a supernatural presence and authority in the conscience.' Where Pascal ventures to express legitimate doubt combined with the duty of acting provisionally as if we believed, modern apologists speak of the 'instinctive assurance' which is 'not set aside in consequence of the speculative doubt; nor is it allowed to check the doubt in its critical function' (Ward, *op. cit.* p. 207). Where they are denied the assurance of knowledge, they fall back on the repose of intuitive belief; and, far from yielding to 'moods of doubt,' they listen to the 'inner voice,' as Tennyson does in 'The Ancient Sage,' and cling to faith beyond the form of faith, though not invariably arriving at an 'unalterable and final shape of certainty.'

Pascal, with all the passionate intensity of a mind heated in the controversial strife of his day, endeavours to establish the truth of Christianity by an appeal to miracle, type, prophecy—such were the weapons suited to the religious warfare of his age. We, living in a different intellectual atmosphere, prefer to test the value

of true religion by the 'beauty of its activities.' The calmer tone of reasoning now adopted may have sometimes the appearance of tepid allegiance, the acceptance of a religion born of doubt and scruple, and may lead some to yearn for the fervour even of a false faith, so it be real, or a belief firmly held though resting on insecure foundations. This would seem to be a reverting to Pascal's standpoint, '*faisant tout comme s'ils croyaient.*' But it is not so. It is only that our modern writers on the subject have learned to speak with the moderation of caution taught by scientific training. Thus we find confirmed agnostics like Sir Leslie Stephen, whom none will accuse of a leaning towards 'make-believe' religion, recommending 'judicious reticence on the part of philosophers by allowing speculation to filtrate gradually through the pores of the old creed.' Thus again we find Herbert Spencer, in his '*Autobiography*,' assuming a more friendly attitude towards religious creeds,

'from a deepening conviction that the sphere occupied by them can never become an unfilled sphere, but that there must continue to arise afresh the great questions concerning ourselves and surrounding things; and that, if not positive answers, then modes of consciousness, standing in place of positive answers, must ever remain.'

If such is the attitude of the opponents, the modern defenders of the faith need not incur the censure of facile accommodation. Where matters of insuperable difficulty are concerned, may they not adopt a method of cautious and reverential criticism which is both conservative and progressive, pursuing the path of hopeful enquiry, yet insisting on the central contents of religion—God, the soul, and immortality? Not startled into fear, like Pascal, by the 'awful vision of truth,' but braced up by his Christian stoicism; not vaguely confounding faith with fancy, but yielding to the inexorable necessity of existing facts; such men will go their way and fulfil their task of saving what can be saved from the wreck of universal doubt.

'Unduped of fancy, henceforth man
Must labour!—must resign
His all too human creeds, and scan
Simply the way divine.'

Thus modern religious thought, facing both ways with keen scrutiny, examining the heirloom handed down from the ages of the past and gazing fearlessly into the future and its as yet unrevealed possibilities of further discoveries, opens the Janus portal of the mind, not both ways in the sense of disingenuous ambiguity, like the former advocates of 'double truth,' but trying, by means of honest research and reflection, to link the past with the future. Such enquirers after, and defenders of, the truth will find much in Pascal amid the perplexities of modern problems both to stimulate and direct them in their work. Concerning such seekers after truth it has been said ironically, 'Ils font penser, ils ne font pas croire.' This does not apply to Pascal's 'Thoughts.' As they are the outcome of a meditative genius, gifted with a kind of divine sagacity and set aglow by a burning desire to know and embrace the truth, so they stimulate reflection and at the same time strengthen belief by contagion. These 'Thoughts' act like a strong tonic to religious thought generally in their stern and serious vigour, facing the facts of existence without flinching. Here there are no timid concealments or vain attempts to capture the 'apostles of reason' by astute devices of the 'esprit de finesse'; they are uncontaminated by 'the secret vice of fallacious apologetics.' They combine the power of trenchant criticism with the readiness of self-immolation for the truth's sake; they exhibit the consuming devotion of a noble-minded man, capable of winning the admiring affection of kindred souls, who take for their motto: 'I must be true to my darkness as courageously as to my light.'

M. KAUFMANN.

Art. XII.—AN INDIAN RENAISSANCE.

1. *A History of English Education in India, 1781-1893.* By Syed Mahmood. M.A.O. College, Aligarh, 1895.
 2. *The History of the M.A.O. College, Aligarh.* By the Principal. Aligarh, 1903.
 3. *The Sayings of Muhammad.* Edited by Abdullah Al-Mamun Al-Suhrawardy, M.A. London: Constable, 1905.
 4. *The Sword of Islam.* By Arthur N. Wollaston, C.I.E. London: Murray, 1905.
- And other works.

CONTACT with Western thought has, in the last hundred years, kindled a new life in each of the great communities of India; unrecorded and, for the most part, unperceived, this renaissance is yet the most momentous consequence of the British occupation. Our railways, our roads, and our canals will endure only so long as the 'British Peace' is maintained; but the English ideas which are transforming Indian society to-day have a vitality which does not depend upon our presence; they are a leaven which would continue to ferment even if the political connexion with England were to be destroyed. No single formula will correctly summarise the different developments of this intellectual awakening; there has not, indeed, been one renaissance in India, but a series of renaissances, each peculiar to a definite community. The clerkly castes, such as the Kayasths, learned English, as they had under other masters learned Persian, for professional purposes. Maratha and Bengali Brahmans were captivated by the liberal spirit of European culture, and embraced the English conceptions of liberty, patriotism, the dignity of man and his individual responsibility, with the ardour of a new gospel. To the few daring spirits who in early days ventured to read English, the world seemed transformed by the new teaching; and, uplifted by a generous enthusiasm, they went among their countrymen as apostles of European ideas. The Parsis appear to have been most influenced by the social organisation of the West; they were brought by the course of trade into personal contact with Englishmen; and they have, to a greater extent than any other Indian people, remodelled their society upon English lines. The only general remark

which can be made about these different movements is that in no class were the old ideals abandoned without a struggle; no community has been without its martyrs for European culture; and everywhere European ideas have so far prevailed that all the most hopeful movements in Indian society to-day are more or less directly inspired by the Western spirit.

For a long while the Muhammadans stood aloof from this Europeanising tendency. Although a large proportion of them are descendants of Hindu converts, they are very little influenced by the ideas prevailing among their Hindu fellow-countrymen. They feel and behave as a distinct community; they are aliens in India, with a civilisation and intellectual heritage of their own; they draw no inspiration from Sanskrit literature, but derive their ideals from the culture of Baghdad and Cordova; they do not look upon themselves primarily as Indians, but as members of the brotherhood of Islam; and consequently their sympathies are with the Afghan and the Arab, rather than with the Hindu and the Sikh, with whom they share the soil of India.

It was as Moslems rather than as Indians that they entertained a dislike of European civilisation; a dislike and distrust of Christendom was part of their Moslem heritage. For thirteen hundred years Islam, of which they were a detached fragment, had been at war with Christendom, and each side had come to look upon the other as its natural enemy. By the nineteenth century the Indian Muhammadans perceived that the long warfare had ended in the complete triumph of Christendom; they were obliged to confess that 'the sword had departed from Islam'; but this bitter reflection only made them the more averse from recognising any merit in Frankish civilisation, and the more determined to resist European influence. The most bigoted carried their devotion to the lost cause of Islam so far as to refuse to take service under the British Government; and, even to this day, there are some unbending Puritans who boast that no member of their family has ever eaten the salt of the English.

The bulk of the community, however, could not afford to be so scrupulous. Employment under Government was the natural occupation of the great majority of well-born

Muhammadans; under Pathan and Moghul rule they had filled almost all the appointments in the public service; and before the establishment of British authority they had come to look upon employment by the State as their hereditary calling. From this profession, which was no less honourable than lucrative, they were gradually ousted in the latter half of the nineteenth century. So early as 1844 the Government of India announced the intention of giving preference in the public services to those who had attended English schools and had passed certain examinations in Western arts and sciences. Even at the cost of exclusion from their ancestral, calling the Muhammadans refused to comply with these conditions. Their religious teachers, the Maulvis, told them that they would become kafirs (infidels) by the bare act of learning English; and the terrifying suggestion became current that the Moslem who knew English might, with his dying breath, utter English words instead of the Muhammadan confession of faith. To these ill-grounded convictions they sacrificed their worldly prosperity. They suffered themselves to be superseded by Hindus in the public services; the other liberal careers were being closed against them for the same reason; forensic pleading, medicine, and engineering were all being revolutionised by the introduction of English principles, with which Muhammadans refused to become familiar. The whole community was in evident decay; wealth and social esteem were passing from them; and their intellectual activity had shrunk to the composition of artificial erotic poetry or the annotation of theological commentaries. Such were the conditions out of which the Muhammadan renaissance took its rise.

The awakening assumed the shape of a religious reform; and the man to whom it was due was Syed Ahmad Khan. Himself a descendant of the Prophet, he was born and brought up in Delhi, among the Muhammadan grandees, who still followed the fallen fortunes of the Great Moghul; but, in defiance of the traditions of his family, he entered the service of the British Government in the subordinate judicial department, and behaved with courageous loyalty during the Mutiny of 1857, saving several British lives at the imminent risk of his own. He was repeatedly appointed a member of the Viceroy's Legislative Council,

was the intimate friend of Sir John Strachey and other English statesmen, was knighted by the Government in recognition of his great services both to the Crown and his own people, and died in March 1898 at the advanced age of eighty-one. I had the privilege of knowing him intimately for the last eight years of his life; and neither in England nor in India have I met any man who inspired me with so strong a feeling of reverence. His life-work was the inspiration of new hopes and of a new ideal into the minds of the Indian Muhammadans. Like Moses, to use a parallel that has occurred to many Englishmen, he lived to bring his people within sight of the Promised Land; one of his Muhammadan friends expressed a similar thought when he said, 'Other men have written books and built colleges, but to have arrested, as with a wall across their path, the decline of a whole people was the work of a Prophet.'

Sir Syed was before all things a religious reformer. To summarise his message very shortly, he sought to return to the simplicity and common-sense of primitive Islam; he denounced the traditions and glosses with which theologians had overlaid the Word of God, and appealed to the Koran to prove that the essence of Islam was the acknowledgment of one God and obedience to His law; this law, when properly understood and disencumbered of fabulous accretions, being in absolute harmony with reason. Sir Syed thus originated a rationalistic movement in the Islamic Church; his own belief in reason and his dislike of the marvels by which religion was obscured made him always prefer a natural to a miraculous explanation of the occurrences of holy writ; and he loved to insist upon the fact that Muhammad himself had expressly disclaimed any miraculous power. Owing to his insistence upon natural law and his belief that God does not interfere with the order of Nature, Sir Syed was called by his critics a 'nечeri' (i.e. believer in Nature).

There can be no doubt that his desire to find a rationalistic explanation sometimes drove him to strain the obvious meaning of the Scriptures. Although, for instance, he acknowledged the inspiration of our Bible, he attempted to explain away the miracles of the Old Testament. He said to me upon one occasion: 'Why do

your writers insist that the ark rested upon the very summit of mount Ararat? There was no doubt in the time of Noah a very considerable flood, but that does not mean that the water covered mount Ararat to its topmost peak. I believe that the ark came to rest upon the top of one of the lower spurs of the mountain.' This intermediate position between the Muhammadan belief in verbal inspiration and modern scientific agnosticism was peculiar to Sir Syed himself. It was an unsatisfactory compromise, in which only a few minds could find rest; and, although Sir Syed effected a profound modification of the religious opinions of his time, his own views were never shared by any considerable number of persons. It was another set of opinions, corollaries of his religious faith, which were destined to exercise a great and lasting influence upon Muhammadan society.

Sir Syed's appeal from tradition to reason disposed him to set a high value upon good sense and scientific knowledge wherever he found them; and consequently he appreciated at their full value the intellectual achievements of European scholars. He denounced as an ignorant prejudice the ordinary Muhammadan aversion from Frankish learning, and declared that the true teaching of Islam was that Moslems should learn from any people who excelled them in knowledge. Of this he found many apt illustrations in early Muhammadan history. The Prophet himself is reported to have said, 'Go even to the walls of China for the sake of learning'; and the great Caliphs of Baghdad are known to have collected books from all the neighbouring countries and to have kept a regular staff of translators to render them into Arabic. Indeed, even at the present time, the Muhammadans confess the great obligations which their civilisation owed to the Christian Greeks; the Hakims, who practice medicine in Lucknow and Delhi, to this day call their art Greek medicine.

Sir Syed urged his people to show the same liberality towards the arts and sciences of Europe as the Arabs had shown to Greek learning. It was owing, he said, to their education that the English were superior to the Moslems both intellectually and morally; and the Moslems could only hope to rise to the European level by acquiring the

same knowledge. To quote a phrase often on his lips, the Muhammadan community was suffering from a deep-seated disease for which the medicine was English education; but, in order to take full advantage of this remedy, the Muhammadans must cleanse their hearts of the rancour they cherished against Christians and sit at their feet in the attitude of reverent scholars; he never allowed them to believe that they could get the intellectual advantage of English education unless their feelings towards their teachers also underwent a change. He constantly urged them to become the sincere friends of the English, and he quoted the Koran to prove that God had said that the Moslems would find their best friends among the people of the Book, i.e. the Christians.

The practical conclusion of such teaching was that Muhammadans should frequent English society, eat at English tables, and not hesitate to receive Englishmen into their houses; it followed no less logically that Muhammadans must make some modifications in their social usages if they wished to mix in English society, as it was not to be expected that the English would make any alteration in their habits to gratify Muhammadan sentiment. Muhammadans, for example, must adopt the English knife and fork if they desired to dine with Englishmen, for there was not the smallest hope that English people would consent to eat with their fingers in the Moslem manner. Sir Syed did not hesitate to push his opinions to this logical conclusion; he discarded the distinctive dress of his own people and adopted European clothes with such slight modifications as were necessary to give them a Muhammadan character. He announced his intention of setting an example to his people in the matter of eating with Englishmen by drinking tea with an English magistrate who was a friend of his. A tent was pitched in a garden, and the sides were looped up so that all might see; and there Sir Syed and his English friend solemnly drank tea together in sight of a Muhammadan crowd which beheld with dismay a descendant of the Prophet ostentatiously displaying his intimacy with a Frankish misbeliever.

Such teaching provoked a storm of indignation throughout Muhammadan India. Maulvis vied with one another in proving out of the writings of revered theologians

that Syed Ahmad was a kafir, an apostate who had betrayed the cause of Islam. The proposal to modify Moslem usages in imitation of the customs of the Franks aroused particular horror. The Moslems of India have probably been unconsciously influenced by the opinions of their Hindu neighbours, and have consequently come to attach a religious significance to eating and drinking which is foreign to Islam. But the opposition to Sir Syed's Europeanising tendencies was also the expression of a deeper sentiment; Islam is the name not only of a religion but also of a social system. Certain peculiarities of dress and behaviour had become as characteristic of Islam as others are characteristic of Christendom; and it was an instinctive loyalty to the social system in which he was born that was at the bottom of the Moslem aversion from Sir Syed's social reforms.

Not content with mixing in English society in India, Sir Syed visited England itself in 1871, and lived for eighteen months in the homes of Christians, during which time, by letters published in an Indian paper, he kept his friends informed of his doings in England, and of his impenitent admiration for English ways. On his journey home he thought of staying at Mecca to perform the pilgrimage, but he reasoned that Muhammadans would conclude that he had gone to Mecca to wash away the impurity of contact with unbelievers, and he therefore refrained. When he landed in Bombay, he found that Muhammadan feeling was everywhere incensed against him, and that the Maulvis of Delhi had formally set him under a bann. They had delivered a written judgment (a *fatwa*) that Syed Ahmad had become a kafir or infidel by mixing with unbelievers, and was now outside the pale of Moslem society; whoever ate or drank with him would consequently become a kafir. Even Sir Syed's personal friends were intimidated at the prospect of excommunication and dared not receive him into their houses. He was in consequence obliged to take his meals in railway refreshment-rooms, and in this friendless state he made his way to his home in Delhi. A day or two after his arrival he met a Muhammadan lady who was his cousin. 'Brother,' she said, 'you have been on a long journey; you must come and eat at my house to-night.' Sir Syed declined, saying, 'Don't you know

that the Maulvis have laid a bann upon me, and that you will be looked upon as a kafir if you eat with me?' 'I have heard what the Maulvis say,' she replied, 'but you must come none the less.' And when he had come to her house she sat by his side, and, to show everybody that she placed herself irrevocably beneath the bann of the Maulvis, she took one or two mouthfuls from Sir Syed's plate, dipping her hand with him in the dish after the immemorial custom of the East.

The experience of Sir Syed was shared by all his friends who ventured to adopt English customs. His lifelong friend, Maulvi Mehdi Ali (now Nawab Mohsin ul Mulk), is in the habit of relating how, when he first went to dinner with an Englishman, the news was telegraphed to his native city and spread consternation through the place. On his return home none of his friends came to meet him on the platform; as he walked to his house the smith left his forge and the weaver his loom to run up to him and exclaim, 'What, Maulvi sahib, have you become a Christian?' and he was followed to his door by an angry crowd. Indignation ran so high that, when his son died shortly afterwards, not a Muhammadan of the city would accompany the bier to the grave.

Sir Syed used to urge his people to become the friends of Englishmen in private life, and to admit Englishmen into Muhammadan society; and he further declared that loyalty to the British Government must be their guiding political principle. Even the Maulvis agreed that the British Government was one to which the Musalmans were bound by their religion to be loyal, and against which rebellion was a sin by the law of Islam; but Sir Syed went further than this and asked his people to give to the Government of India the same whole-hearted allegiance as is rendered by its British subjects. He declared that, when the Musalmans were in reality as trustworthy as their British fellow-subjects, the Government would place them in positions of equal honour and responsibility.

'The time is coming' (he once said) 'when my brothers, Pathans, Syeds, Hashimi, and Koreishi, whose blood smells of the blood of Abraham, will appear in glittering uniforms as colonels and majors in the army. But we must wait for that

time. Government will most certainly attend to it, provided you do not give rise to suspicions of disloyalty. O brothers! Government, too, is under some difficulties. . . . Until the Government can trust us as she* can her white soldiers she cannot do it. But we ought to give proof that, whatever we were in former days, that time has gone, and we are now as well disposed to her as the Highlanders of Scotland.'

Sir Syed's own admiration of the Indian Government and his personal devotion to Queen Victoria were so warm and chivalrous that it was impossible to believe that in his own case they were founded on any calculations of self-interest; but he always insisted that his policy was directed to the advantage of his own people, and that his sole motive was the promotion of their welfare. He was under no illusions as to the length of time required for the Muhammadans to regain the ground they had lost; he recognised that their character must undergo a complete change; and this could only be achieved by devoting all their energies to education in the undisturbed peace of British rule. He once closed a political speech with these words:—

'Although I cannot live to see my people attain to such a position as my heart longs for, yet my friends who are present at this meeting will certainly see my people attain such honour, prosperity, and high rank if they attend to my advice. . . . I assure you that the only thing which can raise you to a high rank is high education. Until our nation (i.e. the Moslem community) can give birth to highly educated people it will remain degraded; it will be below others, and will not attain such honour as I desire for it. These precepts I have given you from the bottom of my heart. I do not care if any one calls me a madman or anything else. It was my duty to tell those things which, in my opinion, are necessary for the welfare of my nation, and to cleanse my hands before God, the omnipotent, the merciful, and the forgiver of sins.'

It was after his visit to England that he became convinced that the intellectual change which he desired would only be brought about when his people were thoroughly familiar with the English language; and he

* Government is a feminine noun in Hindustani.

conceived the idea of teaching them English in a Muhammadan college, founded upon the model of those he had seen at Oxford and Cambridge. But he was always a poor man; and the proposal to raise by subscriptions, from the Muhammadans themselves, funds sufficient for so large an enterprise seemed to his friends mere madness. Sir Syed himself was well aware how desperate was the undertaking to which he had set his hand. Nawab Mohsin ul Mulk has recorded an incident which throws light on the suffering he went through and the enthusiasm with which he worked. On one of his early expeditions to raise money for the Muhammadan college, the Nawab awoke in the night and discovered that Sir Syed had left his bed. He rose to look for him, and found him pacing the verandah alone, with tears streaming down his face. To the question whether he had received bad news, whether his son or one of his family were dead, Sir Syed replied: 'It is not of my son or my family that I am thinking, but of the plight of my people. I know well what our reception will be tomorrow; when I ask for money to teach English, the people will answer by flinging stones and abuse at me; but my wretched heart will not let me give up.'

In the end, this passionate devotion to his people triumphed over all obstacles and carried conviction even into the hearts of bigots. In spite of fierce opposition, sufficient funds were collected by 1875 to make a modest beginning. The site of an abandoned cantonment was given to the reformers by the Government; and the first classes of the Aligarh college were opened in the Mess bungalow. Eighteen months later the foundation-stone of the permanent buildings was laid by Lord Lytton, to whom an address was presented, in which the reformers set forth their objects and ambitions.

'To dispel those illusory traditions of the past which have hindered our progress; to remove those prejudices which have hitherto exercised a baneful influence on our race; to reconcile Oriental learning with Western literature and science; to inspire in the dreamy minds of the people of the East the practical energy of the West; to make the Musalmans of India worthy and useful subjects of the British Crown; to inspire in them that loyalty which springs, not from servile submission to a foreign rule, but from genuine

appreciation of the blessings of good government—these are the objects which the founders of the college have prominently in view. And, looking at the difficulties which stood in our way, and the success which has already been achieved, we do not doubt that we shall continue to receive even in larger measure, both from the English Government and from our own countrymen, that liberal support which has furthered our scheme; so that from the seed which we sow to-day there may spring up a mighty tree whose branches, like those of the banyan of the soil, shall in their turn strike firm roots into the earth and themselves send forth new and vigorous saplings; and that this college may expand into a university whose sons shall go forth throughout the length and breadth of the land to preach the gospel of free enquiry, of large-hearted toleration, and of pure morality.*

The college that was founded with these hopes has made rapid progress in the thirty years which have elapsed since its establishment. In the school and college together there are now over eight hundred students, of whom nearly seven hundred reside in the college. The great majority of these are Muhammadans; but the college is open to all creeds and races. There are always some Hindus in residence; and there have been in the past Christians and Parsis within the walls of Aligarh. The residential quarters are laid out in quadrangles, in which the students have their rooms, as at Oxford or Cambridge. All Muhammadans dine together in the dining hall and say their prayers daily in the college mosque. Except that the students are expected to fast during the month of Ramazan, life in Aligarh much resembles that at an English university. The students play cricket, football, and hockey; they have a debating society with a club-house of their own, and numberless clubs which give expression to the various forms of social activity fermenting in the college. The teaching-staff comprises six Englishmen from Oxford or Cambridge (expensive luxuries in India), and thirty Indian professors and masters. The annual expenditure of the college now amounts to Rs 112,000 (9333£).

In one respect fortune favoured Sir Syed Ahmad. In

* The address was composed by the late Mr Justice Syed Mahmood, the son of Sir Syed Ahmad Khan.

1883 he appointed as principal the late Theodore Beck, then a young man fresh from Cambridge. The daring experiment of appointing a young and untried man on a larger salary than the financial situation warranted has rarely been more amply justified in the result. Theodore Beck was soon inspired with an enthusiasm for the cause of Muhammadan progress hardly less ardent than Sir Syed's own. He mixed with delight in Muhammadan society, never exhibiting the frigid *hauteur* with which the English in India are commonly reproached; and his own devotion kindled in the students a sense of their duty towards the Muhammadan cause which has now become one of the traditions of the college. He succumbed a year after Sir Syed to the strain of excessive work. After the founder of Aligarh, it is probably to Theodore Beck that the Muhammadan renaissance owes its greatest debt; and so completely did he identify himself with the movement that he must be reckoned as one of the Muhammadan reformers. Muhammadans almost forgot that he was not one of themselves. After his death they used the same language of him as of their own dead, habitually speaking of him as 'marhum' ('to whom God has shown mercy'), a term hardly ever applied to a non-Moslem; and a chronogram of the date of his demise was found by an admirer in a verse of the Koran.

In spite of the deaths of Sir Syed and Theodore Beck the college continued to grow, and it is now the educational centre of the Muhammadans all over India. Among the students are to be found boys from Burma and Baluchistan, from Madras and Assam; last year there were in the school department twelve Persians from Bushire and Shiraz. Indeed Aligarh is more than the name of a place; it has become the name of a school of thought; and the Muhammadan community may be divided broadly into the opponents and the supporters of the Aligarh movement. The opponents of the Aligarh school of thought represent the party of ancient orthodoxy, which derives all its inspiration from Arabic and Persian sources. To these men the letter of the law is hardly less important than the spirit. They are rigidly punctual in prayer and fasting. At their worst they resemble the Pharisees in that they take tithe of mint, anise, and cummin, and forget the weightier

matters of the law; to many of them the cut of a man's beard and the length of his trousers are matters of no less moment than the cardinal virtues. On one occasion a Maulvi of great orthodoxy, happening to visit Aligarh on a fast day, told the students that so hallowed and gracious was the time that whoever spent the night in prayer would obtain forgiveness of all his sins, unless he had committed adultery, or let his moustaches grow. They resemble the Pharisees too in that by their meticulous regulations they lay upon men burdens grievous to be borne. They insist that prayers must be repeated at that exact second of time which their theological text-books recommend, even at the sacrifice of important business, disregarding, as the reformers assert, the obvious meaning of the assurance in the Koran, 'God has not made your religion difficult to you.' A Maulvi with whom I was acquainted used to keep an almanac in his room to tell him exactly at what minute the sun set; and the worthy man journeyed every day to the station to compare his watch with the railway clock, a timepiece which little deserved so momentous a confidence. But it would be grossly unjust to say that such wooden formalism was characteristic of all Islamic thought before it had been modified by contact with the West. There probably never has been an age when the Islamic Church did not contain some champion of liberal ideas, and in which there has been no one to vindicate a spiritual interpretation of the revelation of Muhammad. The tradition may at times have dwindled into a very small stream, but it has never wholly ceased; and Maulvis of liberal tendencies can point to this tradition as sufficient evidence that their religion does not need to be liberalised from external sources. To give only one example, it cannot be contended that the society, to which the following apologue by Maulana Rum is familiar, has entirely forgotten that the spirit of the law is above the letter.

'Moses, the man who had speech with God, one day went into the wilderness; there he beheld a shepherd who was filled with the love of God, and who was saying in an ecstasy of worship, "O God, I love Thee so that I long to do Thee service. I will chafe Thy hands and feet when Thou art weary, and pour unguents on Thy hair, and do anything to give Thee comfort." And Moses was indignant and exclaimed,

"Thou stockish brute, dost thou not know that God has no corporeal attributes like a man? He has no hair for thy unguents and no feet for thee to chafe; thou wrongest God by thy ignorant worship." And Moses beat the shepherd and drove him from his presence; and the shepherd went away and wept bitterly. And in the evening God spake to Moses and said, "Moses, what hast thou done to that shepherd who used to praise Me in this place?" And Moses replied, "Lord, I beat him because he attributed to Thee corporeal being like a man." And the Lord said, "Moses, thou canst no more understand Me than did that ignorant shepherd. I accepted his praise as I do thine, and lo! thou hast taken from Me a servant in whose artless praise I took delight." And Moses went forth abashed from the presence of God the merciful, the compassionate, the forgiver of sins."

Ideas of this order have always been represented in Muhammadan thought, but they have probably been stimulated by controversy with the English educated party. The Maulvis are unwilling to allow that their own standard of right and wrong is in any respect lower than that of their anglicised opponents, and they have consequently been compelled to repudiate certain practices and habits of thought which Europe has hitherto believed to be characteristic of Islam. There are some Maulvis of undoubted orthodoxy who deny that the sale of slaves is permitted by Islamic law, others who maintain that polygamy is not supported by a correct reading of the Mohammedan scriptures. Particularly noticeable as a sign of the times is the stress which is now laid on the humanity of Islam, and the public repudiation of acts of violence committed in the name of religion. Some years ago there appeared in the Panjab a little pamphlet entitled, 'The miscalled Ghazi murders exposed in a *fatwa* signed by some of the most famous Muhammadan theologians in Upper India.' In this pamphlet it was shown that the murder of a Christian, or any other non-Moslem, is, in the opinion of the most respectable Muhammadan divines, 'quite unlawful, and a heinous crime according to the faith of Islam'; and the reason for the publication of the pamphlet was expressly stated to be the vindication of Islam from the reproach of being a religion 'which considers unprovoked murders to be a meritorious act.' There are Maulvis who believe that the true remedy for

the murderous fanaticism of the Afghan and frontier tribes is the establishment upon the North-West frontier of a school of Muhammadan theology, in which the wild hillmen will learn how utterly repugnant to the true teaching of Islam is the violence and bloodshed in which they delight.

In one respect the party of ancient orthodoxy hardly receives justice from the 'New Light,' as the reformers have been contemptuously nicknamed. What is commonly called the bigotry and prejudice of the Maulvis is in many cases only attachment to the old forms of Muhammadan society, and ought more justly to be described as a quasi-patriotic sentiment. When they gird at the 'coat and pantaloons' of the reformers, the Maulvis are expressing a not unnatural resentment at the disappearance of the outward characteristics of Muhammadan civilisation. Their patriotism is necessarily expressed in terms of religion, because Islam is the name both of a creed and a society, and the two ideas of religion and patriotism are covered by a single term. It is probably to be regretted that the social life of the reformers has not retained a more decidedly Muhammadan complexion. While their superiority to the old school in all the great essentials of life is undeniable, the lightness with which they have broken from the traditions of their history is less easily vindicated. Their explanation and apology is that they realise, with an acuteness of which no stranger can be conscious, the cramping and deadening influence of the old social order. A young Moslem friend once said to me: 'Our house was on fire and we had to hurry out of it as best we could; perhaps we left behind us some things which were picturesque and interesting to the antiquary; but our existence was at stake, and we were in no mood to think of mere prettiness.'

The Aligarh party have at least a clear understanding of the needs of their people and a definite policy for satisfying them. On the occasion of my last visit to Lucknow, a distinguished Muhammadan scholar said to me: 'If you want to do us real good, Morison sahib, then leave us our one God, and in other respects make us Christians.' This is a blunt and unpopular way of saying that in the essentials of civilisation Europeans to-day are superior to Moslems, and that the Indian Moslems hope

to achieve their regeneration by copying the social and intellectual practices of Europe. But the leaders of the movement have no illusions as to the length of the road they must needs travel; they perceive that it is the decadence of the Muhammadan character which has brought about the decline of their material prosperity. Nawab Syed Husain Bilgrami once said plainly to his people:

'It is a grievous mistake to suppose that the Muhammadans lost their moral qualities when they lost their power. The lesson of history is quite the other way, and teaches us that we lost our power because we had lost all that preserves and perpetuates power ages before.'*

The reformers recognise that a deep-seated disease takes a long time to cure. Sir Syed Ahmad used to say that the Musalmans needed five hundred years of British rule in India in order to work out their regeneration without interruption; but, though they are aware that complete recovery must be slow, they are confident of the result. Of one thing they have no doubt, namely, that the true remedy is education. For this reason they concentrate all their energies upon education, and have of set purpose postponed political action to a later period. Education they want for their people in almost every form—primary and secondary, technical, industrial, and liberal; and, with a true insight into the needs of their community as a whole, they place the necessity of a liberal education before all others. They recognise that the education of barristers, doctors, engineers, merchants, and government servants will be valuable, inasmuch as it will restore to the community wealth and public esteem; but these professional men, however well trained for their particular callings, cannot be expected to do much to enrich Muhammadan thought; it is not from their ranks that can be expected the scholars and thinkers who will remove the reproach of intellectual sterility which has lain for so many centuries upon Muhammadan society. Their greatest immediate need, they say, is to place new ideals before their people, to foster the growth

* Presidential address at the Muhammadan Educational Conference, Rampur, December 1900.

of Muhammadan thought, and to raise the whole community into a higher intellectual plane.

This is the problem upon which they have been most intent in recent years; the solution they propose is the creation of a Muhammadan university. They have no ambition to add another to the examining Boards which, because they have a charter to confer degrees, go by the name of university in India, for these Boards have never stimulated intellectual development. The accepted programme of the Muhammadan reformers is to expand the Aligarh college so that it shall become

'an abode of learning which shall bring together in one place the best available masters of various branches of learning to teach and study their respective subjects, which shall provide them with laboratories and libraries and museums, and the journals of scientific societies all over the world.'*

It is argued that these teachers, living together in an atmosphere of thought and learning, will stimulate each other's mental activity, and will give birth to a body of ideas which will in time become the accepted opinion of the University of Aligarh and will ultimately be diffused throughout the Muhammadan world. The ambitions of enlightened Musalmans were well expressed by H.H. the Aga Khan at Delhi in 1903.

'We want to be able to give our Moslem youths, not merely the finest education that can be given in India, but a training equal to that which can be given in any country in the world. We do not wish that in future our Moslem youths should be obliged to go to England or Germany if they wish to attain real eminence in any branch of learning or scholarship, or in the higher branches of technical or industrial learning. No, we want Aligarh to be such a home of learning as to command the same respect of scholars as Berlin or Oxford, Leipsic or Paris. We want those branches of Moslem learning which are too fast passing into decay to be added by Moslem scholars to the stock of the world's knowledge. Above all, we want to create for our people an intellectual and moral capital, a city which shall be the home of elevated ideas and pure ideals, a centre from which light and guidance will be diffused among the Moslems of India, aye, and out of

* Presidential address at the Muhammadan Educational Conference, Lucknow, 1904.

India too, and which shall hold up to the world a noble standard of the justice and virtue and purity of our beloved faith.'

Thus the new school of Muhammadan thought, like the old, contemplates the continued existence of a separate Muhammadan community in India. The possibility of fusion with the Hindus, and the creation by this fusion of an Indian nationality, does not commend itself to Muhammadan sentiment. The idea has been brought forward only to be flouted; the pride of Muhammadans revolts at such a sacrifice of their historic individuality. On the other hand there are forces at work all over Asia with which, perhaps, the Musalmans have not sufficiently reckoned. The humiliating ascendancy of Europe is emphasising to Asiatics the value of a new conception of nationality, which originated indeed in Europe, but which appears capable of thriving in Eastern soil. This conception is that the inhabitants of a given area, irrespective of race or creed, have a common interest and are bound together by ties stronger than any which connect them with persons living outside that area. The beginnings of such a national feeling are already signalised in China; a vehement demonstration of national spirit has recently been evoked in Bengal by the partition of the province; all over India Hindus are appealing for the recognition of an 'Indian nation.'

Will Muhammadans have to yield to this prevailing fashion of thought? Will the brotherhood of Islam go the way of the universal Church, and will its place be taken by territorial nationalities as yet unnamed?

T. MORISON.

Art. XIII.—THE POLITICAL SITUATION.

THE general election of 1906 will certainly be always reckoned as one of the great events of parliamentary history. We believe that since parties existed in this country there has never been so large a transfer of parliamentary strength from one party to the other. A smaller transfer took place in 1832, notwithstanding the hecatomb of disfranchised boroughs; and even in the conflict of 1784, when Pitt triumphed over Fox and North, the Coalition lost fifty-five seats fewer than fell at the late election. The victories of 1832 and 1784 left uneffaceable marks on the constitution. In each case a political system was brought to an end. The election of 1784 finally destroyed the dominion of the great Whig oligarchy; that of 1832 ended George III's Toryism. Fox came back for a few months in 1806, Peel for a few years in 1841; but in neither case was there any restoration of the old fabric. The Ministry of all the Talents was no revival of the Coalition, and, had it been so, lasted only long enough to show how completely King George had become the master. Peel in 1841 led a new party skilfully built up by himself and buttressed by a small but valuable secession from the Whigs. The Unionists to-day have fallen from a greater height of power and been shattered not less completely than the party of Fox or the party of Wellington. Will it be written of them too that the old order passed away never to return?

The defeat of 1906 is the greatest in British parliamentary history. We have the grim satisfaction, dear to our sporting generation, of making 'a record.' But this unparalleled overthrow has had no congruous surroundings. It has not been accompanied by anything like the agitation of 1832, or even of 1784. Bristol is not in ruins; and no duchess, so far as we are aware, has kissed any elector. It may be a revolution, but, if so, it is a tame one. Our tiger has the manners of a cat. No revolutionary bitterness has been displayed by the triumphant party. There has been no change in the balance of the constitution such as was involved in the victory of the king in 1784 or in the passage of the Reform Bill. Nor is the successful captain so impressive a figure as his fore-

runners. Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman is a sensible leader, but he is no rival of Pitt or Grey. Neither the actors nor the issues are on the heroic scale.

The calmness of the atmosphere and the lightness of the clouds amid which such a thunderbolt has fallen deserve attention not less than the magnitude of the damage done. Here has been nothing resembling the personal enthusiasm inspired by Pitt and King George, nor the political enthusiasm excited by 'the Bill, the whole Bill, and nothing but the Bill.' The feelings excited have been widespread but not intense. There was a good deal of disorder at Unionist meetings, but nothing that can be called a riot. And yet the result has been to inflict an unprecedented defeat. Not by a tempest and rough waves, but by a tide of smooth water, the Unionist party has been washed away.

About the causes of this phenomenon there is naturally much dispute. Some affirm that the activity of the Non-conformists and their bitter antagonism to the Education Act of 1902 was the chief force at work; others emphasise the Labour movement and the question of trades disputes; others believe that Chinese labour did the mischief, with its crop of unscrupulous placards and the cry, half philanthropic and half selfish, against 'yellow slavery' and cheap labour; others say that the victory was for free trade and no taxes on food; others, again, speak of the unpopularity of the tactics of the late Government and of 'the swing of the pendulum,' intensified by the unwise postponement of the dissolution. The truth, doubtless, is that all these causes contributed to the result. Some votes were lost by one antipathy, some by another; and the tremendous electoral movement was due to the aggregate of divers unpopularitys.

But, while it is true that many grievances co-operated to make the Unionist party unpopular, it is also true that most of these different grievances had some common elements, so that they appeared to the electorate like various counts of a single indictment rather than a number of distinct charges. Thus the attack on Chinese labour, on Protection, and on the Taff Vale judgment, all formed part of an accusation of plutocratic conspiracy. Even the Education Act was represented as a victory for privilege, and so fell in with the general charge that

Unionists were the party of the rich and selfish, who were ready to degrade the British conquests in South Africa by gathering gold through the labour of slaves, to build up a system of monopoly by taxing the food of the poor, to keep the public schools of the nation as a preserve for their own friends, and to put the workmen under the heel of the capitalist by overthrowing the trade-unions.

The issue thus seemed to be Rich *versus* Poor—the aristocracy, the capitalists, the mine-owners, and the parsons, leagued together and backed by all the resources of wealth, knowledge, great organisations, and an able and unscrupulous journalism, on the one side; and, upon the other, the poor, industrious workman whose patriotic fervour had made him the dupe of the cunning covetousness of the plutocrats of Park Lane, and whose poverty, freedom, and independence were now threatened with dear food, the capture of the people's schools, and the loss of the power to strike for better wages. The cry which Mr Gladstone vainly tried to raise in 1886, of the masses against the classes, was what triumphed twenty years later. It was to no purpose that Unionist candidates argued one point or another; there was no escaping the general impression. Some candidates went for free food; some pledged themselves to support the Trade Disputes Bill, or to amend the Education Act. It was of little avail; the Unionist party was branded as the plutocratic party; and, if the particular candidate were not himself one of the conspirators, he was their dupe.

This sort of accusation, believed more or less completely by that section of the electorate—after all, not a very numerous one—who are open to a change of mind, and whose votes therefore decide the result of elections, was, we think, what carried the country. The sense that the remedy was easy, that riches and privilege could not stand at the polls against the working-classes, prevented passion from rising high. A struggle between rich and poor could have but one issue in the hands of a democratic electorate. Moreover working-men, while generally far too ready to suspect others of low and self-interested motives, are yet strangely tolerant of such motives. They think badly of human nature, but its badness does not make them angry. That the rich should be greedy and

deceitful seems to working-men a likely hypothesis, but not a shocking one. They dread and hate plutocracy, and will vote unhesitatingly against it; but they are not bitter against plutocrats. They themselves might, they are not unwilling to admit, behave in much the same way if they were rich. Selfishness is too common in all ranks for any one to rage at it, but it must be resisted. So there was a quiet but general rejection of Unionist candidates.

It is remarkable that the party cries which were most successful were negative. No Chinese labour, no taxes on food—these were the most generally destructive pieces of electioneering ordnance. Even the attacks on the Education Act and on the Taff Vale judgment were in a sense conservative. The electorate was hostile, not to long-existing and venerable institutions, but to recent changes. It had been content with the law relating to education as it had been from 1870 to 1902, and with the law relating to trade-unions as it had been supposed to be from 1875 till the Taff Vale judgment. The wish was to get rid of vexatious innovations: there was no clamour for novelties. The instinct of the people was critical, not constructive. 'Anathema,' not 'credo,' was the voice of the polls. The electors were ready to disbelieve, to halt, to reject, to resist, not to hope or to reform or to advance.

Most conspicuously was this the case in respect to the fiscal controversy. Mr Chamberlain called his policy reform—tariff reform; and he used all the rhetoric of a reformer. Times had changed since 1846, and we must change too; a system that had been very well sixty years ago was out of date now; we must advance, we must learn from other countries; we must look forward to the future of the Colonies; we must not be hidebound by theories; we must be emancipated from the thralldom of ancient shibboleths—and much more to the same effect. On the other hand free-traders argued in language typically conservative for the *status quo*. We were prosperous; the existing system had brought us wealth; the hopes of tariff reformers were delusions; it was true there were evils, but the proposed reforms would but increase them; the gains of colonial preference were doubtful or trivial, its losses certain and serious; why should we change a policy which for sixty years had brought us wealth and

contentment? Thus pitted against one another were the warm, hopeful, promising, discontented fiscal reformers, and the cold, cautious, sceptical, complacent fiscal conservatives; and conservatism prevailed.

It is necessary to insist on this feature of the election, because many people continue to affirm that a party that takes up a merely negative position can never prosper. It is true that there still attaches to the idea of reform a certain prestige; and a party which nakedly avowed that it would reform nothing would doubtless be discredited. But recent experience shows that it is wise tactics mainly to emphasise the negative side of your position, while your programme of reform makes a pleasing but somewhat indeterminate background. This was the method that proved victorious, not only in 1906, but also in 1895. It is indeed curious to observe how much the plan of battle of Liberals in 1906 resembles that of Conservatives eleven years ago. The defence of free trade took the place of the defence of the Union; the education question brought into great activity the Nonconformists, just as the attack on the Welsh Church roused churchmen; and the great influence of the licensed victuallers, alarmed in 1895 by the Local Veto Bill, was matched by the great influence of the trade-unions, alarmed in 1906 at the judgments of the House of Lords. Chinese labour had indeed no parallel in 1895; but both in 1895 and 1906 the victorious party effectively contrasted with their opponents' vexatious and revolutionary changes a sketch, not too definitely outlined, of reasonable social reform. In both elections the place of honour in their programme was given by the victors to what was negative; the positive reforms were subordinate. As the electors are now minded, the negative position is the advantageous one; they are much readier to say 'no' than 'yes.'

More than twenty years ago Sir Henry Maine, in his work on 'Popular Government,' which first appeared in the pages of this Review, drew attention to the conservatism of democracy.

'The delusion' (he wrote) 'that Democracy, when it has once had all things put under its feet, is a progressive form of government lies deep in the convictions of a particular political school; but there can be no delusion grosser. It receives no countenance either from experience or from probability.'

This contention seems to be confirmed by recent experience. Sir Henry wrote in censure of democracy; but the conservatism which he noted has its brighter side. It may be hoped that in that deep-seated dislike of innovation, which the critic's keen eye so clearly discerned in democracy, may be found the antidote for some more dangerous tendencies which the same writer pointed out.

Our analysis of the causes of the defeat of the Unionist party at the late election would not be complete without mention of one painful topic. It cannot be disputed that the impatience of the electors was greatly increased by the errors in leadership of which Mr Balfour was guilty. His difficulties were great, but his methods cannot be justified by such a consideration. We have no desire to underrate Mr Balfour's abilities. On the contrary, we believe he is entitled to be regarded as a statesman of great insight and sound judgment. But he is a bad party strategist. The popular estimate of Mr Balfour seems curiously mistaken. The 'man in the street' would probably say that Mr Balfour did not possess the qualities which go to make up statesmanship, but that he was a clever, resourceful, dexterous party leader. This seems to us almost the contrary of the truth.

Mr Balfour's tenure of the Premiership was very far from lacking in distinguished achievement. The Education Act and the Irish Land Purchase Act were laws of great importance and high and lasting value, while, in the region of administration, the management of foreign affairs was not merely successful but brilliant, and the organisation of the Defence Committee was a useful and memorable adjustment of the constitution to new conditions. In these successes it cannot be doubted that Mr Balfour had a large personal share; and of such achievements he has a right to be proud. His government would compare favourably with some that are now famous—with that of Lord Beaconsfield, for example, which began in 1874, or with the last administration of Lord Palmerston. But, if it be wrong to disparage Mr Balfour's public service, it is equally mistaken to praise his party management. It is true that, in dealing with the exigencies of a purely parliamentary difficulty, Mr Balfour showed great dexterity. But outside the House

of Commons, and even inside it, when the House was under the influence of strong feelings in the constituencies, he seemed to be so remote from public sentiment, so incapable of adjusting his words and plans to what was passing in the minds of others, that he could hardly be said to lead at all. He did not guide the judgment of his followers, or inspire them, or clear away their doubts, or even convey to them an unmistakable meaning. He was separated from them by a gulf. He spoke in an unknown tongue; and it was not to edification, for there was none to interpret. The strange result was that the Unionist party, following a man who is assuredly wanting neither in power of decision nor in intellectual clearness, felt itself not so much badly led as without leadership altogether. Every man wandered his own way. They were as sheep without a shepherd.

It may be said with truth that these criticisms apply only to the fiscal controversy, and that it is reasonable to hope that Mr Balfour's handling of that controversy is peculiar to the topic, and not characteristic of his general leadership. On this it is too early to pronounce. Since the summer of 1903 the fiscal question has been the main political issue; and how Mr Balfour would lead if there were no fiscal question we cannot tell. It is, however, not at all improbable that the weakness of Mr Balfour's leadership in respect to Tariff Reform arises from one or two serious faults of judgment made early in the controversy, from the consequences of which he was never afterwards able to escape. A false strategy, in politics as in war, once adopted cannot without loss be abandoned. Yet, if it be adhered to, skill in tactics becomes useless. At every turn the situation is such that no dexterity or resource can avert defeat. This may be the explanation of Mr Balfour's failure; and, if so, there is ground for hope that upon a new issue it need not be repeated.

Certainly it is possible to point to some fundamental errors which have made the whole of Mr Balfour's plans unsound. The greatest is the disproportionate importance he has attached to maintaining an appearance of party unity. For the mere outward pretence of unity is not worth much. Could he have achieved a real unity, it would have been invaluable to the party; could he

have induced Mr Chamberlain really to renounce all attempts to restrict imports in the interest of producers at home, he would have done much; could he also have persuaded the Duke of Devonshire to assent to fiscal retaliation he would have done still more. But these things were impossible. Before the close of 1903 it must have been plain to the dullest eyes that, whether Mr Balfour liked it or not, the party was divided in opinion into three camps. Nevertheless Mr Balfour, though unable to produce a real unity, has strenuously endeavoured to preserve its semblance. The Duke of Devonshire and his friends refused to co-operate in this strange make-believe; and Mr Balfour has apparently resented their candour as a sort of factious perversity. Mr Chamberlain, on the other hand, accepted the pretence and endeavoured to use it for his own purposes. He declined to modify the substance of his policy, but he was willing to use almost any ambiguous phrase which described both Mr Balfour's policy and his own, and went on to claim that his was indeed the official party programme, which every one must, under pain of exclusion, accept.

The semblance of unity thus handled became not merely useless but noxious. It has actually been turned into an instrument against Mr Balfour himself. A large section of the party has been half cajoled and half coerced into adopting that very protectionism which Mr Balfour protests he does not approve. Yet real unity has not been attained. Even now, not only do the Unionist Free-traders openly hold aloof, but a split between Mr Balfour and Mr Chamberlain can only be avoided by the continued use of ambiguous phrases.

Closely connected with this strange devotion to a pretence of unity has been Mr Balfour's determination to ignore what, in the mind of almost every one but himself, was the most important and interesting fiscal issue under discussion, that, namely, between Free Trade and Protection. No one could reasonably doubt that the policy of Mr Chamberlain and the Tariff Reform League was protectionist; that it aimed at restricting imports in the interests of home-producers; and that it had for its ideals the tariffs of foreign countries. This policy, just because it was protectionist, excited warm support and

warm opposition. Comparatively little interest was felt in schemes for colonial preference—except in so far as they implied unpopular taxes upon food—and none at all in ‘negotiation with retaliation.’ Yet Mr Balfour, deaf to the debate that was raging round him, persisted in treating the controversy between Free-traders and Protectionists as remote and without urgency; and, after baldly stating that he was not a Protectionist, went on to urge his version of fiscal reform, to sing the praises of negotiation as a means of reducing foreign tariffs, to denounce dumping and to disparage Cobdenism.

The confusion produced was general and unfortunate. The great majority of Mr Balfour’s countrymen could not believe that any one could take a course so futile as that which Mr Balfour adopted. It was manifest that Mr Chamberlain and his friends were not engaged in any academic discussion; that they were looking to carry their reform into effect in the near future; and that, if they obtained a majority, they would proceed to establish a protective tariff. Was Mr Balfour going to help them or to hinder them? This question he did not answer; he went on with his own plan. But people cared nothing for his plan, and could not conceive that he really intended to remain a neutral about the main issue. So at first they thought he was a trickster playing into Mr Chamberlain’s hand; then doubts grew, and some thought it was Mr Chamberlain who was to be tricked; and again very many supposed it to be all a matter of words, Retaliation being only a politer name for Protection, divested of the unpopular proposal to tax food. Mr Chamberlain added to the confusion by claiming persistently that Mr Balfour agreed with him; the Unionist Free-traders by not less persistently denying the agreement. As time went on, perplexity bred impatience, and impatience turned to contempt. When the polls opened, the mass of the electorate neither understood Mr Balfour nor cared to understand him. From him they had ceased to expect intelligible leadership; they regarded him as a disingenuous trifler.

This was certainly unjust. Mr Balfour was no trifler. He was a man of strong will, convinced that his plan of fiscal reform was valuable, and at the same time passionately anxious not to allow the controversy to break up

the Unionist party. His idea at the outset was probably to carry Retaliation, and perhaps Colonial Preference, by the help of the Protectionists. Having once started in co-operation with Mr Chamberlain, it was undoubtedly difficult for him to go back. At an early stage he had lost the confidence of the decided Free-traders. A split among the fiscal reformers seemed to accomplish ruin. To break with Mr Chamberlain would have been to admit total failure, to abandon any sort of fiscal reform, to recognise that it had been folly to quarrel with the Free-traders, and to let the Unionist party face a general election openly divided and under the discredit of an avowed fiasco. It may be truly said that, bad as this would have been, it would yet have been better than what actually happened. But it is easy to see why Mr Balfour recoiled from such a throwing-up of the cards. Moreover—and this, doubtless, weighed heavily—to abandon office meant to abandon the control of designs which, as we have seen, had high value—the understanding with France, the Japanese alliance, and the organisation of Imperial defence. All these considerations, we may suppose, united to harden Mr Balfour's heart and to make him face, not out of weakness, but out of perverse strength, the disaster that awaited him.

Nevertheless it is to hard to understand how Mr Balfour can have endured what he went through in the last twelve months of his administration. Early in the session of 1905 he was obliged to withdraw from the House on several occasions rather than encounter a fiscal debate. This involved, amongst other humiliations, the condemnation of his own scheme of fiscal reform by the House of Commons without a dissentient voice. It scandalised the public, who could not stomach either the weakness of the Ministry or the slight put upon the House of Commons by the manoeuvre. The rearrangement of offices following the appointment of Lord Selborne to the High Commissionership of South Africa led to a crushing defeat at a by-election at Brighton. At the end of the session the Ministry were beaten in a division by a carefully organised surprise. They refused to resign and scrambled through the remaining days till the prorogation by the help of impassioned appeals to their supporters and ludicrous vigilance against ambus-

cade. Less sensational but even more eloquent of the Government's unhappy position were the exertions made almost nightly throughout the session by their most faithful supporters to obstruct their business lest a division should be taken before the disheartened main body of the party were in their places. Worst of all perhaps was the scene in the debate on the adjournment for Whitsuntide, when Mr Chamberlain on the one side and Mr Ritchie and Lord Hugh Cecil on the other exchanged flat contradictions as to the nature of Mr Balfour's policy in Mr Balfour's presence, without eliciting sign or sound from him. This may be called the absolute negation of leadership—the idea of the not-leader made perceptible.

The final crisis did not redeem the errors of the past. Mr Chamberlain became more and more impatient of a system of tactics which was evidently discrediting the party and ruining the chances of Tariff Reform. Throughout 1905 his speeches grew less friendly to Mr Balfour and less careful to maintain that outward semblance of accepting formulas for which such sacrifices had been made. Even Mr Balfour could not help seeing that the pretence of unity had become transparent. One final appeal to sink points of disagreement he made at Newcastle; and, when Mr Chamberlain rejected it at Bristol, Mr Balfour at last saw that it was necessary to choose the immediate mischief of resignation rather than to face another session and the ever-increasing discredit that it would bring. It was doubtless a wise decision, but the impression given of discord and collapse was one more weight to drag the Unionist party down. The full price of the strategic errors of 1903 had now to be paid, enhanced, as by some grasping usury, by the long series of consequent faults and humiliations. For the sake of his own fiscal reforms and of the appearance of a united party Mr Balfour had not shrunk from great sacrifices. His failure was complete; the party and the policy made shipwreck together.

No one who surveys, as we have endeavoured to do, the circumstances and issues of the general election can feel much surprise at its result. But the new Parliament, though it might have been expected, must still be feared.

Such a Parliament has never sat; for, though that of 1832 was of similar proportions, it was the creature of the middle-classes, and was not only unlikely to be subversive either of property or order, but consisted of men versed in affairs, and was, in the main, responsible to men of educated intelligence. The Parliament of 1906 is formed of different materials, and has been, in the main, elected by less prosperous citizens. While the electorate has probably little appetite for revolution, Parliament is packed with Radicals zealous to prove the value of their principles and the strength of their convictions. In these circumstances, even if there is little ground for fearing revolutionary violence, legislation of a strongly marked and one-sided kind is to be expected; and there is much reason for apprehending errors in the nice art of government, such as are natural to a body of opinion, well-intentioned, it may be, but wanting both in experience and education.

Parliament has been sitting only a few weeks; but its proceedings have certainly not been of a character to quiet the alarms which its composition excited. It has passed several abstract resolutions of a more or less advanced kind; it has taken the first steps towards releasing trade-unions from the control of the law; it has brought in an educational measure framed in the Nonconformist interest; and it has interfered in colonial policy in a very mischievous manner. The mechanism of our colonial empire is extremely delicate. To handle it roughly is instantly to throw it out of gear; and such handling it is only too likely to get from the inexperienced fingers of the Labour members and their more advanced Liberal colleagues.

Many indications point to the conclusion that the Labour victories at the polls have induced almost the whole House to bow down before that compound of class-interest and half-thought-out socialism which makes up a Labour policy. Yet the impression made of the strength of the Labour movement seems to us somewhat exaggerated. What, after all, did the Labour leaders achieve? By threatening to run candidates who would split the anti-Conservative vote, they compelled the Liberals to an alliance; and the allies gained a great victory. But how much of it was really due to

Labour? By perfecting their own organisation they largely increased their voting strength. But in very few constituencies is there reason for thinking that the Labour vote outnumbered the Liberal. In some places, indeed, the Labour candidate was elected against a Liberal competitor; but in most cases the alliance held good, and Labour candidates were elected by Liberal votes. It is of course impossible to analyse the total polls into their Labour and Liberal elements. But we doubt if, without the Liberal alliance, the Labour party could have carried twenty seats.

Yet, if the Labour movement is to become really formidable, the party must not only be able to do without middle-class liberalism, but must be able to overcome it. It is putting it mildly to say that there was nothing in the late election to justify expectation of such independent strength. The Labour party have no hold on the agricultural constituencies, or on those comparatively wealthy districts in or near London and the great cities where the richer citizens dwell. And what success Labour candidates achieved at this election was gained by them as the champions of causes some of which had nothing to do with Labour. They were fighting on free trade and education as much as on the rights of trade-unions. Moving with a great wave of public feeling they did well. How would it have been with them had they fought on a Labour programme alone, and against the swing of the pendulum? It is wise to remember that in 1895 the Conservative party and the House of Lords incurred the utmost wrath of the trade-unions on the question of Employers' Liability, but the electorate supported the Conservatives nevertheless. The stream was then running the other way.

Nor should it be forgotten that the Labour members, whatever their natural ability and whatever their experience in managing their own affairs, are, and must be for a long time, at considerable disadvantage in a parliamentary struggle and in the conduct of parliamentary business. They have not the early political training, the general acquaintance with Imperial affairs, the political connexions, or the education, which would enable them to compete on equal terms with men who, possessing all these advantages, have devoted themselves to politics from

their youth up. Some of them have already shown themselves good speakers; they know their own minds; they express themselves with conviction and with facility; they go straight to the point. But, excepting on their own ground, these qualities will hardly compensate for innate skill and acquired experience in the handling of large political problems, and still less in the guidance of parliamentary tactics. In this region they are as amateurs competing with professionals.

We insist on the inherent difficulties and weakness of the Labour party because there seems to be danger that both Liberals and Conservatives will yield to them more than their strength deserves. They are doubtless formidable so long as they do not try to stand alone but remain in alliance with Liberalism. But it is well to note that Liberals give at least as much as they gain by the alliance. If it came to a rupture, it is not the Liberals who would suffer most. The voting power behind Liberalism is as great as that behind Labour; and even in the large towns, where Labour is strongest, if there were question of a Ministry being formed from the Labour party, the mass of the working-class themselves would recoil from placing the government of the Empire in the hands of men lacking in the sort of skill which has long been a political tradition for English statesmen, and is not less recognised and valued by working-men than by other classes. The Labour party is therefore in no position to exercise unlimited dictation over the Liberals. They can doubtless give precious help to Liberalism, and can sell that help at a certain price. But a bargain is one thing and dictation another. The moment their terms become so high that the Liberal party as a whole, or a sufficient body of moderate Liberals, prefer the return of Conservatives, their power is at an end. For even in its strongholds—much less in the country generally—Labour could scarcely stand against the combined forces of moderation. Only so long as the Labour party is contented to play a subordinate part and to act as the auxiliary of Liberalism will its power be great. If it aspires to stand alone as the equal of the old historic factions it will fail.

Moderate Liberals, therefore, are not bound to make such humiliating concessions as seem to have been ex-

acted in respect to the Trade Disputes Bill. They cannot, of course, control a majority pledged to its constituents, but they need not and ought not to shrink from defending by speech and vote the opinion they hold. So far they have not done this. The moderate section of the Cabinet did indeed insist that the Government Bill should not go the whole length that was demanded. But when the Prime Minister, under pressure from the Labour men, declared for Mr Hudson's Bill, the moderates simply abstained from voting. That the Chancellor of the Exchequer, three Secretaries of State, one of the Law officers, and another member of the Cabinet should decline to vote for what had become a government measure, is a serious matter. But they might well have gone further and given expression to their disagreement. If the point was important enough to insist on in the Cabinet, it was also important enough to defend before the House of Commons. A silent abstention is a feeble answer to the menaces of Mr Keir Hardie.

The general attitude of subservience to the demands of Labour has been shown in less important discussions. Payment of members and free meals for school-children have been solemnly approved. These decisions have no more than an abstract significance; but to yield with facile acquiescence to such demands, if only in the abstract, will serve to increase the already notable arrogance of the Labour party and make the position of moderate Liberals more difficult in the future.

Still more important have been the proceedings in regard to South Africa. The evil consequences of exaggerated language at election time have seldom been more strikingly displayed. Most of the triumphant party uttered language about the use of Chinese labour in South Africa conveying that it was not merely inexpedient but immoral, for it partook of the character of slavery. Faced with the difficulties of abolishing it, the Ministry sought a way out by granting responsible government to the Transvaal and leaving the Chinese question to be settled by the new rulers of the colony. But the Opposition could not refrain from pointing out that, however legitimate a solution of a question of policy that might be, it was altogether inadmissible in regard to a question of morals, and corresponded very ill with

the language of denunciation which had been used. It soon appeared that, whatever may have been the case with the leaders, many of the rank and file took their election speeches very seriously. Here it was not only the Labour men who were moved. The disturbance seems to have extended to many Radicals. Strong pressure was probably applied. At any rate the upshot was a declaration, made first by Mr Asquith and afterwards with youthful emphasis by Mr Churchill, that the Imperial veto would be exercised to prevent the Transvaal establishing any system of Chinese labour which partook of the alleged servile character of the existing arrangements.

These unfortunate statements at once raised the question, always thorny and dangerous, of the limits of the autonomy of self-governing colonies. The British in South Africa were doubly irritated, first at the danger that hung over the prosperity of their country by the threatened withdrawal of the Chinese, and secondly, by the insult (as they deem it) of menacing them with the Imperial veto upon the free and autonomous decision of a South African colony. This irritation has been intensified by an incident not intrinsically important, but of a character to exacerbate feeling. Lord Milner, as embodying the policy of the South African war, is naturally unpopular with that large number of Radicals who disapproved of the war. One of these, Mr Byles, seized upon an irregularity of which Lord Milner admitted that he had been guilty, in sanctioning the corporal punishment of the Chinese coolies. This punishment was contrary to the declarations of the Secretary of State both to Parliament and the Chinese Government, and in that respect its sanction was unquestionably a fault. For it is essential to the proper conduct of the affairs of a great empire that the promises of the central Government should be treated as absolutely sacred by their deputies abroad.

Mr Byles proposed to single out this error for solemn censure by the House of Commons. This was both absurd and unjust. Parliamentary censure of public servants ought to be reserved for offences of great magnitude, and should only be inflicted with due regard to the merits as well as to the faults of the person to be censured. Here a small administrative disobedience was

to be blamed, while no mention was made of six years' brilliant and courageous service. The injustice was patent, and the Government could not consent to the motion. But they dared not flatly reject it. Accordingly they framed an amendment which, by pointedly refusing to censure individuals, appeared to imply the blame it ostentatiously refrained from expressing; and Mr Churchill added to the irritating character of the amendment by dwelling with offensive emphasis on the completeness of Lord Milner's fall from power. The result was to annoy Lord Milner's friends and admirers almost as much as if Mr Byles' motion had been carried. And since among those admirers are to be found nearly all the British in South Africa, the annoyance is a serious mischief.

How angry is the feeling of British South Africans has been shown by the dispute between the Colonial Office and the Government of Natal. It is too early to discuss the rights of this controversy, but the precipitancy with which the Natal Ministry resigned proves how sore and suspicious the language about the use of the veto in the Transvaal has made all South Africans.

These episodes show the difficulties into which the Government are dragged by the pressure of their more advanced supporters. One cannot doubt that moderate Liberals are on their side growing increasingly impatient. The impression is gathering strength that the Ministerial party cannot remain united for very long. It is clear that the differences are not on one subject only, but on many. The relations of capital to labour, the relations of the State to the individual, the principles of colonial policy, of Irish policy, and probably also of foreign policy, are all of them occasions for division in the ranks of the majority of the House of Commons. In what political transformation scene are these divisions likely to end, and what part in it will Unionists play?

Were the Unionist party itself united and vigorous, the prospect before it would be encouraging. But unhappily its internal difficulties have not mended since the election. The correspondence between Mr Balfour and Mr Chamberlain, the meeting of the party, and the fiscal debate in the House have left our chaos more confounded than ever. When the correspondence appeared, it was naturally assumed by the public that Mr Balfour had

adopted Mr Chamberlain's policy, including, of course, its salient feature—the general restriction of manufactured imports. But Mr Balfour, speaking in the City, vehemently affirmed that he had not changed his position. And that there were really still wide differences between him and Mr Chamberlain was made clear by something more instructive than any declaration, namely, the evasive tactics adopted to meet Sir J. Kitson's motion. Plainly, if there were real agreement, the wisest course would have been to meet the motion with a simple and unequivocal amendment moved at the outset and debated on its merits. But a wholly different plan was followed. Mr Balfour spoke, not to propound his own policy, but to make verbal criticisms on the motion. A wrangle followed, and the debate turned on anything rather than the merits of Tariff Reform. Eventually, in the last hour of the debate, Mr Wyndham moved the official amendment of the Opposition in a speech admirable in language, but meaning nothing in particular. The amendment itself was equally uninformative, for its whole significance depended on what was meant by the condemnation of 'artificial protection against legitimate competition'; and this the mover carefully refrained from explaining. After Mr Wyndham's speech the closure was moved, and the debate came to an ineffective end.

This strange performance was extolled by many persons as a triumph of Opposition tactics. And so perhaps it was if they desired to avoid expounding their fiscal policy. But then why say that fiscal reform is the first constructive item in the Unionist programme? How can a reform be carried if it be not first explained and, secondly, defended? The futility of a propaganda by evasion is evident. Of course the truth is that the party has not one fiscal policy but two or even three policies; and exposition is avoided because it means the admission of disagreement. Mr Chamberlain wishes for the general restriction of manufactured imports, and Mr Balfour does not. The puzzling thing is what either of them hopes to gain by pretending to agree. So far their tactics have worked unparalleled mischief; and mischief the same tactics will continue to work.

The division on Sir J. Kitson's motion had lessons of its own. All the efforts for unity had but a partial

success. Some Unionists voted for the motion, and many more abstained. The perverse ingenuity of the leaders brought only 98 followers into the lobby. How many of these were Balfourians is doubtful; but probably the thoroughgoing Chamberlainites may be reckoned at about 85. To carry Tariff Reform these must be raised to at least 340. Is there any visionary who believes that this can be done?

The impracticability of carrying Tariff Reform is so evident that we cannot help hoping that Tariff Reformers may realise and admit it. If they maintain their restrictionist policy, they must eventually part company with Mr Balfour and his friends. If they give up the restriction of manufactured imports, they give up (as they themselves would say) the most popular part of their programme; and, urging Preference and Retaliation alone, are doomed to certain defeat. In either alternative victory is impossible. Some delude themselves with the hope of a coalition with the Labour party and the Irish party. But such an alliance could only be on terms; and those terms must alienate that body of Conservative opinion which is now the main prop of Tariff Reform. Let the situation be viewed from every side, and the more it is looked at the more hopeless appear the prospects of the Tariff Reformers. We do not speak of the merits of the controversy; but, on the humbler issue of what is possible, is it too much to ask that Tariff Reformers should accept the unanswerable logic of facts?

Be that as it may, we are persuaded that the interests of the Unionist party and of the great causes it defends will be best consulted by shelving the whole subject. Then we shall be clear of the damning imputation of plutocracy; then we shall be able to welcome an understanding with that large body of moderate Liberal opinion which is so plainly ill at ease where it is. Thus, uniting all the truly conservative forces in the country, we may resume the position of 1895, and, defending the existing constitution and social order, may proceed with those temperate reforms which, while they excite little controversy and stir no passion, yet effect whatever legislation can do, to ameliorate the condition of the people.

Art. XIV.—THE EDUCATION BILL.

TEN years ago a triumphant Unionist majority spent a substantial portion of the first session after the general election from which it sprang in an unsuccessful attempt to settle the Education Question. Its leaders had made promises to important sections of their supporters, the friends of the voluntary schools, that the 'intolerable strain' cast upon them by the growing demands of the central authorities and by the rate-fed competition of the Board schools should be relieved. But not having a clear view as to what was essentially desirable, or as to the best methods of attaining it, with no coherent pressure of opinion behind them, and with an Opposition, scanty in numbers but passionately combative and resourcefully led, they fell into hopeless difficulties, and had to withdraw their Bill. Thereafter no convenient season for an attempt at a real settlement of the education problem presented itself in that Parliament; and it was only when, owing mainly to an Imperial emergency of a special character, they had been again returned to power with a great majority that the Unionists were able to carry into law a comprehensive measure on that subject.

These reminiscences are not without their lesson for the politicians now in power. Now again we have a great and, indeed, a numerically overwhelming majority, but on the other side in politics. As in 1895, the promise to deal with one aspect of the education question has been one of the more prominent features of the programme put forward by the leaders of the victorious party, but by no means the most prominent. Broadly speaking, the promise to redress the grievances alleged to have been created among Nonconformists by the working of the elementary education clauses of the Act of 1902 occupied, on the Liberal side, during the recent electoral campaign, about the same position of importance in relation to the fiscal question as the promise to do justice to the voluntary schools occupied in relation to Home Rule on the Unionist side in 1895. The Liberal Government, therefore, are entitled and are, indeed, bound to deal with the subject; and no surprise was caused by the early intimation that an Education Bill would form the

leading feature of the programme of their first session. The Bill has appeared; and it has been found to involve nothing short of a revolution in the nature of the provision available for the education of the children of the working-classes over the whole of rural England and, to a very large extent, urban England also.

There was no revolution in the Act of 1870 or in that of 1902. Both those great measures, though we are not at all concerned to maintain that either of them was a sample of perfect legislation, were essentially in harmony with English parliamentary tradition. Neither of them destroyed anything. In the Act of 1870, Parliament, finding that the existing system of state-aided voluntary schools was failing to meet the needs of large masses of urban populations, invited and encouraged the religious denominations to develop that system, so as to meet the needs in question as fully as possible; and only where, after a period of grace, they had failed, or where, as in London, it was, from the first, out of their power to overtake such vast requirements, was the School Board machinery set up. After the lapse of a generation, Parliament, in the Act of 1902, finding that the friends of voluntary schools, who had responded splendidly to the invitation of the Act of 1870, were yet, through no fault of their own, unable to keep their schools generally abreast of the advancing standards of public education, placed them on a level in respect of claim on public funds, local as well as general, for ordinary educational maintenance, while continuing to charge the trustees with the upkeep of the buildings. In return for the relief thus given them, they came under the control of the local authority in the matter of secular education; and, in return for their continued acceptance of the burden of keeping up the fabric, and for its free use, they were authorised to carry forward religious instruction on the old lines. With that view, they were to retain in their hands the appointment of teachers, subject to the veto of the local authorities, exercisable only on educational grounds, in regard to any individual selection.

The result has been that in the villages of England, while there has been a gradual levelling-up in respect of secular education where the staff had been defective in quality or deficient in strength, the essentially and

definitely religious character of the schools has been preserved. At the same time full security has been taken by the infusion of a public representative element into the boards of management, against the possibility of the continuance of any oppressive treatment of children not connected with the denomination to which the school was attached. Thus, in rural England, during the last three years, the type of school with which the people were familiar has been maintained, but with enhanced educational efficiency and with the removal of the liability to abuse on the part of the small minority of narrow-minded or overbearing clergy. In the towns, the working-classes have retained the choice of schools for their children which had generally existed since 1870, with the advantage that the level of secular education in denominational schools is rising, and probably has generally already risen to that common among the better of the publicly provided schools.

That, in these circumstances, the great majority of the electors at the January polls had any idea whatever of promoting radical alterations in the general character of the school arrangements familiar to them is a supposition altogether contrary to all that is known of the English temperament. But among a number of issues put forward by Liberal leaders and their followers, they heard, with a sympathy creditable to their sense of justice, the insistent claim that certain grievances alleged to have been inflicted on Nonconformists by the Education Act of 1902 should be removed. These grievances were mainly three—first, that felt by Nonconformist ratepayers who objected to being required to contribute to the support of schools in which religious teaching of types which they disapproved was maintained; secondly, that felt by Nonconformist teachers, who considered themselves unjustly debarred, on the ground of their religion, from entrance into a considerable proportion of what they affirmed to have become practically a branch of the home civil service; and thirdly, the grievance of the Nonconformist parent in the single-school areas, who might, in regard to the religious education of his child, have no choice between a type of teaching altogether alien to his feelings and no religious instruction at all.

These grievances varied in their cogency and pressure

in different districts. Only the first was new; and we must admit to being among those who have difficulty in following the conscientious distinction between paying rates and taxes respectively for the furtherance of objects of which one disapproves. Still, there can be no doubt that it is a real distinction to an appreciable number of upright and naturally law-abiding citizens who became 'passive resisters' under the Act of 1902. Whatever the inherent value of the distinction, there can be no doubt that Liberal candidates generally must be held to have undertaken that all excuse for 'passive resistance' on the part of Nonconformist ratepayers should be removed. Of the two other grievances—those of the Nonconformist teacher and the Nonconformist parent in some single-school areas—it is probable that the former has been more widely talked about, and the latter, in a limited number of cases, more keenly felt. These grievances, however, had been, not aggravated, but distinctly mitigated by the introduction of an elective element into the boards of managers through the Act of 1902.

The formula generally adopted by Liberal speakers with a view to guaranteeing the removal of all three types of Nonconformist grievance was the enforcement of complete and absolute popular control in all schools supported out of public moneys, with the abolition in such schools of all tests for teachers. We are not concerned to deny that formulas of that description have been uttered by the great majority of the members now sitting on the right of the Speaker's chair. But we maintain with entire confidence that, over the country at large, and to the mass of the electorate, the operation of that formula has never been explained; that in consequence it has not been accurately understood by them; and, further, that in places where the susceptibilities of the friends of the existing system were known to be particularly quick, means were carefully taken to disguise, to deny, or to limit the otherwise obviously intended operation of the formula.

For what is the unquestionable meaning, when taken in connexion with the provisions already referred to, of the Act of 1902 with regard to denominational schools? As we have shown, that Act conferred on the local authority complete control of the secular education given

in those schools. Not only is the control of the local authority as complete with regard to the secular curriculum, books, and so forth, in the denominational as in the Council schools, but it can veto (subject to an appeal to the Board of Education) the appointment of any teacher as to whose educational qualifications it is not satisfied. The one important power retained by the denominational school managers is that of selecting, subject to this veto of the local education authority, the teachers whom they consider best qualified to maintain the religious and moral character of the education given in the school. Unquestionably, if the formula already indicated was to be applied to this state of things, the result would be not a modification but a revolution in the character of the schools. The conversion of the control already exercised by the local education authority over secular education in the schools into the complete and absolute control required by the Liberal formula was therefore bound to mean, at least, the abolition of the majority of 'foundation managers' on the board of management in favour of a local representative majority. But further, the abolition-of-tests-for-teachers clause in the formula was bound to mean, what is much more revolutionary, that, even supposing a majority of a new local representative body of managers of, say, a Roman Catholic or a Church of England school were inclined, in appointing a teacher, to consider his fitness to carry on the traditions of the school, they should be absolutely debarred by statute from giving weight to any such consideration. In other words the Liberal formula, in its natural reading, meant the abolition of the definitely religious character of the present denominational schools.

Speaking generally, however, this fact, though sufficiently patent on any careful consideration, was not put forward on either side in such fashion as to be grasped by the electors. The details and even the principles of educational legislation have always been regarded as dull and heavy by English audiences. There were, however, some constituencies, particularly in Lancashire, where the result of the elections turned on the Roman Catholic vote, and where the leaders, clerical and lay, of that Church were sufficiently clear-sighted to recognise and to place before the voters of their faith the (from their point

of view) absolutely vital nature of the issues at stake. If, they pointed out, the Liberals came in on the cry which they had adopted in regard to education, the Roman Catholic schools, which had been kept going and made more efficient under the Act of 1902, would be swept away; and no means would exist for bringing up their children in the principles of their church. It was too dangerous to Liberal prospects, even in the full flood of Lancashire enthusiasm for the maintenance of free trade, to allow this to be believed.

Measures were accordingly taken, in several northern constituencies, to allay Roman Catholic fears. In the Chorley division of North Lancashire copies of a letter from the Marquis of Ripon were circulated, wishing success for the Liberal candidate. The publication of this letter was clearly intended to convey to the Roman Catholic voters the intimation that the 'Catholic Liberal leader in the House of Lords' was satisfied that, whatever settlement of the education question might be brought forward by the Liberal Government of which he was a member, the Roman Catholic schools would be safe. In that sense it was put forward and was worked in the Chorley division, but not successfully, for Lord Balcarrès defeated Mr Crawshay-Williams. This election was fought by the Unionists, as very few, if any, others in England were, on the education question primarily if not exclusively. The chairman of Lord Balcarrès' election committee, Sir Henry Hibbert, a Lancashire churchman and educationalist of justly great influence, made it his business to bring home to his neighbours the real meaning of the Liberal formula in regard to educational changes. In that division, a representative and typical Lancashire constituency, more than three-fourths of the elementary school places—i.e. 15,586 out of 19,395—are in schools founded by the Church of England and the Roman Catholics. All that was necessary to secure a majority in this constituency for the Unionist candidate was to make clear to the electors that the Liberal formula, however interpreted, really meant the loss of the schools with which they were familiar, and the substitution, at great cost, of schools as to the religious teaching in which no guarantee would be given.

There is good reason to believe that a similar result would have attended a similar policy elsewhere. Even as

it was, the anxieties of the Roman Catholics were keenly aroused; and the side on which their votes would be cast remained in an uncertainty very disquieting to the Liberal candidates in constituencies such as Salford, Burnley, and Preston until the very eve of the polls. Then there was put out, for the benefit of the Roman Catholic voters in these constituencies, as an authority qualified to express the purposes of the Government, the assurance that their schools were safe; and so an important contingent of suffrages was secured, and seats were won.

We have referred explicitly to cases as to which trustworthy information has been supplied to us; but there is no reason whatever to suppose that they are other than representative of what went on generally where the conditions were at all similar.

The above-mentioned facts and considerations throw an instructive light on the situation in which Ministers found themselves when they settled down to consider seriously what form their educational legislation should take. On the one hand, they and their followers generally had used formulas, the embodiment of which in legislation meant the abolition of denominational schools. On the other hand, the operative effect of these formulas had not been generally explained to the electors or realised by them; and in several important places, where the meaning had been partially realised, the Government had been pledged by its supporters, if not directly and in so many words by its members, to abstain, so far at any rate as the Roman Catholic schools were concerned, from giving any practical effect to the formulas in question. To fail at all generally in carrying out the expectations raised by the employment of those formulas among the political Nonconformists, who form the most coherent section of their heterogeneous host, would expose Ministers to bitter recriminations and to threats of extensive parliamentary defection. At the same time the repudiation of pledges such as those given to the Roman Catholic electors would be certain to be regarded, and on the earliest occasion punished, as treachery by voters of that Church. There was good reason to anticipate that the Irish Nationalist vote in the House of Commons would be, at any rate during the progress of any Education Bill, steadily thrown against any Government which was

generally regarded by Roman Catholics, Irish and English, as having treated them with insincerity and injustice.

This was a very awkward situation for the Government; and the difficulties on which we have touched do not by any means exhaust its perplexities. Ministers saw plainly enough that if they enacted that all voluntary schools should be undenominationalised, even though they discovered some device for enabling the Roman Catholics, and possibly the Jews, to escape the general doom, they would have to make provision either for taking over the buildings of the existing Church schools at a price, or for obtaining the use of them at a rental, unless, indeed, they decided to confiscate those schools, or erect other buildings in their place. Now the accommodation provided by Church schools alone was given in an official return dated August 31, 1902, as sufficient for 2,813,978 children, or within 150,000 of that provided by Board schools; and they had 2,328,455 children on their registers as against 2,778,127 in the Board schools. When the accommodation provided by non-Anglican voluntary schools was added in, the denominational totals considerably exceeded the total Board-school figures on the eve of the last great Education Act.

Now, the provision of considerably over 2,000,000 school places in lieu of those afforded by the Church schools alone would involve, at the moderate estimate of 14*l.* a year, a capital charge of thirty millions sterling. On March 29, less than a fortnight before the day on which he actually introduced his Education Bill, Mr Birrell was reported to have said, in reply to a deputation from the Welsh National Liberal Council, which urged upon him the duty of standing firmly to the Liberal election formulas, that 'the question of the non-provided schools was not quite so clear as it would be, were it plain that the local authorities were ready and willing to provide, at their own expense, accommodation for the children who at present went to these schools.' This plainly meant that the non-provided schools could not be quietly appropriated without payment, and that the Chancellor of the Exchequer did not see his way to providing such payment as the first large financial transaction of a Government which had come in on the pledge, among others, to reduce the national expenditure; and there-

fore that the local authorities would have to pay for the luxury of undenominationalising the voluntary schools if they wished to enjoy it.

The speech of the President of the Board of Education in introducing the Bill on April 9 was, in spite of some faults of taste, not devoid of oratorical power or of those literary graces which he has at command. It was probably intended to be conciliatory, but it made the impression that Mr Birrell was conscious of having been overruled by his colleagues and forced to expound an essentially unjust policy; and that, as is, curiously enough, natural in such circumstances, he was disposed to visit his irritation upon those who would be the victims of the injustice he was about to perpetrate. Thus at the very outset of his speech he exhibited, or feigned, a total inability to understand the point of view of those who hold—as he and his colleagues will, we believe, find cause to know, that the majority of their countrymen hold—that the element of definiteness in religious teaching, and the spiritual and moral influence of those teachers who can honestly impart such teaching, are of absolutely vital importance to a sound education. With that air of indifferentist superiority, which he must excuse us for saying that no gift in epigram will avail to make other than offensive, he lamented that the crowded House before him could not be supposed to have met for the discussion of ‘some of the more important aspects of this question,’ such as ‘the breed and rearing, the health and the happiness of seven millions of our children; how best to train them up cleanly in body, mind, and speech.’ By no other form of words could the President of the Board of Education have more emphatically declared the disqualification of himself and those for whom he speaks for meting out, not generous consideration, but the barest justice to those Christian Englishmen who, between the Act of 1870 and that of 1902, had given between thirteen and fourteen millions sterling, besides free sites for the building, enlarging, or improving of schools, and had subscribed sums reaching latterly over 700,000*l.* a year, in order to secure that the Christian faith, as they had received it, should be imparted to the children of those parents who desired it. The same

people, it may be added, since the Act of 1902, which relieved them of the charge for ordinary school maintenance, have raised and spent over the country at large sums aggregating, probably, little short of a million sterling, for clearing off debts and meeting the demands of local educational authorities for the improvement and enlargement of school buildings, in order to retain these opportunities for definite religious instruction which, on just terms, that great measure secured to them.

To Mr Birrell, or at any rate to the present President of the Board of Education speaking as such, these efforts appear to have been put forth for insignificant and barely intelligible objects, except—let us do the minister justice—in the case of Roman Catholics and possibly Jews. He was moved, at any rate, to something like fervour when speaking of the sacrifices made by Roman Catholics in this country for the educational and religious needs of their fellow-believers. They do indeed deserve generous acknowledgment. But it is, at the first blush, more than a little strange that they should be treated as constituting a reason for placing the Roman Catholics in a position of exceptional though, we admit, highly precarious privilege as compared with that offered by the legislation now projected to the members of the reformed Church of England. Or rather, we should say, it would seem strange were it not notoriously the fact that the compact body of political Nonconformists are and always have been mainly bent on the reduction of the Church of England from her position as the Church of the nation, and regard any means as good enough for the promotion of that end.

It is under their inspiration, qualified by a desire to avoid, if possible, exciting Roman Catholic wrath by the too open disregard of the pledges given by Liberal candidates, where voters of that faith were not a negligible quantity, that the Bill of the Government has been produced. The Bill is therefore a revolutionary project so far as Church schools are concerned. From January 1, 1908, if this measure should pass into law, no school will be 'recognised as a public elementary school unless it is a school provided by the local education authority.' This principle is to apply theoretically everywhere, but in practice it is to be subjected in 'urban areas'—which

include the county of London and any borough or urban district having in either case a population exceeding 5000—to mitigations, at the pleasure of the local education authority, which are avowedly designed in the special interest of Roman Catholics and Jews. To these mitigations we will presently return. But the first and most conspicuous effect of the Bill will be to abolish Church schools, as such, throughout the whole of rural England, and, with possibly a few rare exceptions, throughout urban England also, and to substitute for them schools of which the teachers will be allowed to teach only undenominational religion, the essential features of which will be determined from time to time by the local education authority. The buildings, it is expected, will, in the great majority of cases, be those in which the work of Church schools has hitherto been carried on; and various clauses of the Bill are designed to secure that they shall become available for this purpose.

To that end it is first provided in clauses 2 and 3 that the local education authority may agree with the owners of a school-house of any voluntary school for the purchase or hire of such building for the purposes of a public elementary school; and that a condition of such agreement may be the giving of facilities for denominational religious instruction at the beginning of two school-days in the week. Further, under clause 12, there is to be a parliamentary grant of a million pounds a year, apparently with a view to enabling the local education authority to meet the charges arising in connexion with such bargains. The combined effect of these clauses might seem, if they stood by themselves, to be the placing of the owners of voluntary schools in a position to make free bargains with the local education authorities in regard to the use of their buildings, on pecuniary terms bearing some not unreasonable relation to the essential change to be effected in the character of the schools, and to secure genuine facilities for the continuance of definite religious teaching under favourable conditions.

But it is a peculiar note of this Bill to take away with one hand what it purports to be giving with the other. In the first place, the present structural expenditure on the Church schools must be nearly 750,000*l.* a year; and it may be assumed that this will be the first charge

upon the above-mentioned million. This will leave very little for payment of rent or other financial arrangements as contemplated in clause 2. In the second place, it must be remembered that the strength of a bargainer depends upon his ability to say that, if the terms which he deems necessary are not accepted by the other party, the bargain cannot be completed. Now, if the owners of voluntary schools were able to say that they would close their buildings if fair terms were not made with them, so that the local education authority would have to erect other buildings, the latter would be under a powerful inducement to offer satisfactory conditions as to money and as to 'facilities' for denominational teaching. But two clauses, 8 and 11, appear to have been carefully devised so as to deprive the possible vendors or lessors of any such freedom.

Under clause 8 the education authority is empowered, if the owners of a voluntary school held under charitable trusts—as are the great majority of Church schools—should not have come to terms with it by January 1, 1907, to bring them before a Commission to be appointed under the Bill, which Commission is empowered to determine, if it thinks fit, that 'the use of the school-house for the purpose of a public elementary school by the local education authority in accordance with this Act is the best mode of giving effect to the trusts,' and to enforce upon the owners such terms as it thinks just. The Triumvirate created and empowered by clauses 8 and 9 to frame schemes for giving effect to the trusts is a body of almost unlimited authority; its schemes are to have the force of an Act of Parliament; though there is no security that there shall be a lawyer on it, it is to have 'all such powers, rights, and privileges as are vested in any of his Majesty's courts of law'; and 'no court shall have power to review or interfere with its proceedings in any way.' Is it safe to entrust such absolute and despotic powers, affecting property now vested in Church trustees, or bequeathed (it may be) yesterday for specific purposes which this Bill is designed to pass by, to a body of three persons, appointed by and holding office at the will of the Government of the day? Has there been any such body in existence in this country since the Court of High Commission?

If, by any chance, this procedure should not be suffi-

ciently rapid or sure, it is further provided under clause 11 that an existing voluntary school shall not be closed at any time between the passing of the Act and January 1, 1908, except with the sanction of the Board of Education; and that, if the managers of any such school, where no such sanction is given, should be unwilling or should fail to carry on the school during that period, the local education authority may carry on the school as a school provided by them until January 1, 1909. Further, if no arrangement is come to in the case of a school held under charitable trusts, the local authority may, under clause 10, take the school-house, without payment, and use it as a public elementary school for a year from January 1, 1908. The combined effect of these clauses, as it appears to us, is so to cripple the bargaining power of the owners of voluntary schools at the critical period as to place them practically at the mercy of one or more hostile authorities.

But further, even supposing that the owners of voluntary schools should be able, in most cases, to make something approaching to fair pecuniary terms with the local educational authority, and to retain the facilities for denominational teaching on two mornings indicated as reasonable by the Bill, it is expressly laid down under clause 7 that the teachers of the staff of the school shall not be allowed to give any but undenominational religious instruction. This is a disabling clause of an astoundingly unjust character. It means, as the Archbishop of Canterbury has well pointed out in his letter to the secretary of the National Society, the 'compulsory silencing' of 'thousands of trained, qualified, and devoted teachers, who prize the privilege of imparting this particular instruction.' It is a most unwarrantable hardship upon them; and it is a very grave injury inflicted upon some two millions of children, who are to be deprived, upon the most vital matters, of the efficient teaching to which they are accustomed, and left to take their chance of the ability of the denominations concerned to provide a special corps of visiting religious teachers. These latter cannot possibly be expected to command that unchallenged respect and attention which the children give as a matter of course to those who are regularly in charge.

This gratuitous hardship to the existing teachers in denominational schools, this patent and deplorable loss

to the children therein, are the price to be paid for the worship of that foreign idol, equality. The rights of the existing teachers and the interests of the children for all time are to be sacrificed to the interests of a minority of the teaching body and to the cry of 'no tests for teachers.' For if it were admitted that teachers on the staff of a school might suitably be allowed to give, if they were willing, the denominational instruction to be permitted in transferred schools on two mornings a week, it would be recognised that on the appointment of successors to existing teachers the question might be reasonably raised whether they would be qualified by belief to give that instruction. Such enquiries, it appears, could not be tolerated by the Free Church Councils, at any rate in the case of schools which have been provided at great cost by members of the Church of England; and, to gratify them, those schools are to be treated as if they had been established and now existed for the purpose of providing a professional career for a few hundreds of young men and women, instead of for the building up of Christian character in millions of children.

This amazing rule, however, is not to apply absolutely all round. In urban areas, under clause 4, a local education authority is empowered, though not required, to afford 'extended facilities' for denominational religious instruction in transferred schools if an application is made to them for such extended facilities by the parents of at least twenty children in a school; and if they are satisfied, after holding a public local inquiry, (a) that the parents of at least four-fifths of the children attending the school desire these facilities, and (b) that there is public school accommodation in the neighbourhood for the children of parents with other views. Further, when extended facilities are so afforded, the local education authority 'may also, if they think fit, permit the teachers employed in the school to give the instruction desired, but not at the expense of the authority.'

The unfair differentiation here undisguisedly intended between parents and children belonging to the Roman Catholic and Jewish persuasions on the one hand, and those of the Church of England on the other, will not escape observation because of the inadequacy, and even futility, of the provision taken for putting the preferential

policy into effect. The Roman Catholics and Jews are to a large extent massed in certain urban quarters, and are undoubtedly concentrated in certain schools to an extent which would make the four-fifths condition readily applicable in the case of very many, perhaps most, of the schools in which they are specially interested. On the other hand, the proportion of Church of England schools in urban districts to which it would apply is very small. In the country districts it is probably considerable; but there the four-fifths condition does not apply. It is impossible to conceive anything more arbitrary, illiberal, and reactionary than this attempt, in a strongly Protestant House of Commons, 350 years after the Reformation, to establish peculiar educational privileges for Jews and Roman Catholics, while practically denying them to members of the Established Church. It is impossible, we say, unless indeed it is still more absurd that liberty of conscience should in these days become a matter of locality and numerical proportion—that a system of religious teaching should be forbidden in a rural parish which is permitted in an urban one adjoining; or that facilities may be enjoyed by a community forming 80 per cent. in one urban district, which are denied to a community forming 79 per cent. in another district in the same town.

Apart from the character of this concession, the means taken to secure it are feeble and inept. The local authority is not in the least bound to afford 'extended facilities' on application being made to it. It may disregard the expressed wishes of the parents of twenty or of two hundred children, and may decline to hold the local enquiry, or, having held it, may decline to act upon it. This is 'local option' with a vengeance, applied to the most sacred concerns. Further, it is to be observed that, supposing, through any partial shifting of the population, the proportion of Roman Catholics attending a given school dropped from four-fifths to three-fourths, the privilege allowed to both teachers and children in it might be—indeed apparently must be—withdrawn, in which case undenominational religion would become the only form of faith capable of being taught by members of its staff. Is it likely that the Roman Catholics, or any other body of persons setting any value on a particular form of religion, will accept a concession of so precarious a nature, depen-

dent, at the outset, on the goodwill of an elective body whose members may be heathens for all the Bill cares, and subsequently on the casual migrations of perhaps half a dozen pauper families.

Again, as the members of the staff of a transferred Roman Catholic school in an urban area retire or die, the local education authority will be disabled by clause 7 from making membership of the Roman Catholic Church a condition of appointment to the vacancies. Therefore, in theory at any rate, the members of the staff of a transferred Roman Catholic school might become mainly Non-conformists or even unbelievers; and security could only be taken against this by intimations from the Board of Education to the local education authority—which again the latter might disregard—that their conduct would be approved if in practice they ignored the letter of clause 7 in order to carry out the real meaning of clause 4. In conditions like these every municipal election would of necessity turn on the religious-education question; the *odium theologicum* would be imported wholesale into local politics; and every other consideration of fitness for office or the reverse would give way to the paramount question, whether the candidate would favour the grant of 'extended facilities' or not. A pleasant and fruitful prospect indeed for the municipalities of the land! A Bill ostensibly designed to put an end to religious rancour in educational matters is seen to perpetuate it, nay more, to extend its pernicious action to fields hitherto in the main exempt.

Finally, we must ask, what provision is there for any kind of religious teaching in public elementary schools if Mr Birrell's measure becomes law? Mr Birrell, in his speech introducing the Bill, professed a holy horror of secularism, and declared that the people of this country are determined not to banish religion from the schools. It is assumed, in clause 3 and elsewhere, that the ordinary religious teaching in provided and transferred schools not enjoying 'extended facilities' will be such as is 'permitted under sect. 14 of the Elementary Education Act, 1870.' So far so good. We are of opinion—though we are well aware that some good men differ from us here—that Board-school religion is better than none; but what security have we that even this shall be instilled? By clause 7 (2) 'a teacher employed in a public elementary

school shall not be required, as part of his duties, to give any religious instruction.' There is nothing, therefore, to prevent all the teachers in any school declining to give even the religious instruction contemplated in the Bill; and except where, in the case of transferred schools, arrangements have been made for 'special religious instruction' on two days a week, no religion at all will be taught. In the provided schools at present existing, where no provision for 'special religious instruction' by extraneous teachers is allowed to be made, a religious strike of this nature will absolutely, and without any remedy, secularise the school; while, in the schools enjoying 'extended facilities,' it might any day render these facilities nugatory. Mr Masterman protested against the Bill as endowing a particular form of religion. The endowment is one of little value. He is very likely to see his wishes realised in a large number of schools, where another variety of local option—this time in the hands of, it may be, two or three teachers—will decide whether education in any school is to be secular or not.

We have no space to consider other parts of the Bill, but enough has been said to exhibit the character of a measure which, as the Primate has shown, is 'in principle unjust,' and which may be truly stated to have no other relation to principle whatever. Essentially arbitrary in its differential treatment of the members of different Churches, and even of the members of the same Church in town and country, it would destroy the existing character of some fourteen thousand schools which have a deep hold on the affections of the working-classes. It might or might not provide Roman Catholic and Jewish schools with a position in itself more or less approximately just, but of which, if secured to them, the refusal to Church schools would be a gross injustice. This injustice would be felt with special acuteness in those parts of the country where, as in Lancashire, the provision made for the public need in respect of elementary education by the Roman Catholics and the Church of England respectively appears in juxtaposition. In this connexion a few figures will be found not uninteresting.

Of the total provision of 212,939 school-places existing in Lancashire, close upon 105,000 have been provided by the

Church of England, against 37,313 provided by the Roman Catholics. Of the remainder, 16,483 places only have been provided by the County Council, while as many as 19,457 have been provided by the Wesleyans, 26,532 by Baptists, Congregationalists, and other Nonconformists, and 18,888 by the British schools. It may probably be assumed that the friends of the schools in the two last categories would not be unwilling, if they were treated fairly in the matter of buildings, to acquiesce in the reduction of the religious teaching to the level of undenominationalism. But there would be no such readiness on the part of the friends of the Church of England schools or of the parents of the children attending them; and the same is probably true in regard to the Wesleyan schools. What then could be, on the face of it, more glaringly inequitable than a measure which allowed 14,246 children, the average attendance at the Roman Catholic schools, to continue receiving in schools maintained out of public money full instruction in accordance with the tenets of their church, while the more than 85,000 children in average attendance at the Anglican and Wesleyan schools in the same or neighbouring towns and villages were deprived of the right to be taught their respective faiths by the teachers who they know and respect?

In many parts of the country, where Roman Catholics are very few in number, the injustice of the contrast involved in this preferential treatment of Roman Catholic schools in a Protestant country would not be so conspicuous as in extensive areas of the north. But the facts would nevertheless be realised, and it is difficult to conceive that they would long be tolerated. Nothing can be further from the truth than the idea put about by a few writers like Canon Henson that the parents of children now attending Church schools would be contentedly fobbed off with the provision for their children of a type or types of Christianity agreed upon as non-ecclesiastical or fundamental by the local education authority. Parents of the working-classes recognise quite as clearly as those belonging to any other walk in life, if not more so, the difference between an educational system of which it is an essential feature that the dominating influence in the school is that of a Christian believer, who, being such, is certain to be attached to some

church or other, and a system as to which the one thing certain is that the principal teachers need believe nothing. The distinction is recognised with absolute clearness among the industrial population of the north. There is to be found among them genuine enthusiasm for their Church schools, which by prolonged sacrifices they have built and maintained, and therefore look on as their own. Even since the Act of 1902 they have raised much money for the discharge of old obligations and the satisfaction of the requirements of the local education authorities in regard to alterations and extensions of the fabrics. What doubt, for example, can be thrown on the genuineness of the feeling for the Church schools shown in a large manufacturing village in the West Riding where, in various ways, among a population consisting almost entirely of mill-hands and small tradespeople, some 600*l.* have been raised on their behalf in the years 1902-5? And this is only one of many similar communities in which, in the absence of wealthy inhabitants, or the wealthier members being Nonconformists, the Church schools represent the genuine and abiding conviction of the working weavers, spinners, miners, and engineers, that a definitely religious education is a primary need of their children.

Nor, as a matter of fact, is the feeling by any means confined to Church people and Roman Catholics. The formulas of the Free Church Councils, which, as already remarked, were lately reasserted in a menacing fashion in view of apprehensions that the Government was not going to fulfil the expectations of its Liberationist supporters, meant, as we have pointed out, that in no schools maintained out of public moneys was there to be any attempt to guarantee that any teacher believed anything. But Nonconformists of this type are, mercifully, only a section, and it is very doubtful indeed whether they are a majority, of those Protestants who are outside the Church of England. Certain it is, at any rate, that in the West Riding, where, if anywhere, Nonconformity is robust, large numbers have been freely signing petitions to the President of the Board of Education or to Parliament for the preservation in the day-schools of the teaching of the Bible and the Church Catechism during school hours by those who believe in what they teach.

Nor is there any reason to doubt that a similar attach-

ment to the Church schools, as such, prevails among the great mass of the working population of the south of England. There are probably fewer cases in the villages of the south than of the north where the schools have been mainly the product of the zeal and self-sacrifice of working people belonging to the Church. More generally they have owed their foundation and, for the larger part, their maintenance to the generosity of the country gentry and the clergy. But none the less is their value appreciated by the labouring population for whose benefit they were created, and have been through successive generations maintained. Their disappearance in their present character would be generally regarded as an unqualified disaster to the religious and moral life of the countryside; and, as the flood of petitions from parents now pouring into Whitehall shows, the vital value of sincere and definite religious teaching is fully recognised by the rural classes for whose benefit it has so long been supplied.

Equally strong, we may be well assured, is the feeling among the working-classes of London as to the importance of retaining the element of inspiration and of uplift afforded by the denominational schools in the elementary education system of this colossal human congeries. No one who pays any attention to the problems of metropolitan life can have forgotten the ample recognition offered in the report of a special committee of the London County Council of the high qualities of tone and order which they found generally characterising the denominational schools, in spite of the disadvantages caused by the inadequate proportions and defective arrangements of buildings which the special conditions of the metropolitan area made it difficult, if not impossible, to remedy. If this tribute was offered by a committee suffering at least from no prejudice in favour of denominational schools, then we may be very sure, even if there were not abundant positive evidence of the fact, that, while the Board or Council schools have no doubt created a constituency to which, with full confidence they appeal, the denominational schools are recognised by extensive and important sections of the working-classes in London as constituting an influence of the utmost value.

We may therefore expect to see in all parts of the

country, urban and rural, a strenuous agitation against the Education Bill of the Government. There are already signs that its perversity, injustice, and want of principle, and the heavy charge which it will, in any case, throw upon public funds for objects which, as we have endeavoured to show, are totally uncongenial to the prevailing English temper, are arousing and consolidating a vast mass of hostile feeling. It is felt that, instead of merely removing Nonconformist grievances, for which churchmen would have been and would now be ready to go far, the Bill creates new injustice on a colossal scale. There is the injustice, already referred to, involved in the gagging of the existing denominational teachers, and the crippling of their influence for good with the children who know and respect them. There is the injustice inflicted on denominational ratepayers, who are now to be forced to pay everywhere for a type of religious teaching as to the quality of which they can have no kind of guarantee, and which they may regard as profoundly unsatisfactory, while they are not even to be allowed the compensating right of entry, for the type of teaching which they believe in, into half the schools of the land. The Bill has not even the merit which Mr Birrell claimed for it, of unifying the existing system. On the contrary, it creates three distinct classes of schools, differentiated by the nature of the religious teaching allowed. Instead of creating unity, it substitutes a triple classification for the dual system now existing, and bases the division—which is a variable one into the bargain—on local situation and arithmetical caprice.

It is impossible that such a system can afford even a temporary settlement. It will, on the contrary, unsettle everything. It must be resisted strenuously on its merits and for itself. And it must be resisted, if possible, more strenuously still as the reconnaissance in force for that great attack on the establishment of the Church of England for which the most militant section of the party in power are always keeping themselves in training, and on which any slackness in resistance to Mr Birrell's Bill would encourage them to enter at no distant date with high hopes of success.

Nor is it only in its educational aspects that the Education Bill breathes a revolutionary air. By a side

wind it appears to aim at bringing in a very large instalment of the policy which has been known as 'Home Rule all round.' We refer, of course, to the clause (37) empowering his Majesty to establish, by Order in Council, a central authority for Wales, to be called the Council of Wales, consisting of members appointed by the councils of counties and county boroughs, and of boroughs and urban districts with a population of over 25,000. To this council, which is to supply and aid the supply of education of all kinds in Wales, it is proposed to hand over—subject to any exceptions which his Majesty may make by Order in Council, and which, under the advice of the present Ministry, are likely to be of little or no importance—the powers and duties of the Board of Education, and the administration of any money which is granted by Parliament in respect of education and science and art in Wales, with the exception of that granted to universities and university colleges.

We are quite prepared to recognise the zeal and energy which have been exhibited by Welshmen in connexion with the development of intermediate and university education, but no similar acknowledgment is due in regard to elementary education. On the contrary, the only circumstance in that connexion which at all specially marks the recent history of Wales is the administrative insurrection against the Education Act of 1902, which was organised and carried on with an equally flagrant disregard for the authority of Parliament and for the interests, physical, moral, and intellectual, of the unhappy children concerned. To reward conduct of that description by the grant of practically entire autonomy in the administrative sphere affected by the revolt is a sufficiently singular method of stimulating the orderly and humane use of existing powers of local government in other parts of the United Kingdom. If this is an example of the spirit in which experiments towards 'devolution' may be expected to be made it is difficult not to feel that disintegration may set in early and make rapid progress.

The serious constitutional innovation involved in the Welsh Council project is, however, no more gratuitous than the earlier clauses of the Education Bill, on which we have commented more fully. Disturbance on a great

scale, accompanied by an astonishing disregard of the plainest principles of equity and liberty, is offered as the remedy for grievances which, so far as they are real and deserving to be taken into account, might have been, and might now be, dealt with by much simpler and less subversive methods. The demand for the abolition of religious tests for teachers we hold to be inherently irrational, as involving the permanent sacrifice of the interests of the subjects of education to those of its instruments—a deliberate exaltation of means at the expense of ends. But the grievances of Nonconformist ratepayers and Nonconformist parents could certainly be remedied, and ought to be remedied, without creating wider and deeper grievances—without striking a blow at the whole spiritual future of our people, and without extending and perpetuating the influence of religious controversy in our municipal life.

The remedy does not lie in any of those directions, but in the adoption and adaptation to English circumstances and requirements of some principle like the allocation of rates by members of different religious bodies to separate schools maintained by their own bodies, which is in force in Canada; or like the special provision of religious instruction for minorities, at local and national charges, adopted in Prussia. With some arrangement of one of these kinds, which, over large parts of England, might include the proportioning of teachers on the staff of schools to the local strength of the principal religious bodies to be considered, peace might be permanently established. Practically, as Sir John Gorst has pointed out, freedom, justice, and equality can be really secured only by making it a statutory requirement that religious teaching should be available for every child in accordance with its parents' wishes. Towards that goal we ought to work; and it is not impossible that the very badness of the Government Bill may bring about such an awakening and such an instruction of public thought on this great question as may some day cause this lamentable measure, as the Bishop of Birmingham suggests, to be looked upon as having been a blessing in disguise.

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